INTRODUCTION.
The first arrival of the Portuguese in the Eastern Islands was in the year 1510, when Alphonzo de Albuquerque first visited Sumatra. In the following year, Albuquerque conquered the city of Malacca, and sent to announce that event to those countries and islands which had traded thither, inviting them to continue their intercourse, and promising them protection and encouragement[2]. To Java and the Moluccas he sent Antonio de Abrew, having, however, previously prepared the way by a Moor or Mahomedan, of the name of Nakoda Ismael, who was trading in a merchant vessel. Antonio de Abrew sailed on his mission with three vessels, and took with him several Javans and Malayus who had been accustomed to trade with Malacca. The first port on Java at which he arrived was the city of Agacai[3], and from thence he sailed to Amboina, one of the Moluccas, where[4] he set up his padroes, or pillars of discovery and possession, as he had done at every port at which he had touched. One of the vessels was lost in a storm, but the people were saved and carried by Abrew to a port in Banda to which vessels then resorted for trade, and whither it was that the Javan vessels used to go for cloves, nutmegs, and mace, which were carried to that port by the natives of the Moluccas in their own vessels.
Nakoda Ismael returning from the Moluccas with a cargo of nutmegs, his vessel was wrecked on the coast of Java, near Tuban. The cargo of the Nakoda's vessel having been saved, Joam Lopez Alvrin was sent (A. D. 1513) by the governor of Malacca with four vessels to receive it. Alvrin was well received in all the ports of Java where he touched, but particularly at Sidayu belonging to Páteh Unrug, a prince who had been defeated at Malacca by Fernan Peres.
The straits of Sínga púra[5] being infested by the cruisers of the former king of Malacca, who had been expelled from his dominions by the Portuguese in 1511, the straits of Sában were the usual route of the Portuguese vessels from Malacca to the Spice Islands, and in this voyage they generally touched at the ports of Java.
About the year 1520 or 1521, Antonio de Britto, with six vessels under his command, bound to the Moluccas, touched first at Túban and proceeded afterwards to Agacai, where he remained seventeen days, during which time he sent a boat to the island of Madúra, for the purpose of exploring it; but the men landing incautiously were surprised and made prisoners, and were not ransomed without much difficulty, and the friendly intervention of the governor of Agacai.
Antonio de Britto had scarcely accomplished the ransom of his men, when he was joined by Don Garcia Henriquez with four vessels bound to Banda for spices, and at the same time a Javan vessel arrived from Banda. This vessel had been furnished with a pass from the Spaniards, under Fernan de Megalhaen, who having passed by the straits which bear his name, had arrived at the Spice Islands. This was the first intelligence which the Portuguese received of Megalhaen's discovery of the route round the southern extremity of the American continent, and they were the more mortified at it, as he had left his own country in disgust, and was then in the service of Spain[6].
The first voyage made by the Dutch was in 1595, in which year their first fleet, under the command of Houtman (who had been previously employed by the Portuguese in the East India service), sailed direct to Bantam. At this period the Portuguese were at war with the king of Bantam, to whom Houtman offered assistance, in return for which he obtained permission to build a factory at Bantam, which was the first settlement formed by the Dutch in the East Indies.
Following the example of the Dutch, the English East India Company, immediately after their incorporation by Queen Elizabeth in 1601, fitted out a fleet of four ships, the command of which was entrusted to Captain Lancaster, who sailed from London in 1602, first to Acheen (Aché) on Sumatra, where he procured part of his cargo, and entered into a treaty with the king, of which a copy is yet in existence. From Acheen he went to Bantam, and settled a factory there, which was the first possession of the English in the East Indies. Captain Lancaster brought home a letter from the king of Bantam to Queen Elizabeth in 1602, which is still in the state paper office.
In 1610, the first Dutch governor general, Bolt, arrived at Bantam, and finding the situation of his countrymen in that province not favourable to the establishment of a permanent settlement, removed to Jákatra. On the 4th of March, 1621, the name of Batavia was conferred upon the new establishment of the Dutch in Jákatra, which from that period became the capital of their East Indian empire.
In 1683, the English, who had hitherto maintained a successful rivalry with the Dutch, withdrew their establishment from Bantam.
