I.
In "a memorandum of later years," quoted by his biographer, Mr. Gladstone defined his own understanding of "the special commission under which the Government had taken office" in 1880. "It related to the foreign policy of the country, the whole spirit and effect of which we were to reconstruct." Sir Charles's views as to the need for this had long been before the public, and he threw all his energies into the task of helping to achieve it.
'The Liberals, having come into office after violent denunciation of the whole foreign and colonial policy of their predecessors, had a general wish to reverse it in all parts of the world, and to dismiss the agents by whom it had been carried out. They were especially violent against Lytton in India, Layard at Constantinople, and Frere in South Africa.'
Questions of the Indian frontier and Africa lay outside the immediate sphere of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, yet he was constantly consulted upon both of them, and had his full part in defending the reversal of Lord Lytton's policy by the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who restored, or perhaps established, the unity of Afghanistan.
In the matter of South Africa, the Boer leaders wrote at once to express their confidence that the new Government would consist of "men who look out for the honour and glory of England, not by acts of injustice and crushing force, but by the way of justice and good faith." They were answered by promises of local self-government, but such promises had been made to them before, and the retention of Sir Bartle Frere no doubt seemed a bad omen. So, at all events, it was regarded by the Radical party. On May 24th—
'I found that Courtney and my brother, with Dr. Cameron and Jesse Collings, were getting up an attempt to coerce the Colonial Office and Mr. Gladstone by preparing a list of between one and two hundred members who would vote with Wilfrid Lawson for a censure on the Government for not recalling Frere. Childers had found that it would be easy to recall him, for Frere had said that he would only go out for two years, and the two years were over. No doubt Frere, while blameworthy for the Zulu War, was not responsible for the Transvaal business, which had been done by Shepstone and Lord Carnarvon before he went out; but with our people he received the whole discredit for all that went wrong in South Africa, and it was impossible to wonder at this when one recalled the language that he habitually made use of….
'Frere was protected by Mr. Gladstone, and allowed to remain, a mistake for which we very gravely suffered. As this matter became of great importance in 1899, I ought to add that Lord Granville backed Mr. Gladstone in abstaining from rescinding the annexation of the Transvaal, on the ground that as we were retiring from Kandahar we had better not also retire from Pretoria.'
When, a few months later, the Boer rising followed, Dilke, with three other Radical Ministers, Bright, Chamberlain, and Courtney, refused to defend the Government's action even by a silent vote. 'Everything went as badly as possible in South Africa, and Lord Kimberley' (the Colonial Secretary) 'must share the blame with Mr. Gladstone.'
The third instance in which the recall of a man was demanded by Liberal opinion as essential to the reversal of a policy touched matters in whose development Sir Charles had a considerable part to play:
'May 20th.—One of our first troubles in debate was with regard to Layard's position at Constantinople, we being attacked by our own people on May 20th, who were more Gladstonian than Mr. Gladstone, as to the public insults which Layard had heaped upon him. Mr. Gladstone discussed with me what he was to say, and I have his note which, in addition to the statement about Layard, contains the curiously large one, "Statements made in Opposition not to be taken too literally when in office."'
Next day Mr. Gladstone wrote: "Thank you for the wonderful despatch you kindly made in obtaining for me the particulars about Layard's appointment."
The new Under-Secretary writes of these early days and first impressions:
'The general opinion of the party was that a Liberal policy was being pursued in foreign affairs, and that we had in the Foreign Office carried out that which the country intended us to do. We were able to bring about joint action on the part of Europe, and by means of it to settle the Greek and Montenegrin questions; and Goschen's presence at Constantinople was useful, inasmuch as he fully shared the views of the Liberal party upon foreign affairs, although he differed from them in domestic matters. On the other hand, the party were frightened about India, for, although Lord Lytton had been removed, the Government refused to make any sign as to the immediate evacuation of Kandahar, and, as a matter of fact, it was a long time before the Queen's resistance upon this point could be overcome. She no doubt felt more able to stand out against Hartington, whom she liked, than against Lord Granville.' [Footnote: See Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 5.]
