The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Volume 1

by Stephen Lucius Gwynn

CHAPTER XXIII

COERCION—CLOSURE—MAJUBA

In November, 1880, Mr. Forster's "resignation" had only been staved off by the Cabinet's promise to him of coercive powers in the new year, and it was certain that such a Coercion Bill, when introduced, would be met by the Irish members with obstruction outdoing all previous experience. The Land Bill, which was to accompany coercion, went far enough in limitation of the rights of property to be a grievous trial to the Whigs, and yet to Radicals such as Dilke and Chamberlain seemed complicated, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory.

Bad as was the Irish trouble, South Africa was worse. Finding no attempt made by Liberal statesmen to fulfil the expectations of free institutions which had been held out even by the Tory Government, the Boers rose for independence in December, 1880. War followed—a half-hearted war accompanied by negotiations. All was in train for the day of Majuba.

Sir Charles's Memoir shows this ferment working. By January 6th, 1881, he was back in London from his Christmas at Toulon.

'The Radicals were angry with the weakness of the Land Bill, which, however, was Mr. Gladstone's own. Oddly enough, both Hartington and Forster would have gone further, and Hartington certainly even for the "three F's," though he would have preferred to have had no Bill at all; but then Hartington did not care about stepping in, and Gladstone did, and feared the Lords. Chamberlain thought that the Land Bill was sure to be vastly strengthened in passing through the House….

'I noted on January 7th that I was very restive under Mr. Gladstone's Irish policy, but I found that if I were to go I should have to go alone, for Chamberlain at this moment was not in a resigning humour.'

A second element of discord lay in the preparations for the struggle on the Coercion Bill.

'On January 8th Chamberlain gave me a minute by Hartington, which I still have (dated the 3rd), proposing a summary method of dealing with Irish obstruction. Hartington thought that the Speaker, "by a stretch of the rule against wilful obstruction, might, if assured of the support of the great majority of the House, take upon himself the responsibility of declaring that he would consider any member rising to prolong the debate as guilty of wilful obstruction, and thus liable to be silenced." If the Speaker exceeded his power, he would (Hartington thought) only render himself liable to censure by the House, and if previously assured of its support there was hardly any limit to the authority which he might not assume. Chamberlain wrote strongly to Hartington against this proposal. He was convinced that with a stretch of authority the number of opponents would be increased. He added: "I believe the time has passed when Ireland can be ruled by force. If justice also fails, the position is hopeless, but this is a remedy which has never yet been tried fairly." Hartington wrote in reply, on January 10th: "If we cannot pass the Coercion Bill without locking up fifty or sixty members, they must be locked up." Hartington's view was accepted by the Speaker, and led to the wholesale expulsion from the body of the House of the Irish members….

'On January 12th I somewhat unwillingly made up my mind that I must remain in the Government, as Chamberlain insisted on remaining. I feared that if I came out by myself I should be represented as encouraging disorder, and to some extent should encourage it, and should be driven to act with mere fanatics. In coming out with Chamberlain I always felt safe that we could carry a large section of the party with us. Coming out by myself, I feared that that was not so. Chamberlain's position at this moment was that he personally did not believe in coercion, but that the feeling in the country was such that any Government would be forced to propose it, and he was not sufficiently clear that it was certain to fail to be bound as an honest man to necessarily oppose it. I received on this day a letter from a constituent upon the point, and answered that, agreeing generally as regarded pending Irish questions with Bright and Chamberlain, I should follow them if they remained united. [Footnote: The phrase 'pending Irish questions' is important. It excluded Home Rule.] Should they at any point differ from Mr. Gladstone, or the one with the other, as to the course to be adopted, I should have to reconsider my position.

