Personal reminiscences of early days in California, with other sketches

by Stephen J. Field; George C. Gorham

CHAPTER XIX.

EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION.

This case and all the attendant circumstances—the attempted assassination of Justice Field by his former associate, Terry; the defeat of this murderous attempt by Deputy Marshal Neagle; the arrest of Justice Field and the deputy marshal upon the charge of murder, and their discharge—created very great interest throughout the United States. They were the subject of articles in all the leading journals of the country; and numerous telegrams and letters of congratulation were sent to the Justice on his escape from the murderous attempt. Satisfaction was very generally expressed at the fate which Terry met, and much praise was given to the courageous conduct of Neagle and at the bearing of Justice Field under the trying circumstances.

A few of the letters received by him are here given, and citations are made from some of the periodicals, which indicated the general sentiment of the country.

Letter from Hon. T.F. Bayard, ex-Secretary of State:

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, August 18, 1889.

MY DEAR BROTHER FIELD:

I was absent from home when I first saw in the newspapers an account of the infamous assault of the Terrys—husband and wife—upon you, and the prompt and courageous action of Deputy Marshal Neagle that happily frustrated the iniquitous plot against your life.

Accept, my dear friend, my fervent congratulations on your escape from the designs of this madman and of the shameless creature who was his wife and accomplice.

For the sake of our country and its reputation in the eyes of Christendom, I am indeed grateful that this vile stab at its judicial power, as vested in your personality, miscarried, and that by good fortune the insane malice of a disappointed suitor should have been thwarted.

Your dignified courage in this tragical episode is most impressive, and, while it endears you the more to those who love you, will wring even from your foes a tribute of respect and admiration.

Passing over the arguments that may be wrought out of the verbiage of our dual constitution of government, the robust and essential principle must be recognized and proclaimed—that the inherent powers of every government which are sufficient to authorize and enforce the judgments of its courts are equally and at all times and in all places sufficient to protect the individual judge who fearlessly and conscientiously, in the discharge of his duty, pronounces those judgments.

The case, my dear friend, is not yours alone; it is equally mine and that of every other American. A principle so vital to society, to the body politic, was never more dangerously and wickedly assailed than by the assault of Terry and his wife upon you for your just and honorable performance of your duty as a magistrate.

I can well comprehend the shock to which this occurrence has subjected you, and I wish I could be by your side to give you assurance orally (if any were needed) of that absolute sympathy and support to which you are so fully entitled. But these lines will perhaps suffice to make you feel the affectionate and steadfast regard I entertain for you, and which this terrible event has but increased.

I cannot forbear an expression of the hope that the arguments of jurisdictional and other points which must attend the litigation and settlement of this tragedy may not be abated or warped to meet any temporary local or partisan demand.

The voice of Justice can never speak in clearer or more divine
accents than when heard in vindication and honor of her own
faithful ministers.

Ever, my dear Judge Field,
Sincerely yours,
T.F. BAYARD.

The Hon. STEPHEN J. FIELD,
San Francisco, Cal.

Letter from Hon. E.J. Phelps, former Minister to England:

BURLINGTON, VERMONT, August 17, 1889.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

Pray let me congratulate you most heartily on the Terry transaction. Nothing that has ever occurred in the administration of justice has given me more satisfaction than this prompt, righteous, and effectual vindication through an officer of the court of the sanctity of the judiciary when in the discharge of its duty. What your marshal did was exactly the right thing, at the right time, and in the right way. I shall be most happy to join in a suitable testimonial to him, if our profession will, as they ought, concur in presenting it. * * *

Your own coolness and carriage in confronting this danger in the discharge of your duty must be universally admired, and will shed an additional lustre on a judicial career which was distinguished enough without it.

You have escaped a great peril—acquired a fresh distinction—and vindicated most properly the dignity of your high station.

I am glad to perceive that this is the general opinion.
Anticipating the pleasure of seeing you in Washington next
term,

I am always, dear sir,
Most sincerely yours,
E.J. PHELPS.

Letter from Hon. George F. Hoar, Senator from Massachusetts:

WORCESTER, August 16, 1889.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

I think I ought to tell you, at this time, how high you stand in the confidence and reverence of all good men here, how deeply they were shocked by this outrage attempted not so much on you as on the judicial office itself, and how entirely the prompt action of the officer is approved. I hope you may long be spared to the public service.

I am faithfully yours,
GEO. F. HOAR.

Letter from Hon. J. Proctor Knott, for many years a Member of Congress from Kentucky and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, and afterwards Governor of Kentucky:

LEBANON, KENTUCKY, September 5, 1889.

MY DEAR JUDGE: * * *

I have had it in mind to write you from the moment I first heard of your fortunate escape from the fiendish assassination with which you were so imminently threatened, but I have, since the latter part of May, been suffering from a most distressing affection of the eyes which has rendered it extremely difficult, and frequently, for days together, quite impossible to do so. Even now, though much improved, I write in great pain, but I cannot get my consent to delay it longer on any account. You are to be congratulated, my dear friend, and you know that no one could possibly do so with more genuine, heartfelt sincerity than I do myself. * * *

