APPENDIX
Mr Brooke’s Expedition to Borneo.[13]
Borneo (in the language of the natives Bruni), Celebes, Sulu, the Moluccas, and the islands of the Straits of Sunda and Banca, compose what is commonly called the Malayan group, and the Malays located on the sea shores of these and other islands may with certainty be classed as belonging to one nation.
It is well known, however, that the interior of these countries is inhabited by various tribes, differing from the Malays and each other, and presenting numerous gradations of imperfect civilisation.
The Dyaks of Borneo, the Arafuras of New Guinea, and others, besides the black race scattered over the islands (objects here, as elsewhere, of traffic), present an interesting field of inquiry; and it is surprising, whilst our acquaintance with every other portion of the globe, from the passage of the Pole to the navigation of the Euphrates, has greatly extended, we know scarcely anything of these varieties of the human race beyond the bare fact of their existence, and remain extremely ignorant of the geographical features of the countries they inhabit.
Countries which present an extended field for Christianity and commerce—which none surpass in fertility—rich beyond the Americas in mineral productions, and unrivalled in natural beauty, yet continue unexplored, and spite of the advantages which would probably result, have failed to attract the attention they so well deserve. The difficulty of the undertaking will scarcely account for its non-performance; if we consider the voluntary sacrifices made on the shrine of African research, or the energy displayed and the sufferings encountered by the explorers of the Polar regions, yet the necessity of prosecuting the voyage in an armed vessel, the wildness of the interior tribes, the lawless ferocity of the Malays, and the dangers to be apprehended from the jealousy of the Dutch, would prevent most individuals from fixing on this field for their exertions, and points it out as one which can only be fully accomplished by Government, or some influential body.
It is not my object to enter into any detail of the past history of the Malayan nations, but I may refer to the undoubted fact that they have been in a state of deterioration since we first became acquainted with them; and the records of our early voyagers, together with the remains of antiquity still visible in Java and Sumatra, prove that once flourishing nations have now ceased to exist, and countries once teeming with human life are now tenantless and deserted. The causes of such lamentable changes need only be alluded to, but it is fit to remark that whilst the clamour about education is loud, and extravagant dreams are entertained of the progressive advancement of the human race, a large tract of the globe has been gradually relapsing, and allowed to relapse, into barbarism.
Whether the early decay of the Malay states and their consequent demoralization arose from the introduction of Mohammedanism, or resulted from the intrigues of European ambition, it were useless to discuss; but we are very certain that the policy of the Dutch has, at the present day, reduced this ‘Eden of the Eastern wave’ to a state of anarchy and confusion, as repugnant to humanity as it is to commercial prosperity.
Enough is known of the harshness of this policy, and there is no need of here contrasting it with the energetic, successful, though ill-supported sway of Sir Stamford Raffles—but it is the indirect influence which it exerts that has proved so baneful to the Archipelago, under the assumed jurisdiction of this European power. Her unceasing interference in the concerns of the Malay Governments, and the watchful fomenting of their internal dissensions, have gradually and effectually destroyed all rightful authority, and given rise to a number of petty states, which thrive on piracy and fatten on the slave trade. The consequent disorganisation of society arising from these causes has placed a bar to commercial enterprise and personal adventure, and has probably acted on the interior tribes much in the same way as this fatal policy has affected the Malays. As far as can be ascertained, the financial and commercial concerns of the Dutch have not been prosperous; it is easy to conceive such to be the case, as it will be conceded that oppression and prosperity cannot coexist. In short, with the smallest possible amount of advantage, the Dutch Government has all along endeavoured to perpetuate an exclusive system, aiming more at injury to others than any advantage to themselves, or to the nations under their sway; for where an enlightened administration might have produced the most beneficial results, we are forced to deplore not only the mischief done, and the mass of good neglected, but the misery and suffering inflicted on unhappy races, capable, as has been proved, of favourable development under other circumstances.