'On January 14th I had a full talk with Bright, trying to get him to go with me. Bright told me that the outrages had got much worse in Ireland since the middle of December, as for example that of firing into houses. He had come round a great deal in the coercion direction. He now distinctly favoured suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act—that is to say, did not unwillingly yield to it, like Chamberlain, but supported it almost willingly, and he evidently had been converted by Forster to the view that things had grown to be very bad, and that by locking up a small number of the chiefs the rule of law might be restored. I did not agree, but his opinion showed me how completely I was isolated. I seemed trying to put people a point beyond themselves before they were naturally ready to go, and risked only being followed by those who are always ready to run on any fresh scent and whose support is but a hindrance. I felt myself face to face with the necessity for self-sacrifice of the hardest kind, the sacrifice of my own judgment as to the right course in the attempt to work with others. It was clear that few men thought at this time that coercion was so inexpedient that a single member of the Government would be justified in venturing on a course which would weaken the hands of Government itself, increase Mr. Gladstone's difficulties, and retard or hamper the remedial legislation which I myself thought most desirable. Moreover, we had weakened the Irish executive in past years by continually teaching them to rely on unconstitutional expedients, and it seemed very difficult to choose a moment of great outrage to refuse them the support which we had long accustomed them to look for in every similar stress of circumstances.

'The Cabinet of January 22nd dealt with the allied questions of closure, coercion, and remedial legislation for Ireland. It was decided to produce a scheme of closure as soon as it was certain that Northcote was in favour of the principle, and it was left to Mr. Gladstone to make sure of this, and I noted in my diary, "He had better make very sure." I was right in my doubt, and this question of Parliamentary procedure led to such a breach between Mr. Gladstone and his former private secretary that the Prime Minister told me he should never in future believe a word that Northcote might say. The apparent tortuousness of Northcote's conduct was caused by the weakness of his position as leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons. He was in favour of moderate courses, and always began by agreeing with us in private, after which Randolph Churchill would send a man to him with the message: "Go and tell the old goat that I won't have it." And then the unfortunate Northcote, to avoid being denounced in public, had to turn round and say that he could not answer for his party.'

Chronicling another talk with Gladstone, in which the latter spoke of
Northcote's "shiftiness," Sir Charles says:

'I had a high opinion of Sir Stafford, but in face of Churchill he was
not a free agent….

'The Cabinet rejected Chamberlain's proposal to accompany coercion by a provision against ejectments in the sense of the Compensation Bill of 1880. In my diary I add: "By a majority they decided that there should be no declaration of the nature of the Land Bill as yet; but, as Gladstone was in the minority on this point, we shall probably not wait long for the declaration. The Land Bill was finally settled. It really gives the 'three F's,' applied by a Court, but so wrapped up that nobody will find them."'

Mr. Forster's Coercion Bill was introduced as the first business of the Session, and was met by obstruction which more than realized the forecast. From Monday, January 31st, through the whole of Tuesday, February 1st, the debate was prolonged in a House possessing no recognized authority to check it; and at nine on the Wednesday morning Speaker Brand adopted the course which had been advocated by Lord Hartington. Acting in the exercise of his own discretion, he ordered the question to be put. The Irish members, having refused to submit, were removed one by one, technically by force. In face of these circumstances the Cabinet met on the Wednesday afternoon.

'The Cabinet decided not to have general closure in the form in which Chamberlain had asked for it in my name as well as in his. Gladstone wanted to have a special closure for Irish coercion, but Chamberlain presented our ultimatum against that, and won. When Chamberlain and I talked over the whole situation, I told him that I thought we had been too popular up to now for it to last. We were now unpopular with our own people in the constituencies on account of coercion, but, holding their opinions, were not really trusted by the moderates. I thought this position inevitable. The holding of strongly patriotic and national opinions in foreign affairs combined with extreme Radical opinions upon internal matters made it difficult to act with anybody for long without being attacked by some section with which it was necessary to act at other times, and made it difficult to form a solid party.'