I had been troubled, ever since I saw you had gone to your circuit, with apprehensions that you would be assassinated, or at least subjected to some gross outrage, and cannot express my admiration of the serene heroism with which you went to your post of duty, determined not to debase the dignity of your exalted position by wearing arms for your defense, notwithstanding you were fully conscious of the danger which menaced you. It didn't surprise me, however; for I knew the stuff you were made of had been tested before. But I was surprised and disgusted, too, that you should have been charged or even suspected of anything wrong in the matter. The magistrate who issued the warrant for your arrest may possibly have thought it his duty to do so, without looking beyond the "railing accusation" of a baffled and infuriated murderess, which all the world instinctively knew to be false, yet I suppose there is not an intelligent man, woman, or child on the continent who does not consider it an infamous and unmitigated outrage, or who is not thoroughly satisfied that the brave fellow who defended you so opportunely was legally and morally justifiable in what he did. I have not been in a condition to think very coherently, much less to read anything in relation to the question of jurisdiction raised by the State authorities in the habeas corpus issued in your behalf by the U.S. Circuit Court, and it may be that, from the mere newspaper's reports that have reached me, I have been unable to fully apprehend the objections which are made to the courts hearing all the facts on the trial of the writ; but it occurs to me as a plain principle of common sense that the federal government should not only have the power, but that it is necessary to its own preservation, to protect its officers from being wantonly or maliciously interfered with, hindered or obstructed in the lawful exercises of their official duties, not arbitrarily of course, but through its regularly constituted agencies, and according to the established principles of law; and where such obstruction consists in the forcible restraint of the officer's liberty, I see no reason why the federal judiciary should not inquire into it on habeas corpus, when it is alleged to be not only illegal but contrived for the very purpose of hindering the officer in the discharge of his official duties, and impairing the efficiency of the public service. It is true that in such an investigation a real or apparent conflict between State and federal authority may be presented, which a due regard to the respective rights of the two governments would require to be considered with the utmost caution, such caution, at least, as it is fair to presume an intelligent court would always be careful to exercise, in view of the absolute importance of maintaining as far as possible the strictest harmony between the two jurisdictions. Yet those rights are determined and by fixed legal principles, which it would be impossible for a court to apply in any case without a competent knowledge of the facts upon which their application in the particular case might depend. For instance, if your court should issue a writ of habeas corpus for the relief of a federal officer upon the averments in his petition that he was forcibly and illegally restrained of his liberty for the purpose of preventing him from performing his official duties, and it should appear in the return to the writ that the person detaining the prisoner was a ministerial officer of the State government authorized by its laws to execute its process, and that he held the petitioner in custody by virtue of a warrant of arrest in due form, issued by a competent magistrate, to answer for an offense against the State laws, I presume the court, in the absence of any further showing, would instantly remand the petitioner to the custody of the State authorities without regard to his official position or the nature of his public duties. But, on the other hand, suppose there should be a traverse of the return, averring that the warrant of the arrest, though apparently regular in all respects, was in truth but a fraudulent contrivance designed and employed for the sole purpose of hindering and obstructing the petitioner in the performance of his duties as an officer of the government of the United States; that the magistrate who issued it, knowingly and maliciously abused his authority for that purpose in pursuance of a conspiracy between himself and others, and not in good faith, and upon probable cause to bring the prisoner to justice for a crime against the State. How then? Here is an apparent conflict—not a real one—between the rights of the government of the United States and the government of the State. The one has a right to the service of its officer, and the right to prevent his being unlawfully interfered with or obstructed in the performance of his official duties; the other has the right to administer its laws for the punishment of crime through its own tribunals; but it must be observed that the former has no right to shield one of its officers from a valid prosecution for a violation of the laws of the latter not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, nor can it be claimed that the latter has any right to suffer its laws to be prostituted, and its authority fraudulently abused, in aid of a conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the functions of the former. Such an abuse of authority is not, and cannot be in any sense, a bona fide administration of State laws, but is itself a crime against them. What, then, would your court do? You would probably say: If it is true that this man is held without probable cause under a fraudulent warrant, issued in pursuance of a conspiracy to which the magistrate who issued it was a party, to give legal color to a malicious interference with his functions as a federal official, he is the victim of a double crime—a crime against the United States and a crime against the State—and it is not only our duty to vindicate his right to the free exercise of his official duties, but the right of the federal government to his services, and its right to protect him in the legal performance of the same. But if, on the other hand, he has raised a mere "false clamor"—if he is held in good faith upon a valid warrant to answer for a crime committed against the State, it is equally as obligatory upon us to uphold its authority, and maintain its right to vindicate its own laws through its own machinery. To determine between these two hypotheses we must know the facts. * * * The same simple reasoning, it occurs to me, applies to Mr. Neagle's case. Whether he acted in the line of his duty under the laws of the United States, as an officer of that government, is clearly a question within the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. If he did, he cannot be held responsible to the State authority; if he did not, he should answer, if required, before its tribunals of justice. I presume no court of ordinary intelligence, State or federal, would question these obvious principles; but how any court could determine whether he did or did not act in the line of his official duty under the laws of his government without a judicial inquiry into the facts connected with the transaction I am unable to imagine. * * *

I am, as always,
Your faithful friend,
J. PROCTOR KNOTT.

Hon. S.J. FIELD,
Associate Justice Supreme Court U.S.

Letter from Hon. William D. Shipman, formerly U.S. District Judge for the district of Connecticut:

NEW YORK, October 20, 1889.

DEAR JUDGE:

* * * * *

I have attentively read Judge Sawyer's opinion in the Neagle habeas corpus case, and I agree with his main conclusions. It seems to me that the whole question of jurisdiction turns on the fact whether you were, at the time the assault was made on you, engaged in the performance of your official duty.

