The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Volume 1

by Stephen Lucius Gwynn

CHAPTER XIV

REVIVAL OF THE EASTERN QUESTION

Sir Charles at this period of his career was passing from the status of a formidable independent member to that of a recognized force in his party. In May, 1876, he became Chairman of the Elections Committee at the Liberal Central Association, and from that time forward up to 1880 'took a very active part in connection with the choice of candidates.'@@Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had been elected for Birmingham. He was lame from gout, and resented it, saying to Sir Charles 'that it was an illness which should be exclusively reserved by a just Providence for Tories.' On July 8th, 1876, he wrote to Dilke that before coming up to take his seat he had called his friends together and settled a programme and general course of action. "I think there is every chance of our Union being productive of useful practical results, but it is agreed that our arrangements shall remain strictly private for the present. Omne ignotum pro magnifico." On August 2nd Sir Charles introduced to Lord Hartington at Devonshire House 'a great private deputation upon the Education Bill from the North Country Liberal Associations, which was in fact the first movement by what was afterwards the National Liberal Federation.' So the "Caucus" began to make itself felt in domestic affairs.

Sir Charles notes that he 'for the first time began to be summoned to meetings respecting the course to be taken by the party.' Here already he found that—

'Mr. Gladstone began, although somewhat ostentatiously proclaiming in public the opposite principle, to interfere a good deal in Hartington's leadership, and even Harcourt, who only a few months before had ridiculed Mr. Gladstone's pretensions in such strong terms, on the rare occasions when he was unable to get his way with Hartington always now went off to Mr. Gladstone, to try to make use of the power of his name.'

"Foreign affairs had suddenly risen out of complete obscurity into a position in which they overshadowed all other things, and left home politics in stagnation." [Footnote: Speech at Notting Hill, August, 1876.] These complications were destined to bring Mr. Gladstone back into an activity not merely unimpaired, but redoubled, and to shake the power of Mr. Disraeli to its fall.

Sir Charles was, first and foremost, a "good European"; he conceived of Europe as a body politic, bound in honour to regulate its own members. Isolation appeared to him a mere abandonment of the duty of civilized powers to maintain order in the civilized world. Corporate action was to be encouraged, because, in most cases, the mere threat of it would suffice either as between States to prevent wars of aggression, or as between ruler and ruled to assert the ordinary principles of just government.

The enforcement of this view might involve its support by force of arms, and he worked all his life for our military preparedness, holding that it was the best guarantee that armed intervention would be unnecessary, as it was also the best guarantee of our own immunity from attack.

At this moment "foreign affairs" meant the Eastern Question, in regard to which the future of two nations, Russia and Greece, specially interested him. He was notably a Phil-Hellene, who "dreamed of a new Greece"—a "force of the future instead of a force of the past; a force of trade instead of a force of war; European instead of Asiatic; intensely independent, democratic, maritime." Here, and not in any Slavonic State, did he see the rightful successors to the Ottoman dominion. Towards Russia his feelings were complex: admiration for the people accompanied detestation of the Government, and the unscrupulous power commanding the services of so vast and virile a people always appeared in his eyes as a menace to civilization. Yet in the future of Russia he "firmly believed," and he repeats in speech after speech this creed: "Behind it are ranged the forces of the future." "To compare the Russia of to-day to the Russia that is to come is to compare chaos to the universe." "If by Russia we mean the leading Slavonic power, whether a Russia one and indivisible, or a Slavonian confederation, we mean one of the greatest forces of the future." [Footnote: Speech at Notting Hill, August, 1876.]

Sir Charles's speeches, taken in conjunction with the diary, give the story of these Eastern troubles from the outside as well as from the inside. His constituents had little excuse for being carried away by popular cries. In his speech on the last day of the session he advocated the sending of a "strong and efficient man to Constantinople in the name of the Western Powers to carry out that policy of protection of Christian subjects of Turkey which England had intended after the Crimea," [Footnote: Ibid.] But while condemning with the greatest energy the Turkish barbarities in Bulgaria, he warned his constituents against overlooking atrocities committed elsewhere, "for there was not one pin to choose between Circassian ruffians on the one side and Montenegrin ruffians on the other." To those who "were carried away by their belief that the conflict was one between the present and the past, and between Christianity and Islamism, and declared that the Turks must be driven out of Europe," he pointed out the larger questions at stake.

