Uldall's Defence of Count Struensee.
The command which his Majesty the King most graciously sent to me on March 23, orders me to conduct this cause in a responsible manner, and according to the law, on behalf of Count Struensee.
It is this duty which I shall now strive to fulfil with all the moderation which the count owes to his judges in his defence.
Among the unfortunate circumstances which beset him at the present moment, there is one which is the more painful to him, because it was unexpected. This circumstance is, that the Fiscal General tries to render all the count's actions contemptible and ridiculous.
That everything should be converted into a motive for finding him guilty is a natural, though unfortunate, result of the situation in which he finds himself placed. But that his external situation, his origin, and his first position; his mode of thinking, even in instances where it was correct, should be subjected to mockery—against this, at least, he believed himself to be protected, if not out of compassion for an unfortunate man, at any rate on account of the favour which the king had formerly shown him, and in consideration of the applause which his Majesty granted to the political principles in accordance with which he, the count, acted.
There is hardly a circumstance, however insignificant it may be, which has not been employed by the Fiscal General for the purpose of rendering Count Struensee odious.
He is called a foreigner, although through the appointment of his father as superintendent in Holstein, in Struensee's youth, the latter became a royal subject. That he was not possessed of the Danish language is certainly a defect, which, however, has also been found in other ministers, although it has never before been constituted a state crime.
If he had a share in the cabinet order which limits the granting of "characters," and which is still in existence, I believe that no patriot ever denied, or does deny, its necessity and advantage, and if the character of a councilor of justice was not fitted for a mathematician, as the count's brother was, this cannot be charged against Count Struensee, because his brother had been Justiz-rath long before he came here.
Even to religion, the only consolation left him in his misfortune, he is not considered worthy to possess it.
It would lead too far were I to examine everything which has in such a way been brought forward without ground in the Fiscal General's indictment. Everybody knows that this mode of conviction, rendering a cause ridiculous and odious, is not conclusive, because there is nothing which cannot be rendered ridiculous in one way or the other; and, moreover, most of the Fiscal General's imputations exceed that which, by the king's command, is to be discussed before this commission.
Count Struensee is to be charged and convicted for crimes against the laws of the land, and it is in this I have to defend him. As such, the Fiscal General alleges nine various chief points, which are said to be equally as many crimes of high treason. But as all these charges generally either concern the state arrangements, and the form and administration of the government, or are crimes against the person of his Majesty the King and members of the royal house, I will give my answers to them after the above divisions.
The first charge brought against Count Struensee, is the cabinet decree of July 14, 1771, and the authority delivered to him by it.
In order to convict him of audacity in this, the Fiscal General employs two different grounds: partly, Count Struensee's impudence in mixing himself up, though a physician, in affairs of state, and in abolishing the council, whence disorder in the affairs, oppression of the nation and the nobility, and a decrease of the prosperity of the capital, are said to have emanated: partly, that the power which he obtained was royal, as he formed resolutions, and signed in the king's name, and had it in his power to lay before the king the objections sent in against the cabinet decrees, or not to do so, which is said to be opposed to articles 3 and 26 of the Lex Regia, in which such a possession of power is declared to be treason.
It appears as if the first of the grounds alleged by the Fiscal General exceeds his competency to examine, and that of the commission to decide. For, as the share which Count Struensee had in affairs only emanated from the king's will, Count Struensee cannot be rendered responsible for this, because the consequences must revert to his Majesty.
An investigation, whether Count Struensee ought to give the king advice in affairs of state, and what results this advice had, is in reality an examination as to how his Majesty established the government; and Count Struensee cannot be called to account for the advice he gave, as it met with the king's approval. Still I do not see how this can be made a crime on the part of Count Struensee. It is certainly true that his original position did not seem to promise the dignity which he eventually acquired. But history offers many instances of such elevation, and, if the king fancied he deserved it, was not Struensee at liberty to accept it?
The form of the council is no material portion of the Danish constitution. That the king was dissatisfied with its arrangement, is visible from many passages in the examination; and there can be no better proof of this than that his Majesty signed the decree of its abolition with his own hand. Even though Count Struensee advised it, we find from Count Brandt's explanation to quest. 18, that several persons considered his sentiments correct, and that the plan was that the colleges should be heard in ordinary cases, and commissions in extraordinary affairs, the final decision being left to the king; so that it cannot be asserted that the royal power was thus rendered greater or less than it should be according to the Lex Regia.