You had been to Los Angeles to hold court there and had finished that business. In going there you were performing an official duty as much as you were when you had held court there. It was then your official duty to go from Los Angeles to San Francisco and hold court there. You could not hold court at the latter place without going, and you were engaged in the line of your official duty in performing that journey for that purpose, as you were in holding the court after you got there. The idea that a judge is not performing official duty when he goes from court-house to court-house or from court-room to court-room in his own circuit seems to me to be absurd. The distance from one court-house or court-room to another is not material, and does not change or modify the act or duty of the judge.

Now, Neagle was an officer of your court, charged with the duty of protecting your person while you were engaged in the performance of your official duty. His duty was to see to it that you were not unlawfully prevented from performing your official duty—not hindered or obstructed therein. For the State authorities to indict him for repelling the assault on you in the only way which he could do so effectually seems to me to be as unwarranted by law as it would be for them to indict him for an assault on Terry when he assisted in disarming the latter in the court-room last year.

When, therefore, it was conceded on the argument that if the affair at Lathrop had taken place in the court-room during the sitting of the court, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court would be unquestionable, it is difficult for me to see why the whole question of federal jurisdiction was not embraced in that concession. Assassinating a judge on the bench would no more obstruct and defeat public justice than assassinating him on his way to the bench. In each case he is proceeding in the line of official duty imposed on him by law and his official oath. The law requires him to go to court wherever the latter is held, and he is as much engaged in performing the duty thus imposed on him while he is proceeding to the place of his judicial labors as he is in performing the latter after he gets there.

It would, therefore, seem to go without saying that any acts done in defense and protection of the judge in the performance of the duties of his office must pertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of which he forms a part.

The fact that the assault on you was avowedly made in revenge for your judicial action in a case heard by you gives a darker tinge to the deed, but, perhaps, does not change the legal character of the assault itself.

That Neagle did his whole duty, and in no way exceeded it, is
too plain for argument.

Yours faithfully,
W.D. SHIPMAN

Mr. Justice FIELD.

Letter from James C. Welling, president of Columbian University,
Washington:

HARTFORD, August 15, 1889.

MY DEAR JUDGE:

It is a relief to know that Justice, as well as the honored justice of our Supreme Judiciary, has been avenged by the pistol-shot of Neagle. The life of Terry has long since been forfeited to law, to decency, and to morals. He has already exceeded the limit assigned by holy scripture to men of his ilk. "The bloody-minded man shall not live out half his days." The mode of his death was in keeping with his life. Men who break all the laws of nature should not expect to die by the laws of nature.

In all this episode you have simply worn the judicial ermine without spot or stain. You defeated a bold, bad man in his machinations, and the enmity you thereby incurred was a crown of honor. I am glad that you are to be no longer harassed by the menace of this man's violence, for such a menace is specially trying to a minister of the law. We all know that Judge Field the man would not flinch from a thousand Terrys, but Judge Field the Justice could hardly take in his own hands the protection of his person, where the threatened outrage sprang entirely from his official acts.

I wish, therefore, to congratulate you on your escape alike from the violence of Terry and from the necessity of killing him with your own hands. It was meet that you should have been defended by an executive officer of the court assailed in your person. For doubtless Terry, and the hag who was on the hunt with him, were minded to murder you.

Convey my cordial felicitations to Mrs. Field, and believe me
ever, my dear Mr. Justice,

Your faithful friend,
JAMES C. WELLING.

Mr. Justice FIELD.

Letter from Right Rev. B. Wistar Morris, Episcopal Bishop of Oregon:

BISHOPCROFT, PORTLAND, OREGON, August 22, 1889.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

I hope a word of congratulation from your Oregon friends for your escape in the recent tragedy will not be considered an intrusion. Of course we have all been deeply interested in its history, and proud that you were found as you were, without the defenses of a bully.

I will not trespass further on your time than to subscribe
myself,

Very truly your friend,
B. WISTAR MORRIS.

Mr. Justice FIELD.

A copy of the following card was enclosed in this letter:

AN UNARMED JUSTICE.
PORTLAND OREGON, August 19.

To the Editor of the Oregonian:

There is one circumstance in the history of the Field and Terry tragedy that seems to me is worthy of more emphatic comment than it has yet received. I mean the fact that Judge Field had about his person no weapon of defense whatever, though he knew that this miserable villain was dogging his steps for the purpose of assaulting him, perhaps of taking his life. His brother, Mr. Cyrus W. Field, says:

"It was common talk in the East here, among my brother's friends, that Terry's threats to do him bodily harm were made with the full intent to follow them up. Terry threatened openly to shoot the Justice, and we, who knew him, were convinced he would certainly do it if he ever got a chance.

"I endeavored to dissuade my brother from making the trip West this year, but to no purpose, and he said, 'I have a duty to perform there, and this sort of thing can't frighten me away. I know Terry will do me harm if he gets a chance, and as I shall be in California some time, he will have chances enough. Let him take them.'

"When urged to arm himself he made the same reply. He said that when it came to such a pass in this country that judges find it necessary to go armed, it will be time to close the courts themselves."

This was a manly and noble reply and must recall to many minds that familiar sentiment: "He is thrice armed who has his quarrel just." With the daily and hourly knowledge that this assassin was ever upon his track, this brave judge goes about his duty and scorns to take to himself the defenses of a bully or a brigand; and in doing so, how immeasurably has he placed himself above the vile creature that sought his life, and all others who resort to deeds of violence. "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword," is a saying of wide application, and had it been so in this case; had this brave and self-possessed man been moved from his high purpose by the importunity of friends, and when slain by his enemy, had been found armed in like manner with the murderer himself, what a stain would it have been upon his name and honor? And how would our whole country have been disgraced in the eyes of the civilized world, that her highest ministers of justice must be armed as highwaymen as they go about their daily duties!