Turning to the Balkan States, he did not believe in a continuous united movement among these "which would suffice to drive the Mohammedan out of Europe." "To allow the Russians to interfere openly" would rouse Austria, a Power which, in spite of the difficulties presented by its internal "differences of creed and hostilities of races," must in the interests of South-Eastern Europe be "bolstered up." In this instance he urged the need for joint action, and laid bare some underlying difficulties awaiting diplomacy. It was a situation complicated by the fact that "this Europe is probably mined beneath our feet with secret treaties." [Footnote: Sir Charles notes later: 'Since the accession of George III. the country had concluded about forty treaties or separate articles of a secret nature which were not communicated to Parliament at the time of their conclusion, and in some instances not at all; but these secret engagements were mostly concluded in anticipation of war, or during war, and ceased to have effect when war was over.']

In his speech of January 15th, 1878, in Kensington, at one of the critical moments of the struggle, he told the whole story, which began in August, 1875, when Mr. Disraeli's Government consented "with reluctance" to take part in sending a European Consular Mission to inquire into disturbances occasioned by Turkish misrule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Great Britain's reluctance weakened, so Sir Charles thought, the European concert, and the mission resulted only in delusive promises of reform. In the following winter Turkey was increasingly encouraged to lean upon British support in withstanding pressure from the other Powers; and in May, 1876, after disturbances in Bulgaria had been repressed with appalling ferocity, Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet positively refused to join in a demand for certain reforms to be carried out by Turkey under European supervision.

'Our Government had refused to sign the Berlin Memorandum on account of a reference in it to the possible need of taking "efficacious measures" to secure good government in Turkey.

'But' (commented Sir Charles in 1878, making plain exactly what he meant by European intervention) 'it was England who, not shrinking from mere words, but herself proposing deeds, had taken a really "efficacious" part in the "efficacious measures" of 1860, when, after the massacres in the Lebanon, Europe sent Lord Dufferin to Syria with a French armed force—the Powers making that engagement not to accept territory which could also have been made in 1876. In 1860 Lord Dufferin, in the name of Europe, hanged a guilty Pasha and pacified the Lebanon, which to this moment still enjoys, in consequence of European intervention, a better government than the rest of Turkey, and this with the result of an increase of strength to the Turkish, power. Only the obstructiveness of our Government prevented the still more easy pacification of the European provinces of Turkey in 1876, and caused the present war with all its harm to British trade and all its risks to "British interests."' [Footnote: Speech delivered at Kensington on January 15th, 1878.]

Holding these views, Sir Charles encouraged Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice to place on the notice paper of the House of Commons a formal resolution of censure on the Government for refusing to join in the Berlin Memorandum without making a counter-proposal of their own. It was believed that Mr. Gladstone approved the course indicated, but he was still in retirement, and not only did Lord Granville and Lord Hartington think that any formal action in the House would be impolitic, but many of the 'peace-at-any- price' Radicals, who regarded Lord Derby's extreme policy of non- intervention with favour, refused to support the proposed censure. The resolution accordingly had to be withdrawn, amid the general disapproval, however, of the Liberal Press. Thus the first attempt at action at once betrayed a profound cleavage of opinion. This was unfortunately only typical of everything which followed in this chapter of events, though the debate which took place towards the end of the Session proved very damaging to the Government. [Footnote: See Hansard, cxlii. 22; Life of Gladstone, ii, 549; _Life of Granville, ii. 166 and 264, where Lord Ampthill, writing in 1882, expresses the opinion that Lord Derby's policy was most unfortunate.]

It was on May 19th, 1876, that the British Government dated their refusal to intervene. As early as June, accounts of what had been done in Bulgaria began to appear in the Press. Mr. Disraeli ridiculed them in the House of Commons, but testimony soon accumulated, and the most important evidence was that of Mr. Eugene Schuyler, then attached to the American Legation at Constantinople. As American Consul at St. Petersburg in 1869-70, he had become acquainted with Sir Charles, and had seen a good deal of him in London during the earlier part of 1875. It was, therefore, to Dilke that Schuyler wrote his account of the massacres at Batak, based upon his visit to the spot, which he found still horrible with unburied corpses; and in August, on the last day of the Session, Dilke, addressing his constituents at Notting Hill, read Schuyler's letter to them.

Early in September, 1876, public indignation was set ablaze by Mr. Gladstone's famous pamphlet, which demanded that the Turk should clear out of Bulgaria, "bag and baggage." On the 14th of the same month Mr. Baring's official report confirmed the Schuyler letter, and on the 21st Lord Derby sent a despatch, which, says Sir Charles, 'in the sharpest words ever, I think, used in a despatch, demanded reparation, and the "signal, conspicuous, and exemplary punishment" of Chefket Pasha, director of the Bulgarian massacres.'

Meanwhile Servia and Montenegro, feudatory States of the Porte, had gone to war with their overlord; and in order to induce the Turks to grant an armistice, Russia and Austria proposed to England a joint naval demonstration, carried out in the name of Europe, by England and France. Lord Derby proposed instead a conference of Europe to take place at Constantinople, and to this the Powers agreed. But Russia, not contented with this step, presented an ultimatum to Turkey demanding an armistice for Servia, and obtained it on November 1st. Thus, by Lord Derby's action, 'the armistice was refused to Europe and yielded to a Russian ultimatum.'

