I.
By the close of 1879 the Beaconsfield Administration was deeply discredited. The year had opened with the disaster in the Zulu War at Isandhlwana; in September came the tragedy at Kabul, when Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff were slain by a sudden uprising of the tribesmen; and though Sir Frederick Roberts fought his way into the Afghan capital on October 12th, it was only to be beleaguered within the fortifications of Sherpur.
The European situation Sir Charles described to his constituents before the Session of 1880 opened:
'What, I asked, were they promised in the Treaty of Berlin? Turkey restored to strength, reformed, and, if reformed, made secure for a distant future; Greece contented; Russian influence excluded; and the Balkans fortified as "an impregnable frontier" for Turkey. Very different were the realities. Turkey had been partitioned; Greece had not been satisfied; surrender of Turkish territory to Greece, though it was the one form of surrender which might really have strengthened Turkey, had been opposed rather than advocated by the British delegates. Austria, gorged with Bosnia and Herzegovina, was alone contented.
'Of the Asia Minor clandestine convention, it was beyond our power to fulfil the terms. Russian intrigue would sooner or later create insurrection in Armenia. The insurrection would be put down by the old Turkish means, by the old savagery, and our guarantee would prove useless in face of public opinion at home. The Government had allowed Russia to gain exactly those things which in the excellent circular of April 1st, 1878, they had declared that it would be fatal to our country that she should possess. The Government had proclaimed British interests in language which I had described as the gospel of selfishness, but there was not a British interest which was not worse off for their rule. In Egypt, their policy of joint action with France was certain to lead to future trouble. Greece was dissatisfied, and leant on France, and the rising nationalities of South-Eastern Europe were all alienated from us. Russia was in possession, not only of Bessarabia, not only of a firm hold over Turkey by the stipulations with regard to the debt due to her, but of that fortress of Kars and that port of Batoum which our Government had told us she could not consistently with British interests be permitted to possess. To add insult to injury, we were thought such silly children as to believe that what was left of Turkey had been saved by our plenipotentiaries— saved in Asia by a bit of paper, and in Europe by an "impregnable frontier" which was situated in the middle of the Bulgarian country, and which the Sultan's troops would never be allowed to approach.
'This was a strong indictment, and, as is now seen, it was all true.'
Sir Charles's "indictment" was strengthened by information he had received as to England's treatment of M. Waddington's circular proposing mediation between Turkey and Greece, and by the knowledge that the championship of Greek interests was at this moment being left to France.
'On January 26th I reached Paris on my return from Toulon, and breakfasted with Gambetta, stupid Spuller remaining with us all the time. Barrère came to see me, and told me that the late ministerial crisis in France had had for cause Waddington's refusal to accept Gambetta's orders to turn out all the reactionaries from the Foreign Office. "That lock has now been forced." [Footnote: The Waddington Ministry had fallen in the last days of December, and M. de Freycinet came into power. M. Camille Barrère was at this time Gambetta's chief private secretary. Sir Charles had first met him in London during the Commune. He has had a distinguished career, and is, in 1917, Ambassador at Rome.] Tissot, French Minister at Athens, and known to me as having been formerly the representative of the Government of National Defence in London, when he occupied the Embassy and acted as an unauthorized Minister, is to be Ambassador at Constantinople, and Waddington will take the Embassy in London. Barrère has been made French Commissioner on the European Commission of the Danube, which enables him for nine months in the year to continue his newspaper work in Paris. It is true, as stated in the French newspapers, that Waddington's last circular proposing mediation between Turkey and Greece was accepted by all the Continental Powers, but not answered by England.
'On the 27th I breakfasted with Gambetta to meet General Billot, commanding the Marseille corps d'armée, who, in the event of war occurring between 1887 and 1890, would have been second in command of the French armies.