When Dilke and Chamberlain, neither of whom was averse from the idea of closure in itself, resisted a proposal which meant treating the Irish members in a category apart from the rest of the House of Commons, they took a course which now seems simple and inevitable. But there is some difficulty in realizing to-day how Irishmen, and more especially Irish members, were viewed in England through the early eighties. Something of the public feeling towards them may be gathered from a string of extracts dealing with another source of dissension in this Cabinet. Sir William Harcourt, as Home Secretary, had adopted determined views of what may be conceded to the exigencies or the demands of detectives. Sir Charles writes on February 5th:

'It was at this moment that I first had to do with dynamite. Lord Granville had instructed me to deal with such matters at once myself without their passing through the Office; and receiving despatches from Washington (containing despatches from our Consul at Philadelphia offering information as to plots), and having missed Harcourt, I took them to Mr. Gladstone. I said that I had no doubt a sharp Yankee was trying to get a couple of hundred pounds out of us.'

But Sir William Harcourt wished for the information, and Sir Charles adds:

'The result of this policy undoubtedly was the fabrication of plots,
as exposed by Michael Davitt in the Labour World in 1890.'

Later Harcourt modified his view, but 'this was like shutting the stable door when the steed was stolen.'

'On February 16th I noted in my diary my dissatisfaction with regard to the Secret Service money. In 1880 I had walked out instead of voting for it, and I proposed this year to follow the same course. I knew of nothing on which was spent the £15,000, except one sum of £40 for a service not secret at all in its nature, "and £200 spent in America on a … panic of Harcourt's." I believe that as a fact most of the money was spent in the United States, but as I was not trusted with the information, I again walked out.'

On February 12th 'there was a great row between Fawcett and Harcourt.'

'Harcourt and Fawcett had been opening the letters of the Irish members, and when the Irishmen found it out Fawcett wanted to admit it, and Harcourt insisted on a blank refusal of information. My brother came to me with this question from the Radicals: "What is the use of having a blind Postmaster-General if he reads our letters?"'

The matter came up in the Cabinet along with a discussion on the Arms Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms in Ireland without licence from a Magistrate, and authorized the police to search. This Act had been in force before, but had been dropped by the Government on coming into office, and was now proposed as a supplement to Mr. Forster's "Protection of Property" measure.

'On February 12th Mr. Gladstone, with Bright and Chamberlain, fought hard against the Arms Bill. Harcourt, however, said that "coercion was like caviare: unpleasant at first to the palate, it becomes agreeable with use"; and, led by Harcourt, the majority insisted on having more coercion, and it was settled that the second Bill should go on. At dinner at Lord and Lady Cork's in the evening I was astonished to see in what excellent spirits Mr. Gladstone was, although he had been entirely overruled in his own Cabinet in the afternoon.'

Meanwhile the Home Secretary's activity was making trouble for the Foreign
Office.

'It having been stated in the House of Commons by Parnell that he had been watched and followed in Paris by persons connected with the Embassy, Lord Lyons telegraphed to me to ask me to contradict the statement. On February 19th he telegraphed again: "No one known to or in communication with the Embassy followed Parnell or watched him in any way in Paris, and nobody reported to the Embassy about him." I wrote to Harcourt and told him that Lord Lyons wished a contradiction made, and that Lord Granville wished me to make the contradiction "if Harcourt sees no objection." I afterwards wrote to Harcourt, "From what you said, I imagine that you do see objection; but if we can, it is better to keep the Embassies out of police matters." Harcourt, however, would not allow a contradiction to be given; and the fact was that Parnell had been watched, but watched by the Home Office, through the police, without the knowledge of the Embassy. Through this watching of the Irish leaders, Parnell's relations with Mrs. O'Shea were known to some of those who afterwards professed to be amazed by the discovery.'

Another subject produced open symptoms of a "split." On January 21st, 1881, during the debate on the Address, Mr. Rylands proposed a resolution condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable, which was tantamount to declaring that the Boers had been justified in their revolt.

'After my dinner party on the 21st, I went down to the House of
Commons and deliberately walked out on the Transvaal division, as did
three other members of the Government—Bright, Chamberlain, and
Courtney. We had all along been opposed to the annexation.'