For a belief that affairs consequently were carried on with less vigour than before, or that the nation was unequally oppressed by the promotion of foreigners, neither the documents nor experience afford a reason.
No other noble was prohibited from appearing at court except Count Laurvig (Ahlefeldt Laurvig), who had met with the same fate once before; and if several nobles retired to their estates, and Copenhagen suffered through the declension of luxury, this may be ascribed to the hard times rather than other causes.
If we were to examine the matter politically, the prosperity of the two kingdoms could hardly be sought in the size of Copenhagen, and the value of its buildings. Nor do I believe that the wise king, Frederick IV., when he laid on Copenhagen a consumption tax double that of the other cities in the country, so much intended the increase of his revenues, as to prevent the too rapid growth of a single city, which would at last attract to it all the sources of a livelihood. France and England have long complained that their capitals insensibly swallowed up everything; and experience has shown that the Duc de Sully reasoned correctly, when he, in order to prevent this, decided that those French nobles who were not employed in the public service should sooner serve the state and themselves by good management of their estates, than ruin themselves and other families by indolence and extravagance.
As regards the second of the Fiscal General's grounds—Count Struensee's authority—it cannot be denied that his Majesty the King was at liberty to grant his confidence to whom he pleased, and decide to what extent he should confer it on Count Struensee.
The decree of July 14, 1771, states that the cabinet minister shall draw up the commands which the king gives him verbally, and either lay them before the king for signature, or issue them in the king's name with the seal of the cabinet, after which they shall be obeyed by every one.
It is not, therefore, the person of the cabinet minister, but the orders given him by his Majesty himself, and which the king makes known through him, that acquire value through this order.
The cabinet was nothing else but the king himself, and Count Struensee was so far from apprehending that he should be confounded with it, that, whenever any one wrote to him as cabinet minister on business matters, he answered that application must be made to the cabinet or the king. He especially remembers that this was the case with General Huth. In the cabinet nothing took place, and not the slightest order was issued from it save under royal authority. The king saw and heard everything that was sent in from the colleges or elsewhere; and himself gave the decision, sometimes in writing, sometimes verbally. Nothing could escape his Majesty's attention, because affairs were repeatedly brought before him: first, when the cabinet order was issued; secondly, when the report was sent in about it by the persons concerned; and, lastly, when the weekly extract of the cabinet orders was approved. Everything was done in the king's name. His Majesty signed the decree in question with his own hand, and from his own most gracious motu proprio appointed Count Struensee cabinet minister.
Just as there cannot lie in this the slightest supposition of a surprise, so we cannot see in it any encroachment on the royal authority. It seems, therefore, as if Count Struensee were reproached more for what might have happened than for what really did happen, for the Fiscal General dwells more particularly on the danger which was to be apprehended, in the event of the count misusing the king's confidence in issuing other orders than those which the king gave him.
In order to prevent this, it is said the Lex Regia has commanded the king to sign everything himself, and declared any man guilty of encroachment on the king's supremacy who appropriated any function opposed to this. But I trust I shall have no difficulty in proving that this reasoning is incorrect. How most unfair a law would be that punished a man because he possessed the opportunity for sinning, although he never made an attempt to take advantage of the opportunity! Hence Count Struensee cannot be punished because he might possibly have misused the king's confidence, unless it is notorious that he did so.
The royal law never desired such a thing, for the two articles quoted from it do not agree with it. It is true that article 7 orders that all letters on business of the government shall be issued in no other name but the king's, and under his seal, and that he must sign himself, if he has attained his majority (his fourteenth year). Furthermore, it is true that article 26, states that the man who acquires anything which might encroach on the king's authority shall be regarded as an insulter of his Majesty. But what is it that Count Struensee acquired, and which was injurious to the king's supremacy? The count cannot be accused of this by the first part of article 7 of the Lex Regia; for no one will deny that the letters and decrees of the government were issued in the king's name. But if it be true that his Majesty did not always himself sign the cabinet decrees, it must be remembered that this point concerns his Majesty, and no one else. It is clear that Count Struensee cannot be made accountable because it did not always please his Majesty to sign, and that the royal authority has suffered, or could suffer, no encroachment, as it was dependent on the king's will whether he would sign an order himself, or specially command Count Struensee to sign it in his Majesty's name.