The policy of the British in the Indian Archipelago has been marked by vacillation and weakness. The East India Company, with a strong desire to rival the Dutch, aimed at doing so by indirect and underhand means, and shrunk from the liberality of views and bold line of conduct which was perhaps inconsistent with their position and tenure of authority. It was in vain that Sir Stamford Raffles urged on them a line of conduct which, had it been pursued, must eventually have ensured the ascendency of the British over the space from Borneo to New Holland, and have linked her colonies in the East by a chain of posts from the northern part of India to the southern extremity of Van Diemen’s Land. The timidity of the Company and the ignorance or indifference of the then existing Governments not only neglected to carry this bold project into execution, but sacrificed the advantages already acquired, and, without stipulation or reserve, yielded the improving Javanese to the tender mercies of their former masters. The consequences are well known; all the evils of Dutch rule have been re-established, and the British watchfully excluded, directly or indirectly, from the commerce of the islands.
It is true that the settlement of Singapore has attracted a large portion of the native trade to its free port, and has become, from its happy situation, in some measure an emporium for Straits’ produce; but, with this single commercial exception, our loss of footing and political influence in the Archipelago is complete, and our intercourse with the natives has gradually become more restricted. We may sum up these remarks by taking a brief survey of the present position of the Archipelago. The Dutch are masters of a large tract of New Guinea at one extreme, and, at the other, have possessed themselves of the coast of Borneo, extending from the western boundary of Borneo proper to the southern limit of Matan. A glance at the chart will show that they have stations of more or less importance connecting these points, and that Java, and their settlement on Sumatra, give them exclusive command of the Straits of Sunda. It may likewise be here observed that their territorial extension is only limited by their desires, for as there is no check from European nations, a title to possession is too readily acquired from distracted and contending native Governments.
But the position of the Dutch nation in the ‘Far East,’ though apparently so imposing, is, in reality, far from strong, and their power would easily sink before the vigorous opposition of any European country.
Java, exhausted and rebellious, submits, but remembers the period of British possession. The wild Battas, of Sumatra, successfully repel the efforts of the Dutch to reduce them. The Chinese of the southern part of Borneo are eager to cast off the yoke of masters who debar them every advantage, and would fain, were it in their power, exact a heavy tribute. Their possessions in New Guinea are nominal rather than real, and their older settlement of the Moluccas, fallen in value, can scarcely be supposed to compensate for the sacrifice of men and money caused by their narrow-minded views and ill-directed efforts. The Dutch are strong enough to defy any native power directed against them, but their doubtful title and oppressive tenure would, as I have before said, render the downfall of their rule in the Archipelago certain and easy before the establishment of a liberal Government and conciliating policy.
Of the Malays, it is sufficient here to remark that they have ceased to be powerful, and that their distracted and disorganised state renders it dangerous for friends or strangers to trust themselves in their hands; but their hatred of the Dutch is unbounded, and there is no reason to think that any insuperable obstacle would be met with in the formation of a strong legitimate Government amongst them.
Our recent knowledge of the position of the native states is so circumscribed, however, that it is difficult to say much on this subject.
The Bugis, the traders of the islands, and their hardiest and most enterprising race, are checked and hampered by Dutch restrictions, and this remark, applying most forcibly to them, is true of the whole trading interests, and renders all alike inveterately hostile to the Dutch.
It may be fairly concluded from the foregoing remarks that the injury done to British interests by the cession of Java and the consequent loss of power has been greatly counterbalanced by the misrule of the Dutch since their undisputed re-establishment. The field is again open, therefore, to any nation desirous of rivalling Holland, and little doubt can be entertained of the success of such an effort, if carried on by a course of policy and conduct the reverse in every respect of that pursued by the present monopolists. The fact must be always borne in mind that the Dutch are masters of the Archipelago only because no other nation is willing to compete with them, and although any attempt by another power might, and would, doubtless, be watched with the greatest anxiety and distrust, and every opposition, direct and indirect, be levelled against it, yet it could not be considered any infringement of acknowledged right or actual possession.
A liberal system, indeed, recommended by mutual advantage, would assuredly triumph over any local opposition, if not obstructed by European interests; nor is there any great reason to apprehend such a probability, unless, going from one extreme to another, we should attempt hostility to regain what was foolishly thrown away.
Nevertheless, sooner or later, the time must arrive when we shall again be in possession of these islands, and we may accordingly look forward and prepare for the event in various ways.
The subject may be divided under two heads, viz., Territorial Possession, and Commercial Prosperity; and these appear so intimately blended, that the second is greatly dependent on the first, for it must be remembered that Sir Stamford Raffles, the highest authority on this point, has pronounced that no purely commercial settlement can succeed in the Archipelago, and has attributed the numerous failures which have occurred to a lack of knowledge of the country, and the non-possession of territory.
