CHAPTER XXXII
FOREIGN AND COLONIAL AFFAIRS OCTOBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883
Sir Charles Dilke's transference to the Local Government Board scarcely lessened his contact with the more important branches of the Foreign Office work, while his entry into the Cabinet greatly increased the range of his consultative authority.
The Triple Alliance was a fact, but only guessed as yet. It is not till the middle of 1883 that Sir Charles writes:
'On June 4th, 1883, I heard the particulars of the alliance of the Central Powers, signed at Vienna between Germany and Austria in October, 1879, and ratified at Berlin on October 18th of that year, to which Italy had afterwards adhered.' [Footnote: Sir Charles knew that Prince Bismarck had tried first for an English alliance, and wrote on August 17th, 1882, to Sir M. Grant Duff: "N. Rothschild told me that the late Government had twice declined an offensive and defensive alliance offered by Germany." See also Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., p. 211.]
An extension was contemplated which would have put France between two fires. Later, in the autumn of 1883,
'a private letter from Morier to Lord Granville showed that Bismarck had sent the Crown Prince of Germany to Spain to induce Spain to join the "peace league"' (Triple Alliance), 'and had failed.'
On November 22nd, 1883,
'At the Cabinet I saw a telegram from Lord Dufferin, No. 86, received late on the previous night, in which the Sultan asked our advice as to offers of alliance in the event of immediate general war, which had probably been made him by both sides. We replied to it after the Cabinet (No. 68): "We cannot enter into hypothetical engagements or make arrangements in contemplation of war between friendly Powers now at peace. The Sultan must be aware that Germany is the most powerful military nation on the Continent, and that she has no ambitious views against Turkey. Strongly advise the Sultan not to enter into entangling engagements." This whole story of the Sultan's was probably a lie, to get us to say whether we would defend his Armenian frontier, but, curiously enough, Dufferin seemed to believe it.'
'On May 24th, 1883, I informed the Ministers assembled of two interesting matters of foreign affairs. The one was Bismarck's denunciation to us of a league among the small Christian States of the Balkan Peninsula for provoking popular votes in Turkey in favour of annexation of various provinces to one or other of the partners. The other was an offer by the Grand Sherif of Mecca to turn the Turks out of Arabia, and place it under British protection.'
The gravest danger to the world's peace lay in the fact that to the ordinary Englishman Russia was still the natural enemy, and that France, smarting under the rebuff she had experienced in Egypt, was assuming a more unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain.
In South Africa the state of things established after Majuba was revealing itself as one of constant friction, and border wars between the Boers and African tribes claiming British protection led to ceaseless controversy.
'On the 10th (March, '83) there was another Cabinet. A Transvaal debate was coming on on Thursday the 15th, and in view of this Chamberlain asked for support of his opinion that an expedition should be sent out to save Montsioa. He was supported only by Hartington and myself, but he afterwards managed to commit us to it, and to force his view upon Mr. Gladstone. He passed a paper to me when he found we could not win at the Cabinet: "How far would the difficulty be met by supplying arms to Mankowane and (query) to Montsioa, and permitting volunteers to go to their assistance?" I replied, "I don't think it would stand House of Commons discussion." To this he answered, "Perhaps not. But the first is what Mankowane himself asks for, and if we gave him what he wants that course ought to be defensible." I wrote, "Yes, I was thinking more of Montsioa."' [Footnote: Mankowane and Montsioa were independent native chiefs of Bechuanaland, for whose protection the Aborigines' Protection Society was appealing to the British Government.]
'March 16th, 1883, Mr. Gladstone asked me to speak in the event of the Transvaal debate coming on again, and I refused, as I did not agree in the policy pursued. Chamberlain said he would speak in my place, and did so.
'May 26th or 27th. We decided at the Cabinet to keep Basutoland.
