I.
In September, 1870, shortly after the Siege of Paris had begun, the Russian Chancellor, Gortschakof, intimated to the Powers that the Tsar proposed to repudiate that article in the Treaty of Paris which declared the Black Sea neutral, forbade Russia to build arsenals on it, and limited her fleet there to six small vessels. [Footnote: Treaty of Paris, July 13th, 1856 (Hertslet's Treaties, vol. xiv., p. 1172).] This particular article had been specially demanded by England; and when France, desirous of closing the Crimean War, spoke of yielding to Russia's resistance, Palmerston had declared that without this stipulation England and Turkey must carry on the war alone.
Sir Charles, on this matter as on many others, inclined to the Palmerstonian tradition, which was certainly neither that of Mr. Gladstone nor of Lord Granville. But Lord Granville gave him introductions for his projected second journey to Russia, and charged the young Liberal member with the task of representing the Cabinet's views:
"In talking to Russians I hope that you will say that we are about the most peaceable Ministry it is possible for England to have, but we are determined not to put up with any indignity. On the other hand, we greatly regret any stop to increasing good relations between the two countries, and shall be glad to make them even more cordial than before if we are properly treated."
He added the request that Sir Charles would write him first-hand impressions of the situation in Russia.
From St. Petersburg Sir Charles, in November, 1870, went to Moscow, where he lived with the Mayor, Prince Tcherkasky, 'who afterwards became Governor of Bulgaria, and died at San Stefano, just after the signature of the Treaty.' He was thus brought into touch with 'the political intrigues' of the moment:
'The Imperial Prince, who was afterwards Alexander III., was no stranger to them. Alexander II. was, like his grandfather Alexander I., a German and a dreamer, as well as melancholy mad. His son, the Imperial Prince, like his grandfather Nicholas and like Paul, was both violent and sulky; but he was patriotic, and had at this time the sense to put himself in the hands of the Moscow men.'
"It is satisfactory to know that the antagonism of an heir-apparent to the reigning Sovereign docs not depend on race or climate," was, says Sir Charles, Lord Granville's comment on this description.
'It was an interesting moment, and no foreign residence of my life was ever more full of the charm which attaches to the development of new political situations. The Emperor Alexander II. had fallen back from a most brilliant early part of his reign into its second period, which saw the rise of his unpopularity and the birth of Nihilism. He had become frightened, had not perhaps lost all his good intentions, but become too terrified to escape political reaction. His son, afterwards Alexander III., was, as often happens in despotisms, glorified by a popularity which he afterwards did not retain. When I saw the heir- apparent at his palace he seemed to me to be a hard-working, stupid man, and I never afterwards was able during his reign to divest myself of this first impression.
'Of all those that I met in Russia, the ablest were the two brothers Miliutine. The General, I think, survived his brother by a long time, and continued to be Minister of War for years after his brother's death; but the brother, the Miliutine of the reorganization of Poland after the last Polish insurrection, who was when I knew him half paralyzed in body but most brilliant in mind, struck me as being more full of ideas than any man I have ever met. His inferior brother was, though inferior, nevertheless a good Minister of War.
'The Miliutines were Liberals. The leader of the high Tory party of my time was an equally remarkable man, Count Tolstoi, the iron representative of iron Toryism, of perfect honesty, in whom energy and strength were not destroyed by prejudice. He was the most ideal minister of despotism that autocracy has produced, representing the principles of order and authority with more ability than is generally found in leaders of his type. He was intensely hated by the Universities and by most of those, chiefly Liberals, with whom he lived. But although he is said by his terrorism to have created Nihilism, I am far from being convinced that any other course was possible to the Russian Empire, and if this course was to be taken, he took it well. In modern times there never was so unpopular a Minister, and when, in after years, Alexander III. recalled him to power as Minister of the Interior, one could not but feel that the break between the principles acted on by this Sovereign as Emperor, and those which he had honestly professed when heir-apparent, was complete.
'I not only well knew Jomini, but I had made the acquaintance in 1868 in London (and renewed it at a later date) of his colleague Vlangali, at that time as truly brilliant and as supple as Jomini himself, though as silent as Jomini was talkative; … and between them and their marvellous subordinates, Hamburger the hunchback Jew, and his head of the Asiatic Department, Westmann, I do not wonder that two stupid men, the vain Gortschakof and the drill-sergeant de Giers, were able successively to pretend to rule the Foreign Office without the policy of the country suffering.