Many arguments might be urged, and many reasons given, to show the entire justice of this opinion, but it will be sufficient to state that where a native population exists, and is rightly governed, an influence is insensibly acquired and strengthened, not only over those immediately protected, but also over the neighbouring tribes, and that on the occasion of any disturbance or collision with other powers, the means of resistance or the punishment of aggression are at hand. A commercial post, on the contrary, though advantageously situated, is liable to the fluctuations and distractions of its neighbours, its means of attack or defence are necessarily limited, and whilst it fails to command respect, the natives are rather injured than benefited by its existence.
The chief consideration, however, seems to be that territorial power is constantly opening new sources of traffic, and extending those already established, by disembarrassing trade of the intermediate clogs which tend to limit exports, from the small amount of benefit to the original dealer—and to lessen the demand—from the increased price attendant on passing through various hands.
The insular situation of Singapore may be adduced as a proof of this, for all articles of Straits produce, before coming into the possession of the British merchant, afford profits to several classes of natives, in a very unequal degree; and little hope can be entertained of the favourable progress of a trade wherein the original producer or proprietor participates to so trifling an extent in its advantages. It may, indeed, be considered a monopoly by the natives inhabiting the coasts, as severe on the interior tribes as the Dutch restrictions on themselves.
For these and many other causes which readily occur, it would seem that territorial possession is the best, if not the only means, by which to acquire a direct and powerful influence in the Archipelago, but any government instituted for the purpose must be directed to the advancement of the native interests and the development of native resources rather than by a flood of European colonization, to aim at possession only, without reference to the indefeasible rights of the Aborigines.
On the second head, viz., the Commercial Prosperity, nothing need be added save that, being dependent on the right working of the first principle, it must unavoidably, in its progress, present a striking contrast to the commercial monopolies of the Dutch, and be the means of bringing the English merchant in contact with the original native dealer.
The advantages, political and commercial, accruing from a well-managed territory need only be alluded to, as everyone in the slightest degree acquainted with the country is well aware of its vast capability.
In a political view, the contiguity of the islands to our possessions in New Holland and India, and the command over China, are sufficiently apparent; and commercially, it would only be necessary to quote their productions to prove their value. The difficulty of once more placing our interests on a footing worthy a great nation is no doubt considerable, but apt to be greatly overrated; as the unpopularity of the Dutch, and the weakness of the native states, would ensure success to an establishment aiming at sufficient results by slow but steady means. The question, indeed, is not one embracing the acquisition of territory, but its occupation: viz., whether England shall claim and improve lands she holds by as good a title as any the Dutch can show, and whether, doing so, she shall use the full ascendency of her national position to extend her commerce, and distribute her manufactures among a people who have always, when permitted, shown their craving for mercantile adventure?
A strong government established in Malludu[14] Bay, a British territory capable of extension, and possessing internal resources, having sufficient authority to cultivate a good understanding with the native governments, and spread inferior posts over the Archipelago, as opportunities offered, would effect this object, and, without infringing upon the claims of any foreign state, ensure a commercial footing on a scale never yet developed in this portion of the world. Malludu Bay, situated at the northern extremity of Borneo, has been mentioned as best adapted for the purpose in view on several accounts.
1st. It is a British possession.
2nd. There is no great Malay or Bugis settlement in its vicinity.
3rd. It is the place where, in all probability, a direct intercourse may be held with the Dyaks of the interior.
4th. The position relative to China is advantageous.
5th. It forms the western limit of the Archipelago, and our new settlement at Port Essington bounds it to the eastward. The climate and the soil are well spoken of: a river flows into the bay, and is reported to communicate with the lake of Keeny Balloo[15] and the mountains in the interior—one of very considerable elevation. Above all, however, the natives are reported to be docile and easily taught; the servants of the Company attached to their settlement of Balambangan were decided in opinion that this bay was far preferable in every respect to the station chosen and subsequently abandoned.
Supposing these advantages to be as above stated, yet it would scarcely authorise any active steps being taken without a more accurate knowledge than we at present possess of the particular locality and of the States in its vicinity; it is to this point that I would direct attention, remarking, however, that although Malludu Bay should on inquiry be found to be unfit for the purposes of colonisation, yet the general view of our policy remains unaffected, as it would be only necessary to obtain a suitable place.