Well said this undaunted servant of the state: "Then will it be time to close the courts themselves." May we not hope, Mr. Editor, that this example of one occupying this high place in our country may have some influence in staying the spirit and deeds of violence now so rife, and that they who are so ready to resort to the rifle and revolver may learn to regard them only as the instruments of the coward or the scoundrel?

B. WISTAK MORRIS.

The citations given below from different journals, published at the time, indicated the general opinion of the country. With rare exceptions it approved of the action of the Government, the conduct of Neagle, and the bearing of Justice Field.

The Alta California, a leading paper in California, had, on August 15, 1889, the day following the tragedy, the following article:

THE TERRY TRAGEDY.

The killing of David S. Terry by the United States Marshal David Neagle yesterday was an unfortunate affair, regretted, we believe, by no one more than by Justice Field, in whose defense the fatal shot was fired. There seems, however, to be an almost undivided sentiment that the killing was justifiable. Every circumstance attending the tragedy points to the irresistible conclusion that there was a premeditated determination on the part of Terry and his wife to provoke Justice Field to an encounter, in which Terry might either find an excuse for killing the man against whom he had threatened vengeance, or in which his wife might use the pistol which she always carries, in the pretended defense of her husband. For some time past it has been feared that a meeting between Terry and Justice Field would result in bloodshed. There is now indisputable proof that Terry had made repeated threats that he would assault Justice Field the first time he met him off the bench, and that if the Judge resisted he would kill him. Viewed in the light of these threats, Terry's presence on the same train with Justice Field will hardly be regarded as accidental, and his actions in the breakfast-room at Lathrop were directly in line with the intentions he had previously expressed. Neagle's prompt and deadly use of his revolver is to be judged with due reference to the character and known disposition of the man with whom he had to deal and to his previous actions and threats. He was attending Justice Field, against the will of the latter and in spite of his protest, in obedience to an order from the Attorney-General of the United States to Marshal Franks to detail a deputy to protect the person of Justice Field from Terry's threatened violence. A slap in the face may not, under ordinary circumstances, be sufficient provocation to justify the taking of human life; but it must be remembered that there were no ordinary circumstances and that Terry was no ordinary man. Terry was a noted pistol-shot; it was known that he invariably carried arms and that he boasted of his ability to use them. If on this occasion he was unarmed, as Mrs. Terry asserts,[1] Neagle had no means of knowing that fact; on the contrary, to his mind every presumption was in favor of the belief that he carried both pistol and knife, in accordance with his usual habit. As a peace officer, even apart from the special duty which had been assigned to him, he was justified in taking the means necessary to prevent Terry from continuing his assault; but the means necessary in the case of one man may be wholly inadequate with a man bearing the reputation of David S. Terry, a man who only a few months previously had drawn a knife while resisting the lawful authority of another United States officer. It is true that if Terry was unarmed, the deputy marshal might have arrested him without taking his life or seriously endangering his own; but Terry was a man of gigantic stature, and though aged, in possession of a giant's strength; and there is no one who was acquainted with him, or has had opportunity to learn his past history, who does not know that he was a desperate man, willing to take desperate chances and to resort to desperate means when giving way to his impulses of passion, and that any person who should at such a moment attempt to stay his hand would do so at the risk of his life. Whether he had a pistol with him at that moment or not, there was every reason to believe that he was armed, and that the blow with his hand was intended only as the precursor to a more deadly blow with a weapon. At such moments little time is allowed for reflection. The officer of the law was called upon to act and to act promptly. He did so, and the life of David S. Terry was the forfeit. He fell, a victim to his own ungovernable passions, urged on to his fate by the woman who was at once his wife and his client, and perhaps further incited by sensational newspaper articles which stirred up the memory of his resentment for fancied wrongs, and taunted him with the humiliation of threats unfulfilled.

The close of Judge Terry's life ends a career and an era. He had the misfortune to carry into a ripened state of society the conditions which are tolerable only where social order is not fully established. Restless under authority, and putting violence above law, he lived by the sword and has perished by it.

That example which refused submission to judicial finalities was becoming offensive to California, but the incubus of physical fear was upon many who realized that the survival of frontier ways into non-frontier period was a damage to the State. But, be this as it may, the stubborn spirit that defied the law has fallen by the law.

When Justice Field showed the highest judicial courage in the opening incidents of the tragedy that has now closed, the manhood of California received a distinct impetus. When the Justice, with threats made against his life, returned to the State unarmed, and resentful of protection against assault, declaring that when judges must arm to defend themselves from assault offered in reprisal of their judicial actions society must be considered dissolved, he was rendering to our institutions the final and highest possible service. The event that followed, the killing of Terry in the act of striking him the second time from behind, while he sat at table in a crowded public dining-room, was the act of the law. The Federal Department of Justice, by its chief, the Attorney-General of the United States, had ordered its officer, the United States marshal for the northern district of California, to take such means and such measures as might be necessary to protect the persons of the judges against assault by Judge Terry, in carrying out the threats that he had made. This order was from the executive arm of the Government, and it was carried out to the letter. Judge Terry took the law into his own hands and fell. Nothing can add to the lesson his fate teaches. It is established now that in California no man is above the law; that no man can affect the even poise of justice by fear. Confiding in his own strength as superior to the law, David S. Terry fell wretchedly.

No more need be said. New California inscribes upon her shield, "Obedience to the law the first condition of good citizenship," and the past is closed.

