Trade and Commerce
The mercantile movement in the Ukraine, as, in fact, in all of Eastern Europe, is comparatively slight. To give an exact picture of Ukrainian commerce is much more difficult than to describe its agricultural and industrial production. The great exchanges of goods in the interior, the commercial relations of the Ukraine with the other districts of Russia and Austria-Hungary, its part in the export trade of these states,—all this matter awaits working up on the part of competent economists and geographers.
The Ukrainian people take but little part in the commercial activity of their country; the Ukrainian peasant simply considers trade an occupation very little in accord with the rank of a landed proprietor, and the middle class has only begun in the last decades to recover from the suppression of centuries. Hence, Ukrainian commerce lies almost wholly in the hands of the foreign races—the Russians, Jews, Armenians and Greeks.
The causes of this condition are usually sought and found by the foreign (Russian and Polish) “standard-bearers of culture” in the indifference and incapacity for culture of the Ukrainians. This explanation, however, can be objected to when we recall the great commercial importance of the ancient Kingdoms of Kiev and Halich, as well as the long perseverance of the Ukrainian trade down into the 16th Century, despite its systematic suppression by the Polish Government. Naturally, the five centuries of Tatar invasion caused severe injuries to Ukrainian trade. And when the commercial activity of the Ukraine of the hetmans began to flourish in the 17th and 18th Centuries, it was systematically suppressed by the Russian [[293]]Government, following the ill-fated rebellion of Mazeppa. Then we must consider the difficulties of competition with the Russians, a very talented commercial race, with the Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks. Most keenly, however, the calamitous lack of education is being felt. Wherever the education of the people is more advanced, as, for example, in Eastern Galicia, there is a revival of the commercial spirit in the Ukrainians. The Galician Ukrainians have thousands of shops, large commercial co-operative organizations (Narodna Torhovla, with seventeen branch warehouses and several hundred shops, Soyuz tohorvelnick spilok, Soyuz zbutu khudobi, etc.), with the large annual turnover (large for Galician conditions) of 25 million crowns. The enlightened peasantry of Sinevidsko and vicinity (Boiko country) carries on an active fruit-trade far beyond the Austrian borders. Even in the Russian Ukraine trade is coming to life in all places. The co-operative movement has taken such a bound in advance, in spite of the frightful illiteracy, that in 1912 there were over 2500 such organizations, while all of Russia (including the Ukraine) had 5260, and Poland only 920. From these facts we may safely conclude that, with the elevation of the grade of culture, the former commercial spirit of the Ukraine is reawakening. To be sure, the sturdy, upright nature of the Ukrainian, which abhors every form of dishonesty, will not lend to this new commercial spirit a world-conquering character, but it will, on the other hand, increase the influence of the Ukrainian merchant in the commercial world.
The present condition of commerce in the Ukraine is still very primitive; first, because of the generally low grade of culture; second, because of the very primitive traffic conditions of Eastern Europe.
The first mark of the primitive condition is probably the existence of countless annual fairs in the Ukraine—a [[294]]relic of medieval trade conditions. The number of annual fairs in the Russian Ukraine exceeds 4000, altho it is far out of proportion to the great number of annual fairs in Great Russia. But out of twenty-two grand annual fairs of Russia, eleven fall to the Ukrainian territory—four in Kharkiv, two in Romny, one in Poltava, Kursk, Kolevez, Yelisavet and Sumy, respectively. In addition, there are the once famous Kiev “kontrakti” (now declining), and the smaller annual fairs in Berdichiv, Zitomir, Dubno, etc. The greatest exchanges of goods take place in the Yordan fair in Kharkiv (January 20th), and the Elias fair (August 2nd) in Poltava. Here the wholesale dealers sell their goods to the retailers (Ofenyi—Russians from the Governments of Vladimir and Slobozani—Russian sectarians, colonists from the Chernihiv country, Jewish retailers who sell in the right half of the Ukraine), who buy or supplement their stock of goods during the annual fairs. In these wholesale transactions, the so-called prassoli—Russian barterers—also engage, dealers who travel all year thru the villages of the Ukraine, exchange the wool, bristles and flax of the peasants for hardware, and sell the collected raw materials to the wholesalers. In this annual fair system, the Ukrainians have, until recently, played an important part as paid drivers, who drove the goods on their oxcarts from fair to fair. These drivers at one time formed a sort of class of their own—the “chumaki”—and even engaged independently in the trading of the Crimean salt and the dried fish of the Sea of Azof. The railroads have put an end to the former importance of the chumaki, yet the scanty length of the Ukrainian railway system prevents this carting industry from disappearing altogether. In the eighties of the past century there were counted in the districts of Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv, 210,000 chumaks; in the year 1897, in Kherson, Katerinoslav, Tauria and Don, about 100,000 of these hired drivers. [[295]]
The fair system of Ukrainian trade is carried on not only by means of great annual fairs, which, by the way, are decreasing in importance year by year, but also by means of an enormous number of smaller annual fairs in the cities, towns, and even villages of the Russian Ukraine, which take care of the retail trade. In the Austrian Ukraine the annual fairs (as for instance, the once famous fairs of Tarnopol, Ulashkivtzi, Czernowitz) have lost all significance since the modernization of the country’s commerce.