To this argument must be added, that the Lex Regia does not regard it as an important part of or an insult to the royal authority to sign in the king's name, for article 9 prescribes that the regents should sign in the event of the king's minority, although article 13 orders them to take oath that they will maintain the supremacy uninjured, an oath which would be contradictory if the signature formed a material part of the supremacy: that, consequently, the Lex Regia, like other states, for instance, France and Spain, regards the expedition, and not the signature, as the true symbol of supremacy. Formerly this was understood in such a way, as both the colleges and other royal officials, in many instances, made the king's will known, and still do so, in his name, but without his signature. Nor did any one represent to Count Struensee that it was a thing contrary to the Lex Regia to do so. And, lastly, his Majesty's own special order of July 14, 1771, is sufficient to remove the responsibility from him, even if there were a crime in doing so, as it was only in accordance with his Majesty's commands, and to prove his most submissive obedience to the king's will that he acted thus, and were it otherwise, no one would be secured by a royal order.
The Fiscal General, in points 5, 6, and 7, of his indictment, brings forward several charges, in order to prove that Count Struensee really misapplied the king's confidence in his signature. Of these instances, the one referring to the dismissal of the body-guard is the first, and it is even supposed that it was based on dangerous designs.
What was really the motive for this operation, namely, that the Guards were in many respects injurious to the army, is seen both from Count Struensee's answers and from the documents, to which he appeals in his own memorial.
That it was done, however, without his Majesty's knowledge, or that the latter was surprised by it, is, according to Count Struensee's assurance, incorrect. As regards the cabinet order of December 21, concerning the reduction, he positively remembers having read it to the king before it was sent off; and further, that the king approved of it with his own signature, after the college had sent in an appeal against it; and his Majesty himself signed the order of December 24, for dismissal, before it was sent to Lieutenant-General von Gähler, as it was generally reported that the Guards refused to obey the first order.
As to the crime said to have been committed in omitting several of the extracts from the cabinet decrees in this week, so that the king might approve of the two concerning the body-guard, I do not understand it, as his Majesty would sooner be surprised by a long report than by a short extract, and the answers of Panning and Morack (the cabinet secretaries) prove that this error must be ascribed to them rather than to Struensee.
The second charge concerns the presents which Count Struensee is said to have procured for himself and others, and more especially the forgery which is said to have been committed in the accounts of the special treasury for the months of April and May, 1771. As concerns the gratifications, it is sufficient for Struensee's defence that the king himself granted or approved of them, and Count Struensee is of opinion that, if compared with those given on former occasions, they will not be found extraordinary. As regards the falsification, he learns to his deep grief that even his Majesty himself appears to bear witness against him. But, as he solemnly asserts in his memorial that he was never guilty of such things, he also hopes that he will be permitted to quote the circumstances serving to prove his innocence.
The Fiscal General employs two suppositions to prove this forgery, namely, that a cipher was added to each of the two amounts of 6,000 dollars, and that the gratification for Falckenskjold was inserted at a later date. But that this is not correct is proved by the document itself, in which the figures of all the four amounts and Falckenskjold's name are written with the same ink as the approbation, without mentioning that his Majesty (if we compare the document with the approval of other calculations written afterwards) must have signed higher up, if the line concerning Falckenskjold had not existed at the time when the royal signature was appended. It is true that the adding up seems to be written with a different ink, and the figure 3 in the 132,000 dollars to have been first a 2. But the former is of no consequence when it is remarked, that the adding up took place after the approval had been given, while the latter could easily occur through an error in casting up, as Panning has regarded it in his explanation, lit. I., p. 379.
If we add to this—1. That Count Struensee had no necessity to have recourse to such a forgery, partly because his Majesty never refused him what he asked in such matters; partly, because a hundred other ways of enriching himself stood at his service, if he wished to act dishonestly, of which not the slightest evidence has been brought forward. 2. That he never made a secret of it, which might be supposed in a dishonest action, either from Count von Schimmelmann, who paid the money, or from Count Brandt, who, on the very same day thanked the king for the 50,000 dollars which he had received, to which his Majesty replied, it was but fair that he should make him a sort, leading to the supposition that the sum was a considerable one (see Brandt's answer to question 44, p. 250) and lastly, 3. That it could not be concealed from the king, as credit was taken for the amount in the next balance-sheet, in which the sum was again approved—I am of opinion that this circumstance cannot be regarded as dishonesty, but that everything really is as Count Struensee has explained it.
The third charge relates to the sale of the bouquet. As this affair depended entirely on the will of her royal Majesty the Queen, and Count Struensee declares that he never knew otherwise but that the sale took place with the king's consent, and as he did not profit in the slightest degree by it, he had not supposed that this would be alleged as a crime against him.