The conference met at Constantinople in December, 1876, and on the 14th Lord Salisbury, who represented England, was advocating the "efficacious measure" of occupying Bulgaria by English troops, and, when this was refused, proposed the employment of Belgians. But—

'It was now too late. Turkey had been encouraged by us into mobilization. Russia had been thwarted by us into mobilization. The time was past when we might have averted war, might have pacified the East, protected alike the Eastern Christians and "British interests" by a signature.'

Replying to a common argument, he said: 'Want of money will not cause Russia to terminate the war. Machiavelli has truly said that nothing is more false than the common belief that money is the sinews of war.'

The conference failing, all Ambassadors were withdrawn from the Porte, and Russia continued to parley with the other Powers. 'Early in March, 1877, a draft Protocol regarding the expectation of the Powers with regard to Turkish reforms was handed to Lord Derby, who promised to sign if Russia would promise to disarm.' Russia specified the conditions on which she would 'disarm,' and Lord Derby then signed the Protocol, but added a declaration that his signature should be null unless disarmament followed both in Russia and Turkey. This, in Sir Charles's judgment, was tantamount to a refusal to sign, because Lord Derby must have known that Turkey would never grant, except under coercion, the conditions on which Russia had consented to disarm. "All Turkish promises are of one material— paper," he said, and in severely criticizing the action of the Government added: "The unreformed state of Turkey is, and will continue to be, the greatest standing menace to the peace of Europe."

Further, at the same moment England again separated herself from the other Powers by sending an Ambassador—Mr. Layard—to Constantinople, 'to which the Turks replied: "The Porte is very sensible of this delicate mark of attention."'

The effect was to encourage Turkey to count on English support, and
Russia, unable to secure concerted action, declared war single-handed.

Thus, not only was the result missed which Sir Charles desired and thought possible—namely, the restoration of order by joint action of Europe—but the way was paved for another result which he deplored—the extension of Russia's influence, and even of her territorial sway.

As his speeches gave the story of the European position, so his diary provides a commentary on that story from within:

'Things generally were in a disturbed condition at this moment. The Eastern Question, which was to be so prominent for the next four years, had grown critical, and Bourke, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (afterwards Lord Connemara and Governor of Madras), said to me at the House of Commons: "The one thing that astonishes me is the confidence of people in Lord Derby." Now, Lord Derby was his chief. This proved pretty clearly that Mr. Disraeli was, in fact, his own Foreign Secretary, and had made up his mind that Lord Derby should "go." [Footnote: Lord Derby did not "go" till the spring of 1878.]

'June 28th, 1876, is the date of the first of my letters mentioning the Eastern Question. It is from Auberon Herbert: "We are sure to get into some frightful trouble if Dizzy is to be allowed uninterruptedly to offer what sacrifices he will on the altar of his vanity. You all seem to me to be living in Drowsy Hollow, while Dizzy is consulting his imagination, and Hartington politely bowing. What can you all be doing? Is it the hot weather? Or are all of you secretly pleased at England's 'determined attitude'? Please, dear Neros, cease fiddling for a short time, and let us poor, harmless, innocent-minded country- folk have some assurance that you are not going to fight all Europe…. You sleepy and unfaithful guardians." …

'Although I was the first politician to make a speech upon the Bulgarian massacres, [Footnote: See reference to Eugene Schuyler's letter in speech of August, 1876, p. 207.] I afterwards refused to follow Mr. Gladstone into what was called the "atrocity agitation," because I feared that we should find ourselves plunged into a war with Turkey in alliance with Russia, of which I should have disapproved.'

He subscribed, however, to the funds of those who took charge of the fugitives on both sides.

The agitation offended him by its extravagance. "If Gladstone goes on much longer, I shall turn Turk," he wrote to Sir William Harcourt. There was general disquiet in the Liberal party. On October 10th, 1876, Sir William Harcourt wrote:

"Things here are in the most damnable mess that politics have ever been in in my time. Gladstone and Dizzy seem to cap one another in folly and in pretence, and I do not know which has made the greatest ass of himself. Blessed are they that hold their tongue and wait to be wise after the event. To this sagacious policy you will see we" (i.e., the Hartington section) "have adhered, and shall adhere. I had a long letter from Hartington from Constantinople (whither, as you will see, he has prudently retired), full of his usual good sense and caution. I quite concur with him that, though a strong case can be made against the Government for their deliberate status quo policy during the months of June, July, and August, there is little fault to find with what they have been doing since Derby has taken the matter into his own hands in September. There is a decided reaction against Gladstone's agitation. The Brooksite Whigs are furious with him, and so are the commercial gents and the Norwood-Samuda [Footnote: Leading shipowners and Members of Parliament.] lot, whose pecuniary interests are seriously compromised. The Bucks election [Footnote: This by- election, on September 22nd, 1876, was consequent on Mr. Disraeli's acceptance of a Peerage. The Conservative (Hon. T. F. Fremantle) beat the Liberal (Mr. R. Carington, brother to Lord Carrington), but only by 186 votes on a poll of over 5,000.] has a good smell for Dizzy. All the Rothschild tenants voted Tory, though, to save his own skin, Nat. went on Carington's committee. The Rothschilds will never forgive Gladstone and Lowe for the Egyptian business. Chamberlain and Fawcett … are using the opportunity to demand the demission of Hartington and the return of Gladstone. But you need not … prepare for extreme measures."

By the same post came a letter from Mr. Chamberlain, who declared that he was "not Gladstonian," but considered that—

"After all, he is our best card. You see Forster's speech—trimming as usual, and trying to dish the Radicals by bidding for the Whigs and Moderates. Gladstone is the best answer to this sort of thing, and if he were to come back for a few years he would probably do much for us, and pave the way for more. Lord Hartington … is away and silent, besides which he is pro-Turk. If Gladstone could be induced formally to resume the reins, it would be almost equivalent to a victory, and would stir what Bright calls 'the masses of my countrymen' to the depths."

Sir Charles's own considered opinion was written to Sir William Harcourt on October 16th:

"I, as you know, think Hartington the best man for us—the Radicals— because he is quite fearless, always goes with us when he thinks it safe for the party, and generally judges rightly—or takes the soundest advice on this point. In fact, I don't think he's ever made a mistake at all—as yet; but Chamberlain seems, by a sort of quasi- hereditary Birmingham position, to look at him as Bright used to look at Palmerston. This is serious, because Chamberlain is a strong man and does not easily change, unlike the other member of our triumvirate, Cowen, who is as fickle as the wind, one day Hartington, one day you, one day Gladstone, and never seeming to know even his own mind."

Mr. Gladstone's return to leadership was more and more assured, but he would not find his old antagonist face to face with him in the House of Commons. At the close of the Session of 1876 Sir Charles had unknowingly witnessed a great withdrawal.

'On the night of August 11th I had listened to Mr. Disraeli's last speech as a Commoner, and had noticed that on leaving the House in a long white overcoat and dandified lavender kid gloves, leaning on his secretary's arm, he had shaken hands with a good many people, none of whom knew that he was bidding farewell to the House of Commons.'

This withdrawal marked no lessening of power. As Sir Charles had perceived, Disraeli was his own Foreign Secretary, and a Foreign Minister's influence gained by being exercised in the House of Lords. Meanwhile, in Gladstone's absence the Liberal party seemed broken and divided beyond hope of recovery. In the country, though the campaign launched by the Bulgarian pamphlet had seemed so immediately effective that a Tory county member said to Mr. Gladstone, "If there were a dissolution now, I should not get a vote," yet the reaction, spoken of in Harcourt's letter to Dilke on October 10th, very quickly developed. Those who supported Mr. Gladstone identified themselves unreservedly with the Slav as against the Turk. But by others the demand for ejection of the Turk, "bag and baggage," from Bulgaria was construed as an invitation for Russia to seize Constantinople, and thus as a direct infringement of British interests in Egypt and the Mediterranean. Lord Beaconsfield skilfully played upon this feeling, and there ensued a condition of affairs in which Mr. Gladstone made triumphal progresses through the north of England, and was hooted weekly in the streets of London.

Sir Charles himself was in a great difficulty, being as he says, 'anti- Russian without being for that pro-Turk.' Sharing to the full the general detestation of these massacres, of which the earliest complete exposure had been made public [Footnote: See p. 207, Schuyler's letter.] by him, he held that there ought to be armed intervention. But he knew too much of Russia's action in conquered provinces to feel that the matter could be settled satisfactorily by allowing Russian influence to replace Turkish control.

What was more, he knew that in 1870, when Russia repudiated the Black Sea article in the Treaty of Paris, March 30th, 1856, Mr. Gladstone's Government had pressed the Powers of Europe to make general the Tripartite Treaty, April 27th, 1856, 'Our Government (Gladstone-Granville) proposed to answer the Russian Circular by extending the Tripartite Treaty to all the Powers, and it was only Germany's refusal that stopped it.' By this treaty, 'France, Austria, and the United Kingdom bound themselves to consider any breach of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, or any invasion of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as a casus belli.' In other words, the Liberal Government had been anxious in 1870 that all the Powers should guarantee for all time the power of the Turk in its full extension, though Turkish methods were in 1870 and before it no other than they revealed themselves at Batak in 1876. Sir Charles thought that, as Liberals had been precipitate in their desire to guarantee Ottoman integrity in 1870, so now they were precipitate in their Pan-Slavism. Moreover, the vacillation of the Liberal leaders had put a weapon into the hands of the Government. 'Fancy what a temptation to the present Government to publish the despatches,' notes Sir Charles, in comment on Sir William Harcourt's remark 'that the Tripartite Treaty discussion would be a mine of gunpowder to the Liberal Front Bench.'