With a settlement at each extremity of the Archipelago, we could readily protect the trade of the natives, and obtain minor posts, and free-trade ports, whence the best principles of commerce and good government might be disseminated, and our interests best promoted, by the general prosperity of the countries under our sway, or in our own vicinity. It is scarcely necessary to say more on this subject, but before closing these remarks, I cannot help adverting to the colony at Port Essington.
The former settlement, which existed in the immediate neighbourhood of Port Essington, was after a trial (of a few years) abandoned as useless, and the same difficulties which checked the progress of the first will probably impede the present colony.
It was a striking feature of this settlement, that the natives, though frequenting the coasts to the northward of New Holland,[16] seldom if ever visited or offered to trade with the settlement. This has, I know, been attributed to the natives being ignorant of the existence of the place, but this reason appears to me improbable in the highest degree, and we may with more justice surmise the cause to be our utter disinclination and local inability to protect traders from the consequences attendant on a breach of Dutch regulations. This conjecture gathers confirmation from the facts that the inhabitants of the Eastern portion of the Archipelago are not addicted to maritime adventure, being supplied by the traders of the Western Islands with such articles of European or Chinese manufacture as are suited to their tastes. The Bugis vessels that frequent the north coast of New Holland chiefly carry on the trade with the Arafura group, and it is evident that going and returning from this voyage they are at the mercy of the Dutch cruisers. Is it probable, then, that the Dutch would allow an intercourse with a British settlement which it was in their power to prevent? And whilst the Bugis are the carriers, is it not in the power of the Dutch to restrict and harass, if not totally to prevent, their communication with us? The natives of the Archipelago cannot look to the British for protection, but they can and do look for Dutch vengeance, and dread it.
These considerations are not urged against advantages to be derived from the possession of Port Essington, but rather as a warning against the over-sanguine expectations of its having a trade of any considerable extent, whilst our relations with the Archipelago continue on their present eclipsed footing. The good to result from this colony must be looked for on the continent of New Holland, where it will probably extend and make the same progressive strides to importance as the sister colonies in the same country: but with reference to the Archipelago, its government will want authority to control the evil influence sufficiently to ameliorate the present system.
Not far distant to the westward of Port Essington is the large and fertile island of Timor, a portion of which there is no doubt the Government of Portugal would cede willingly for the smallest equivalent, as it has been long virtually abandoned, and is utterly useless to the mother country. The size and situation would render the possession of the Portuguese frontier of this island a desirable acquisition, and the favourable opportunity may not, if allowed to pass over, again recur.
The same, indeed, may be said of Leuconia, which, offering no real benefit to Spain, would, in the hands of the English, be a lever to rule both China and the Archipelago. Rich, fertile, and blessed with a fine climate, within a few days’ sail of Canton, and commanding the China sea, it would be an unrivalled jewel in the colonial tiara of England. When our relations with China come to be settled, and settled they must shortly be, the importance of Manila can scarcely be overrated.
Spain, distracted and torn by internal factions, and pledged to England by treaty and obligation, would readily place Leuconia in our hands as a guarantee for the sums due, and would probably cede the possession in lieu of the claims we have on her exchequer.
For such an acquisition, the present is the time, the tide in our affairs which, taken at the flood, would lead on to fortune; and as I have before stated, that in a political point of view it is only on an extended scale that any real advantage, national or local, is to be gained, I must re-urge my conviction that it is better to leave the Archipelago in its present state until the next general war, when it will again pass into our hands, than, by contenting ourselves with paltry and insignificant stations, convey false impressions of our national importance, not easily removed from the minds of the natives.[17]
Whatever difference of opinion may exist, or whatever degree of credit may be due to the views here recommended, there can be no doubt of our future ascendency in the Archipelago, whether attempted at the present time, or delayed until the fortunes of war offer a fitting occasion. In either case a previous acquaintance will greatly facilitate the result, and must in all probability tend to a more just appreciation of these highly interesting countries; for when public attention is once aroused, and a stimulus given to inquiry, it cannot fail in fully developing the resources, and exhausting the knowledge of the mine, which has heretofore been left to the weak and casual efforts of individual exertion. It has been remarked by Mr Farquhar that the indifference of the British Government must have originated solely from the want of information, or its incorrectness, since it is not improbable that the riches of Sumatra and Borneo are equal to those of Brazil and New Spain. The lapse of years has by no means weakened the force of this observation, for Borneo, Celebes, and indeed the greater portion of these islands are still unknown, and the government is as indifferent now to these countries, equal in riches, and superior in commercial advantages to the new world. The apathy of two centuries still reign supreme with the enlightened people of England, as well as their Government, and whilst they willingly make the most expensive efforts favourable to science, commerce, or Christianity in other quarters, the locality which eminently combines these three objects is alone neglected and alone uncared for.