These are the principal charges brought against Count Struensee as regards his administration. For though the Fiscal General, in his indictment, has touched on all sorts of small matters: for instance, the appointment of Councillor of Justice Struensee to the College of Finances, &c., as they all depended on the general principles which his Majesty the King had accepted in the administration, and his Majesty had given his special approval to their execution, it is unnecessary to dwell on them.
On the other hand, I will in conclusion of this portion of the indictment show, that the Fiscal General incorrectly charges Count Struensee with having formed dangerous designs, and of wishing to sustain himself in the most improper way in the post which his Majesty entrusted to him.
As a proof of this, the dismissal of the body-guard and the loading of the cannon are first alleged. It was proved in the examination that the reasons for this were perfectly legal; it is also seen from the confrontation of Major-General Gude and Count Struensee, that the intention of the latter order was only to hold the populace in check, for the sake of the public tranquillity, and that Count Struensee never ordered Major-General Gude to take the latter precaution, but the general was of opinion that it was merely a consequence of the general reminder given him, "that everything must be tranquil and in order."
Equally little probable or proven is it that Count Struensee had undertaken, or wished to undertake anything which would have procured him an opportunity for escaping, if his supposed meditated design of assuming the character of a protector had failed.
That nothing was attempted against the person of his royal Majesty is proved by the documents and the acknowledgment of the Fiscal General himself. And how could gratitude or caution have suggested so detestable a thought to the count? It was the king alone to whom he owed his fortune, and the confidence of his Majesty was the sole basis of his respect and his security.
But if he could have been so malicious as to deny all his obligations, where was the party he had formed to carry out his design? Would he have been so incautious as to announce his intention to the whole public? For such was the case with the loading of the cannon; and would he not rather have taken precautions to secure himself against such surprises as might easily take place, and really did take place, especially as we see from Christian Näses' declaration and Count Brandt's acknowledgment, that he had received some intimations to that effect?
That Count Struensee employed other illegal means to support himself is equally incorrect. It certainly seems as if Count Brandt were attached to the king in order to watch him; but the latter declares exactly the contrary, and that Count Struensee did not at all need him to support himself. Equally little can it be concluded from point eight of the indictment, that letters addressed to the king were to be delivered in the cabinet; for, without mentioning that this order was given by the king himself, and that, if it had any secret object, it ought to have been given long before, Panning and Morack's statements prove that the disorder in which letters and other papers lay about the king's apartment was the sole cause for this order, and that his Majesty, after this time, received his letters as punctually as before.
As regards the accusations, then, which have been brought against Count Struensee with respect to public affairs, I hope I have proved that he only acted according to the will of his Majesty; that it was not his intention to acquire power at the expense of his royal Majesty; and that, if he erred in one point or the other, it was not done through petulance, or deserves the harsh expressions employed by the Fiscal General, but that it is solely to be explained by the fallibility which is inseparably connected with every man. Nowhere has anything been found which raised a doubt as to the safety of the king, his family, or his supremacy, or could give cause for the supposition that Count Struensee wished to treat his king and benefactor in so shameful a way. He declares most sacredly, even now, that his only desire was to promote the king's welfare and the prosperity of the kingdoms.
I will now pass to the second portion of the charges, which relate to the insults said to have been offered to the persons of the royal house. As regards the "éloignement" in which her Majesty Queen Juliana Maria and his royal highness the hereditary prince were held, Count Struensee declares that he has given the true reason in his answers to questions 486 and 469; that he never attempted to maintain or increase it; that he was not aware of any other reason for a different box being given the prince at the theatre, except that the king did not wish to have the prince's suite in his box; and that, lastly, so far as he could remember, he had no share in the correspondence carried on, upon this subject, between Count Brandt and Count Scheel.
As regards the education of his royal highness the prince royal, I refer to the count's own memorial; he protests most sacredly against ever having entertained such thoughts as the Fiscal General imputes to him. In this matter, he is so conscious of the purity of his intentions, that he is willing to submit it to the verdict of experienced physicians, whether the prince's health has not been improved by it. Moreover, it was the queen's will that this course should be pursued; and Count Struensee more than once drew on himself her displeasure, by representing to her that the right measure was exceeded in it. (Cfr. letter F., pp. 361 and 362.)