'"On the 28th Gambetta, at a private interview, confirmed what Barrère had said about Greece, regretted that Waddington had proposed to leave the town of Janina to Turkey, and thought that the French Government ought to go back to the old position of 'Thessaly and Epirus.' He added (most confidentially) that as soon as the trouble about 'Article 7' was over Léon Say would come as Ambassador to London." [Footnote: The double quotes here show that Sir Charles transcribed in his Memoir a note of the conversation taken at the time.] Léon Say did come, but Waddington came afterwards, though with some between. Article 7 was, of course, the Ferry proposal with regard to unauthorized congregations, which I opposed in conversations with Gambetta, who supported it as strongly in private as in public. [Footnote: The 'Article 7' referred to was in the Education Bill then under discussion in the French Assembly. By this article it was proposed that members of religious bodies which were not recognized by the law should be forbidden to teach in public or in private schools.] Opinion in France undoubtedly backed him in his opposition to "Clericalism," but I myself continue to think that it was unwise to harry the Church, although the position of the Government was in accordance with the law.
'On the same morning I received a letter from Chamberlain inviting
himself to dine with me on February 4th "to discuss the situation."
Chamberlain was strongly opposed to taking Lord Derby in the next
Administration, and determined also, if he could, to shut out Goschen.
'On Wednesday, January 28th, I reached London, and on the 29th saw Harcourt as to a request which had been made to him by A. M. Sullivan on behalf of Lord Ramsay, who was standing at Liverpool as the Liberal candidate, but who had pronounced in favour of Home Rule, to the great scandal of the country. The Irish members were supposed to be doing more harm than good by helping him, and were most anxious that someone from the Liberal Front Bench should give them countenance. Hartington was strongly opposed to Ramsay's action. Harcourt consented to go, and went, which must have meant, I think, that he had decided to throw over Hartington, seeing that Mr. G. was the only possible leader, and that he did not think that Mr. Gladstone would feel strongly about the Home Rule pledge. Harcourt told me that Lord Granville and Hartington intended that Lord Derby should be in the next Government, but found difficulties, inasmuch as they thought that the land question must be dealt with, and he was too conservative for the party on it. The Duke of Argyll was to be left out of the next Cabinet; no one would consent to become Viceroy of Ireland or Irish Secretary; and there was a difficulty about the Viceroyalty of India. I suggested Lansdowne for India, if his wife would go, and it is curious that after many years he was sent, although sent by the other party. Harcourt said that some of the older men over whose heads I had passed were very jealous of me. I said, half in jest: "I believe I am the only English politician who is not jealous," at which Harcourt laughed very much, and replied: "We all think that of ourselves." I said: "I mean it."'
The sincerity of that assertion was to be proved within three months. But he notes in his diary a decision in consequence of Harcourt's warning "to keep in the background this Session."
'On February 4th Harcourt wrote to me to say that, if I would go to his house that night, someone from Devonshire House should meet me to show me the Queen's Speech, as he had to go to Liverpool; Hartington, he said, was full of approval of my speech.'
The dissolution came suddenly, hastened by the result of a by-election, which encouraged the Government to believe that the country was with them. On February 10th Sir Charles dined at Lady Ripon's, where were 'the Duke of Argyll, Lord Granville, the Childers, and the Hayters.'
'The conversation of the evening turned upon the Southwark election, where we all knew that the Conservative must win, Clarke (later Sir Edward Clarke) being a popular Queen's Counsel, an excellent election speaker, while the Liberals were divided between two bad candidates…. When the numbers became known to me I wrote in my diary: "Southwark not quite so bad as I expected, but quite bad enough." Yet it was this election, which, to anyone who knew the facts, should have meant nothing, which is supposed to have induced the Tories to dissolve.' [Footnote: The Conservatives won both the Liverpool and Southwark elections.]