It has unfortunately been the fate of our Indian possessions to have laboured under the prejudice and contempt of a large portion of the well-bred community, for whilst the folly of fashion requires an acquaintance with the deserts of Africa, and a most ardent thirst for a knowledge of the usages of Timbuctoo, it at the same time justifies the most profound ignorance of all matters connected with the government and geography of our vast possessions in Hindostan. The Indian Archipelago has fully shared this neglect, for even the tender philanthropy of the present day, which originates such multifarious schemes for the amelioration of doubtful evils, and which shudders at the prolongation of apprenticeship in the West for a single year, is blind to the existence of slavery in its worst and most exaggerated form in the East. Not a single prospectus is spread abroad, not a single voice upraised in Exeter Hall, to relieve the darkness of paganism and the horrors of the slave trade. Whilst the trumpet tongue of many an orator excites thousands to the rational and charitable object of converting the Jews and reclaiming the gipsies; whilst the admirable exertions of missionary enterprise in the Ausonian climes of the South Sea have invested them with worldly power as well as religious influence; whilst the benevolent plans of the New Zealand Association contemplate the protection of the natives by the acquisition of their territory: whilst we admire the torrent of devotional and philosophical exertion, we cannot help deploring that the zeal and attention of the leaders of these charitable crusades have never been directed to the countries under consideration. These unhappy countries have failed to rouse attention or excite commiseration, and as they sink lower and lower, they afford a striking proof how civilisation may be crushed, and how the fairest and richest lands under the sun may become degraded by a continuous course of oppression and misrule.
It is under these circumstances I have considered that individual exertions may be usefully applied to rouse the zeal of slumbering philanthropy, and lead the way to an increased knowledge of the Indian Archipelago.
Such an exertion will be made at some cost and some sacrifice, and I shall here quit the general topic, and confine myself to the specific objects of my intended voyage. It must be premised, however, that any plan previously decided on must always be subject, during its execution, to great modification, in countries where the population is always wild and often hostile, and where the influence of climate is sometimes fatally opposed to the progress of inquiry. Local information, likewise, frequently renders a change both advisable and advantageous, and circumstances, as they spring up, too often influence beyond the power of foresight, especially in my own case, where the utmost care will still leave the means very inadequate to the full accomplishment of the proposed undertaking.
With a small vessel properly equipped, and provided with the necessary instruments for observation, and the means for collecting specimens in Natural History, it is proposed, in the first place, to proceed to Singapore, which may be considered the headquarters for the necessary intervals of refreshment, and for keeping open a certain communication with Europe. Here, the best local information can be obtained, interpreters procured, the crew augmented for any particular service, and, if needful, a small vessel of native construction may be added to the expedition to facilitate the objects in view. An acquaintance may likewise be formed with the more respectable of the Bugis merchants, and their good-will conciliated in the usual mode, viz., by civility and presents, so as to remove any misconceived jealousy on the score of trading rivalry, and to induce a favourable report of our friendly intentions in their own country, and at the places where they may touch. The Royalist[18] will probably reach Singapore in the month of February or March 1839, at the latter end of the N.E. or rainy monsoon. The delay consequent on effecting the objects above mentioned, besides gaining a general acquaintance with the natural history and trade of the settlement, and some knowledge of the Malay language, will usefully occupy the time until the setting in of the S.W. or dry monsoon. It may be incidentally mentioned, however, that, in the vicinity of Singapore, there are many islands imperfectly known, and which, during the interval of the rainy season, will afford interesting occupation. I allude more especially to the space between the Straits of Rhio and those of the Durien, and likewise to the island of Bintang, which, although laid down as one large island, is probably composed of small ones, a better acquaintance with which might facilitate the voyage from Singapore to the eastward, by bringing to light other passages besides those of Rhio and Durien, and at any rate would add something to the knowledge of the country in the immediate vicinity of our settlement. On the commencement of the healthy season, I purpose sailing from Singapore, and proceeding without loss of time to Malludu Bay. This spot has been chosen for our first essay for reasons previously enumerated, and in a country every part of which is highly interesting, the mere fact of its being a British possession gives it a prior claim to attention. The objects in view may be briefly mentioned.