Lord Lytton's policy is thus described:
'The Allgemeine Zeitung for one of the last days of February contained a remarkable disclosure of the Government scheme for the settlement of Afghan affairs, which, so far as I know, did not appear in the English newspapers. It was quoted from some Indian paper, and revealed the fact that Persia was to occupy Herat, Kabul and Kandahar being capitals of two separate States. I did not at the time believe that it was possible that the Government should have absolutely reversed the past British policy by proposing the cession of Herat to Persia, but when I came into office at the end of April I made immediate inquiry into the subject, and found that it was true, and that they had done so. It was afterwards admitted.'
This proposal, however, had been declined by Persia. Before the fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry—
'The Amir of Afghanistan had written to tell us that he must be the friend of Russia, though he would be our friend too. We had replied (that is to say, the outgoing Government had replied) that Russia had sworn to us to have no dealings with Afghanistan, but that we should in any case evacuate his country in October without conditions, although he must respect our hold on Kandahar. Persia, it was clear from Lytton's despatches, had acted under Russian influence when declining Herat on our conditions.'
Under Lord Ripon, the policy of breaking up Afghanistan disappeared. But although there was a clear intention to abandon all claim to remain in Kandahar, yet the difficulty which attends any retrogressive movement in Central Asia was at this moment intensified, because Russia was threatening to advance on Merv, only 250 miles from Herat; and it seemed as if the Tsar's troops might occupy one Afghan stronghold at the moment when the Queen's forces withdrew from another.
'Lord Granville showed me, 15th May, some notes of language which he intended to hold to Russia as to Central Asia, very strong indeed upon the question of Merv; but the Cabinet afterwards took all this out, not a single man being found in the Cabinet to back up Lord Granville upon this question.'
In the succeeding months Sir Charles maintained a steady correspondence with the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who described his task as a hard one. "But I will do my best to perform it faithfully, and trust to you to back me up." In it appears the reason for Lord Ripon's unwilling acceptance of Abdurrahman, whom he called "the most Russian of the candidates" for the Afghan throne, but also the inevitable choice. If Lord Ripon broke with him, no hope appeared of establishing "even a semblance of order" before the Indian Government withdrew the troops, "as," said the Viceroy, "we must, because the service in Afghanistan, especially in winter, is so unpopular with the native troops as to be a serious difficulty if it should continue long. I hate the idea of leaving the Afghans a prey to anarchy, created to some extent, at all events, by our policy, and I shall do all I can to avoid it."
The Eastern Question was still dominant. The Treaty of Berlin had left three sources of discontent in the region affected by its provisions. In Bulgaria, Turkey complained that the Bulgarians had not fulfilled their promise to disarm and to raze fortifications. In Greece, evasive negotiations concerning the promised 'rectification of the frontier' were being deliberately spun out. On the Montenegrin border, territory surrendered and evacuated by the Turks had immediately been occupied by Mohammedan Albanians before the Montenegrin troops could reach it.
'On my first examination of the papers at the Foreign Office, I found that the black spot was Montenegro; the Roman Catholic Albanians on the frontier and the Mahomedan Albanians being equally determined not to become Montenegrin, and the Montenegrins insisting either on the line of the Treaty, which would give them some Mahomedan, or on the lines of the "Corti compromise," which would give them some Roman Catholic Albanian subjects.' [Footnote: The "Corti compromise" was so named after the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, who advocated a frontier line more favourable to Turkey than those previously proposed (Sir Edward Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iv.).]
Immediate steps were taken to remove the menace to European tranquillity which arose from what the Austrian Ambassador called "the Porte's long delays and tergiversation."