World-commerce has, until very recently, left the Ukraine almost untouched. This is one of the reasons why the primitive forms of commerce were able to last so long in the Ukraine. Until recently, world-commerce has taken the Ukraine merely for a producing and exporting country of raw materials, and left the supplying of local demands to the traditional forms of trade. Only within the last decades has the modern commercial organization begun slowly to take in the Ukraine. The exchanges in Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, Kreminchuk, Mikolaiv, Tahanroh, Rostiv, the chambers of commerce in Lviv and Brodi, are organizing the export of raw materials from the Ukraine, and the flooding of the country with the products of foreign industry is becoming more and more intensive.
In spite of all we have mentioned, the significance of the Ukraine in the internal commerce of Russia and in world-trade is very great. The natural resources of the country, its situation on the threshold of Asia and the Mediterranean world, its property of being a direct hinterland of the Black Sea, give to the Ukraine a commercial importance with which that of any other individual district of European Russia, the Baltic lands and Poland not excepted, can never compare.
In the internal commerce of Russia, the Ukraine figures, first of all, as purveyor of foodstuffs, and in Austria-Hungary the Austrian Ukraine plays the same part on a small [[296]]scale. To represent these relations in figures encounters great difficulties, and the figures can be only approximate. In 1895 the Ukraine exported over 1.5 million metric hundredweights of grain to Lithuania and White Russia, about 1.7 million metric hundredweights to Poland, and about 0.9 million metric hundredweights to Central Russia. In 1905, two Ukrainian districts alone, Poltava and Kharkiv, exported over 0.7 metric hundredweights of grain to Central Russia. These figures must be much greater today. And the grain exportation of the Austrian Ukraine to the interior of Austria must be relatively as great. As a matter of fact, Galicia produces one-third of the total Austrian output of oats and wheat, and almost half the output of potatoes.
Quite as important is the Ukraine’s exportation of live-stock. In the years 1902–1904, the Ukraine exported 80,000 head of cattle to Central Russia, and the part played by Galicia as purveyor of live-stock for slaughter is well-known. Equally important is the exportation of small cattle, poultry, eggs and butter. The exportation of wool from the Southern Ukraine plays an important part in the internal commerce of Russia. The Polissye, Carpathian and Caucasus regions furnish great quantities of lumber for exportation. The mineral products of the Ukraine are used for the greater part outside the country—Caucasian and Carpathian petroleum, the iron ore of Krivi Rih, the salt, the manganese, the coal of the Donetz Plateau. Of the entire yield of coal of the Donetz basin in 1905, barely one-third was used up in the factories of this region; the other two-thirds were to serve the advancement of Central Russian industry. All these products are the object of an active export trade.
In comparison with the exports, the imports of the Ukraine cannot be very large. The imports embrace, almost exclusively, products of foreign manufacturing. [[297]]In view of the general poverty and the very limited wants of the Ukrainian peasantry, these imports must be small, since home industry still covers the greatest part of the demand.
The part of the Ukraine in the external commerce of the Russian State is very important, while the Austrian Ukraine plays a very subordinate part in this respect. The ten central regions of the Ukraine furnish over 60% of the total grain export of Russia. In the customs districts of the Ukrainian part of the western border of Russia, 28.6 million rubles’ worth of goods was exported, 14.3 million rubles imported. The customs districts of the Pontian and Azof coast within the borders of the Ukraine passed 245 million rubles in exports, 64.8 million rubles in imports. Over the borders of Russian Ukraine passed 33% of the Russian exportation and only 11% of the importation. This shows us how much the Ukraine contributes to the balance of trade in favor of Russia.