In the year 1811, Holland having become a province of France, the French flag was hoisted at Batavia; and on the 11th September, in the same year, the British government was declared supreme on Java, by a proclamation of that date signed by the Earl of Minto, Governor General of Bengal. On the 17th of the same month, a capitulation was entered into, by which all the dependencies fell into the hands of Great Britain.
On the 13th August, 1814, a convention was entered into by viscount Castlereagh, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, restoring to the Dutch the whole of their former possessions in the Eastern Islands; and on the 19th August, 1816, the flag of the Netherlands was again hoisted at Batavia.
Without adverting to the political importance to Great Britain of the conquest of Java, or to the great commercial advantages which both countries might eventually have derived from its remaining in our hands, I shall merely notice that the loss of it was no immediate or positive evil to the Dutch. For many years prior to the British expedition, Holland had derived little or no advantage from the nominal sovereignty which she continued to exercise over its internal affairs. All trade and intercourse between Java and Europe was interrupted and nearly destroyed; it added nothing to the commercial wealth or the naval means of the mother country: the controul of the latter over the agents she employed had proportionally diminished; she continued to send out governors, counsellors, and commissioners, but she gained from their inquiries little information on the causes of her failure, and no aid from their exertions in improving her resources, or retarding the approach of ruin. The colony became a burden on the mother country instead of assisting her, and the Company which had so long governed it being ruined, threw the load of its debts and obligations on the rest of the nation.
It might have been some consolation for the loss of immediate profit, or the contraction of immediate debt, to know, that such unfavourable circumstances were merely temporary; that they arose out of a state of political relations which affected internal improvement, and that the resources of the colony were progressively increasing, and would become available when peace or political changes should allow trade to flow in its former channels. Whether the Dutch could not indulge such prospects, or whether the system on which the internal government of their eastern dominion was conducted was in itself ruinous under any circumstances, a view of the financial and commercial state of Java before the conquest, and of the causes which led to the losses and dissolution of the Dutch East India Company, will assist the reader in determining.
In tracing these causes, it is hardly necessary to go further back than the period of the Company's history immediately preceding the war of 1780. The accidental calamities of that war brought it to the brink of ruin, and its importance in the past transactions of the country being borne in mind, a general concern existed in Holland for its preservation, and for the restoration and maintenance of its credit. With the view of affording it the most effective and beneficial assistance, inquiries were set on foot, not only to discover some temporary means of relief, but to provide a more permanent remedy for threatened decline. It is impossible to ascertain what might have been the result of the measures which were then in contemplation, as the convulsed state of Europe, and especially of Holland, subsequently to this period, left no room for their operation, and did not even admit of making the experiment of their efficiency. The free intercourse of the mother country with her colonies was interrupted; the trade was thrown into the hands of neutrals; several possessions were lost for the want of due protection, and those which remained were left to support or defend themselves in the best way they could, without any assistance or reinforcement from home.
For ten years preceding the year 1780, the average annual sales of the Company amounted to upwards of twenty millions of guilders, which was considerably more than in former years, and the prices of the different articles were nearly the same as they had been from the years 1648 to 1657, when the sales only amounted on an average to about eight millions a year; it was therefore clear, that the decline of the Company was not to be attributed to the decrease of trade.
On an examination of the Indian books, it was found, that from the year 1613 to 1696, the profits in India, though moderate, had always kept equal pace with the profits in Europe.
| From 1613 | To 1653. | To 1663. | To 1673. | To 1683. | To 1693. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guilders. | Guilders. | Guilders. | Guilders. | Guilders. | |
| The total profits were | 101,704,417 | 142,663,776 | 206,072,335 | 259,250,969 | 322,735,312 |
| Expences | 76,177,755 | 117,616,961 | 161,271,745 | 212,282,020 | 274,416,306 |
| Nett Profits | 25,526,662 | 25,046,315 | 44,330,590 | 46,968,949 | 48,319,506 |
| Thus, on an average of forty years till 1653, the annual profits were about | 640,000 | guilders a year; | ||
| Of fifty years | to 1663 | about | 500,000 | do. |
| Of sixty do. | to 1673 | 750,000 | do. | |
| Of seventy do | to 1683 | 670,000 | do. | |
| Of eighty do | to 1693 | 600,000 | do. | |
In the year 1696, the nett profit from the same year (1613) amounted to only 40,206,789 guilders, being full eight millions less than it had been in 1693, only three years preceding; and the average nett annual profit from 1613 was reduced to 484,371 guilders. But from 1697 to 1779, comprehending a like period of eighty-three years, the losses were so exorbitant as to overbalance and absorb, not only the contemporary, but all the preceding profits in Europe, and even a large amount of fictitious profit stimulated to screen the government in India.