'Cross drowns the Government,' is Sir Charles's comment on the Return on the Water Question, for which he now moved; 'the notice contained such a mass of statistics as to make the return of a very searching character in its bearing on the agreement that the Home Secretary had come to with the water companies.' It did frighten Cross, as Mr. Trevelyan had prophesied, 'and the trouble between himself and his colleagues over this question was the immediate cause of the dissolution.' [Footnote: Mr. Cross, Home Secretary, had introduced a Bill to provide for the purchase of the undertakings of the London Water Companies, which was supposed to offer the companies too favourable terms. Sir Charles notes (July, 1879): "Manning was getting up a meeting on the water question, and got me to manage it for him." 'I fancy, indeed,' he adds in his Memoir, 'that it was the Cardinal who was the indirect cause of the dissolution in the spring of 1880, for he induced Cross to undertake the purchase of the Metropolitan Water Supply, and so got him into tangled negotiations.']
Just before the electoral campaign began—
'On March 4th I received a note from Lord Fife asking me to dine with him on Friday, the 12th, to meet the Prince of Wales at the Prince's wish. The note was of such a character that it left no choice. When the dinner came off it turned out well. The Prince laid himself out to be pleasant, and talked to me nearly all the evening—chiefly about French politics and the Greek question. The other guests were Lansdowne, Dunraven, Burnand of Punch, Bernal Osborne, and Colonel Carington, brother of Lord Carrington, a very pleasant member of the House.' [Footnote: Colonel Carington was M.P. for Wycombe, 1868-1883.]
There was still among leading politicians 'much doubt as to the prospects of the election,' which Sir Charles found expressed when he spent Sunday, March 7th, 'at Aston Clinton with the Cyril Flowers, Lord Hartington being there, and Charles Villiers (at eighty), and Wolff walking over from Tring Park.' However, on March 15th, Sir William Harcourt wrote from Oxford: "I have never wavered in my opinion that the Government will be beaten, though I thought a fortnight ago it would only be a shave."
In his own borough Sir Charles found that there were 580 publicans, and that 500 of them were Conservative.
'My belief in the influence of the publicans made me hesitate with regard to Chelsea, where I thought myself not unlikely to be beaten, but I had a full belief in the success of the party generally. I was triumphantly returned, bringing in Firth with me, by great majorities over a clever Tory, Lord Inverurie (afterwards Earl of Kintore, and Governor of South Australia), and a colonial sheep-farmer, who paid the cost.'
The result was declared on April 2nd, and Sir Charles, having stayed to vote in two divisions of Surrey where he owned property, left England for Toulon on the 7th—a proceeding which separated him from those who were importunate for office. Before his departure he had dined with Sir William Harcourt:
'I found his ambition to be to … succeed Lord Selborne as Lord Chancellor. In order to reach this goal, he would prefer to be Attorney-General rather than Home Secretary. James, however, cannot well be anything but Attorney-General. Harcourt would like James to be Home Secretary, for which James is not fit, but which he would like to be. If this combination should fail, then Harcourt would like to be Chancellor of the Exchequer…. He asked me what I should like, and I told him that I did not expect to be offered a great post, but that if there were any such chance the Navy was the only one that I should like.' [Footnote: Sir Charles's view that a Foreign Secretary had better be in the House of Lords, so long as there is a House of Lords to put him in, no doubt influenced his preference for the Admiralty.]
In regard to the events which have now to be narrated, it must be remembered that the Chamberlain of 1880 was not yet the author of any "unauthorized programme" or any "gospel of ransom." He was admittedly the controller of the Caucus. It was widely known that he, like Fawcett, had professed republican principles. But Queen Victoria's objection to Sir Charles Dilke—and it will be seen how strongly she maintained it—was based not merely on his avowal of abstract Republican theories, but also on his very concrete proposal to assert control over the Civil List. Chamberlain upon this matter was not committed to a personal view, and it had not yet been demonstrated that whatever position Dilke defended, Chamberlain would defend also.
A compact laying down the principle of mutual support between the two
Radicals was proposed in a letter written by Chamberlain to Dilke—then at
Toulon—immediately after the General Election had given the Liberals a
sweeping triumph. They came back 349 against 243 Conservatives. Irish
Nationalists were 60, of whom 35 followed Mr. Parnell.