The Record-Union of Sacramento, one of the leading papers of California, on August 15, 1889, the day following the tragedy, had the following article under the head—

KILLING OF JUDGE TERRY.

In the news columns of the Record-Union will be found all the essential details of the circumstances of the killing of D.S. Terry. It will be evident to the reader that they readily sap the whole case, and that there is no substantial dispute possible concerning the facts. These truths we assert, without fear of successful contradiction, establish the justifiableness of the act of the United States marshal who fired upon and killed Terry. We think there will be no dispute among sensible men that a federal circuit judge or a justice of the supreme bench, passing from one portion of the circuit to another in which either is required to open a court and hear causes, and for the purpose of fully discharging his official duties, is while en route in the discharge of an official function, and constructively his court is open to the extent that an assault upon him, because of matters pending in his court, or because of judgments he has rendered or is to render, is an assault upon the court, and his bailiff or marshal detailed to attend the court or to aid in preserving the order and dignity of the court has the same right to protect him from assault then that he would have, had the judge actually reached his court-room.

But further than this, we hold that in view of the undeniable fact that the Justice had knowledge of the fact that the Terrys, man and wife, had sworn to punish him; that they had indulged in threats against him of the most pronounced character; that they had boarded a train on which it is probable they knew he had taken passage from one part of his circuit to another in his capacity as a magistrate; in view of the fact that Terry sought the first opportunity to approach and strike him, and that, too, when seated; and in view of the notorious fact that Terry always went armed—the man who shot Terry would have been justified in doing so had he not even been commissioned as an officer of the court. He warned the assailant to desist, and knowing his custom to go armed, and that he had threatened the Justice, and Terry refusing to restrain his blows, it was Neagle's duty to save life, to strike down the assailant in the most effectual manner. Men who, having the ability to prevent murder, stand by and see it committed, may well be held to accountability for criminal negligence.

But in this case it is clear that murder was intended on the part of the Terrys. One of them ran for her pistol and brought it, and would have reached the other's side with it in time, had she not been detained by strong men at the door. Neagle saw this woman depart, and coupling it with the advance of Terry, knew, as a matter of course, what it meant. He had been deputed by the chief law officer of the Government—in view of previous assaults by the Terrys and their threats and display of weapons in court—to stand guard over the judges and protect them. He acted, therefore, precisely as it was proper he should do. Had he been less prompt and vigorous, all the world knows that not he but Terry would to-day be in custody, and not Terry but the venerable justice of the Supreme Court of the United States would to-day be in the coffin.

These remarks have grown too extended for any elaboration of the moral of the tragedy that culminated in the killing of David S. Terry yesterday. But we cannot allow the subject to be even temporarily dismissed without calling the thought of the reader to contemplation of the essential truth that society is bound to protect the judges of the courts of the land from violence and the threats of violence; otherwise the decisions of our courts must conform to the violence threatened, and there will be an end of our judicial system, the third and most valuable factor in the scheme of representative government. Society cannot, therefore, punish, but must applaud the man who defends the courts of the people and the judges of those courts from such violence and threats of violence. For it must be apparent to even the dullest intellect that all such violence is an outrage upon the judicial conscience, and therefore involves and puts in peril the liberties of the people.

The New Orleans Times-Democrat, in one of its issues at this period, used the following language:

The judge in America who keeps his official ermine spotless, who faithfully attends to the heavy and responsible duties of his station, deserves that the people should guard the sanctity of his person with a strength stronger than armor of steel and readier than the stroke of lance or sword. Though the judges be called to pass on tens of thousands of cases, to sentence to imprisonment or to death thousands of criminals, they should be held by the people safe from the hate and vengeance of those criminals as if they were guarded by an invulnerable shield.

If Judge Field, of the Supreme Court, one of the nine highest judges under our republican government, in travelling recently over his circuit in California, had been left to the mercy of the violent man who had repeatedly threatened his life, who had proved himself ready with the deadly knife or revolver, it would have been a disgrace to American civilization; it would have been a stigma and stain upon American manhood; it would have shown that the spirit of American liberty, which exalts and pays reverence to our judiciary, had been replaced by a public apathy that marked the beginning of the decline of patriotism.

Judge Field recognized this when, in being advised to arm himself in case his life was endangered, he uttered the noble words: "No, sir; I do not and will not carry arms, for when it is known that the judges of the court are compelled to arm themselves against assaults offered in consequence of their judicial action it will be time to dissolve the courts, consider the government a failure, and let society lapse into barbarism." That ringing sentence has gone to the remotest corner of the land, and everywhere it has gone it should fire the American heart with a proud resolve to protect forever the sanctity of our judiciary.

Had not Neagle protected the person of Judge Field from the assault of a dangerous and violent ruffian, apparently intent on murder, by his prompt and decisive action, shooting the assailant down to his death, it is certain that other brave men would have rushed quickly to his rescue; but Neagle's marvelous quickness forestalled the need of any other's action. The person of one of the very highest American judges was preserved unharmed, while death palsied the murderous hand that had sworn to take his life.

That act of Neagle's was no crime. It was a deed that any and every American should feel proud of having done. It was an act that should be applauded over the length and breadth of this great land. It should not have consigned him for one minute to prison walls. It should have lifted him high in the esteem of all the American people. When criminals turn executioners, and judges are the victims, we might as well close our courts and hoist the red flag of anarchy over their silent halls and darkened chambers.

The New York Herald, in its issue of August 19, 1889, said:

The sensation of the past week is a lesson in republicanism and a eulogium on the majesty of the law.