The nett amount of profits calculated from 1613, amounted
| Guilders. | ||
|---|---|---|
| In 1697 | to only | 38,696,527 |
| In 1703 | 31,674,645 | |
| In 1713 | 16,805,598 | |
| In 1723 | 4,838,925 | |
| In 1724 | 1,037,777 | |
In 1730 there was already a total loss of 7,737,610, and in the year 1779 this loss amounted to 84,985,425.
The Company used to send yearly to India, before the commencement of the war of 1780, twenty ships of about nine hundred tons each, and eight or ten of about eight hundred tons each, which, to the number of twenty-two or twenty-three, returned with cargoes: four from China, three from Ceylon, three from Bengal, one from Coromandel, and twelve or thirteen from Batavia. They annually exported to India provisions and other articles of trade to the amount of two millions six or eight thousand florins, and in cash from four to six millions, and sold yearly to an amount generally of twenty or twenty-one millions; and it was estimated that the Indian trade maintained, directly and indirectly, all the external commerce of Holland, employing a capital of about two hundred and sixty millions of florins.
From the inquiries of a commission appointed by the government of Holland, in the year 1780, to ascertain the real state of the Company's finances, and to report how far the nation would be warranted in giving its further support to the credit of an institution which had so rapidly declined, it appeared that in 1789, the arrears of the Company amounted to seventy-four millions of florins, and that this amount had since increased to eighty-four or eighty-five millions, of which sum no less than 67,707,583 florins had been advanced by the nation.
The Commissioners, however, being of opinion, that the affairs of the Company were not irretrievable, recommended a further loan of seven millions of florins.
A meritorious servant of the Company, Mr. C. Tetsingh, had offered to the Commissioners a memorial, in which he proposed that the Company should abandon the trade to private merchants under certain restrictions; but on this proposal the Commissioners stated that they were not then prepared to offer an opinion.
This Commission, in reporting upon the manner in which the Company's affairs had been managed in India, declared that "they could not conceal the deep impression which the same had made upon their minds, and that they could not fix their thoughts upon it, without being affected with sentiments of horror and detestation...." "When," said they, "we take a view of our chief possession and establishment, and when we attend to the real situation of the internal trade of India, the still increasing and exorbitant rate of the expenses, the incessant want of cash, the mass of paper money in circulation, the unrestrained peculations and faithlessness of many of the Company's servants, the consequent clandestine trade of foreign nations, the perfidy of the native princes, the weakness and connivance of the Indian government, the excessive expenses in the military department and for the public defence; in a word, when we take a view of all this collectively, we should almost despair of being able to fulfil our task, if some persons of great talents and ability among the directors had not stepped forward to devise means by which, if not to eradicate, at least to stop the further progress of corruption, and to prevent the total ruin of the Company."
The improvements proposed by the directors extended to every branch of the administration abroad. They proposed, first, with regard to the Cape of Good Hope, the yearly arrears of which settlement had latterly amounted to a million and a half of florins, that the same should be reduced to one half of that sum. With regard to the further eastern possessions, the measures proposed for consideration were chiefly the following.
To confine the Company's future trade to opium, spices, pepper, Japan copper, tin, and sugar, as far as the European and Japan markets would require. To abandon the trade to Western India to the Company's servants and free merchants, under payment of a certain recognition. To abandon several factories in that quarter, and to reduce the rest to mere residencies. To make considerable reductions in the establishment on the coast of Malabar and in Bengal. To reduce the establishments on the coast of Coromandel to three factories. To abandon the establishments on the West coast of Sumatra, and to leave it open to a free trade. To diminish the expenses at Ceylon by a reduction of the military force, and by every other possible means to animate the cultivation and importation of rice into that settlement. To open a free trade and navigation to Bengal and Coromandel, under the superintendence of the Company, on paying a certain recognition. To encourage, by every means, the cultivation of rice in the easternmost possessions, and especially at Amboina and Banda, for the sake of preventing the inducements of a clandestine trade, which the importation of rice to those places might afford. To abandon several small factories to the eastward. To adopt a plan for the trade of Malacca proposed by Governor De Bruem. To introduce a general reduction of establishment at Batavia and elsewhere. To introduce new regulations with regard to the sale of opium at Batavia. To improve the Company's revenue, by a tax upon salaries and a duty upon collateral successions. And finally, to send out commissioners to India, with full powers to introduce a general reform in the administration.