He set forth his position in a speech to his constituents at Kensington on January 9th, 1877. He condemned Lord Derby, who had neither "the energy nor the force of character to fit him for the post of Foreign Secretary," and whose policy had left them at the close of 1876 in "absolute isolation." Yet, "on the other hand, he marvelled to see Radicals, for years the enemies of Russian autocracy, propose the immediate adoption of the policy of Canon Liddon and of the Emperor Alexander." [Footnote: Dr. H. P. Liddon and Dr. Malcolm MacColl were conspicuous as enthusiastic supporters of Mr. Gladstone's campaign.] And he went on to depict what that policy might mean:

"The world could not afford to see 120,000,000 of Slavs united under the sceptre of an absolute despot, holding at Constantinople the strongest position in all Europe, stretching from the Adriatic to Kamskatka and the Behring Straits, and holding in Corea the strongest position in the Pacific." Then he recalled the record of "that Power with which the Liberals of England were to strike alliance—an absolute autocracy of the purest type, the Power which crushed Poland, the Power which crushed Hungary for Austria." And by what methods! The long story of violation "both of the public and the moral law" was repeated, with citation of British Ministers who had spoken in fierce condemnation of, Russian methods; the decoration of Mouravief, the "woman-flogging General," was set off against the promotion of Chefket Pasha. He himself had seen in 1869 "long processions of Polish exiles, who were still being sent by hundreds into the solitudes of Siberia." In Turkestan General Kaufmann had ordered a massacre of women and children, and Kaufmann, "loaded with favours by the Emperor Alexander, still ruled in Turkestan." It was a vehement denunciation of the autocracy of Russia, and he notes that he had never before so moved his hearers. To his attack on the Russian Government were added some severe strictures on the barbarities perpetrated by Servians, and by Mr. Gladstone's special favourites, the Montenegrins, inhabitants of "countries whose civilization had not sufficiently progressed to allow of the belief that they were the unselfish champions of an outraged Christianity."

Holding these views, and holding them the more strongly because they were the outcome of personal experience and knowledge laboriously acquired, he was in a considerable degree isolated, not only from the Liberal party as a whole, but even from that more intimate organization whose existence was already recognized in the autumn of 1876, when Mr. Knowles asked him to write in the Nineteenth Century on the "New Party."

His closest associate, now and henceforward, was Mr. Chamberlain, who in 1877 stayed a great deal in Sloane Street, and Dilke notes that in February of that year he was giving dinners almost every night to introduce the member for Birmingham to London. But the "New Party," when Mr. Knowles made his unsuccessful request, consisted

'of Chamberlain and myself and Cowen in the House of Commons, and Morley outside of it…. As Chamberlain and Cowen failed to agree upon any subject whatever, the House of Commons portion of the party soon dwindled to two leaders, in the persons of Chamberlain and myself, who, however, picked up one faithful follower in Dillwyn. From September, 1876, to April, 1880, there did exist a very real and very influential, but little numerous, party, consisting of Chamberlain and myself, followed blindly by dear old Dillwyn, and supported in the Press by Morley. As Randolph Churchill afterwards said to me, shaking his head over Balfour's desertion: "When you and Chamberlain were together, your party was not too large." He had begun with four (three regular and one half-attached), and found it certainly one, perhaps two, and I sometimes think three, too many, though Wolff indeed followed him almost as steadily as Dillwyn followed us.'

For a time the "New Party" consisted of six. Mr. Edmund Dwyer Gray, an Irish Nationalist, owner of the Freeman's Journal, was of it, but soon dropped out, and for a time Mr. Burt—Father of the House in 1910—was also included.

At the beginning of 1877 summons was sent to a meeting before the opening of Parliament, to which Mr. Chamberlain replied solemnly: "The party will be complete." Further solemnity was added by the holding, at 76, Sloane Street, of a Queen's Speech dinner in due form on the eve of the Session, but—

'the dinner of six members, which assembled democratically without dressing in order to suit Burt's habits, was not graced by that copy of the Queen's Speech which is sent by Government to the leaders of the regular Opposition.'

The "New Party" of 1876-77 differed notably in one respect from the other small and influential group of which it was the forerunner. It had no leader.