It was not a personal controversy between Stephen J. Field and David S. Terry. It was a conflict between law and lawlessness—between a judicial officer who represented the law and a man who sought to take it into his own hands. One embodied the peaceful power of the nation, the will of the people; the other defied that power and appealed to the dagger.

Justice Field's whole course shows a conception of judicial duty that lends grandeur to a republican judiciary. It is an inspiring example to the citizens and especially to the judges of the country. He was reminded of the danger of returning to California while Judge Terry and his wife were at large. His firm answer was that it was his duty to go and his would go. He was then advised to arm himself for self-defense. His reply embodies a nobility that should make it historic: "When it comes to such a pass in this country that judges of the courts find it necessary to go armed it will be time to close the courts themselves."

This sentiment was not born of any insensibility to danger; Justice Field fully realized the peril himself. But above all feeling of personal concern arose a lofty sense of the duty imposed upon a justice of the nation's highest court. The officer is a representative of the law—a minister of peace. He should show by his example that the law is supreme; that all must bow to its authority; that all lawlessness must yield to it. When judges who represent the law resort to violence even in self-defense, the pistol instead of the court becomes the arbiter of controversies, and the authority of the government gives way to the power of the mob.

Rather than set a precedent that might tend to such a result, that would shake popular confidence in the judiciary, that would lend any encouragement to violence, a judge, as Justice Field evidently felt, may well risk his own life for the welfare of the commonwealth. He did not even favor the proposition that a marshal be detailed to guard him.

The course of the venerable Justice is an example to all who would have the law respected. It is also a lesson to all who would take the law into their own hands.

Not less exemplary was his recognition of the supremacy of the law when the sheriff of San Joaquin appeared before him with a warrant of arrest on the grave charge of murder. The warrant was an outrage, but it was the duty of the officer to serve it, even on a justice of the United States Supreme Court. When the sheriff hesitated and began to apologize before discharging his painful duty, Justice Field promptly spoke out: "Officer, proceed with your duty. I am ready, and an officer should always do his duty." These are traits of judicial heroism worthy the admiration of the world.

The Albany Evening Union, in one of its issues at this time, has the following:

JUSTICE FIELD RELIES UPON THE LAW FOR HIS DEFENSE.

The courage of Justice Stephen J. Field in declining to carry weapons and declaring that it is time to close the courts when judges have to arm themselves, and at the same time proceeding to do his duty on the bench when his life was threatened by a desperate man, is without parallel in the history of our judiciary. We do not mean by this that he is the only judge on the bench that would be as brave as he was under the circumstances, but every phase of the affair points to the heroism of the man. He upheld the majesty of the law in a fearless manner and at the peril of his life. He would not permit the judiciary to be lowered by any fear of the personal harm that might follow a straightforward performance of his duty. His arrest for complicity in a murder was borne by the same tranquil bravery—a supreme reliance upon a due process of law. He did not want the officer to apologize to him for doing his duty. He had imprisoned Judge Terry and his wife Sarah Althea for contempt of court. * * * The threats by Judge Terry did not even frighten him to carry weapons of self-defense. This illustration of upholding the majesty of the law is without precedent, and is worth more to the cause of justice than the entire United States army could be if called out to suppress a riotous band of law-breakers. Justice Field did what any justice should do under the circumstances, but how many judges would have displayed a like courage had they been in his place?

The New York World, in its issue of Monday evening, August 26th, has the following article:

A NEW LEAF TURNED.

When Judge Field, knowing that his life was threatened, went back unarmed into the State of California and about his business there, he gave wholesome rebuke to the cowardice that prompts men to carry a pistol—a cowardice that has been too long popular on the coast. He did a priceless service to the cause of progress in his State, and added grace to his ermine when he disdained to take arms in answer to the threats of assassins.

The men who have conspired to take Judge Field's life ought to need only one warning that a new day has dawned in California, and to find that warning in the doom of the bully Terry. The law will protect the ermine of its judges.

The New York World of August 18th treats of the arrest of Justice
Field as an outrage, and speaks of it as follows:

THE ARREST OF FIELD AN OUTRAGE AND AN ABSURDITY.

The California magistrate who issued a warrant for Justice Field's arrest is obviously a donkey of the most precious quality. The Justice had been brutally assailed by a notorious ruffian who had publicly declared his intention to kill his enemy. Before Justice Field could even rise from his chair a neat-handed deputy United States marshal shot the ruffian. Justice Field had no more to do with the shooting than any other bystander, and even if there had been doubt on that point it was certain that a justice of the United States Supreme Court was not going to run away beyond the jurisdiction. His arrest was, therefore, as absurd as it was outrageous. It was asked for by the demented widow of the dead desperado simply as a means of subjecting the Justice to an indignity, and no magistrate possessed of even a protoplasmic possibility of common sense and character would have lent himself in that way to such a service.

The Kansas City Times, in its issue at this period, uses the following language:

NO ONE WILL CENSURE.

Gratitude for Judge field's Escape the Chief Sentiment.

Deputy Marshal Neagle acted with terrible promptitude in protecting the venerable member of the Supreme Court with whose safety he was specially charged, but few will be inclined to censure him. He had to deal with a man of fierce temper, whose readiness to use firearms was part of the best known history of California.

It is a subject for general congratulation that Justice Field escaped the violence of his assailant. The American nation would be shocked to learn that a judge of its highest tribunal could not travel without danger of assault from those whom he had been compelled to offend by administering the laws. Justice Field has the respect due his office and that deeper and more significant reverence produced by his character and abilities. Since most of the present generation were old enough to observe public affairs he has been a jurist of national reputation and a sitting member of the Supreme Court. In that capacity he has earned the gratitude of his countrymen by bold and unanswerable defense of sound constitutional interpretation on more than one occasion. In all the sad affair the most prominent feeling will be that of gratitude at his escape.