As concerns the "passage" between his royal Majesty and Count Brandt, which forms a charge in the Fiscal General's indictment, the explanations of Count Struensee show that he could never have conjectured that Count Brandt would undertake it in so audacious a way as he did, but that the affair would be settled en badinant between the king and Brandt. His advice was to the effect that Brandt should keep aloof from the king; and that Brandt did not, in the remotest degree, expect Count Struensee's assent, or subsequent approval, in this affair, is seen from the fact that he not only previously kept secret the way in which he had resolved to go to work, as he merely said "that he would demand an explanation of the king," but that, afterwards, he also concealed the most aggravating portions of his deed,—the circumstance with the riding-whip; his bolting the door; and the challenging and abusive language which he employed. In so far, then, as regards the share which Count Struensee had in this "passage," he hopes the more to be excused, because his Majesty the King, in such private matters, did not wish to be regarded as king, but as a private person, which was the reason why he, Count Struensee, did not oppose Brandt's design, so far as it was known to him.
That it was never his "sentiment" to neglect the proper reverence in intercourse with the king; and that no one can mention an instance of it, strengthens his innocence in this case; for what the Fiscal General alleges to the contrary only consists of mere gossip. Equally little can Brandt's letter, quoted by the Fiscal General, serve as a proof that Brandt was rewarded for his conduct to the king, as it was written in September, 1771, and the "passage" with Brandt did not take place till November of that year. And should not all this be a sufficient justification for Count Struensee, he appeals to the kindness which his Majesty has so frequently shown him, to obtain his pardon.
In the same way he throws himself at his Majesty's feet, and implores his mercy for the crime against his Majesty's person, the first mentioned by the Fiscal General, but hitherto unalluded to by me. It is the only thing in which he knows that he consciously sinned against his king; but he confesses, with contrition, that this crime is too great for him to expect forgiveness of it. If, however, regard for human weakness, a truly penitent feeling of his error, the deepest grief at it, the tears with which he laments it, and the sighs which he dedicates to the king and the welfare of his family, deserve any compassion, he will not be found unworthy of it.
In all the rest he supposes that the law and his innocence will defend him, and that for this reason he can expect an acquittal. But, in the same way as in the last point, he seeks refuge in the king's mercy alone; he begs this high court, who have witnessed the sincerity of his grief and sorrow, to be kind enough to procure him the greatest possible alleviation of his fate by a favourable representation of his repentance to his Majesty.
Uldall.
Copenhagen, April 22, 1772.
This defence, though neatly written, is still so weak and lukewarm, that it cannot protect its author from the suspicion that he had an understanding with the conspirators, and that his defence was only intended to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. Falckenskjold, who, as a native, contemporary, and adherent of Struensee, and who, as unattached to the court, is an impartial witness, expresses himself as follows on the subject in his "Memoirs:"—
"The royal law supplied Uldall with an article which, by formally authorising the king to suppress or create any council or office he thought proper, consequently gave the right of proposing the suppression of the privy council and of other offices which might appear injurious to the interests of the monarchy, as well as the creation of a cabinet minister. Further, Uldall did not develope all the absurdity of the charge of forgery brought against his client. He did not make use of the means he possessed to justify him about the ill-treatment of the king, of which Brandt was accused: means the more easy, because there was in this point no evidence against Struensee. He ought to have discussed the reforms effected by this minister, and have shown that far from being criminal and injurious, they generally tended to the welfare of the state and the advantage of the monarch. This examination would have given him occasion to display the conduct of Struensee, and show him, as he really was, vigilant and anxious to simplify affairs, so that the king might see and know them, and decide them himself. It was very easy to heighten the merit of such conduct by comparing it with that of previous ministers; by placing in its true light that royal law by virtue of which every Danish monarch binds himself on ascending the throne not to suffer any attack on his power, and to maintain it in its integrity. It was not sufficient to say, as if en passant, that the will of the king covered the acts of Struensee's administration with an inviolable defence; he ought to have made those who attacked them feel the consequences to which they exposed themselves; he ought to have shown them in the royal law the sword that menaced those who dared to condemn in Struensee the wishes and orders of the king."[91]
But Uldall had been one of Struensee's opponents from the beginning, and hence was most unfitted to be a defender; and that he consented to be so, on being selected by the chief conspirator, throws a sufficient light on his good will as a lawyer.