Traffic in the Ukraine is very slightly developed. Altho the natural conditions for traffic are very favorable, the historical fortunes of the country took such a course that we cannot wonder at the present state of intercourse. The Ukraine was for a long time under the domination of Poland, which never cared for the condition of the roads; then the country fell under the rule of Russia, which to this day stands upon a very low level as far as traffic conditions are concerned. The Austrian Ukraine has the greatest number and the best roads, but they are found especially in Bukowina and Northern Hungary. For in Galicia, where most of the roads are under the management of the autonomous Polish authorities, the condition of the roads is sad enough.
The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian highways are unpaved. All that the Russian geographer, Krassnov, [[298]]has said in general about the highways of Russia, applies in its fullest extent to the unpaved, unmacadamized roads of the Ukraine. These roads are among the worst in the world. In the summer they are enveloped in clouds of dust; in the spring and fall, as well as in rainy weather, they are strips of bottomless mud, in which even the light farm-wagon sinks to its axles. Wherever it is at all possible, vehicles drive across the fields along the roadway. Worst of all are the ways in the vicinity of and within villages and small towns. Drains and bridges are either unknown, or else there are not enough of them. The kind of roads just described are known in the entire right half of the Ukraine by the traditional name of “Polish roads.” Still worse are the cane and corduroy roads of the Polissye; riding over these a long time becomes a positive torture to the traveler. In the Hutzul country most of the roads are ordinary bridle-paths (plai), accessible only to foot passengers and bridle-horses.
In Galicia, only villages and hamlets are connected by unpaved roads; in the Russian Ukraine even large cities. Not a single macadamized road leads to cities like Poltava, Kreminchuk, Katerinoslav, Rostiv, Kherson. That such negligence of the government should cause the Ukrainian peasantry incalculable damage, and actually hinder trade and commerce, is obvious at once.
Macadamized roads are very scarce in the Ukraine as a whole. The Austro-Hungarian part of the Ukraine, altho in this respect it is far behind the cultural countries of Europe, possesses a greater absolute number of macadamized roads than the Russian Ukraine, which is ten times as large in area. All cities and towns of the Austrian Ukraine are connected by macadamized roads. Eight such roads meet at Lemberg, seven in Czernowitz, six each in Peremishl, Ternopil, Kolomia, Buchach, Horodenka, etc. In the Russian Ukraine, on the other hand, the only macadamized [[299]]roads that deserve the name, are the road from Homel to Kiev, the road from Kiev to Berestia (by way of Zitomir, Novhorod-Volinsky, Rivne, with branches to Dubno and to Kremianetz, Lutzk, Kovil), the road from Tomashiv to Lublin, the road from Starokonstantiniv to Kamenetz, the road from Kursk to Kharkiv, and the mountain-road in the Yaila Mountains in Crimea. The remaining “great tracts” and “post-roads” (altho they sometimes figure as macadamized roads) are in such a miserable condition, that even in the large cities they look more like moraines than streets in a civilized city.
Quite analogous conditions prevail, also, in the railroad traffic of the Ukraine. In this respect, too, the Austrian Ukraine surpasses the Russian Ukraine by far, despite the backward condition of the former. Galicia, for instance, has 5 kilometers of railroad for 100 square kilometers of surface, the Russian Ukraine barely 1 kilometer. Besides the loose mesh of the railway-net of the Ukraine, there is the additional disadvantage that its lines tend toward foreign centers, and consider the local needs of Ukrainian traffic only in rare cases. Galicia, separated from the rest of Austria-Hungary by the natural boundary of the Carpathians, has had to develop an independent system of railways, with the main junction at Lemberg. In the Russian Ukraine all the main lines were built only for the convenience of the Moscow center and the Baltic ports. Hence, there is no direct railway line between Kiev and Odessa, for instance, or to Kharkiv, while there exist almost straight line connections between Romen and Libau, between Sevastopol and Kharkiv and Moscow. Besides that, strategic factors were the deciding ones in the building of the railroads (particularly in Western Ukraine), and the economic life of the country often has had to suffer for it.