This was only the beginning. In South Africa difficulties accumulated for the British Government. General Colley was repulsed at Laing's Nek on January 28th, and on February 8th at the Ingogo River. But in this war there was a real anxiety on both sides to negotiate, and President Kruger despatched an offer to submit the whole dispute to an English Royal Commission if troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal. On Wednesday, February 16th, Sir Charles learnt from Mr. Chamberlain that there had been a special Cabinet that afternoon 'to consider proposals from President Kruger of the Transvaal, which Mr. Gladstone was most anxious to accept.'

On the 18th 'the Transvaal question came up again on a Dutch petition brought over by delegates, as to which Lord Granville wrote to me: "I suppose it would not be right for you or me to see them. We shall probably bear with fortitude the sacrifice."' But the Government were trying to meet Kruger's advances in a reasonable spirit, and they instructed Colley by telegram to suspend hostilities if the Boers abandoned armed opposition. Colley telegraphed back for more precise instructions. The Boers hold Laing's Nek, which was in Natal territory. Was he to insist on their evacuating it—and thus opening the pass into the Transvaal—before he suspended hostilities? The answer sent back on February 19th was that he should forward to the Boers the British proposal, and fix a reasonable time within which they must reply. During that time he was not to attempt to occupy Laing's Nek. Sir Charles's Memoir makes it plain that the decision to negotiate with the Boers was due to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain:

'At the Cabinet of Saturday, February 19th, Mr. Gladstone and Chamberlain, for a wonder, were in the majority, and it was decided to drop the Arms Bill and to negotiate with the Boers; but at a further Cabinet on the 26th, Mr. Gladstone being in bed… the decision of the previous week was reversed, and it was decided to go forward with the Arms Bill.'

No reply came from the Boers within the time appointed, and on the night of February 26th Colley seized the height of Majuba, which commanded Laing's Nek. By noon on the 27th he was a dead man, and his force defeated. The stated time had expired, and Colley did his duty as a soldier. [Footnote: See an article in the Nineteenth Century (March, 1904) by Lady Pomeroy Colley (Lady Allendale) in reply to some points in the account of these events in the Life of Gladstone, iii., pp. 36-38.] But it is none the less true that the Boers, even after the action, still believed themselves to be in negotiation. On the 28th Kruger, ignorant of what had befallen, was writing a grateful acknowledgment of the proposal to suspend hostilities, and was suggesting a meeting of representatives from both sides.

It was urged, of course, that a disgrace to the British Army must be wiped out before there could be any further talk of parleying. Yet in Mr. Gladstone's Government there had been from the first an element which plainly thought the war unjustified, and with that element Mr. Gladstone had some sympathy. The Radicals now asserted themselves.

'On Wednesday, March 2nd, after a long interview between me and Chamberlain on the state of affairs, Chamberlain had an hour and a half with Bright, and got him to write a strong letter to Gladstone about the Transvaal, which we put forward as the ground for a proposed resignation, although of course the strength of the Coercion measures, the weakness of the Land measures, and the predominance of the Whigs in the Cabinet were the reasons which weighed chiefly with Chamberlain and myself. In the Transvaal matter, however, we should not be two, but four, for Bright and Courtney must go out with us, and Lefevre might do so. On the other hand, we had reason to think that if the Whigs yielded to us on the Transvaal, Kimberley would go. On the next day, Thursday the 3rd, Bright was sent for by Mr. Gladstone on his letter. Bright found him in entire harmony with our views. Kimberley at once gave in, and telegraphed what he was told; so the difficulty was over before the Cabinet was able to meet, and we as far from resignation as ever.

'On March 5th, I noted in my diary that the Land Bill was unsatisfactory. Chamberlain told me of a scene between Bright and Dodson which amused me much. Says Bright to Dodson: "You were put into the Cabinet to vote with Gladstone. Surely you ought not to oppose him." Says Dodson indignantly, "A man may have an opinion." "But why express it?" said the old Quaker.'