1st. A general knowledge of the bay, and the correct position of its various points, so as to determine its outline.
2nd. To make inquiries of the settlement of Cochin-Chinese, reported, on Earl’s authority, to be fixed in the neighbourhood of Bankoka. (An intercourse will if possible be opened with this settlement.)
3rd. Carefully and minutely to explore the rivers which flow into the bay, and to penetrate, if practicable, as far as the lake and mountain of Keeny Balloo.
4th. Every endeavour will be used to open a communication with the aboriginal inhabitants, and to conciliate their good opinion. I speak with great diffidence about penetrating into the interior of this country, for I am well aware of the insurmountable difficulties which the hard reality often presents, previously overlooked, or easily overcome on the smoothness of paper, or in the luxury of a drawing-room. The two points chiefly to be relied on for this purpose are a friendly intercourse with the natives, and the existence of navigable rivers. It is mentioned by Sir Stamford Raffles, on native authority, that a land communication of not more than forty miles exists between Malludu Bay and Keeny Balloo, but neither this computation, nor any other derived from the natives, can be relied on, for the inhabitants of these countries are generally ignorant of any measure of distance, and their reckoning by time is so vague as to defy a moderately certain conclusion. The fact, however, of the vicinity of the lake to the bay is certain, and it follows as a reasonable inference that the river or rivers flowing into the bay communicate with the lake. The existence of such rivers, which were from the locality to be expected, are mentioned by Captain Forrest.
Most of this north part of Borneo (he says), granted to the East India Company by the Sulus, is watered by noble rivers; those that discharge themselves into Malludu Bay are not barred. It is by one or the other of these rivers that I shall hope to penetrate as far as the lake and mountain of Keeny Balloo, and into the country of the Idaan. I have not been able to learn that any Malay towns of importance are situated in the bight of the bay, and their absence will render a friendly communication with the aborigines a matter of comparative ease. The advantages likely to result from such friendly relations are so evident, that I need not dwell upon them, though the mode of effecting such an intercourse must be left to the thousand contingencies which govern all, and act so capriciously on the tempers of savage races. The utmost forbearance and liberality, guided by prudence, so as not to excite cupidity, appear the fundamental rules for managing men in a low state of civilisation.
The results of an amicable understanding are uncertain at its commencement, for they depend on the enterprise of the individual and the power of the native tribe into whose hands he may chance to fall. I will therefore not enter into a visionary field of discovery, but it appears to me certain that, without the assistance of the natives, no small party can expect to penetrate far into a country populous by report, and in many parts thickly wooded. Without entertaining exaggerated expectations, I trust that something may be added to our geographical knowledge of the sea-coast of this bay; its leading features, productions, river anchorages and inhabitants; the prospects of trade and the means of navigation; and although my wishes lead me strongly to penetrate as far as the lake, yet the obstacles which may be found to exist will induce me to rest satisfied with the more moderate and reasonable result. It may not be superfluous to notice here that a foregone conclusion appears to be spread abroad regarding the aboriginal (so-called) inhabitants of Borneo, and that they are usually considered and mentioned under the somewhat vague appellation of Dyaks. They are likewise commonly pronounced as originating from the same stock as the Arafuras of Celebes and New Guinea, and radically identical with the Polynesian race. The conclusion is not in itself highly improbable, but certainly premature, as the facts upon which it is built are so scanty and doubtful as to warrant no such structure. On an island so vast as Borneo, races radically distinct might exist, and at any rate the opposite conclusion is hardly justifiable from the specimens of language, or the physical appearance of the tribes of the southern portion of the country. We have Malay authorities for believing that there are many large tribes in the interior, differing greatly in their degree of civilisation, though all alike removed from the vicinity of a superior people. We have the Dyaks of the south, the Idaan of the north, the Kayan warriors and the Punan, a race little better than monkeys, who live in trees, eat without cooking, are hunted by the other tribes, and would seem to exist in the lowest conceivable grade of humanity. If we can trust these accounts, the latter people resemble in many particulars the Orang Benua, or aborigines of the Peninsula, but the Dyaks and Idaans are far superior, living in villages, cultivating the ground and possessing cattle; besides these, we have the names of several other tribes and people, and in all probability many exist in the interior with whom we are yet unacquainted.