A third disadvantageous aspect of the Russian Ukrainian railway system is its tariff regulations, the purpose of [[300]]which is to concentrate the greatest possible amount of traffic on the railroads of Central Russia and the Baltic provinces, and thus redound to their advantage. As a result of this tariff policy of the Russian Government, it happens that it is sometimes cheaper to transport goods from the Ukraine to the most distant Baltic ports, than to the adjacent ports of the Black Sea. Thus, the tariff rates for grain from Romen to Libau (1077 versts) are 21 kopeks per pud, from Romen to Mikolaiv (429 kilometers) 18 kopeks. It costs more money and trouble to transport coal from the Donetz region to the Black Sea ports than to the ports of the Baltic, which, of course, are far more distant. Naturally Pontian navigation suffers above all from this cause, but all Ukrainian trade in general suffers likewise.
As a result of the loose web of the net of railroads, and the destination of all the railroad lines in the Ukraine to foreign centers, there are almost no important railway centers in the Ukraine. The only center of European proportions is Lemberg, where nine main and local lines meet. Striy, Stanislaviv, Kolomia and Ternopil are smaller junctions, with five converging lines. In the Russian Ukraine, only Berestia and Kharkiv deserve the name of railway junction, in the strict sense of being a point of intersection of at least two main lines; the same is true of Poltava and Rostiv. The dependence of the Ukrainian railway lines upon foreign centers is the cause of the fact that frequently very important crossings lie beyond large towns, near to some miserable little village, as for example, Sarni, Bakhmach, Kosiatin, Zmerinka, etc. The only concentrated district of the Ukrainian railroad system with numerous local junctions, lies in the Donetz Plateau.
We shall now enumerate several railroads of the Ukraine which are most important for the traffic of the country. The Ukraine is connected with the Black Sea by means of seven main lines: Lemberg-Odessa, Znamenka-Mikolaiv, [[301]]Kharkiv-Sevastopol (with a branch to Kerch), Katerinoslav-Berdiansk, Donetz Plateau-Mariupol, Donetz Plateau-Tahanroh, Katerinodar-Novorossysk. Direct railroad connections with Roumania exist via Tiraspol to Yassy, and from Lemberg by way of Czernowitz to Bukarest. The following lines lead into Hungary: Stanislaviv-Sihot, Lemberg-Mukachiv, Lemberg-Uzhorod-Peremishl-Uihely. The connection with Austrian-Poland (Western Galicia) is formed by the Lemberg-Cracow and Stanislaviv-New-Sandetz lines, the connection with Russian-Poland by the lines of Kovel-Lublin-Warsaw and Berestia-Sidletz-Warsaw. The lines of Berestye-Bilostok, Rivne-Vilna, and Romen-Minsk-Libau lead north to White Russia, Lithuania and the Baltic. The Ukraine is connected with the north and northeast (Great Russia) by the lines of Kiev-Kursk, Kharkiv-Moscow, Kupiansk-Penza-Samara, and Donetz Plateau-Voroniz. Eastward, the railroad lines run from the Donetz region and Katerinodar to the bend of the Volga, and from Rostiv along the Caucasus to Baku.
In the Ukraine itself, the main lines of the railroads should run in a direction west and northwest to east and southeast. Hence, the main paths of traffic should be the following lines: Czernowitz-Odessa, Berestye-Rivne-Berdichiv-Uman, Kovel-Kiev-Poltava-Donetz region-Rostiv, Fastiv-Katerinoslav, Novosibkiv-Sumi-Kharkiv-Donetz Plateau, etc. As a result of the railroad policy of the Russian Government, the north and south lines, which lead directly or indirectly to the Muscovite centers, are held to be more important, as for instance, the following: Berestye-Minsk-Moscow, Lemberg-Rivne-Vilna, Novoselitza-Kiev-Kursk, Vapniarka-Cherkassi-Piriatin, Mikolaiv-Kreminchuk-Romni, Balta-Kreminchuk-Kharkiv-Kursk, etc. Of greatest importance are, also, the industrial railroads which connect the iron mines of Krivi Rih with the coal-fields of the Donetz region, via Katerinoslav. [[302]]
The waterways of the Ukraine were at one time the main roads of trade and commerce. The great cultural mission of the Ukrainian waterways is familiar from history; thru the course of long centuries they were the only convenient thorofares thru the difficult forest regions and the pathless steppes of the Ukraine. Traffic on the Ukrainian waterways was, in former times, much more important than at present, not only because of the lack of other convenient pathways, but also because of their former greater length and capacity. Deforestation has decreased the normal level of the rivers; mill-dams have cut off the once navigable stretches of water.