In the middle of March

'Things looked bad again at this moment, for on the 14th I wrote a draft address to the electors of Chelsea, prepared in view of my resignation along with Bright and Chamberlain. I alluded in it to "the non-reversal in the Transvaal of an act of high-handed aggression, which at the time of its inception I had condemned by vote and speech," and also condemned the resort to coercive measures for Ireland.'

So far as the Transvaal was concerned, the sympathies of Chamberlain and Dilke with the Boers prevailed; negotiations proceeded, and a Commission was named, which finally recommended a reversal of the annexation. The selection of Chamberlain—whose department had no connection with South Africa—to justify this step in debate indicated how strong was his opinion in favour of the Boers. But the Duke of Argyll, who was leaving the Government from disapproval of their Irish Land Bill, nevertheless on this matter defended the action of his former colleagues.

The situation was summed up by an observation of the Queen's to Lord Spencer, which, says Sir Charles, amused the Cabinet on March 26th. The Queen's Speech on January 7th had contained this curt phrase: "A rising in the Transvaal has imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." To this the Queen replied: "I cannot see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated' in the Transvaal." "There was nothing else to be done, Ma'am," says Spencer. "I quite understand that," says Her Majesty, "but still I do not see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated.'"

Mr. Gladstone was meanwhile doing the right thing in Ireland with his Land Bill, but Mr. Forster, Sir Charles thought, was destroying the effect by the free use of his new measure, which, having become law by the end of February, enabled the Irish Government to put any man into gaol on a mere suspicion and without form of trial. Members of Parliament were not at first attacked, but the officials of the Land League were seized. Mr. Davitt had been general manager; his ticket-of-leave, as an ex-Fenian prisoner, was recalled by Sir William Harcourt, and he was re-arrested. Mr. Dillon took Davitt's place. Sir Charles writes on Saturday, April 30th, 1881:

'At the Cabinet, which I think was on the previous night, but of which I heard the details on this day, it was decided to arrest Dillon. Spencer and Granville, who were both of them away, for it was not, I think, a regular Cabinet, were both against it rather than for it; Harcourt was really neutral, though Gladstone counted him for it; Kimberley, Hartington, and the Chancellor alone supported Gladstone and Forster. Bright, Chamberlain, Childers, and, wonderful to relate, Carlingford (who was present, though the newspapers said he was absent), Northbrook, and Dodson opposed the arrest. Gladstone declared that it was six to six, and gave himself a casting vote. A few days later Lord Granville spoke to me warmly against the decision of the Cabinet. He said he never knew numbers counted in the Cabinet before, and that it was absurd to count heads in assemblies in which there was such a difference in the contents of the heads. This criticism, however, goes too far, and strikes at the root of the decisions of Parliament itself.'

Meanwhile the Land Bill had reached its second reading. But the Irish executive was constantly appealed to for constabulary to assist in carrying out sentences of eviction, while, on the other hand, tenants were fighting landlords by a general strike against rents.

'At the Cabinet on May 4th the chief topic discussed was the possibility of checking evictions in Ireland without preventing the payment of rent by tenants perfectly able to pay.'

In addition to the Irish trouble in Ireland, there was the Irish trouble in the House of Commons, in no way settled by the Speaker's one arbitrary imposition of closure at his own discretion. That Mr. Gladstone's mind was working towards another solution is evident from the following note:

'On June 8th I went to The Durdans to lunch with the Roseberys, and walked with Mr. Gladstone. We marched round the Derby course, and Mr. Gladstone said that the first business after the Irish Land Bill must be procedure, and that this must be the business of next year. He said, "there must no doubt be some repression by the closure, but there must also be still more delegation."'