In a memorial subsequently submitted by the Commissioners, which formed the basis of all the measures recommended and adopted at this time, for the better administration of affairs in India, after shewing that, from the year 1770 to 1780, the Company had on the whole of its trade and establishments on the coast of Coromandel, Bengal, Malabar, Surat, and the western coast of Sumatra, averaged a profit of only 119,554 florins a year, they recommended the introduction at Batavia of a public sale of the spices, Japan copper, and sugar, wanted for the consumption of Western India, and the establishment of a recognition of ten per cent. on the piece goods from Bengal, and of fifteen per cent. on the piece goods from Coromandel. Under such a plan of free trade, they calculated that, after the diminution of the Company's establishments in Western India, and the abolition of several small forts and factories to the eastward, it was highly probable that the administration in India would, in future, cover its own expenses, and thereby save the Company from utter ruin.
It was on these calculations that the Commissioners appointed by the States of Holland founded their hopes of the future relief of the Company, and with these prospects they closed their report, the care and future fate of the Company devolving from that time chiefly on the Commissioners appointed at their recommendation to proceed to India, in order to carry into effect, on the spot, the reforms proposed. Of these new Commissioners, Mr. Nederburg, then first advocate to the Company, was appointed the chief.
The Indian Commissioners sailed from Europe in the year 1791. At the Cape of Good Hope they made such changes and reforms as may be said to have fully effected the object of their commission. The importance, however, of the Cape being comparatively small, it is not necessary to enter into any detail of the measures adopted there. The more momentous part of their trust was undoubtedly to be discharged in India, where they arrived in 1793.
If the talents of these Commissioners were to be estimated by the benefits which resulted from their labours, we may safely pronounce them to have been incompetent to the task they had undertaken; but such a criterion cannot with any justice be applied. A continuance of peace with Great Britain was of course reckoned upon in all their calculations, and war with that power broke out almost immediately afterwards.
With regard to the abandonment of several forts and factories to the eastward, to which their attention had been particularly directed, the result of their deliberation and inquiry was, that the continuance of the Company's establishment on Celebes was indispensable for the protection of the Moluccas; that at Timor reductions had been made, in consequence of which the revenues covered the expenses; that after mature investigation the Japan trade was shewn to yield a nett profit of 200,000 florins; that with regard to the West Coast of Sumatra the revenues had been made to exceed the expenses, and the pepper collected in that neighbourhood left still some profit to the Company.
With respect to the institution of public sales at Batavia for Japan copper, spices, and sugar, on the introduction of which it was supposed the establishments in Western India might be for the most part reduced, they were of opinion, after deliberating with the Council of India, and after a personal inquiry into the actual state of the private trade at Batavia, that chiefly for the want of an adequate means among the purchasers such sales were entirely impracticable, and that it would therefore be preferable, after making some partial reductions in the expense, to continue the establishment in Bengal and the coast of Coromandel, but that Cochin on the Malabar coast might, perhaps, be advantageously abandoned[7].
To determine the mode in which the trade with India should in future be conducted, these Commissioners assumed a general calculation of the receipts and disbursements which would occur at home and abroad, on the supposition that the Company should, in future, navigate with hired vessels only, and that all marine establishments should be abolished. The result of this calculation was in abstract as follows. The estimate may be considered as affording an interesting view of the hopes and prospects which were at that time entertained of the resources of the Eastern Islands.