The Ukraine possesses almost no artificial waterways. The only ones in existence—the Orginski Canal (Yassiolda-Vihonivske ozero-Shchara, 54 kilometers of canal, 124 kilometers of connected watercourses) and the Dnieper-Buh Canal (Pina-Mokhavez, 81 kilometers of canal, 134 kilometers of connected watercourses)—were built back in the days of Polish rule. They are antiquated, shallow and neglected, so they can serve only occasionally, and then only for log-floating.
The total length of Ukrainian waterways exceeds 7000 kilometers, which is just as much as the length of the waterways of Austria or of England, but only one-tenth that of European Russia. In this figure, sections of rivers are included which are navigable only for smaller river vessels.
The statement of the navigability of individual rivers of the Ukraine is contained in the section which deals with the rivers of the Ukraine (v. p. 70 ff.).
The most important waterway of the Ukraine is the Dnieper system. The main river is navigable in its entire Ukrainian section by the largest river vessels. In the entire Russian river system the Dnieper system constitutes 11% of the length, 10% of the total navigable length, 16% of [[303]]the length navigable by steamship-lines. The rapids section, however, as a result of the incomprehensible negligence of the Russian Government, is, to this day, accessible only to the smaller ships and rafts, and then only for sailing downstream. The canals built by the Government in the Porohi (1843–1856) are so badly placed that navigation, to this day, must still keep largely to the natural ancient “Cossack paths.” In the years 1893–1895, investigating engineering commissions determined that it was possible, without great cost, to make the Porohi section completely navigable. But the thing never went any further than that. At the beginning of the 20th Century, English engineers worked out a plan for the complete regulation of the Pohori section and the construction of a waterway, accessible even to sea-going ships, which should connect the Baltic with the Black Sea by means of the Dvina and the Dnieper. The realization of this plan, which would be of the very greatest importance to the Ukraine, is still distant, and there is no hope that the Russian Government will attack it very soon.
Thus, the rapids hinder Dnieper navigation to this day, and not least for the reason that the insurance companies will not insure vessels for the rapids section. For this reason, the river fleet of the Dnieper is separated into two parts. Above the rapids (in 1900) 208 steamboats and 1002 other ships, below the rapids (together with the inlets of the Boh) 148 steamboats and 1203 other ships were plying. The number of steamboats increased threefold above the rapids and doubled below the rapids during the last sixteen years of the last century. The total horse power in 1900 was over 16,000. In 1906 the number of steamers of the Dnieper region was 382, the number of other ships 2218.
The Dnieper ships, propelled by sails and oars, which carry lumber, grain, fruit and other goods, are of various [[304]]types. The largest are called “honchaki,” and have a tonnage of up to 1400; then come the “barzi” and “barki” (900–1300 tons), “berlini” (800–1140 tons), which are the most useful, “baidaki” (650 tons), “trembaki,” “laibi,” “dubi” (130–160 tons), “lodki” (80 tons), “galari” (50 tons), and “chaiki” (30 tons). The tonnage of the river fleet of the Dnieper (not counting steamers), in 1900, was approximately 500,000 tons, hence not much less than the tonnage of the present Austro-Hungarian merchant-marine.
Besides this, the Dnieper and its tributaries are navigated by a great number of rafts. In 1910 the number of them was 15,676.
Of the river harbors of the Dnieper system, Kherson carries on the greatest exchange of goods (10 million q. in 1910). Then follow Kiev (5.3 million q.), Katerinoslav (3.1 million q.), Cherkassi (2.1 million q.), Niznodniprovsk (1 million q.), Chernihiv (0.6 million q.), and Pinsk (0.5 million q.).
Navigation on the Don, as a result of the small volume of water, is much slighter than the Dnieper navigation, despite the absence of rapids. In 1900, the number of steamboats on the Don was 189, with 10,000 horse-power (in 1906 it was 382); the number of other ships 488, with 200,000 tonnage (in 1906 only 471 ships). The main river-harbor is Rostiv, which handles goods to the amount of 7.5 million q. annually.