The Army and Navy Journal, in its issue of August 24, 1889, had the following article under the head of—

MARSHAL NEAGLE'S CRIME.

The public mind appears to be somewhat unsettled upon the question of the right of Neagle to kill Terry while assaulting Judge Field. His justification is as clear as is the benefit of his act to a long-suffering community. Judge Field was assaulted unexpectedly from behind, while seated at a dining-table, by a notorious assassin and ruffian, who had sworn to kill him, and who, according to the testimony of at least one witness, was armed with a long knife, had sent his wife for a pistol, and was intending to use it as soon as obtained. * * *

The rule is that the danger which justifies homicide in self-defense must be actual and urgent. And was it not so in this case? No one who reflects upon the features of the case—an old man without means of defense, fastened in a sitting posture by the table at which he sat and the chair he occupied, already smitten with one severe blow and about to receive another more severe from a notorious ruffian who had publicly avowed his intention to slay him—no one surely can deny that the peril threatening Judge Field was both actual and urgent in the very highest degree.

"A man may repel force by force in the defense of his person, habitation, or property, against one or many who manifestly intend and endeavor by violence or surprise to commit a known felony on either." "In such a case he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he find himself out of danger; and if in a conflict between them he happens to kill, such killing is justifiable. The right of self-defense in case of this kind is founded on the law of nature, and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society. Where a known felony is attempted upon the person, be it to rob or murder, the party assaulted may repel force by force; and even his servant attendant on him, or any person present, may interpose for preventing mischief, and, if death ensue, the party interposing will be justified." (Wharton Amer. Crim. Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 1019.)

This is the law, as recognized at the present day and established by centuries of precedent, and it completely exonerates Neagle—of course Judge Field needs no exoneration—from any, the least, criminality in what he did. He is acquitted of wrong-doing, not only in his character of attendant servant, but in that of bystander simply. He was as much bound to kill Terry under the circumstances as every bystander in the room was bound to kill him; and in his capacity of guard, especially appointed to defend an invaluable life against a known and imminent felony, he was so bound in a much greater degree.

"A sincere and apparently well-grounded belief that a felony is about to be perpetrated will extenuate a homicide committed in prevention of it, though the defendant be but a private citizen" (25 Ala., 15.) See Wharton, above quoted, who embodies the doctrine in his text (Vol. 2, Sec. 1039).

* * * * *

Let us be grateful from our hearts that the old Mosaic law, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed," is shown by this memorable event to have not yet fallen altogether into innocuous desuetude; and let us give thanks to God that he has seen fit on this occasion to preserve from death at the hands of an intolerable ruffian the life of that high-minded, pure-handed, and excellent jurist and magistrate, Stephen J. Field.

The Philadelphia Times of August 15th has the following:

ONLY ONE OPINION.

Marshal Neagle Could Not Stand Idly By.

The killing of Judge Terry of California is a homicide that will occasion no regret wherever the story of his stormy and wicked life is known. At the same time, the circumstances that surrounded it will be deeply lamented. This violent man, more than once a murderer, met his death while in the act of assaulting Justice Field of the Supreme Court of the United States. Had he not been killed when he was, Judge Field would probably have been another of his victims. Terry had declared his purpose of killing the Justice, and this was their first meeting since his release from deserved imprisonment.

In regard to the act of United States Marshal Neagle, there can be only one opinion. He could not stand idly by and see a judge of the Suprene Court murdered before his eyes. The contumely that Terry sought to put upon the Judge was only the insult that was to go before premeditated murder. The case has no moral except the certainty that a violent life will end in a violent death.

The Philadelphia Inquirer of the same date says as follows:

A PREMEDITATED INSULT.

Followed Quickly by a Deserved Retribution.

Ex-Judge Terry's violent death was a fitting termination to a stormy life, and the incidents of his last encounter were characteristic of the man and his methods. He was one of the few lingering representatives of the old-time population of California. He was prominent there when society was organizing itself, and succeeded in holding on to life and position when many a better man succumbed to the rude justice of the period. Most of his early associates died with their boots on, a generation ago. Terry lived, assailed on all sides, despised by the better element and opposed by the law, in trouble often, but never punished as he deserved. His last act was to offer a gross, premeditated insult to the venerable Justice Field, and the retribution he had long defied followed it quickly. California will have little reason to mourn his loss.

The Cleveland Leader, in its issue of August 18th, speaks of the conduct of Neagle as follows:

THE KILLING OF TERRY.

We have already expressed the opinion in these columns that the killing of David S. Terry by Deputy Marshal Neagle at Lathrop, California, Wednesday, was entirely justifiable. In that opinion it is a pleasure to note that the press of the country concur almost unanimously. The judgment of eminent members of the legal profession, as published in our telegraph columns and elsewhere, support and bear out that view of the case. The full account of the trouble makes the necessity of some such action on the part of the deputy marshal clear. The judgment of the country is that Neagle only did his duty in defending the person of Justice Field, and in that judgment the California jury will doubtless concur when the case is brought before it.