'June 13th. As to South Africa, the Colonial Office told us that they hoped to induce the Cape to take Bechuanaland. A little later on the whole of their efforts were directed in the opposite direction— namely, to induce the Cape to let us keep Bechuanaland separate from the Cape. It was announced that Reay had accepted the Transvaal Mission.
'June 23rd. We decided that Reay was not to go out, because the
Transvaal people preferred to come to us.
'November 30th. We talked of the Transvaal, which looked bad.'
The Transvaal deputation is mentioned immediately after this as having arrived.
There are also allusions to South African affairs having been raised at other Cabinets in this year, but no details given.
Late in 1883, Sir Charles says, 'I was pressing for the restoration of Cetewayo, and Lord Derby insisted that he had brought all his troubles on himself.'
At this time Russia had subdued the Turcomans and made herself paramount in the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. It was only a matter of months before Russian troops would be on the ill-defined frontiers of Afghanistan. Great Britain was bound to the Amir of Afghanistan by an engagement to assist him against external attack, provided that he complied with British advice as to his foreign relations. Not only was a collision predicted between Russia and the Amir, whose territory Great Britain had thus guaranteed, but it was known where the struggle would be.
'It was also about this time' (February, 1883) 'that the Russian Government took up my suggestion as to the delimitation of the boundary of Afghanistan. But, as Currie wrote, "the object of the Russian Foreign Office may only be to keep the British Government quiet, while they are settling the boundary question with Persia and annexing … Merv, with a view to a fresh departure in the direction of Herat as soon as that process is accomplished."'
'We already foresaw that the struggle would be over Penjdeh. A memorandum of 1882, by Major Napier, [Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. C. Napier, C.I.E., son of the first Lord Napier of Magdala, and twin brother of the second Lord Napier.] had told us that "below Penjdeh the Afghans would not appear to have ever extended their authority." Mr. Currie, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Currie, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.] as he then was, prophesied that the line proposed by the Russians would strike the Murghab near Penjdeh.'
This was a situation well fitted to arouse Sir Charles, who wrote to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice: "I'm as great a jingo in Central Asia as I am a scuttler in South Africa." His policy was not that of the India Office. He advocated delimitation of the Afghan frontiers, and in October, 1882, the Amir had asked for this. [Footnote: 'On October 17th, 1882, the Amir had proposed to Lord Ripon that delimitation of his frontiers which I was pressing at the time, but which had been refused by Lord Ripon. Lord Granville and Fitzmaurice had come round to my view. Northbrook strongly resisted, and wanted his famous treaty.'] 'The Government of India insisted at this time upon the proposal to Russia of a treaty with regard to Afghanistan.' Sir Charles thought that British interests in India would be better served by strengthening Afghanistan, by ascertaining exactly what the Amir's rights were, and by making him feel that he would be protected in them. To-day, when Afghanistan is one of the self-equipping Asiatic military powers, and admittedly an awkward enemy to tackle, the situation seems plain enough; but in those days Abdurrahman, new on the throne, was still a 'King with opposition.'
'On April 20th, 1883, there was a meeting at the Foreign Office as to Central Asia between Lord Granville, Hartington, Kimberley, Northbrook, Edmond Fitzmaurice, and myself. The Amir was in a friendly humour, and I felt that the evacuation of Kandahar had been better than a dozen victories.'
The evacuation of Kandahar had been Lord Ripon's work, but Lord Ripon was now inclining to compromise the unity of the Native State which he had then laboured to establish. He was disposed to keep the Amir at arm's length, and wished to decline a visit of ceremony which Abdurrahman proposed. All the Committee at the Foreign Office were against this, except Lord Northbrook, who 'did not believe in Abdurrahman's strength, and believed that he would soon be turned out of Herat by his own Governor.'