The discussion of the Land Bill was long almost beyond precedent, but by August it left the Commons, and Lord Salisbury, though furious in his invective, declined to advise its total rejection. The Irish landlords had their will of it in Committee, and sent it back unrecognizable. The Lords' amendments were then reviewed by Mr. Gladstone, and, broadly speaking, rejected. There was the usual threat of a collision between the Houses. Sir Charles's first note, in his diary of August 12th, indicates how completely Mr. Gladstone controlled this situation:

'"Harcourt is very violent against the Lords, more so than either
Bright or Chamberlain, but the decision, whatever it may be, of the
Cabinet, will on this occasion be Mr. Gladstone's."

'On the 14th I noted, "The claim of Lord Salisbury to force us to 'consult the country' is a claim for annual Parliaments when we are in office, and septennial Parliaments when they are in office." I did not, however, believe in this particular crisis. On the 14th Lord Houghton wrote complaining that we did not meet so often as we used to do. "This is a penalty one pays for having one's friends in power. I fear there is no hope of their ceasing to be so by the instrumentality of the House of Lords." On the 15th Lady Lytton's sister told me that Lytton had "enjoyed the fighting attitude of the Lords. It seemed more worthy than talking so much and doing so little." But she added: "After it was all over they were in a most horrid fright."'

Lord Ripon wrote from India of the proceedings in the House of Lords that he thought Lord Salisbury "would succeed in blowing the institution to pieces before long."

With a Cabinet so divided, rumour of changes was certain to be rife.

'On August 17th there occurred the Ministerial fish dinner at Greenwich, which was then a yearly institution. Rosebery was in the chair—for on these occasions the Chairman is arbitrarily chosen, generally from among the very youngest members of the Government, and is a sort of lord of misrule. [Footnote: Lord Rosebery was Under- Secretary at the Home Office.]

'Harcourt told Chamberlain at the dinner that Mr. Gladstone had made up his mind to put Lord Frederick Cavendish into the Cabinet, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain arguing that he ought not to be put in over my head.

'On the way home Harcourt told me that there were other changes to be made besides putting in Cavendish, and that one of them was that he should become Lord Chancellor…. I did not myself believe any of these reports, but confined myself to urging that Chamberlain should be Chancellor of the Exchequer.'

This assumed continuance in office, but a little later Mr. Chamberlain, writing to Sir Charles, entered the domain of prophecy, with some hint of the 'unauthorized programme.' He thought that the Liberals would be beaten at the next election, and that their business was to try to get the farmers over to their side.

"What is the good of bothering about Bankruptcy or Local Government when our real business is to outbid Chaplin and Co. with the farmers? But, then, what will our Whig friends say to Radical proposals as to tenant right, improvements, rating, etc.?"

While Sir Charles was in Paris Mr. Chamberlain wrote on October 4th:

"I am very uneasy about the Irish business. It does not look as if the Land Bill would do much, and meanwhile 'outrages,' exaggerated probably by the Press, are forming a large part of the information supplied by the papers for the autumn season. It is the history of last October over again, and I expect every day to hear of some proposal for further coercion. I am clear that we were right in resisting coercion last year, and I even wish we had gone further and gone out upon it. But what is to be done now? Can we go on drifting without a policy? We cannot go back. It is too late to release the 'suspects,' and, if we were to do so, the experience of the past few weeks shows that this would not make things smoother with Parnell and Co., while it would bring down a storm of denunciation from the other side. Then, can we go further in the direction of coercion? I doubt if the House of Commons would stand it. To put down the Land League would involve so many questions affecting public agitation in this country that the Radicals would surely be up in arms. It is possible the Tories might do it if they were in office, which I wish to God they were. But can the Liberals do it, and, above all, can you and I be parties to any more of such work? I should not have a moment's hesitation in saying 'No,' if I could find any alternative, but it is evident that Parnell has now got beyond us. He asks for 'No Rent,' and Separation, and I am not prepared to say that the refusal of such terms as these constitutes an Irish grievance. I should like to stand aside and let the Coercionists and Parnell fight it out together, but I fear this is not now possible. Altogether it is a horrible imbroglio, and for the moment I do not see my way out of the fog. I wish I could talk it all over with you."