'May 1st.—Pressure at Constantinople had begun this day, the Cabinet having on the previous day approved an excellent and firm despatch from Lord Granville to Layard, really written from the first word to the last by Tenterden, containing the phrase, "While Her Majesty's Government wish to abstain from anything like menace, any intimation they give will be adhered to to the letter." The weak point about the despatch, however, was that the Russians had written us a despatch in the same sense, and that it might have been made to appear that we were only acting under Russian dictation. At the same time the despatch returned to the position of the circular bearing Lord Salisbury's name, which I have called the April 1st (1878) Circular, and set up that Concert of Europe which was destined to be kept together until the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions had been settled….
'On May 3rd the Cabinet again considered our circular despatch (calling on the Powers to address an identic and simultaneous note to the Porte to fulfil its Treaty obligations as regards Greece, Montenegro, and Armenia) in its final form…. On May 4th I lunched with Lord Granville, and found that it was finally settled that Goschen would go as Ambassador to Constantinople and Edmond Fitzmaurice in Wolff's place.'
Meanwhile France was vigorously backing the new policy. Lord Granville was deeply engaged in trying to unite Germany with the Powers in carrying out concerted action, which was constantly evaded by Bismarck.
'May 7th.—On this day I had an opportunity of reading quietly a curious despatch of Odo Russell, dated April 29th, recounting the views of Prince Bismarck, who seemed to me to have been laughing at him. The Prince "is even more willing to give his support to any combined policy of England and France, as for instance in Egypt, because he looks upon an Anglo-French alliance as the basis of peace and order in Europe." [Footnote: This despatch is to be found in the Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 211, where the date is given as May 1st.]
'On Sunday, May 9th, I had to dinner Léon Say, the new French Ambassador; Montebello, his first secretary, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople; Lord Lyons and his secretary Sheffield; Lord Tenterden, my colleague at the Foreign Office; my secretary Murray; Harcourt, and C. E. D. Black, who the week afterwards became Harcourt's secretary on my recommendation. Léon Say brought with him from the French "bag" Gambetta's answer to my letter. Gambetta informed me that the French Government were unanimous in throwing over Waddington's compromise and giving Greece all that she had been intended to have; and Gambetta was in favour, and said that his Prime Minister' (M. de Freycinet) 'was in favour, of taking active steps to prevent further delay on the part of Turkey.' [Footnote:
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, "PARIS, "le 7 Mai, 1880.
"CHER AMI,
"Les dernières Élections Cantonales m'avaient si vivement absorbé que je n'ai pu trouver la minute de liberté nécessaire pour répondre à vos deux lettres.
"Permettez-moi d'ailleurs, après m'être excusé du retard, de vous dire que je ne partageais ni votre émotion ni votre point d'impatience. Je crois fermement que la solution grecque sera prochainement obtenue, en dépit des résistances et des tergiversations qui peuvent se produire chez les Turcs ou ailleurs. L'important est de maintenir le concert de l'Europe, de le manifester par l'action commune d'une démonstration navale; et d'après tout ce que je sais, j'ai confiance que le gouvernement de la République est resté dans la ligne de conduite et qu'il y persévérera.
"Quant à la Grèce, il convient qu'elle attende aussi, sans faire mesure, l'effet de cette démonstration. Je suis peut-être optimiste, mais je crois à une issue favorable.
"En ce qui touche le traité de Commerce votre lettre m'a fort surpris, et je ne peux m'expliquer une attitude si contraire aux préliminaires pris par M. L. Say: je vous prie de ne pas trop vous hâter de la porter à la connaissance du public. Je crois qu'il y a là quelque malentendu que je serai bien aise de faire disparaître, si vous voulez m'y donner le temps.
"Je vais demain à Cherbourg, où je verrai vos amis qui sont invités par la Ville, et au retour je vous manderai ce que j'aurai appris sur les négociations du traité de Commerce qu'il serait si bon de voir conclure.
"Bien cordialement,
"L. GAMBETTA."