'On June 7th it was settled that the Amir should have twelve lakhs of rupees a year.' But Sir Charles had not yet carried his point as to preventing a treaty with Russia, and
'Philip Currie and Fitzmaurice both wrote to me in favour of the India Office view, while Condie Stephen [Footnote: Sir Alexander Condie Stephen, K.C.M.G., was in 1882-83 despatched from the Legation at Teheran on a mission to Khorassan, the north-east province of Persia] returned from Central Asia with the same view in favour of a treaty…. But Currie put a postscript to his long letter, in which he departed altogether from the treaty position, and took up my own view as to delimitation: "In view of our engagement to defend Afghanistan from foreign aggression, we ought surely to know the limits of the territory we have guaranteed."
'I finally said that I had no objection to a treaty which would merely recapitulate facts and set out the Afghan frontier. This was my last word, and, Lord Granville agreeing with me, we went on with delimitation as against treaty…. It was not until June 8th, 1888, that the Emperor of Russia recognized the arrangement and the frontier marked by the boundary pillars.'
For Sir Charles's policy it was necessary to propitiate the ruler of Afghanistan, and in July, 1883, it was reported that the Amir had applied to the British Government for a new set of teeth. The application had really been for a European dentist. When Lord Ripon persisted in refusing Abdurrahman's proffered visit, Sir Charles tried to get civil expressions of regret from the Government, and, failing in this, wrote in despair to Lord Kimberley: "I hope to goodness he has got his teeth."
It was not, however, till 1885 that the tension with Russia became really acute.
In France, Gambetta's death had been followed by a Ministerial crisis, and in the disturbances which resulted M. Duclerc fell in February, 1883, and after a time of confusion M. Ferry became, for a second time, Prime Minister, having M. Challemel-Lacour, no lover of England, for his Foreign Secretary.
"In order to distract the country's attention from internal dissensions and the Eastern frontier," [Footnote: Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., p. 313.] M. Ferry developed that "Colonial policy" of which Sir Charles said, in 1887, that
"it greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and disorganizes her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of mobilization of the reserves." [Footnote: Present Position of European Politics, p. 101.]
Germany also was embarking on a "Colonial policy" disapproved of by Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI., p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,
'de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in stopping our carrying through our treaty.'
Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles's reference to this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:
'In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883, Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty- making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: "In all other countries having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted. We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it was good for the country, I feel sure."'
In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee 'by its delays and hesitations lost us the Cameroons,' where two native Kings had asked to be taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in regard to Zanzibar.
'As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, "Are you going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?" a note which applied to an offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become his heirs—an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and which I was in favour of accepting.'
'The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, assigned as the chief reason for not accepting this trust "the fear lest it should infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862." … It may be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement. In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my suggestion pointed out at this time that "to the north of the Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long? without a European rival; where the political future of the country is of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the slave trade." The Government, however, delayed too long, and we afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.' (Heligoland).
Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides. Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883, officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling that something must be done.
'On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described him as one 'who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a new kind of slavery in Fiji.'] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the 13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and almost lost the whole of it.'
'As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the British Government would undoubtedly "excite a violent outbreak of public feeling in the Australian colonies." Lord Derby was a party to this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.'
The Colonial Secretary's general attitude upon these matters may be illustrated from a correspondence which passed between him and Sir Charles in the autumn of this year. Replying to criticisms concerning the Australian Colonies, Lord Derby
'somewhat sneeringly observed that in order to keep out foreign convicts "it is not necessary that they should annex every island within a thousand miles of their coast. They cannot have at once the protection of British connection and the pleasures of a wholly independent foreign policy."'