But what will my readers think of the two advocates, and the legal members of the commission, when I state that the criminal code of Christian V. prohibits every judge from listening to or trying charges that dishonour members of the reigning family? Falckenskjold says about this:—
"How could Uldall insert in his defence Struensee's declarations about his relations with the queen? Was he ignorant of the Danish law that nullified this declaration, and prohibited the judges from paying any attention to it? How, if he was versed in the principles and duties of his profession, did he dare, in a memoir intended to be made public, to represent his client as demanding mercy for this pretended crime, and imploring the intercession of his persecutor? And how was it he did not feel that by acting thus he joined a perfidious cabal, which was abusing the unhappy Struensee with deceitful hopes of escape, in order to drag from him the means of ruining him more completely?"
Another witness to the shamefulness of the charges against Struensee steps forward in honest Reverdil, himself no admirer of the favourite, but who valued truth above everything. He carefully analyses the charges. The one about the queen's bouquet was most unjust, he considers. It belonged to the queen, and she ordered it to be sold. The price it fetched was much lower than that paid for it, because princes pay long prices for jewels, and sell them cheaply, especially those of great value. The purpose for which it was sold was to get the money for making the badges for the new Order of Matilda.
As regards the forgery, Reverdil's evidence is decidedly in favour of Struensee. His argument, which seems to be conclusive, is to the following effect:—
1. At the time when this account was made out, Struensee, overwhelmed with business, had no secretary to assist him. Pleasure, audiences, races, and attentions to the queen, occupied the greater part of his time. He was ignorant of forms and their consequences: therefore, it is very credible that he cast up the account incorrectly, corrected, and presented it for signature with the erasures. The king signed without looking, and useless crimes ought not to be supposed.
2. No other trait in Struensee's life denotes an ignoble scamp or vile man: his character was rather to carry frankness to the verge of effrontery and hardness.
3. On the other hand, it lay in the king's character to refuse any pecuniary favour as long as he could, but he had no idea of the value of money, so that it was as easy to obtain from him 60,000 crowns as 6,000. They had the bad faith to take his evidence in this affair, and he declared that he remembered perfectly well having only given 6,000 crowns to each of the counts; but, with his malicious mania and his hatred for Brandt, it was impossible to trust to the fidelity of his memory, or the truth of his declarations.
4. Struensee replied to the charge with a good deal of candour; that appearances, it is true, were against him, but they were deceitful; and that, as he had already confessed more faults than were needed to destroy him, he would not deny this one, if he had committed it. He persisted in this language, without variation, to the end.
Still, while Reverdil acquits the favourites of the forgery, he has no excuse for the affair itself. To obtain so large a sum from an imbecile king, who was not of a generous temper: to obtain it at a time when the Treasury was exhausted, the state loaded with debt, and when, under pretext of economy, the favourites were making hundreds of families miserable by arbitrary retrenchments, was no better than a swindle. Reverdil was the more revolted when the trial made the fact known, because he had heard Struensee and Brandt a thousand times upbraid the prodigalities of the old court, and the presents lavished on the favourites, especially Counts von Moltke and Holck. But neither of them had received so large a sum in so short a time. The former enriched himself in twenty years of constant favour, but a considerable portion of his fortune consisted of the savings of his income, when he lived cost free at court, as grand marshal: while the new favourites, after expelling everybody, had established themselves at court, without any apparent duties.
At those Hirschholm breakfasts, when only the elect were present, and the guests liked so much to talk about the old ministry, as an occasion to applaud the present saving, Reverdil frequently heard it mentioned, as an extraordinary instance of profusion, that during the king's stay at Paris, Bernstorff, aware that Count von Holck, the most extravagant of men, was on his last legs, promised him 30,000 crowns, so that he might not yield to the seductions of the French court, who wished to employ him in detaching the king from the Russian alliance. It would have been ridiculous for any other king to pay his favourite, lest he should propose absurd and dangerous acts to him; but this conduct, when recommended to Christian VII., was founded on reason, as a bounty of 30,000 crowns, at such a moment, might save the state.
In this case, at least, the form was decent: a perfectly upright minister solicited the king in favour of a third party, and the treasurer received his Majesty's orders to pay. But the gratification granted to Struensee and Brandt had an entirely different character. The same person solicited, decided, and countersigned. It was of no use for him to say that it was once for all, and for the purpose of securing an independent position. Who could answer that avidity was not augmented by enjoyment? and with what face could the same man, who forced the king to sign a decree that, henceforth, no retiring pension should exceed 1,000 crowns, secure, after six months' office, the capital of thrice as large an income? Such is the dangerous seduction of unlimited power. Struensee, before he attained it, was not only honourable, but noble and liberal, though his circumstances were exceedingly limited.
No time was lost in the trial of the accused minister, for on April 23 the Fiscal General handed in his reply to Uldall's defence.