'On Saturday, February 17th, Chamberlain dined with the Prince of Wales. In noting the invitation in my diary I put down: "The Prince of Wales has asked Chamberlain to dinner for Saturday. I call this 'nobbling my party.'" But the possessive pronoun with regard to the party was not according to my custom. We always said that the party consisted of three in all—two leaders and a follower—and Dillwyn acknowledged Chamberlain and myself as equal leaders.'

'On July 4th I drove Dillwyn down to Chiswick to the Duke of Devonshire's garden party. The Prince of Wales was there, and gave Dillwyn a very friendly bow, whereupon I asked Dillwyn how he came to know him so well, to which "the party" answered that he had shot pigeons with him; and on my reproaching my old friend for indulging in such sport, he said that he not only shot pigeons, but that the Prince had been so struck with his shooting that he had asked who the old gentleman was "who looked like a Methodist parson and shot like an angel."'

At the beginning of 1877, when they were still six, division existed even in that small group on the burning question of the hour. Mr. Cowen was strongly influenced by his intercourse with a settlement of Poles at Newcastle, and—

'although his anti-Russian views were only the same as my own, yet he allowed them, as I think, without reason, to drive him into a position of support of the Government which from this time forward separated him from the Liberal party.'

None of Sir Charles's other colleagues approached the Eastern Question entirely on its own merits as distinct from party. His study of foreign politics had, however, forced him to understand the issues, and thus his position was rendered difficult: 'I was anti-Russian, and in this with Hartington. On the other hand, I was for avowed intervention in the East, and in this more extreme than Mr. Gladstone.' But at the same time his exceptional competence in the discussion brought him steadily to the front. Without any sacrifice of independent judgment he found himself increasingly consulted.

His Memoir gives, therefore, an interesting picture of the movement of opinion in the Liberal party. At the beginning of the Session, when it was known that Lord Salisbury had advocated active interference in the name of Europe, Sir Charles found that 'only Harcourt and the Duke of Argyll were for strong action in the sense of coercion of Turkey.' The Duke, however, soon made two converts, and Dilke wrote to his brother on January 6th, 1877:

"Lord Granville and Lord Hartington will, I am delighted to say, speak for concerted intervention. The only man who strongly opposed their doing so was Mr. Gladstone, who ran away from his own views." Against this Sir Charles notes later: 'Both at the meeting of Parliament in 1877, and also later on in the Session in the case of his own memorable resolutions.'

'Mr. Gladstone had in private conversation told Harcourt that such a course as European intervention to coerce Turkey "should only be resolved upon after much deliberation." To this Harcourt had retorted: "Well, Mr. Gladstone, if people outside knew what you were saying, they might reflect it was you that hung the bag of powder on the door."'

On February 11th Sir Charles noted, 'Harcourt has got frightened and has gone back,' fearing a division in the House of Commons on which Henry Richard and the peace men would either support the Government or abstain from voting, lest intervention should mean war.

Thus party feeling fluctuated. On February 16th, 1877, Sir Charles's diary recorded that 'the popular name for our Front Bench with the London mob is "Bag and baggage Billy and his long-eared crew."' This showed that 'in the popular mind the personality of Mr. Gladstone had finally triumphed over that of Hartington.'

At this moment Sir Charles's views coincided with those of Lord Hartington
to the extent of being anti-Russian, and, as already seen, he was more
drawn by personal feeling to him than to any of the various leaders. Mr.
Forster and Mr. Goschen seemed to him inclined to what a letter of
Harcourt's called "the old facing-both-ways style," and the magic of Mr.
Gladstone's personality never exercised its spell on Dilke. But he liked
Lord Hartington personally, and liked also Lord Hartington's ally, the
Duchess of Manchester, who, he says—

'used to try very hard to pick up political information for Lord Hartington; but her own strong Conservative prejudices and her want of clearness of head made her by no means a useful guide, and in fact the wonder to me always was to see how Hartington's strong common sense kept him from making the mistakes into which she always tried by her influence to press him.'

That was written after an interview which Sir Charles had with her, at her request, on January 8th, 1877. The Duchess had read a report of a speech of his, in which 'I lectured on the Franco-German War, and condemned the taking of territory as bound to lead to further wars.' On February 10th he met her again to discuss the difficulties which were beginning to spring up, since Mr. Gladstone's sudden access of activity, as to the leadership of the party. In this matter Sir Charles kept himself 'absolutely independent, going now with one and now with the other, with mere regard to the opinions which they put forward…. I had a full knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes,' although, because he was not in complete agreement with either party among the Liberal leaders, he 'had not the complete confidence of either side.'