A little later, however, he wrote:

"'The resources of civilization'—see Mr. G.'s speech—will mean immediate and greatly extended use of the Protection Act. There will be a miraculous draught of fishes directly. In for a penny, in for a pound. I hope it will be a clean sweep. The electors will better stand a crushing blow than coercion by driblets. There is no other alternative except new legislation—and from that may Heaven defend us."

On October 12th, 1881, Mr. Parnell was arrested and put into gaol. On October 17th, Sir Charles, then in the South of France, wrote to Sir M. Grant Duff—who had become Governor of Madras—that "Bright and Chamberlain supported the proposed general razzia on the Land League leaders in order to avoid fresh coercive legislation." Fresh legislation would have meant trouble in the House of Commons. But the arrest of Mr. Parnell, which "folly" Sir Charles had tried to prevent, led to greater trouble.

The British Government now endeavoured to back up the policy of force by dividing the opposition. Ever since the trouble generated by the rejection of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, Dublin Castle had been (not for the first time) seeking to enlist on its side the spiritual power of Rome. There were two lines of approach, of which the first is indicated in a note under November 22nd, 1880:

'Lord Granville was engaged at this moment in trying, through Cardinal
Newman, to induce the Pope to bully the Irish Bishops; but the Irish
Bishops told the Pope, in reply to his remonstrances, that if he
adopted a policy of compromise in Italy which was unpopular with the
Church, he must leave them alone with Irish affairs.'

The "policy of compromise" was not likely to be adopted. Cardinal Manning, talking to Sir Charles on July 15th, 1880, on his return from Rome, expressed his belief that the Vatican was badly advised in its hostile attitude towards the Italian Monarchy, which he personally would be prepared to support against the Revolutionary Party, since its fall would probably bring about an anti-clerical republic.

Far more continuous were the negotiations, with a view to influencing the Irish Church, carried on through Mr. George Errington, a gentleman of old Roman Catholic family, who had sat since 1874 as a moderate Home Rule member for County Longford. [Footnote: The historic difficulties in the way of an Embassy to the Vatican, fully given by Lord Fitzmaurice in the Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., chap, viii., pp. 281-282, had been surmounted "by the practice of allowing a Secretary of Legation, nominally appointed to the Grand Ducal court of Tuscany, to reside at Rome, where he was regarded as de facto Minister to the Vatican." Lord Derby had, however, withdrawn Mr. Jervoise, the last representative, and no other appointment had been made.]

The following notes show the points at which Sir Charles came into touch with the development of Mr. Errington's 'Mission' to the Vatican. On December 1st, 1880, Mr. Errington wrote—in pursuance of a conversation of the previous day—to solicit Sir Charles's offices with the French Government towards mitigating the severity with which expropriation of the unauthorized congregations might be carried out under M. Ferry's Article 7. The letter dealt also with the matter on which his 'Mission' was afterwards based:

"I am constantly receiving news from Ireland of the evil effects already produced by the temporary success at Rome of Archbishop Croke"—who represented advanced Nationalism—"and his party. This would have been quite impossible had any diplomatic relations existed. Cardinal Jacobini will take care, I am sure, that such a thing does not occur again. Whether he can undo or counteract the mischief already done is, I am afraid, doubtful….

"I suppose it would be desirable in the interests of government and order in Ireland that the Vatican should do all in its power to keep the clergy from going with or countenancing the Land League."

On December 6th, 1880:

'Errington came to me in Paris, nominally on behalf of the Vatican, with a view of having negotiations entered upon, and I believe this was the time at which he obtained, at Lord Spencer's request, some sort of private commission from Lord Granville. The commission was afterwards made more definite.'