The Argonaut, a leading paper of San Francisco, not a political, but a literary paper, and edited with great ability, in its issue of August 26, 1889, used the following language:

The course of Judge Field throughout this troublesome business has been in the highest degree creditable to him. He has acted with dignity and courage, and his conduct has been characterized by most excellent taste. His answer, when requested to go armed against the assault of Terry, is worthy of preservation. And now that his assailant has been arrested in his career by death, all honest men who respect the law will breathe more freely. Judge Terry had gained a most questionable reputation, not for courage in the right direction; not for generosity which overlooked or forgave, or forgot offenses against himself or his interests. He never conceded the right to any man to hold an opinion in opposition to his prejudices, or cross the path of his passion with impunity. He could with vulgar whisper insult the judge who rendered an opinion adverse to his client, and with profane language insult the attorney who had the misfortune to be retained by a man whose cause he did not champion. He had become a terror to society and a walking menace to the social circle in which he revolved. His death was a necessity, and, except here and there a friend of blunted moral instincts, there will be found but few to mourn his death or criticise the manner of his taking off. To say that Marshal Neagle should have acted in any other manner than he did means that he was to have left Justice Field in the claws of a tiger, and at the mercy of an infuriated, angry monster, who had never shown mercy or generosity to an enemy in his power. * * *

Judge Field has survived the unhappy conflict which carried Judge Terry to his grave. He is more highly honored now than when this quarrel was thrust upon him; he has lost no friends; he has made thousands of new ones who honor him for protecting with his life the honor of the American bench, the dignity of the American law, and the credit of the American name. In the home where Judge Terry lived he went to the grave almost unattended by the friends of his social surroundings, no clergyman consenting to read the service at his burial. The Supreme Court over which he had presided as chief justice refused to adjourn in honor of his death, the press and public opinion, for a wonder, in accord over the manner of his taking off.

Indeed, the public opinion of the country, as shown by the press and declarations of prominent individuals, was substantially one in its approval of the action of the Government, the conduct of Neagle, and the bearing of Justice Field.[2]

The Daily Report, a paper of influence in San Francisco at the time, published the following article on "The Lesson of the Hour," from the pen of an eminent lawyer of California, who was in no way connected with the controversy which resulted in Judge Terry's death:

The universal acquiescence of public opinion in the justifiable character of the act which terminated the life of the late David S. Terry is to be accounted for by the peculiar nature of the offense which he had committed. It was not for a mere assault, though perpetrated under circumstances which rendered it peculiarly reprehensible, that he met his death without eliciting from the community one word of condemnation for the slayer or of sympathy with the slain.

Mr. Justice Field is an officer of high rank in the most important department of the Government of the United States, namely, that which is charged with the administration of legal justice. When David S. Terry publicly and ostentatiously slapped the face of this high official—this representative of public justice—the blow being in all probability the intended prelude to a still more atrocious offense, he committed a gross violation of the peace and dignity of the United States. The echo of the blow made the blood tingle in the veins of every true American, and from every quarter, far and near, thick and fast, came denunciations of the outrage. That any man under a government created "by the people, for the people" shall assume to be a law unto himself, the sole despot in a community based on the idea of the equality of all before the law, and the willing submission and obedience of all to established rule, is simply intolerable.

In his audacious assault on "the powers that be" Terry took his life in his hand, and no lover of peace and good order can regret that, of the two lives in peril, his was extinguished. He threw down the gage of battle to the whole community, and it is well that he was vanquished in the strife.

In the early part of the war of the rebellion General Dix, of New York, was placed in charge of one of the disaffected districts. We had then hardly begun to see that war was a very stern condition of things, and that it actually involved the necessity of killing. Those familiar with the incidents of that time will remember how the General's celebrated order, "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot," thrilled the slow pulses of the Northern heart like the blast of a bugle. Yet some adverse obstructionist might object that the punishment pronounced far exceeded the offense, which was merely the effort to detach from its position a piece of colored bunting. But it is the animus that characterizes the act. An insult offered to a mere symbol of authority becomes, under critical circumstances, an unpardonable crime. If the symbol, instead of being an inanimate object, be a human being—a high officer of the Government—does not such an outrage as that committed by Terry exceed in enormity the offense denounced by General Dix? And if so, why should the punishment be less?

In every civilized community, society, acting with a keen instinct of self-preservation, has always punished with just severity those capital offenders against peace and good order who strike at the very foundation on which all government must rest.

[1] It has been conclusively established since that he was armed with his usual bowie-knife at the time.

[2] NOTE.—Whilst there was a general concurrence of opinion as to the threats of Terry and of the fate he met at the hands of Neagle and of the bearing of Justice Field through all the proceedings, there were exceptions to this judgment. There were persons who sympathized with Terry and his associates and grieved at his fate, although he had openly avowed his intention not merely to insult judicial officers for their judicial conduct, but to kill them in case they resented the insult offered. He married Sarah Althea Hill after the United States Circuit Court had delivered its opinion, in open court, announcing its decision that she had committed forgery, perjury, and subornation of perjury, and was a woman of abandoned character. And yet a writer in the Overland Monthly in October, 1889, attributes his assault upon the marshal—striking him violently in the face for the execution of the order of the court to remove her from the court-room because of her gross imputation upon the judges—chiefly to his chivalric spirit to protect his wife, and declares that "the universal verdict" upon him "will be that he was possessed of sterling integrity of purpose, and stood out from the rest of his race as a strongly individualized character, which has been well called an anachronism in our civilization." And Governor Pennoyer, of Oregon, in his message to the legislature of that State, pronounced the officer appointed by the marshal under the direction of the Attorney-General to protect Justices Field and Sawyer from threatened violence and murder as a "secret armed assassin," who accompanied a Federal judge in California, and who shot down in cold blood an unarmed citizen of that State.