This detachment of attitude adds the more weight to the judgment which is passed in the following detailed review of the situation as it was in the spring of 1877:

'At this moment' (February 18th, 1877) 'London was a centre of intrigue. But my interest in the Eastern Question had nothing to do with persons, and was an honest one, and I found myself able to act only with those who had no candidate of their own for the leadership of the party, or who, like Lord Granville, were brought to a similar position by the conflict between party loyalty and a personal affection for Mr. Gladstone, and I was able therefore at this moment to act more steadily with Lord Granville than with any other leading member of the Liberal party. He was jealous of Lord Hartington, but he was loyal to him as the party chief. Towards Mr. Gladstone he was affectionate, but not blind.' [Footnote: Sir Charles summarises here a memorandum he drew for Lord Granville for the debate on February 19th, used then and on several other occasions. He pointed out that the Government policy, since the failure of the Conference, of leaving things alone, was safe for the moment, but it did nothing for the Eastern Christians, gave no satisfaction to the demands made in the name of the Queen by Lord Derby on September 21st, 1876, offered no bridge to Russia for the avoidance of war, and therefore left the Turkish Empire and British interests exposed to the gravest danger. Concerted action was the course Liberals desired.]

'There can be no doubt that many were making use of the Eastern Question for the purpose of advancing their particular views as to the leadership of the party. When men have to use other men as tools for the execution of any plan, it is difficult for them to refrain from that tricky handling of them which is best for the immediate end, but debases both the user and the used. To sway men by knowledge of their weaknesses is the task of a charlatan rather than of a statesman. Mr. Gladstone, with all his inconsistency upon the Eastern Question, and in spite of the fact that he had only just seen evils which had always been there, had that which the others lacked, moral conviction, and Hartington was infected with moral indifferentism. The Conservatives no doubt thought that Mr. Gladstone's attitude was mere emotional facility, a mere exhibition of spasmodic power of transient enthusiasm, an effect rather of temperament than of conviction, and unlikely therefore to produce a continued consequence of action sustained at a high level. The public, however, saw more clearly. Power over the moral fibre of other natures is not given to those whose own nature is wanting in this moral force, and Mr. Gladstone's attitude on the Eastern Question, in spite of his contradictions and of his occasional running away from the consequences of his own acts, was appreciated with accuracy by that large section of the public which ultimately followed him.'

To this estimate should be added the record of a talk which passed in June of the same year at a dinner party, where Sir Charles, 'along with Matthew Arnold, Bowen, afterwards Lord of Appeal, and Frederick Pollock,' discussed 'what is known as moral force':

'I upheld the view that to me Gathorne Hardy (although I never agreed in a word which the future Lord Cranbrook said) possessed moral force in the highest degree, but that this moral force was one which I felt had only prejudice behind it. Still to me the intense conviction of the man gave him immense strength, and made him the most really eloquent Englishman to whom I had ever listened. Gladstone, I thought, had moral force, because he believed in the particular thing of which he was speaking at the particular moment at which he spoke. I somewhat differed from the others with regard to Bright, thinking that he was seldom really in earnest, although I admitted that no man gave more strongly the impression of earnestness to his hearers, and therefore no man had "moral force" in a higher degree…. Courtney (who had come in during the autumn of 1876) and Fawcett both have "moral force."'

In March, 1877, the last stage was reached in those long-drawn negotiations by which the statesmen of Europe endeavoured to avoid war, and the declaration which Lord Derby attached in the name of England to the Protocol of London was virtually a refusal to assent to coercion of Turkey. Acting as leader of the Opposition, Lord Hartington asked Dilke to 'sketch a vote of censure on the declaration.' In the debate which took place on April 13th (the day after Russia declared war against Turkey)—

'I spoke at great length, but too late for good reports, and by my "gospel of selfishness" and other similar phrases raised ringing cheers and counter-cheers, which for some time stopped my going on. I felt after this day no longer afraid to stand up to anyone upon the other side, but I noted that if Mr. Disraeli had been still in the House I should not have hoped to have escaped as I did, after saying all I had said of his colleagues in a full house, and coining such a phrase of their proceedings as "gospel of selfishness"; but that which struck me most in the whole debate was above all the want of statesmanlike suggestion.'

A week after the declaration of war it seemed all but certain that Great
Britain must be drawn into the conflict; and Sir Charles—

'prepared (on April 20th, 1877) a resolution, which put on record my opinions, and stated that the House regretted the failure of the policy of the Government either to improve the position of Christian subjects of the Porte or to avert war. It also regretted their unwillingness to co-operate with any other of the European Powers.'

But the Liberal party as a whole was not able to formulate any such clear conclusion. Within a week Mr. Gladstone had determined to break away from the "upper official circles of Liberalism," and to move a series of Resolutions, which were actually drafted on April 26th, but the existence of which did not become generally known till the 29th.