The whole estimate was framed on the principles of monopoly, and with a view to an increase of the trade on the one hand, and a reduction of expenses on the other. The quantity of coffee stated at eighteen million pounds, was calculated upon the produce which might be expected after two years. In the calculation of the quantity of pepper, an augmentation of 1,500,000 pounds beyond the produce of the preceding year was anticipated, from the encouragement given to the growth of that article in Bantam and other parts of Java. With regard to the sugar, calculated at 8,000,000 of pounds for the home cargoes, it is stated, that the actual deliveries
| From Batavia at that time amounted to | 6,000,000 | lbs. |
| From Chéribon | 500,000 | |
| From other ports in Java | 1,000,000 | |
| 7,500,000 | lbs. | |
| Supposing therefore the home cargoes | 8,000,000 | lbs. |
| The demand for Surat | 3,500,000 | |
| For Japan | 900,000 | |
| For the consumption of the Company's own establishments | 200,000 | |
| The quantity required would be | 12,600,000 | lbs. |
Or 5,100,000 pounds more than the actual produce. The whole of that quantity, however, the Commissioners felt confident might be produced in three years, by encouraging the manufacture in the Eastern Districts of Java. Among the retrenchments was a tax upon the salaries of all civil servants, which reduced the average salary of each to the sum of fifteen Spanish dollars per month.
These Commissioners seemed to entertain no very favourable ideas of the benefits which would arise to private trade from the license it already enjoyed. As a measure much more beneficial to the general trade of Europe and to the Company, they proposed, in lieu of it, to throw open to individuals, under certain restrictions, the trade and navigation from Europe to Bengal and Coromandel.
Thus we see these Commissioners sent out with the view of introducing something like free trade on Java, coming to a resolution to take away from it even the little private trade which it had previously been allowed to enjoy.
The Company's trade with continental India had already been so much encroached upon by foreigners, that it was judged expedient no longer to exclude the Dutch free trader from his share in the spoil; but it was hoped, by increased strictness, to preserve entire to the Company the exclusive trade in spices, Javan coffee, pepper as far as it was the produce of her own possessions, Japan copper, the opium which was consumed in Java and in the Moluccas, and Javan sugar.
The trade of the Dutch Company has thus been brought to the period, when its monopoly was proposed to be almost exclusively confined to Java and the Eastern Islands, including Japan. The causes which operated to destroy the Dutch influence on the continent of India, are too well known to require any particular description.
The Dutch had long maintained a decisive superiority, as well on the continent of Asia, as among the Indian islands, until the active exertions of their competitors in trade succeeded in undermining and overturning their monopoly; and as it was natural their weak side should suffer first, it was on the continent, where their establishments were far removed from the chief seat of government, and where they had not been able to insure to themselves those exclusive privileges from the princes of the country which they had exacted from the weaker princes of the Eastern Islands, that other nations, chiefly the French and English, first endeavoured to introduce themselves.
After reciprocal jealousies had for some time prevented both nations from making any considerable progress, a successful war at last turned the scale entirely in favour of the English, whose influence, from that period, has been paramount in continental India, and the Dutch East India Company was no longer able to enforce its system of exclusive trade there.
Without inquiring into the practicability of realizing the flattering estimate made out by the Indian Commissioners, or the policy which dictated a still more rigorous monopoly of the produce of the Eastern Islands, it ought to be remarked, although it seems never to have been adverted to by the Commissioners, whose calculations and plans were exclusively of a commercial nature, that the original situation of the Company as a mere mercantile body, looking out for trade and not dominion, had undergone a material alteration, by the acquisition it had made from the middle of the last century of considerable territorial possessions, especially on the island of Java.
To use the words of one of the most enlightened men who now adorns his country, and is prepared to give energy to a better state of things[8], "these territorial acquisitions became to the Company a source of new relations. In consequence of them, new rights were acquired and obligations of a novel kind were contracted, as well with regard to the territories themselves as the population upon them. The nature of these rights and duties might have been deemed worth inquiry; and as all these territorial acquisitions were made by a delegated authority derived from the government at home, it was further worthy of investigation how far the government itself was entitled to a direct share in the acquisitions made, and how far it was bound to controul and superintend the exercise of those duties which were newly contracted. A consideration of these points would have led to the important question, how far, on a renewal of the Company's charter, it would be requisite to alter and modify its conditions according to existing circumstances, and especially how far it would have been expedient, in future, to leave the Company the exclusive trade, and at the same time the uncontrolled sovereignty over the same country."