Chamberlain's proposal was in these words:
"The time has come when we must have a full and frank explanation.
"What I should like—what I hope for with you—is a thorough offensive and defensive alliance, and in this case our position will be immensely strong.
"I am prepared to refuse all offers until and unless both of us are satisfied.
"Can you accept this position with perfect satisfaction? If you think I am asking more than I can give, I rely upon your saying so—and in this case you may depend on my loyalty and friendship—I shall support your claim cordially and just as warmly as if I were personally interested.
"But my own feeling is that if you are stronger than I am in the House, my influence is greater than yours out of it, and therefore that, together, we are much more powerful than separated; and that in a short time, if not now, we may make our own terms.
"To join a Government as subordinate members, to be silenced and to have no real influence on the policy, would be fatal to both of us. If we both remain outside, any Government will have to reckon with us, and, on the whole, this would be the position which on many grounds I should prefer.
"I am ready to make all allowances for the difficulties in the way of giving to both of us the only kind of places which it would be worth our while to accept. If these are insuperable, I will give a hearty support to any Government which is thoroughly liberal in its measures; but I am not going to play the part of a Radical Minnow among Whig Tritons.
"The victory which has just been won is the victory of the Radicals. Gladstone and the Caucus have triumphed all along the line, and it is the strong, definite, decided policy which has commended itself, and not the halting, half-hearted, armchair business…. The country feels it, and we should be mad to efface ourselves and disappoint the expectations of all our strongest supporters.
[Illustration: THE RT. HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.
From the painting by F. Holl, R.A., in the National Portrait Gallery.]
"You see that my proposed condition is—both of us to be satisfied.
"As to what ought to satisfy us, if you agree to the principle, we will consult when the time comes, but my present impression is all or nothing."
'In other words, Chamberlain's view was that we should insist on both being in the Cabinet. My own view was that we should insist on one being in the Cabinet, and the other having a place of influence, giving him the opportunity of frequent speech in the House of Commons, pleasant to himself; and my view prevailed.
'On April 19th, Chamberlain wrote again that he had heard from Mr.
Bright that "Mr. Gladstone will take the Premiership if pressed."'
'"I am glad to see that all the papers speak of you as a certainty for the Cabinet. For myself, I am absolutely indifferent to office, and the only thing on which I am clear is that I will take no responsibility which does not carry with it some real power. Another point on which I have made up my mind is that I will not play second to Fawcett, or to anyone of the same standing, except yourself."'
On April 22nd, Sir Charles received at Toulon a telegram from Sir William Harcourt insisting on his immediate return, and he started at once for London, missing a second urgent telegram from Harcourt on his way. From Mr. Frederic Harrison he received a letter strongly urging him to claim at once a place in the Cabinet and 'to lead the new men.' He meant 'the cultured Radicals; Mr. Bryce and the like.' He urged that the new Left must have a full place in the Ministry, and that any Liberal Minister must be pledged to deal with redistribution in the House.
'Hill of the Daily News had written to me that with the exception of
Harcourt everybody thought that Gladstone must be Prime Minister.' Sir
Charles goes on to note a breakfast with Lord Houghton, Renan, Professor
Henry Smith of Oxford, Henry Reeve of the Edinburgh Review, Lord Arthur
Russell, and Lord Reay, at which they
'agreed that Gladstone must be Prime Minister, or would upset the
Government within a year. … Hill advised that I should take the
Cabinet without Chamberlain if Gladstone was Prime Minister, but
refuse the Cabinet without Chamberlain—i.e., insist on both being
in the Cabinet—if Hartington was Prime Minister.'