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, "PARIS, "le 8 Mai, 1880.
"MON CHER AMI,
"Je profite de l'intermédiaire d'un jeune ami, M. Auguste Gérard, que vous avez déjà rencontré, pour vous envoyer quelques lignes de réponse a votre aimable dernière communication.
"J'ai vu le Président de notre cabinet au sujet de la question Grecque, et comme vous pensez, le gouvernement est unanime pour reprendre la question de Janina intégralement, en écartant définitivement la dernière proposition de Waddington; on accepte la formation de la commission internationale, chargée de reprendre le tracé au double point de vue diplomatique et technique. On y défendra le tracé qui englobe Janina. Ce qui importerait aujourd'hui serait d'agir promptement, et de concert. On commettrait une lourde faute en laissant la Porte atermoyer plus longtemps et épuiser toutes les forces des diverses nationalités auxquelles elle refuse de donner les maigres satisfactions fixées par le traité de Berlin.
"M. Léon Say doit avoir reçu d'ailleurs à ce sujet les instructions les plus nettes, et vous l'avez probablement déjà vu.
* * * * * * *
"A bientôt, je l'espère,
"Votre dévoué,
"LÉON GAMBETTA.">[
Such a step had already been taken by Great Britain on May 8th, when the
Cabinet—
'wrote a despatch to the Courts proposing a Conference at Berlin or Paris as to the Greek frontier, which led, in fact, to the Conference summoned at Berlin to consider the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty.'
On May 10th this activity was resented by the Sultan, who 'telegraphed his unwillingness to receive Goschen, and great pressure had to be brought to bear upon him during the next few days to induce him to consent.'
There was another matter arising out of the Russo-Turkish War which had occupied Sir Charles much while in Opposition—namely, the government of Cyprus. He did not think that the Foreign Office was the proper department to administer dependencies, and accordingly, within a few days of taking office, he raised the question whether there was any ground for keeping Cyprus under the Foreign Office, and suggested its transfer to the Colonial Office. In this Lord Granville concurred. But—
'Philip Currie, who as head of the Turkish department was managing the affairs of Cyprus, did not want to lose it, and asked to be allowed to prepare a memorandum in the opposite sense, and Lord Granville wrote, "I do not expect to be converted by Currie's memorandum. Do you? If not, the Colonial Office will have to bolt it." The Colonial Office did have to bolt it, for the island was soon handed over to them!'
By the close of the year, as has been seen, Sir Charles was able to report to his constituents "that, acting under the instructions of Lord Granville, he had secured a greatly improved administration for this island."
On May 21st—
'Egypt began to trouble me, and I was not to be clear of the embarrassment which it caused for several years. I wrote to Lord Granville to say that I had been sounded through Rivers Wilson as to how the Government would take the appointment of a Nubar Ministry with an English Finance Minister,' and Sir Charles again warned Lord Granville of dissensions between the English representatives in Egypt.
It became the most serious of all the embarrassments which involved Mr.
Gladstone's Government. On May 8th—
'I had to see Lord Ripon, who had appointed Colonel Gordon to be his private secretary, and to inform him privately that the Foreign Office feared that he would find him too excitable to be possible as a secretary, which, indeed, very speedily proved to be the case.'
Gordon resigned before Lord Ripon reached India, and on June 14th telegraphed to Sir Charles—
'to know whether we would let him take service again with the Chinese. I saw a friend of his in London, one of the Chinese Commissioners of Customs, and asked whether Gordon could be got to telegraph that he would refuse any military command in the event of war between China and Russia. He said he thought so, and I told Lord Granville, who wrote back, "I have told the Duke of Cambridge that on these conditions he might have leave."'
Lord Ripon wrote on his arrival:
"… So, you see, your warnings about Gordon came true. It is fortunate that the arrangement came to an end before I got here. As it is, there is no real harm done; we parted the best of friends, and I learned to my astonishment, after I left him at Bombay, that he was off for China."