'29th April.—Took Chamberlain to a party at Lord Houghton's, where Lord and Lady Salisbury were leading figures, and where was Harcourt, boiling over with rage at Mr. Gladstone, whose Resolutions had just been heard of. Gladstone will very probably split the Liberal party into two factions, but I do not see that he could have avoided doing as he has done. Chamberlain and I and Fawcett must vote with him. Cowen will vote against him, although if principles and not persons were in question he must vote the other way. Gladstone will move a string of resolutions, of which only one will touch the past—namely, one to condemn the Turks for not carrying out the sentences on their officers employed in the Bulgarian massacres. The main one, which touches the future, will, I believe, bind over the Government not to give aid to Turkey. His speech will be very fine.'

The "upper official circles" met, and in full conclave decided to separate themselves publicly from Mr. Gladstone.

More serious still, this decision to oppose their colleague and quondam leader was communicated to the Press. But on May 5th reconciliation was effected. Concerning this Lord Morley says:

"What was asked was that he (Mr. Gladstone) should consent to an
amended form of his second resolution, declaring more simply and
categorically that the Turk by his misgovernment had lost his claims."

Gladstone himself wrote that the change was "little more than nominal."
But Sir Charles's Memoir of the time shows at once how far the schism had
gone, and also how different a view was taken of the alteration by some of
Mr. Gladstone's supporters:

'On May 3rd I noted in my diary: "The Liberal party will next week cease to exist. I have already eighty-eight names of men who will vote with Gladstone, and, the Front Bench having foolishly decided to support the previous question, the party will be equally divided, and Hartington will resign. Gladstone will, I think, refuse to lead. Hartington will be asked to come back, but Goschen's friends may spoil the absolute unanimity of the request, and Hartington then refusing, Goschen would succeed. This seems to be the Goschen intrigue. I am sincerely sorry. The Front Bench people might perfectly well have voted against the 'previous question' on the ground that they support the first resolution, and yet have spoken against Gladstone's later resolutions."' He added later: 'I have still in my possession (1890) the list of the party as made up by me, showing who would have voted with Mr. Gladstone, who would have voted with Lord Hartington, … and who had stated that they would abstain. The analysis is of interest, as the facts have never been made known.' [Footnote: For analysis see Appendix at end of this chapter, p. 223.]

The outcome was a day in which Mr. Gladstone had to sustain singlehanded from half-past four to seven a Parliamentary wrangle of the most embarrassing kind, concerning the alteration of the form (and possibly the substance) of his original motion, and then to speak for another two hours and a half.[Footnote: See Life of Gladstone, vol. ii., chap, iv., p. 565.]

'At the last moment Mr. Gladstone executed a sudden change of front, which prevented a break-up of the party, but made his own position somewhat foolish. I was lunching with old Mrs. Duncan Stewart to meet Mrs. Grote and Lady Aberdare, the wife of Mr. Gladstone's former colleague (Bruce, the Home Secretary), when I heard what was to happen. But publicity was only given to the change at the last moment.

'On May 8th I recorded in my diary that "Gladstone's noble delivery of his peroration last night saved the evening from being a complete fiasco, but only just saved it. The Duke of Westminster, who was to have presided at the meeting at St. James's Hall, absented himself on account of the change of front; but the meeting was not told that the third and fourth resolutions were to be withdrawn. Both Gladstone and also the rest of the Front Bench people are in the wrong—he for moving at all in a sense hostile to Lord Hartington unless he meant to go through with the thing, and they for not finding a better way out. Such a way was clear last night. If Hartington had given notice of a direct vote of censure on the new reply to Russia published yesterday, as he might have done consistently with his views, Gladstone could have withdrawn in face of it."'

A general note on his personal difficulties follows later:

'In August (1877) I was again embarrassed by my attitude upon the Eastern Question. The fact that, being responsible, we had neglected to be humane, or to be politic, during the previous one-and-twenty years in which we might have taken the lead—might have insisted upon reform in Turkey and fostered the possibilities of self-government in the dependent States—made it difficult to approve the sudden activity which the conduct of the Turks in their straits called forth on the part of many Liberal politicians. Action might doubtless have been taken by us at any time between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, but, as the opportunity had been neglected, it was difficult to inaugurate such a policy under pressure of the atrocities agitation….

'The new position of the Eastern Question, although it did not unite me with Mr. Gladstone, made a political breach between myself and Hartington. He fell more and more under the somewhat stupid influence of his surroundings, and I, holding a position between the two wings of the party, found few with whom I myself agreed. Randolph Churchill… made advances towards me which led to joint action, as will be seen, in 1878. But in the autumn of '77 I was isolated, for Chamberlain went, although with moderation, with Mr. Gladstone's agitation.'