By the night of April 23rd, when Sir Charles reached London, the question of Mr. Gladstone's primacy was settled, and Ministry-making had begun, with the decision of Lord Granville to return to the Foreign Office, and Lord Hartington's consent to act as Secretary of State for India. Mr. Childers went to the War Office, Lord Northbrook to the Admiralty; Lord Selborne, most conservative of Whigs, became Lord Chancellor; Lord Spencer was President of the Council, Lord Kimberley took the Colonies, the Duke of Argyll the Privy Seal. Sir William Harcourt, who had been called "a Whig who talked Radicalism," was Home Secretary. Mr. Forster at the Irish Office, with Lord Cowper as Lord-Lieutenant, did not commend himself greatly to the advanced party, and Mr. Bright, in returning to the Chancellorship of the Duchy, brought with him only a tradition of Radicalism. When it is added that Mr. Dodson was President of the Local Government Board, ground will be seen for a warning which Sir Charles received that, although the victory had been forced upon them by the Radicals almost against their will, the "incorrigible old place-hunters would, if left to have their own way, appropriate the victory and the prizes calmly enough to themselves."
On Saturday, April 24th, Sir Charles had two interviews with Sir William
Harcourt, and communicated the result to Chamberlain:
'The position is that Gladstone is in the hands of Lord Wolverton, [Footnote: As Mr. Glyn he had been Chief Whip.] the evil counsellor of 1874, and that, while a Whig Premier must have had a Radical Cabinet, Gladstone will say, "You have got me; that is what you asked for," and will give us a Whig Cabinet. Stansfeld is likely to be in the Cabinet owing to W. E. Forster's influence, of which I personally shall be glad. Rosebery is likely to be put in, at which I shall not be sorry…. Gladstone disapproves strongly of people being put straight into the Cabinet who have not held office before. This is for Chamberlain and for me. They are likely to offer me the Under- Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, which I suppose I shall be unable to accept. Later in the evening I was informally offered the Secretaryship of the Treasury, with management of the Government business in the House. Harcourt at a second interview said that Gladstone intended pedantically to follow Peel's rule that men should not be put straight into the Cabinet without going through non-Cabinet office; and that Chamberlain and I must both take non-Cabinet office; [Footnote: It is worth noting that Sir Robert Peel himself had violated this rule if it ever existed.] that he, Harcourt, strongly advised us to take Under-Secretaryships of which the Secretary was in the Upper House, or the Secretaryship of the Treasury. He then offered me the Under-Secretaryship for the Colonies, to which I replied, "Certainly not." He said, "Remember that with Mr. Gladstone Prime Minister, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs will have no chance to speak, because Gladstone will do all the talking." [Footnote: Sir William Harcourt's prophecy received frequent confirmation. See infra, pp. 384, 459, 535, and Vol. II., p. 51.] At the same time, there was evidently another reason behind—namely, that Lord Granville had sooner have anybody in his office than me; in other words, he would like me in anybody's office except his own. Harcourt strongly urged me to take office on personal grounds—namely, in order to get over the Queen's prejudice, and so succeed naturally to the first vacancy in the Cabinet. I replied that I had sooner keep my independence than take office without power. He then said curtly, "It will not be a pleasant opposition." I said it would not be an opposition at all, as far as I could see, as I should support the Government and lead a very quiet, humdrum Parliamentary existence. Harcourt replied, "That is what is always said." "But I shall not be cross," was my last word. I telegraphed at night for Chamberlain, who replied that he would come up at five on Sunday afternoon and dine and sleep. But I prepared him, and was prepared by him, for a double refusal of office. In fact, we were decided on refusal of that which alone was offered.