There are strong reasons for believing that the Hindoo religion, which obtained so extensively in Java and Sumatra, and yet survives in Balli and Lombok, was likewise extended to Borneo, and some authors have conceived grounds for supposing a religion anterior even to this. If only a portion of these floating opinions should be true, and the truth can only be tested by inquiry, we may fairly look for the descendants of the Hindoo dynasty as well as an aboriginal people. It never seems to have occurred to anyone to compare the Dyaks with the people of Balli and Lombok; we know indeed little of the former, but both races are fair, good-looking and gentle. Again, respecting the concluded identity of the Dyaks and Arafuras; it is clear we have a very limited knowledge of the former, and, I may ask, what do we know of the Arafuras? In short, I feel as reluctant to embrace any preconceived theory as I am to adopt the prevailing notion on this subject, for it requires a mass of facts, with which we are lamentably deficient, to arrive at anything approaching to a reasonable conclusion. To return, however, from the above digression to the proceedings of the Royalist, I would remark that it depends greatly on the time passed in Malludu Bay whether our next endeavour be prosecuted at Abai on the western, or Trusan Abai on the eastern coast. The object in visiting Abai would be chiefly to penetrate to the lake, which, on the authority of Dalrymple and Barton, is not very far distant thence by a water communication; but should any success have attended similar efforts from Malludu Bay, this project will be needless, as the enterprise will be prosecuted to the westward, and reach the vicinity of Abai. As Kimanis is the limit of the British territory to the westward, so Point Kenabantongen, situated to the southward of the bay of Londakua (Sandakan?), forms the eastern boundary, and a line drawn from coast to coast between these points is represented as including our possessions. A reference to the chart will show the extent to be considerable, and the eastern coast from Malludu Bay to Point Kenabantongen is so little known, that it is desirable to become acquainted with its general features and conformation, and to seek thence the means of gaining an inlet into the interior should it be denied at Malludu Bay. The reported proximity of Keeny Balloo to Malludu Bay, and likewise to Abai, would (supposing it to be anything like the size it is affirmed) lead us to expect that it cannot be far distant from the eastern coast, and it is reasonable to conclude that some rivers or streams discharge themselves into the sea, in the numerous indentations that abound on this shore. However this may be, the coast, with its bays, islands, and bold headlands, is one of great interest, the careful inspection of which as far as Point Keneonjon will add to our knowledge. The longitude of Point Unsong and Point Keneonjon will likewise determine the eastern extremity of Borneo, as the latitude of Point San Paniange will give the northern extreme of the island.
Much might be added on this topic, especially on the reputed communication by a line of lakes from Malludu Bay to Benjar Massin, which, if true, would in all probability place some of these lakes near particular points of the eastern coast, as the whole line from the relative position of the two extremes must be on the eastern side of the island. These reports, and the various surmises which arise from them, are matters rather of confirmation than discussion, and I will therefore only add that, tempted by success, I shall not devote less than a year and a half to this object; but in case of finding a sickly climate, or meeting with a decidedly hostile population, I shall more easily abandon the field, and turn to others of not less interest, and perhaps less risk.
Equal to Borneo in riches, and superior in picturesque beauty to any part of the Archipelago, is the large and eccentric country of the Bugis, called Celebes; so deep are the indentations of its coast, that the island may be pronounced as composed of a succession of peninsulas, nearly uniting in a common centre in the district of Palos, and thus, by the proximity of every part to the sea, offering great facilities for brief and decisive inland excursions.