October 28th, 1881:

'I saw Errington, who was in Paris on his way to Rome with letters from Lord Granville, based on the request of Spencer and Forster that he, Errington, should represent the Irish Government at Rome during its great struggle with Parnell, matters in Ireland being too serious to make roundabout dealing through Lord Emly [Footnote: An Irish Roman Catholic M.P. who, after being Postmaster-general, was raised to the Peerage.] and Cardinal Howard safe; and Errington was to be tried from October until Easter….

'In the evening of November 10th, at dinner at the Harcourts', Mr. Gladstone, taking me aside about Errington's mission, told me that he was bitterly opposed to the notion of reopening relations with the Papal Court; and there can be no doubt that he assented most unwillingly to the views of Spencer, Forster, and Harcourt in favour of the Errington "Mission." He deceived the House of Commons about it, because he always closed his own eyes to the facts. [Footnote: The line taken by the Government in the House of Commons was that Mr. Errington had no formal appointment, and that his communications were not officially dealt with by the Foreign Office. These diplomatic explanations only increased the suspicion of the followers of Parnell and of the Ultra-Protestants led by Sir H. Drummond Wolff.]

'On December 24th, 1881, Lord O'Hagan passed through Paris, despatched on a secret mission to Rome about Ireland by Forster, who was not satisfied with the results up to then of the Errington Mission.'

'On December 31st I received a letter from Forster, in which he said that Lord O'Hagan had returned, and that no notice had been taken by the papers of his visit to Rome, which was a good thing.'

To the principle of such intermediation Sir Charles had no objection. What he disliked was that the thing should be done and denied. He himself in the previous year had written by the Government's request to Cardinal Manning at Rome for assurance that the future Bishop of a new See in Canada would be a British subject. Manning also had written to him concerning the establishment of a new See for Catholics of the Levant, with its seat in Cyprus, guaranteeing that "the influence of our Bishop and all about him would be … strictly in support of the Government," and asking therefore that, "when the seat of Government for Cyprus had been fixed, Rome might be informed, as it would be desirable for the Bishop to be in the same place."

Manning was quite content with the influence that he could wield, and, as a letter from him in 1885 shows, was strongly against diplomatic relations between England and the Vatican. Sir Charles, however, did not take that view:

'Such perpetual applications have to be made to the Court of Rome, not only (as the public thinks) with regard to Irish affairs, but with regard to Roman Catholic interests in all parts of the world, that I have always been favourable to taking the public into our confidence in the matter and appointing a representative at the Court of Rome. At one time we used to carry on our affairs with the Papal Court through Cardinal Howard, an English Cardinal; but the Pope is so anxious to obtain official representation that he throws difficulties in the way of ecclesiastics acting as informal representatives. Then Lord O'Hagan used to go to Rome, at the expense of Irish Secret Service money, as a private traveller, and he used to carry on negotiations with the Vatican.'

Sir Charles resented 'the complications that are caused by our having to do that in fact which we refuse to do in form.' The Errington "Mission, which was no mission," was an instance.

Though the year drew to its close there was still no decision as to the means of dealing with obstruction. But approach was being made to a settled policy.

'On my return to London I found that a Cabinet had been called for Thursday, November 10th, to deal with the forms of the House, as the Speaker and Erskine May had been concocting a new code, which, I added, "is certain to be perfectly useless, as the Speaker is generally, and May invariably, wrong…. Direct closure is the only thing of any use. That would be one fight and no more; but the Speaker-May code would probably take a whole Session to get, and be useless when we have got it.'

'When Chamberlain came to dinner on November 11th, he left with me till the next day the "secret" paper printed for the Cabinet as to the forms of the House, which was written by May and annotated by the Speaker, and I was glad to find that it included closure.'

In a Parliamentary Session marked by so much that was inconclusive, Sir Charles had the satisfaction of recording in his diary one piece of progressive legislation which was his own. By April, 1881, he had got ready his Bill for putting an end to the Unreformed Municipal Corporations, and so carrying out the policy which he had recommended while in Opposition, and it became law.