'On Sunday afternoon, 25th, before seeing Chamberlain, I saw James, who went to Lord Granville and fully stated my views, reporting to me afterwards that Lord Granville seemed inclined to come round a little. James added of Harcourt: "Confound that Home Secretary! How discreet he is even before kissing hands! I shall live at the Home Office." I went to Euston to meet Chamberlain. We were fully agreed in our line, and he remained at my house the next morning, when I was sent for by Mr. Gladstone through Lord Granville, the note being simply to ask me to call at four o'clock at Lord Granville's house, where Mr. Gladstone was. The questions which I put to Chamberlain were—"Is your former opinion changed by the fact that Mr. Gladstone can, if he likes, do without us, whereas Hartington could not? Or is it changed by the fact that Gladstone's Government will last six years, whereas Hartington's would soon have been modified by Gladstone?" Chamberlain's view was my own view, that, although we were much weaker, we could not change our attitude as regards one of us being in the Cabinet. Before seeing Mr. Gladstone I had calls from Fawcett and Lefevre. Nothing had been offered to Fawcett; Lefevre had been sounded as to an Under- Secretaryship, and would take it. He told me he was sure that Stansfeld would have the Local Government Board again and be in the Cabinet. Childers came three times to see me in the course of the day, and said that he was most anxious that I should be in the Cabinet and Chamberlain in a good place outside it; but that the Queen had made a difficulty about my Republicanism, and he asked me to write him a letter about it. I declined to say anything new, but ultimately we agreed that I should write him a letter marked "Private," in which I wrote to the effect that on March 13th I had been asked the question at a meeting, and that my answer had been in the newspapers on March 15th, that it was the same answer which I had made before the election in 1874, and that I had nothing to alter in it.' [Footnote: The rest of the letter gave a full account of the incident of Saturday, March 13th, 1880:
"The Tories sent the 'Reverend' W. Pepperell, an ex-dissenting minister, to a meeting of mine, who asked me 'whether it was true that I was a republican?' I replied to the effect that 'while as a matter of speculative opinion I thought that a country starting afresh—as France after Sedan—would in these days generally do better to adopt a republican form of government than a limited monarchy, yet that in a country possessing a constitutional monarchy it would be mere folly to attempt to upturn it, and consequently folly even to try to disturb it.' The answer was a very long one, and was nowhere fully reported, but everything in it was on these lines.">[
A copy of this letter was ultimately brought to the Queen, and on May 5th returned by Sir Henry Ponsonby with the words, "Her Majesty accepts Sir Charles Dilke's explanation." But Lord Granville, through whom it had been sent, and who had by that time become Sir Charles's immediate chief, softened the austerity of this formula by explaining that the Queen in a private letter had said she was "quite ready to believe all I had told her about you, having known you as a child."
These preliminary conversations having occupied the morning, Sir Charles set out after luncheon for the decisive interview.
'When I got to Lord Granville's I found Lord Granville, Lord Wolverton, and Mr. Gladstone in the room, and Mr. Gladstone at once offered me the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. I asked who was to be in the Cabinet. I was told Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington, Harcourt, and Lord Spencer. Further than this, they said, nothing was settled. I asked, "What about Chamberlain?" Mr. Gladstone replied to the effect that Chamberlain was a very young member of the House who had never held office, and that it was impossible to put him straight into the Cabinet. I then said that this made it impossible that I should accept the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, or any place. Mr. Gladstone said he would see whether anything could be done, but that he feared not. I then asked whether, supposing that anything could be done in my direction, I should be excluding Grant Duff [Footnote: Sir M. Grant Duff had been spoken of for this office in 1868, and had then in that Ministry become Under-Secretary of State for India. In 1880 he was—much to Sir Charles's joy—made Under- Secretary for the Colonies, his chief, Lord Kimberley, being in the Lords.] from the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, because I said that I should be very sorry to do that, for both personal and public reasons. He replied that if I refused it, it would not be offered to Grant Duff; and I then left….
'On Tuesday morning Chamberlain was sent for, and accepted a seat in the Cabinet (with the Presidency of the Board of Trade), and at one o'clock I accepted the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. Just about this time I received a message from James: "Do, for the sake of our future comfort, take something. The Bench will be dreadfully dull. Stansfeld in office must be worse than Stansfeld out." But Stansfeld was not in office. What had interfered at the last moment to prevent an appointment which was resolved upon I never knew for certain. [Footnote: Mr. Stansfeld is generally believed to have refused office owing to his wish to devote himself entirely to the cause of a special measure of social reform in which he was interested.] But, as they had not intended to put Chamberlain in, and I forced him in, I suppose that Stansfeld was the man who had to make way for Chamberlain.'