'In Katkof I was greatly disappointed. The man was very powerful under two reigns, and with the exception of Count Tolstoi, he was the only man who was so, since otherwise all the adherents of Alexander II. were in disgrace during the reign of Alexander III.; but I could see nothing in Katkof except strength of will and obstinacy. He was entirely without judgment or measure or charm. The two Vassiltchikofs were men of what is called in Russia a "European" type, or "civilized." There was nothing specially Russian about them, but they were far pleasanter than as a rule are able Russians, and this was also the case with Madame Novikof's brothers, the two Kiriefs. In general it may be said that in the Moscow chiefs of the Slav Committees there was more European give and take, and less obstinacy or pig-headed Toryism of Russian character, than among any other set. One of the Vassiltchikofs had an art collection, and afterwards became, I think, Art Director at St. Petersburg, while the other, who was the greater Slav, and who was the son-in-law of Prince Orlof Davydof of St. Petersburg, who sent me to him at Moscow, was chiefly given to good works in Moscow. I think, if I remember right, that my hostess, Princess Tcherkasky, with whom I lodged, was their sister.
'I saw a good deal of Peter Schouvalof, known as "all-powerful," of whom I afterwards again saw a great deal when I was at the Foreign Office and he was Ambassador in London. He was the bitter enemy of Count Tolstoi all through life; but his complete fall, and it may even be said utter destruction, during the reign of Alexander III., was, I think, not owing to this fact, but because he was easygoing and had made friends with the morganatic wife of Alexander II. in his last years. Alexander III. never forgave anyone who had shown this disrespect to the memory of his mother, although as soon as his son in time succeeded to the throne, the members of the Imperial family visiting France, who had never acknowledged the existence of the Princess during all the years of Alexander III.'s reign, immediately began to revisit her at Biarritz or in Paris.
'Peter Schouvalof represented the French Regency in our times, with all its wit, with all its half-refined coarseness—the coarseness of great gentlemen—with the drunkenness of the companions of the Regent, and with their courage. At the time that I knew him in St. Petersburg he was as much hated as his enemy Count Tolstoi, but that was because he held the terrible office of head of the Third Section or Director of the Secret Police, with the power of life and death over everyone except the Emperor. It was a somewhat sinister contrast to find, in one who used to the full the awful powers of his office, the greatest gaiety that existed in mortal man, unless in Gambetta.
'K. Aksakof was in Moscow the superior in power even of Tcherkasky the Mayor, even of the two Samarines, even of Miliutine of Moscow, the brother of the General. He was not in reality so strong a man, but he had the ear of the heir-apparent, and I cannot but think, from a good deal which came to my knowledge at the time, that there was some secret society organization among the Slavophiles, of which he was the occult chief. Some think that had he liked he would have continued to rule Alexander III. after the latter ascended the throne, but my own impression is that he would have ended his days in Siberia. His brother John, who survived and had influence, was a very different man, and held other views. His influence for a time was enormous, although I could more easily have understood the dominance in the party of Miliutine or of Samarine. Katkof retained his influence because he was above all of the despotic party. Aksakof would have failed to retain his, because, although he held, as an article of faith, that reforms must come from the Emperor to the people, yet he desired that the Emperor should be a Russian Liberal—a very different thing from a "European" Liberal, but still something different from Alexander III. or from Count Tolstoi's ideal of a Russian autocrat….
'Among those I knew' (says a later note) 'was the pretty little child of Count Chotek of the Austrian Embassy, the bosom friend of Prince Henry VII. of Reuss, the Prussian Ambassador. The child's mother, Chotek's wife, was Countess Kinsky. She became the wife of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and the birth of her son, in 1902, was hailed by the Magyars as that of an heir to the throne of the dual monarchy, and may lead to civil war in Austria some day.' [Footnote: It was the assassination of this Archduke which preceded the Great War of 1914.]
Sir Charles continued to correspond with Lord Granville about the international complication. The Foreign Secretary wrote in December of the proposed Conference of London that—
"It would not be a bad result that each side should imagine it had had a victory. There would remain the public opinion of Europe, and as we are neither of us popular, that may be tolerably impartial."
The Russian point of view had been put to Sir Charles before he left England in a letter from Baron Jomini, who complained that attempts to revise the Treaty of Paris by a European Congress had repeatedly failed, because England had always made it a condition that at such "a Congress the Eastern question should not be raised." What, then, was open to Russia—since "all the world privately admitted that the position created for her by the Treaty of 1856 was inequitable and an obstacle to good understanding" but to show the signatory Powers the impossibility of her remaining any longer in a false position?
The view which Sir Charles formed at the time was in strong condemnation of Lord Granville's action. In his opinion, Great Britain, by consenting to a Conference (proposed by Russia's friend; Prussia), consented to negotiate upon an act of repudiation by which her own rights were infringed; and this surrender seemed to him wholly unnecessary. Later knowledge only confirmed him in his opinion.