The Dutch hold possession of Macassar, and formerly had settlements on the north-west coast and in the Bay of Sawa; their power appears never to have been very extensively acknowledged, and at present I have not been able to find any account of the condition of their factories. This information will probably be gained at Singapore, and at all events, I am by no means ambitious of frequenting their ports further than necessity obliges, and expect but little information from them respecting the internal regulations of their colonial Government, or the trade or productions of the territory under their sway. I propose, therefore, limiting my inquiries to the northern and north-eastern portion of the island, more especially the great Bay of Gunong Tella. It is impossible to state here the direction of these inquiries, or any definitive object to which they should be turned, as I am acquainted with no author who speaks of the country save in a general and vague manner. It is reported as rich, mountainous, strikingly beautiful, and possessed of rivers abounding in birds, and, like Borneo, inhabited by wild tribes in the interior, and by the Bugis on the seashores and entrances of rivers. The character of the Bugis, so variously represented, gives me strong hopes of rendering them, by care and kindness, useful instruments in the prosecution of these researches, for all writers agree that they are hardy, active, enterprising and commercial, and it is seldom that a people possessing such characteristics are deaf to the suggestions of self-interest and kindly feeling.
The arrogance and especially the indolence of the Malays counteract the influence of these strong incentives, and the impulse which governs such wild tribes as the Dyaks and Arafuras is a dangerous weapon which cuts all ways, and often when least anticipated. The Bajoos (Bajaus), or sea gipsies, are another race on whom some dependence may be placed, particularly if they be freed from the trammels of debt, swindled upon them by the Malays. Mr Earl, who had a personal acquaintance with this tribe, and could speak their language, always expressed to me a degree of confidence in their good faith which must have had some grounds.
I may here conclude the first stage of the expedition, during the progress of which the headquarters will be fixed at Singapore. During some of the intervals I hope to see Manila, and to acquire a cursory knowledge of the unexplored tract at the southern extremity of Manila, called in Norries’ general chart the Tiger Islands. The time devoted to the objects above mentioned must, as I have before said, be regulated by the degree of fortune which attends them; for, cheered by success, I should not readily abandon the field; yet, if persecuted by climate or other serious detriments, I shall frequently shift the ground to remove myself beyond such evil influence. It is scarcely needful to continue a detail of projects so distant, having already carved out for myself a work which I should be proud to perform, and which is already as extended as the chances of human life and human resolves will warrant.
The continuation of the voyage would lead me to take the Royalist to Timor or Port Essington, thence making excursions to the Aru Isles, Timor Laut, and the southern shores of North Guinea. That part of the coast contiguous to Torres Straits I am particularly desirous of visiting, as it has been suggested to me by Mr Earl, and I think with reason, that a better channel than the one we are at present acquainted with may be found there. That such a channel exists, and will be discovered when the coast is surveyed, I entertain but little doubt, but the navigation is hazardous, and from the westward must be attempted with great caution. My own proceedings must of course be regulated by the discoveries previously made by Captain Wickham and others, and as this gentleman has orders to survey Torres Straits, the field may be well trodden before I reach it. The rest of the voyage I shall consider as one merely of pleasure, combining such utility as circumstances will permit. It is probable that I shall visit our Australian settlements, glance at the Islands of the Pacific, and return to Europe round the Horn.
Before concluding this long paper, I may observe that there are points of inquiry which may be useful to the studies of the learned, which, provided the process may be moderately simple, I shall be willing to make, and I shall always be happy to receive any directions or suggestions regarding them. I allude to observations of the tides, to geology, natural history, etc., etc., for the general observer often overlooks highly interesting facts from his attention not being called to them. The specimens of natural history will be forwarded from time to time, and information will be sent to the Geographical Society which may always, if it be of any value, be used as freely as it is communicated. In like manner, the objects of natural history will be open to any person who is interested in such pursuits. I cannot but express my regret that, from pecuniary considerations as well as the small size of the vessel, and the limited quantity of provisions she carries, I am unable to take a naturalist and draughtsman, but I should always hail with pleasure any scientific person who happened to be in the countries at the time; and I may venture to promise him every encouragement and facility in the prosecution of his pursuits.
I embark upon the expedition with great cheerfulness, with a strong vessel, a good crew, and the ingredients of success, as far as the limited scale of the undertaking will permit; and I cast myself on the waters, like Southey’s little book; but whether the world will know me after many days is a question which, hoping the best, I cannot answer with any degree of assurance.