On this Sir Charles comments:
'Lord Derby had lost all credit with the Conservative party about the time of his resignation of the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs in the Conservative Administration. But he had retained considerable weight with Liberals. During his tenure of the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in Mr. Gladstone's Administration, he lost his credit with the Liberals as well, and his influence reached a position of decline which makes it difficult even to remember the enormous weight he had possessed in the earliest part of his political career. For many years Lord Derby was the ideal spokesman of the middle man not fiercely attached to either party. Going over this diary in 1900, it is a curious reflection that the immense weight gained by Sir Edward Grey in the period between 1890 and 1900 was similar to that which Lord Derby had enjoyed at the earlier period. Each of them in his time appeared to express, though far from old, the lifelong judgment of a Nestor. Each of them extorted from the hearer or reader the feeling: "What this man says is unanswerable. It is the dispassionate utterance of one who knows everything, and has thought it out in the simplest but the most convincing form." Lord Derby could sum up a discussion better, probably, than anyone has ever done, unless it is Sir Edward Grey. Sir Edward Grey's summing up of a discussion on a difficult problem, such as that presented by the Chinese question, 1897-1900, was better than was to be expected from anyone else, unless it had been the Lord Stanley of, say, thirty-five years before.'
On May 27th
'I dined at Marlborough House at a dinner to meet a little tin soldier cousin in white epaulettes, who was over from Germany … and (the German Ambassador) Count Münster told me that the French had hoisted their flag on a reef, as he said, within cannon-shot of Jersey, as to the British or neutral nature of which there had long been a dispute between the two Governments.' [Footnote: The Memoir has a note upon this episode of the Ecréhous Books, which led to the publication of Parliamentary papers in June of that year:
'The rocks were not within three miles of the coast of Jersey at low- water mark, and this was the limit of the reservation of the Jersey oyster fishery, and it was upon this fact that the French went. It afterwards appeared that the French flag never had been hoisted on the rocks, but only on a boat which came thither for the purpose of fishing, so that the whole matter was somewhat of a storm in a teacup. It raised, however, another question. The Convention of 1839, which defined the limits of the oyster fishery between Jersey and France, also defined the limits of the exclusive French rights of fishery on all other parts of the coast of the British islands; and some day an Irish Parliament may find interest in Sir Edward Hertslet's "Memorandum as to the French right of fishery upon the coast of Ireland, printed for the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1883."']
'On May 28th there was a Levee, at which d'Aunay, of the French Embassy, told me that the act of the fishermen at Ecréhous was disavowed by France. "But," he added, "there is perhaps some Challemel in it," an admission which rather weakened the other statement, and it again struck me that it was a pity we had been so rude to Challemel when he was Ambassador.'
Relations with France were going from bad to worse. Not only were they strained by the breach of 1882 over Egypt, but French colonizing aspirations had created trouble in Madagascar. The understanding between the two Great Powers that an "identic attitude" in regard to the Hova people was to be maintained was broken down by France, which under various pretexts intervened by force in Madagascar, claiming a protectorate over certain narrow strips of territory on the north-west coast. This claim was denounced by Lord Granville. Yet 'on October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville's, at which I met Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook.' This meeting of the heads of the military and foreign services discussed the affairs of the Congo, and also Madagascar; 'it was decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of the French. 'At this time the growing tension was disagreeably felt, and Sir Charles learnt a month later that the Cabinet of November 28th, 1882, 'had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France.'
At this time an Embassy from Madagascar was in Paris to protest against the oppressive policy pursued. An ultimatum was presented which left the envoys no option but to depart, and they came with their bitter complaint to London, where Sir Charles Dilke very warmly espoused their cause:
'At this moment, December 1st, 1882, I was having difficulties with Lord Granville about Madagascar, as I was seeing much of the Malagasy envoys, and was very friendly to them; whereas Lord Granville was frightened of the French. A deputation came to us, got up by Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and introduced by Forster; it suggested American arbitration, and Lord Granville threw much cold water upon the scheme.'
A few days later he adds:
'I was still at this moment fighting for my Malagasy friends. Not only did Lord Granville snub me, but Courtney wrote from the Treasury: "I hope you will get rid of these people as soon as possible. Even the Baby Jenkins sees the absurdity of the anti-French feeling." But whatever "Ginx's Baby" might do, I could not see the absurdity of the anti-French feeling with regard to Madagascar, for the French were wantonly interfering with an interesting civilized black people in whose country they had not even trade, for All the trade was in American, British, or German hands.