'We knew' (he writes in the Memoir) 'that Austria, the original proposer of the neutralization, had on November 22nd stated that she would join us in a war with Russia if we declared war upon the question, and Italy had already declared that she would act with Austria and ourselves. On the other hand, we now know (1906) that the British Cabinet of 1856 did not contain a member who thought the neutralization worth anything, or that it could be maintained beyond "the first opportunity." Gladstone, in 1879, returned to the question, and said that even Turkey had been willing to agree in 1870 to what had been done; but from a despatch to Lord Granville, dated November 24th, 1870, which has been published, it is clear that Austria, Italy, and Turkey would have gone along with us. Under these circumstances no fighting would have been wanted. All that we need have done would have been to have declared that we should take no notice of the Russian denunciation, and to have sent our fleet into the Black Sea, and the Russians could have done nothing but give in, as a platonic declaration that they were free would not have enabled them to launch a ship. Then we might gracefully have yielded; but as it was, we gave in to a mere threat of force.'
Acceptance of the Conference, moreover, seemed to Sir Charles a betrayal of France. France, who had been England's ally in the Crimea, one of the signatory Powers to the Black Sea Treaty, saw her capital beleaguered by the Prussian friends of the Power which repudiated the Treaty, and could not even send a representative to the Conference to protest.
It was natural, then, that at the opening of Parliament in 1871 the member for Chelsea should raise this question. But to do so involved the bringing forward of a motion tantamount to a vote of censure on the Government, which Sir Charles Dilke himself supported; and Mr. Gladstone contrived to put his too critical supporter in a difficulty.
The Queen's Speech inevitably contained reference to Prince Gortschakof's action, and in both Houses there was considerable comment upon this in the debate on the Address. The Prime Minister referred to the opportunity for fuller discussion which would be afforded by Sir Charles's motion, but, when pressed to name a day for the motion, deprecated discussion while the Conference was sitting. Frequent questioning led finally to the intervention of Mr. Disraeli, who raised the whole question of Conference and Treaty in a speech, and was answered by Mr. Gladstone. When after all this Sir Charles still persisted in his motion, the purpose of which was not to discuss either the methods or the results of the Conference, but to deplore the Government's action in having entered on it at all, Mr. Gladstone declared that Government could spare no time, and would give a day only if it were taken as a direct vote of censure, which they must in honour meet; adding that the day could only be found by the postponement of a Licensing Bill which had much support in the Liberal party. Sir Charles persevered, and made a very able speech, to which no serious answer was given. He entirely destroyed the pretence that the Conference had met without a "foregone conclusion," and stigmatized the indecent haste which could not wait to secure the presence of France even as an assenting party to this acceptance of an act of repudiation. But the House was dominated by dislike for anything which seemed to hint at opening up a new European war at the moment when a settlement of the existing conflict was expected. The Tories, 'would only speak, and would not vote'; while Sir Charles's Radical associates, such as Mr. Peter Rylands, welcomed anything done under pretext of avoiding war.
'An attempt was made by Sir Henry Bulwer, the cynical and brilliant brother of Lord Lytton, by Mr. Horsman and Mr. Otway, to use my motion for their own purposes. Otway had resigned his Under-Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs on account of his strong opinion upon the question, and was distressed to find that his resignation had fallen flat. Horsman was always discontented, and Bulwer wanted to be a peer. [Footnote: Sir Henry Bulwer was afterwards created Lord Calling; Mr. Horsman had been a conspicuous Adullamite in the previous Parliament.] I used to tell Bulwer up to his death that I gave him his peerage, for he received Gladstone's offer of the peerage just in time to prevent him from speaking for my motion. Bulwer, whom I had known as Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Andrew Buchanan, whom I had known as Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Horsman, and Otway came and dined with me, and we made a great plot, and thought we were going to upset the arrangement with the Russians. But Gladstone succeeded in taking away Goldsmid, who was one of our very few Liberal supporters, made Bulwer a peer, and left me only with Otway, Gregory, afterwards Governor of Ceylon, and Horsman….
'I ought to have divided, even if I had been in a minority of one, for the proposal to withdraw my motion brought a hornet's nest about my ears, and was a parliamentary mistake.'
Michel Chevalier, the celebrated French Economist and Free Trader, wrote thanking Sir Charles. He had spent, he said, thirty years of his life in advocating an Anglo-French understanding, and now he would not know how to look his countrymen in the face were it not for the courageous utterances of a few friendly Englishmen to which he could point as evidences of a good-will that had not forsaken France in her evil day.