But however natural it may be, at the present moment, to consider questions of this kind, it was perhaps at that time beyond the common course of human thought to entertain doubts on the subject. From an honourable regard for ancient institutions, the mercantile system of the Company was still considered with reverence and respect; it had been at all times the boast and pride of the nation; the services which the Company had rendered to the state in its earlier days, and the immense benefits which the government had been enabled, by its means, to spread among the community at large, had rendered the East India Company and all its privileges, objects of peculiar care and tenderness. The rights of sovereignty which the Company afterwards acquired, were obtained by degrees and almost imperceptibly. Every acquisition of the kind had been considered, at the time, merely as the means of increasing its mercantile profits, and all its territorial rights were looked upon as subservient to its mercantile system.
In consequence of these ideas, after the whole of the northern and eastern coast of Java had been added to the Company's territorial dominions, by a cession in the year 1749, no step seems to have been taken for improving these acquisitions, by any direct use of the supremacy obtained. Some contracts were instituted with the native chiefs, for delivering gratis, or at the lowest possible price, such articles as would serve the Company's investments at home; but taxation, the levy of produce, and the management of police and justice in the inferior courts, were left to the care and conscience of the natives themselves.
Arguments in favour of this system may perhaps be drawn from the respect due to the native usages and institutions, and from a supposed want of power, on the part of the Company, to assume any direct controul over the native population. But whatever influence these ideas may have had on the conduct of the Company, it may be affirmed that an European government, aiming only to see right and justice administered to every class of the population, might and ought to have maintained all the native usages and institutions, not inconsistent with those principles; and that the power, for want of which it withheld its interference, would have been supplied and confirmed by the act of exercising the power which it possessed, and by the resources it might have been the means of drawing from the country.
Considering, therefore, the propensity inherent in every native authority to abuse its influence, and to render it oppressive to the population at large; the ascendancy of Europeans in general, even over the class of native chieftains; the scantiness of many of the establishments proposed in the plan of the Indian Commissioners; the manifest inadequacy of the remuneration of the civil servants which it recommended, and the narrow scale on which all expenses were calculated; no very durable benefits could have been reasonably expected from it. The discretionary power being left in the hands of the native chieftains, the whole of the lower class of the population would have remained at their disposal; the ascendancy of the European servants would have subjected both to peculations, which the insufficiency of their salaries would constantly have tempted them to practice; the administration of justice not meeting with a proper remuneration would have been ineffectual, perhaps corrupt; the reduction of the military establishment would have left the possessions an easy prey to the first invader; and the original sources of the Company's revenues in India remaining the same, it seems probable, that in a short time, the same scenes which had hitherto met with so much reprobation, would have been acted over again, and to a still more disgraceful extent.
But of whatever merit might have been the plans suggested by the Commissioners in India on the 4th July, 1795, the calamities which had already befallen the mother country were followed by an event, which it seems the Commissioners had hardly dared to suspect, and which, in every case, would have frustrated all their designs. This was the dissolution of the Company, in consequence of a resolution taken to that effect on the 24th December, by the body then representing the government of the United States of Holland.
New views of policy were of course suggested by this important change. In the year 1800 there appeared a small volume, entitled "A Description of Java and of its principal Productions, shewing the Advantages to be derived therefrom under a better Administration, by Mr. Dirk Van Hogendorp," in which the writer, after observing that the true state of Java and its importance to the mother country had hitherto been little known, or at least that no correct ideas had yet been formed in Holland with regard to its value, fertility, population, and advantageous situation for trade, establishes,
"1. That the system on which the trade in India had hitherto been conducted and the possessions administered, was no longer good under present circumstances, but contained in itself the seeds of decline and ruin.
"2. That the exclusive trade was in its nature injurious, and naturally caused the ruin of the colonies.
"3. That under a different system, those colonies would flourish, and yield much greater advantages than ever.
"4. That a revenue, founded on the principles of freedom of trade, property in the soil, and equality of imposts, could be easily introduced.
"5. And finally, that all the benefits which would thereby accrue to the mother country, from the territorial revenue, the duties on trade, the industry and wealth for which that trade would furnish employment, and the treasures which the distribution of produce throughout Europe must bring into the mother country, would greatly exceed the highest advantages that could be calculated upon, even under the most favourable prospects, by the means of the fallen Company or a continuation of its former system."