A good deal smaller still is the navigation of the Dniester. Here, in 1900, there were only 9 steamers, with 200 horse-power (16 steamers in 1906), and 187 ships of other kinds with a tonnage of 22,000 tons (277 of them in 1906). The harbors of the main stream are Benderi (handles 0.7 million q. of goods) and Maiaki (0.5 million q.). On the Kuban River 69 steamers (counting in those of the Kura) and 131 other ships plied in 1906. [[305]]
In general, river navigation in the Ukraine is on a very moderate scale. The negligence of the Russian Government and the low grade of culture limit the development of Ukrainian interior navigation. Thru the regulation of the Dnieper rapids and the connection of the river systems of the Dnieper and Dniester with the Baltic waters, by means of practicable canals, the waterways of the Ukraine could attain a wonderful importance.
Having come to the end of our description of Ukrainian traffic, we must still devote some attention to Ukrainian sea-navigation. Its present condition is as lamentable as the general condition of Ukrainian traffic. Of course, there is no doubt that the Black Sea has many qualities unfavorable to the development of navigation—its seclusion, the lack of good harbors, and an abundance of dangerous storms. Yet, what are these disadvantages against modern engineering? To assign all the blame to the low grade of Russian industry, as the Russian publicists are in the habit of doing, will not do. The causes of the slight development of Pontian navigation should be sought in the low cultural conditions of the ruling Russian nation and in the indolence of the government, which is not properly encouraging this navigation. The Russian steamers do not enjoy a good reputation on the Black Sea. Pontian coastwise navigation, which at the beginning of the 19th Century had a splendid start, and was carried on predominantly by Ukrainians, has not been able to develop properly under the heavy fist of the government. Today, conditions on the Black Sea are such, that the transportation of a unit by weight of goods from one Pontian harbor to another, costs just as much as the transportation of the same unit from the same port to England.
The number of steamers which sail the Black Sea under the Russian flag was, in 1901, only 316, with a tonnage of 187,000 tons, that is, 42% of the number and 52% of the [[306]]tonnage of the entire steamship fleet of Russia. In 1912 the figures were 410 steamers, 223,000 tons, the percentages being 42% and 47%. The number of sailing vessels in 1901 was 635, with a total tonnage of 47,000, and in the year 1912 there were 827 sailing vessels, with over 53,000 tons. The development of Pontian navigation is thus going a very slow, if not a retrogressive course.
The Russian Black Sea steamers maintain a more or less regular service between the most important Black Sea ports—Odessa, Mikolaiv, Kherson, Sevastopol, Rostiv, Novorossysk, etc. From Sevastopol a line goes to Constantinople, from Odessa one to Alexandria and Vladivostok.
Despite this miserable condition of Pontian navigation, from a European point of view, it still has greater significance than navigation on other seas of Russia. Near the end of the past century, 70% of the total oversea exportation of Russia by weight, and 65% by value, went thru the harbors of the Ukrainian coast. To be sure, in 1896, only 7.5% of the ships which visited these ports sailed under the Russian flag. In the year of 1911 it was not much different; of the outgoing ships only 11.4%, and of the incoming ships only 13.9% carried the Russian flag!
Among the Black Sea ports, Odessa, now, as ever, takes first place. The imports of Odessa, in 1911, amounted to 19.2 million q., the exports 26.2 million q. This, by the way, is an example of the great preponderance of exportation over importation. In other ports the disparity is even greater. Thus, the imports of Mikolaiv amount to only 2.3 million q., the exports 22.8 million q. For Tahanroh the respective figures are 1.9 and 19.5, for Novorossysk 1.5 and 18.3, for Mariupol 3.1 and 16.2, for Kherson 1.1 and 11.3, for Feodosia 0.6 and 4.8, for Rostiv 2.1 and 2.4, for Berdiansk 0.3 and 3.9, for Eupatoria 0.8 and 2.9, for Akerman 0.4 and 2.0.
These figures once more bring before our eyes the [[307]]ruinous effect of the economic policy of the Russian Government upon the Ukraine. The natural resources of the Ukraine are exported in enormous masses, without consideration of the needs of the Ukrainian population; the imports are to a great extent directed to other far distant coasts of the Russian Empire, and Great Russia gets the advantage of them, while the Ukraine is flooded with the inferior goods of Central Russian industry. If we consider, further, that an annual customs balance of 200 million rubles goes to the central government from the Ukraine, an amount which is then used for the development of the central provinces, we become able to understand under what unfavorable conditions the economic life of the Ukraine must develop, and how dearly its progress must be paid for.