So passes out of sight for the moment, but only for the moment, this fateful personality.
An immediate trouble, however, arose out of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, by which Great Britain had been pledged to defend Turkey's possessions in Asia Minor on condition that necessary reforms in government were introduced. This pledge made England indirectly responsible for the character of Turkish rule in Armenia; and Sir Charles had repeatedly expressed the view that England was committed to more than she could perform, either as against Russia or on behalf of Armenia. On May 14th the Cabinet left in the draft of instructions to Mr. Goschen 'a passage of Tenterden's, in which we recognized the Asia Minor Convention of our predecessors…. But I induced Lord Granville to strike it out after the Cabinet on his own responsibility.'
On the other hand, since the Convention existed, Sir Charles held that by abrogating it they 'might appear to invite the Russians to invade Armenia, which Russia might proceed to do in the name of humanity.' So far as Turkey was concerned, it was considered likely that the Porte would wish to see the Convention annulled, because it could then sell Cyprus to Great Britain for cash instead of leasing it in return for the Asiatic guarantee; and Turkish Pashas would be free from any interference about reforms in Asia Minor. Ultimately the fear of letting Russia in outweighed the other considerations, and the Convention was recognized, leaving England with a heavy burden of moral responsibility for all that subsequently occurred in Armenia under the protection of what Mr. Gladstone himself had not unjustly called this "insane covenant."
Meanwhile, Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, was complaining to Lord Granville that 'the Sultan had assented to the Convention under a false impression, not knowing that a portion of his dominions would be given over to Austrian control, an alienation not contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano.' He complained, moreover, that the arrangement went, in reality, beyond temporary occupation of provinces. 'We (Lord Salisbury) had given Bosnia and Herzegovina secretly to Austria without reserve.'
The whole Eastern situation was ill-defined and full of difficulties. Mr. Goschen, before he left England on his mission, came to Dilke to 'bewail the unwillingness of Gladstone and of Lord Granville to make up their minds how far they were going in the direction of coercion of Turkey.' On May 26th—
'Looking about to see how Turkey was to be coerced with regard to the Greek and Montenegrin questions, I discovered that all reinforcements and officials were sent, and all money received by the Constantinople Government, by the sea route, so that a blockade of the Dardanelles would cut their Empire in two until they came to terms.'
Sir Charles's aim throughout all these frontier negotiations was to support the claims of Greece, left indefinite by the Berlin Treaty. At Great Britain's instance, the Greeks had refrained from attacking Turkey when Turkey was engaged with Russia; but the Treaty of Berlin had only promised to Greece in general terms "a rectification of frontier." On the other hand, the Treaty had awarded to Montenegro certain districts of Albania, which, as already stated; showed great repugnance to accept Montenegrin rule. Sir Charles now conceived a plan—
"for combining Albanian autonomy with personal union with Greece, finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining securities or privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of them belonged."
On May 28th he learnt from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that proposals for such a personal union had been made to the King of Greece, directly and very secretly, "on the part of a Turkish statesman." The Southern Albanians, wrote M. Gennadius, are to all intents and purposes Greeks. But, the latter added, "the initiative ought to proceed from the Albanians." A few days later Mr. Goschen wrote from Constantinople that the proposed union would be a solution "very valuable for Europe," but that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks, and the Albanians were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the Empire. Still, autonomy, Mr. Goschen thought, the Albanians "would and must have in some shape." [Footnote: See also Life of Goschen, vol. ii., pp. 215, 216.]
In their attempt to reverse the Beaconsfield policy there was one influence steadily opposed to the Government.
'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in the least agree in this.—V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'
The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed this judgment when the King of the Hellenes was struck down more than thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In 1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not alone in his estimate:
'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the Duchess of Manchester about him, and the Duchess said to me: "How you Liberals have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'
Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:
'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said: "Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I call a fashionable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales, he said: "Now, that is what I call a fashionable Prince—un Prince vraiment 'chic.' He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up— well, never. That is what I call a really fashionable Prince. My King gets up at six!"'
Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an exhaustive letter.
A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as 'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by ships of the concerted Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a protocole de désintéressement. It was imposing rather than formidable, since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned. The Greek question still remained for settlement.
Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:
'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000 Russian men in English ships to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."
'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye' (Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But, preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno. Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna, and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece. [Footnote: Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 231.]
'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me Professor Panariétoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the evening I met Borthwick, who playfully assured me that he knew that our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into hostilities with one another in Macedonia.'
On July 5th the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July 7th he called at the Austrian Embassy, at the wish of the Ambassador, who explained the views of his Government:
'It would send two ships to meet two ships of each Power that chose to send any, to watch the Montenegro coast with a view to carrying out the Dulcigno proposal if the Porte would not give effect to the Corti compromise within three weeks.' Count Karolyi 'then went on to speak warmly in favour of the future of Greece, and to say that as regarded the Greek frontier Austria would be willing even to send troops.'
Public feeling in Austria, it appeared, was willing to sanction much stronger measures in support of Greece than it would tolerate on behalf of Montenegro. The British Foreign Office now proceeded to utilize the position of vantage which had been gained.
'On July 16th I noted that, Lord Granville having urged the Queen to write an autograph letter to the Sultan of a nature to induce him to give in, the Queen very naturally refused, on the ground that she dissented from every proposition in the draft sent her. She offered to write a mild word of advice or recommendation to him to yield without bloodshed, and this proposal was accepted by the Government. A telegram based on it was despatched on the 17th, and it asked in the name of united Europe for a complete fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan had at this moment despatched a secret agent, a French advocate at Constantinople, to Gambetta, who assured him that it was because France was interested in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it was absolutely necessary to force Turkey to allow herself to be saved.
'The attitude of the French Government had begun to embarrass us a good deal. On July 28th I wrote to Gambetta that we could not understand the hesitations of the French Government, which was continually putting in reserves. All this was known at Constantinople, and augmented the resistance of the Porte; the Prime Minister's paper was attacking us, and Gambetta's paper (the République Française) giving us no support…. In his telegraphic reply Gambetta used words of encouragement with regard to the attitude of his Government, as to which, no doubt, he was himself finding a good deal of trouble. A little later he sent over one of his private secretaries with a fuller letter.'
A conversation with Gambetta would have been valuable to Sir Charles at this moment, and he regretted having to forgo an opportunity which offered. He had procured invitations for—
'the Brasseys and Samuelson to the Cherbourg banquet, [Footnote: This banquet was the occasion of Gambetta's famous Cherbourg speech, a passage from which is inscribed on his monument in Paris.] which was to be given to the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the two Chambers (that is, Grévy, Gambetta, and Léon Say). Brassey asked me to go with him in the Sunbeam. Although I should like to have gone, I was under engagements in London; and I spent the Sunday dismally … instead of at Cherbourg with Gambetta.'
But he sent him messages by Mr. Bernhard Samuelson [Footnote: M.P. for
Banbury; afterwards Sir Bernhard Samuelson.] which were quickly effective.
Also, although public opinion in Austria favoured Greece, Sir Charles had ground for believing that Italian Ministers kept the Turks perfectly informed, and that even while advising concession upon Montenegro, they did so with the suggestion that the Greek claims might be the more easily resisted. Austria's concern was, of course, with the northern part of the Illyrian coast; Italy's with the southern. As he noted later in the year, 'the European Concert was about as easy to manage as six horses to drive tandem.' Nevertheless, by the first week in August, 1880, he was able to write:
'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte, so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy, represented by the previous Identic note—a most considerable success, contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met with two or three years later.'
These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:
"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all competitors in the race of success, … which" (he added) "in regard to some parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps inclined to say."