'On December 15th, 1882, there was a fresh trouble, for Lord Granville was furious at a speech by Lord Derby, and, indeed, I never knew him so cross about anything at all. The difficulty was once more Madagascar. Lord Granville meant to do nothing about Madagascar, but he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play, by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad the cards were.'
The Malagasys were unique in that since 1869 they had become definitely a Christian State, and a State Christianized by English missionaries, and this fact was impressively brought home to Sir Charles by a scene which he afterwards (in 1886) thus described in a public lecture:
"At Westminster Abbey there came in to the Morning Service the whole of the members of the Madagascar Embassy, which had just come to London from France. The two Malagasy Ambassadors were at the head of the party. They sat very silently through the service, which the senior Ambassador did not understand at all, and which the second Ambassador only partly understood, until a hymn which had been given out was sung, when, recognizing the familiar tune, the two Ambassadors and the whole of their secretaries struck boldly in with the Malagasy words. There could be no better instant proof, to anyone who saw the scene, of their familiarity with the missionary teaching of England and America, and of the extent to which, though separated from us by language, they look upon themselves as members of the Christian Church."
In 1882-83 Sir Charles failed to interest his colleagues in the matter, till on August 22nd, 1883, just before Parliament was prorogued, the Cabinet had to discuss 'what was known as the Tamatave incident, which nearly brought England and France to war over matters growing out of the French operations in Madagascar.'
The town of Tamatave had been bombarded and occupied by the French in June. The matter was aggravated by the treatment of the British Consul and of a British missionary, and difficulties were made as to adequate apology and indemnity.
'In the course of September I had frequent interviews with Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office with regard to Madagascar…. Lord Granville wrote to me, about the middle of October, that (the French Ambassador) Waddington "professed to have a solution of the Tamatave" difficulty, and on the 22nd a Cabinet was called with regard to the Tamatave difficulty, Egypt, and South Africa. The French despatch from Challemel to Waddington was most unsatisfactory.'
Another Cabinet having been summoned for October 25th, Harcourt wrote: "I have heard nothing about its cause or object, but conjecture that it is Granville's Cabinet for France…. It is ominous Northbrook (First Lord of the Admiralty) being a principal assistant. I am myself for being stiff with France."
'The Cabinet was upon the two points of Tamatave and withdrawal from Egypt, but, in the absurd way in which Cabinets behave when summoned upon important questions, we spent most of our time in discussing a scheme of Lefevre's for widening Parliament Street; Mr. Gladstone wishing to widen King Street and to make a fork. A Committee was appointed on the matter, to consist of Harcourt, Childers, Lefevre, Northbrook, and myself. Hartington came late as usual, and on his arrival our Tamatave despatch was discussed.'
The complete destruction of the native State and dynasty did not come at this time, and French "protection" of Madagascar was only recognized by Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890. But the encroachments of France led in this year to further friction, arising from their conflict for the possession of Tonquin. On November 17th the Cabinet discussed 'the protection of British subjects in China in view of a French attack on the Chinese Empire, and decided to concert measures with Germany and the United States.' On the 19th they proposed to France mediation in the Chinese difficulty, 'with the full expectation that it would be refused.'
'On December 7th there was a paragraph in the Times in large type intended to reassure the French, by stating that our interference in China to protect our own subjects was not combined with Germany in particular. The paragraph, although it may have been wanted, was untrue. We had combined our action with the Germans, and then found it was resented by the French.'
So dissension grew at a pace which enabled Bismarck to turn his attention from European politics, and, in one of his many meetings with Count Herbert, Sir Charles reports that about the second week in November
'I had a conversation with H. Bismarck about his father. He said that the Prince had turned as yellow as a guinea, and could not now work more than an hour at a time, and that the only thing on which he troubled himself was his workman's insurance scheme.'