Many parts of this pamphlet abound in violence and invective, and others are too highly coloured; but with these exceptions, it may be safely asserted that it contains a more correct view of the state of society, and of the resources of the country, than any paper which had preceded it, and the author is most justly entitled to all the credit of having chalked out to his countrymen the road to honour and prosperity, in the future administration of the Dutch East-Indian colonies.
Having, in the course of the foregoing sketch of the decline and fall of the Dutch East-India Company, exhibited a statement of these resources, under the mercantile system of the Company, it may be interesting also to state what, in the opinion of Mr. Hogendorp, the island of Java alone was capable of affording eventually, under a system founded on the principles of property in the soil, freedom of cultivation and trade, and the impartial administration of justice according to equal rights. "When the exclusive and oppressive trade of the Company, the forced deliveries, the feudal services, in short, the whole system of feudal government, is done away with, and when the effects of this important revolution are felt in the certain increase of cultivation and trade, then," observes Mr. Hogendorp, "the limits of probability will by no means be exceeded, in estimating the aggregate of the revenues of Java, in progress of time, at twelve millions of rix-dollars, or twenty-four millions of guilders, annually."
This statement, calculated with reference to the comparative produce of the West India Islands, has been generally considered by the colonists as exhibiting a very exaggerated view, of what the island could, under any circumstances, afford, and by many as too wild a speculation to deserve attention; but to this it should be added, that the plan on which it was founded, viz. an entire change in the internal management of the country, was considered as equally wild and romantic by those who declaimed the loudest against the possibility of these advantages accruing, and that notwithstanding the doubts then entertained of its practicability, that measure has been actually carried into effect, without producing any one of the consequences depicted by the advocates of the old system, and as far as a judgment can yet be formed, with all the advantages anticipated by Mr. Hogendorp.
It is not surprising to find, that the enlightened views of this writer were never acted upon, when we find it asserted by a commission, who sat at the Hague in 1803, composed of the highest, and perhaps best qualified persons in the state of Holland, and of which he was himself a member (of course a dissenting one), that "it appeared to them to have been admitted generally, and without contradiction, that according to ancient regulations, of which the first institution was lost even among the Javans themselves, the manner in which that people are used to live rests on principles, with which a free and unlimited disposition of the ground and its productions is absolutely inconsistent; that they were, for their parts, convinced that such a change could not be effected, without causing a general fermentation among all classes of people; that though, in this case, violent measures might suppress an insurrection, they would rather advise to bid an eternal farewell to Java, than to resort to such means; that if they adverted to the question in a commercial point of view, the same uncertainty, the same dangers presented themselves. These arose from the natural disinclination of the Javan to work, which has been observed by many eminent persons; the danger of new monopolies, which would fall heavier upon the common people than the present forced deliveries; the exorbitant charges to support a great number of native chiefs and priests, who are at present provided for and ought to be supported; an undoubted deficiency in the revenues, and a considerable expenditure during the first years, without the probability of a remedy. All this," say they, "seems to forebode a neglect of the cultivation; and after long and laborious researches, we are compelled to lay it down as a general principle, that property, of the soil among the common Javans, and the abolition of public services, cannot be adopted as the basis of an improvement, of which the internal management of Java would be susceptible. The contingents and forced deliveries ought therefore to be continued and received on account of the state, which has succeeded to the prerogatives of the former Company[9]."
Marshal Daendels, who was recalled from the government of Java only a few months before the British conquest, and who was by far the most active and energetic governor who had for a long time been at the head of the colony, has written an account of his own administration, of the state in which he found the island, of the measures he proposed and executed, of the improvements which he projected or carried into effect, of the revenues that might be expected, and of the expenditure that the public service required. Although he enters into some free and bold strictures on the conduct of the Commissioners, the estimates they formed, and the policy they recommended, he does not seem himself to have avoided many of the faults which rendered their policy objectionable, or to have entertained any hope of establishing a more liberal system. Forced services and contingents, and all the tyranny which they render necessary, still constituted the greatest part of the ways and means of the colonial treasury, and the grand source of profits for the Company.
The difficulties he had to struggle with, and the peculiar habits and character formed by his profession, seem to have determined his proceedings, more than any matured scheme of general administration, or any deliberate principles of government. He thus describes the situation of the colony on his arrival: "A powerful enemy threatened us by sea, and the Javan princes, acquiring audacity in proportion as they saw proofs of our weakness, thought the moment had arrived for prescribing the law to their former superiors. The very existence of our dominions on Java was thus in the greatest danger. Our internal resources of finance were exhausted, while a stagnation of trade, caused by the blockade of our shores, cut off all hopes of procuring assistance from without. In the midst of such disastrous circumstances, and the failure of so many attempts to introduce reform, and to maintain the dignity of government, I found it necessary to place myself above the usual formalities, and to disregard every law, but that which enjoined the preservation of the colony entrusted to my management. The verbal order which I received, at my departure from Holland, had this for its object, and the approbation bestowed upon my attempts to carry it into execution, encouraged me in the course of proceeding which I had began."
The situation in which the Marshal found the colony is justly drawn; but the result of his operations, and the condition in which he left the government to his successor, are described in colours by far too flattering. His partiality for his own work, and the consciousness of having made great exertions to accomplish it, seems to have influenced his mind too easily, in convincing him of the advantage and success of the measures he had adopted. "In spite," says he, "of all the obstacles I encountered, I obtained the following results. I made the general government the centre of authority, from which every inferior authority descended in a determined proportion, with a definite responsibility and a salutary controul. Into all the local and subordinate administrations, clearness and simplicity were introduced; agriculture was encouraged, protected, and extended; general industry was promoted; the administration of justice and of the police was put on a sure footing; the means of defence were increased as much as possible; many works were undertaken, both for the service of government and other useful ends; new roads were made and old ones improved; the condition of all the inhabitants, as well native as European, was ameliorated, and every cause of misunderstanding removed; the relations of the colonial government with the courts of the native princes were regulated on principles, conformable to the dignity, and conducive to the interests of the former; and, in fine, the revenues of the colony were so augmented, that after every deduction for internal expenditure, they will furnish a surplus of five millions, free of all charge, as a nett return to Holland."
Marshal Daendels, in his memoir, sufficiently showed the fallacy contained in the report of the Commissioners, concerning the estimated revenue and profits of the Company. Instead of the receipt of 1,250,000 florins, accruing from the profit of the sale of opium (as marked in the table which I have transcribed), he assures us that not one farthing was actually obtained. Many of the conclusions of the Commissioners, concerning the temper of the inhabitants, the nature of the soil of particular districts, and the general resources of the island, he satisfactorily proved to be founded on erroneous information or mistake; and it is only to be regretted, that he did not carry the same spirit of impartiality into the formation of his own reports, which he requires in those of his predecessors, or anticipates from his successors, an examination equally rigorous, and a measure of justice equally strict as that to which they were subjected. Had this been the case, we should not have been offered such financial results as make the revenue of the island amount to 10,789,000 rix-dollars, and its expenditure only 5,790,000, leaving a balance of five millions of profit. It may be interesting to compare his estimate with the table already exhibited.
| ESTIMATED RECEIPTS. | ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Rix-dollars. | Rix-dollars. | ||
| Rent of land | 2,000,000 | Civil appointments | 1,000,000 |
| Produce of land unfarmed | 500,000 | Land forces | 1,227,000 |
| Sale of opium[10] | 1,120,000 | Manufactory of powder, foundery of balls, and arsenals | 180,000 |
| Money | 360,000 | Hospitals | 80,000 |
| Coffee, 300,000 pikuls, at 20 rix-dollars | 4,500,000 | Marine | 250,000 |
| Pepper, 30,000 pikuls | 160,000 | Fortifications, &c. | 200,000 |
| Tin, 35,000 pikuls | 400,000 | New works | 400,000 |
| Japan Copper, 25,000 pikuls | 250,000 | Justice and police | 150,000 |
| Spices | 1,000,000 | Transports and freights | 300,000 |
| Forests | 250,000 | Transport of Company's servants, recruits, &c. from Europe | 300,000 |
| Sale of rice | 250,000 | Purchase of native articles | 300,000 |
| Package | 100,000 | ||
| Interest | 400,000 | ||
| Unforeseen charges | 903,000 | ||
| 5,790,000 | |||
| 10,790,000 | Which being subtracted from | 10,790,000 | |
| Leaves a nett profit, Rix-dollars | 5,000,000 | ||