I.
Ireland and Egypt fill the most important places in the history of 1882. That was the year, in Ireland, of the Kilmainham Treaty, the resignation of Mr. Forster, and the Phoenix Park murders; in Egypt, of the riots in Alexandria, followed by the bombardment, which caused Mr. Bright's resignation, and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
They had their roots far back in preceding years. But the abrupt development of the trouble in Egypt was due to an accident; that of the Irish question was of no sudden or casual growth. The Parliamentary difficulty as to procedure of the House was only part of Parnell's deliberate design to paralyze legislature and executive alike. [Footnote: Sir Charles notes: 'In 1890, when I wrote out these diaries, I showed them to Chamberlain, and gave him a copy of some part, notably that relating to the Kilmainham Treaty and that relating to Egypt (1882). His remembrance of events agreed with the notes made by me at the time.']
Government, for the moment, was trying to suppress Parnell and his associates. The Irish leader himself had been in gaol since October 12th, 1881; Mr. Dillon, Mr. Sexton, Mr. Davitt, and many hundreds of lesser men, had been imprisoned without sentence or form of trial. Sir Charles Dilke, whom nobody believed to be an adviser of coercion, experienced as a member of the Government manifestations of Irish displeasure.
'On January 31st I addressed my constituents. The Irish attacked the meeting, and one East-Ender came at my private secretary with a chair, howling Mr. Bright's phrase: "Force is no remedy!" As a very violent breach of the peace had been committed, the police came in and cleared the room, and after that our people came back again, and I was able to make my speech quietly…. Congratulations upon my speech on all hands were warm, especially those of Chamberlain and Lord Granville. Chamberlain had written to me before the meeting to recommend a free resort to "chuckers-out," and on my informing him of the use made of Bright's maxim, he amused himself by communicating it to Bright, who was only grim upon the subject.'
Irish discontent could count on sympathy and support from the rulers of America. On March 31st, 1882, the Memoir notes: 'It was settled to tell the Americans that those suspects who would leave the United Kingdom and engage not to return might go.'
'On April 20th I had to point out to Lord Granville the fact that the Irish had shown on the previous day that they had got hold of the condition which we had attempted to make with the Americans as to the liberation of American suspects, a condition which the Americans had indignantly refused.'
All these things affected public opinion in Great Britain. At this moment the Radical wing was demanding a change of policy in Ireland, while Mr. Forster was pressing hard for renewal of the Coercion Act, which, having been passed in 1881 for a year only, was now expiring. The Radicals won, and the change of policy was inaugurated by the so-called Kilmainham Treaty.
'At this moment' (April, 1882) 'Parnell was let out of prison, at Mr. Gladstone's wish, to go to Paris to attend a funeral, but he was away from prison, also at Mr. Gladstone's wish, unnecessarily long, and, staying in London with Captain and Mrs. O'Shea, was seen by Chamberlain at the wish of Mr. Gladstone (expressed on April 20th), with the view that Chamberlain should offer him leave of absence from prison with the view of concocting some arrangement (for his release and for the pacification of Ireland) between him and the Government. On the 21st Chamberlain and I met and decided that we would resign if it was proposed to renew the Coercion Act, or the power of arbitrary arrest in its then naked form.
'On April 22nd, 1882, Chamberlain obtained from the Cabinet, by a majority, Mr. Gladstone being strongly with him, his own way in the Irish Question, with full leave to enter into negotiations with Parnell through O'Shea, but to be disavowed if he failed. Mr. Gladstone reported the Cabinet of the 22nd to the Queen, stating that the decision of the Cabinet was to the effect that it was wise "to strengthen the law in Ireland." This was one way of putting it. What the Cabinet really decided on April 22nd was to let out Parnell and his friends, and to drop arbitrary arrest, although they did decide to have a new Coercion Bill on minor points, to which Coercion Bill Parnell himself was favourable. The statement that Parnell was favourable would be denied, but O'Shea showed me a draft Bill, which was, so he said, in Parnell's writing. I knew the hand, and it seemed to be so.
'On April 25th Chamberlain reported to the Cabinet the result of his interviews. Lord Cowper had already resigned the Lord-Lieutenancy, but Forster's resignation (for some reason which I have never understood) was kept back for a little. It is a curious fact that the Duchess of Manchester told me in the middle of March that Lord Spencer was to succeed Lord Cowper; but the first the Cabinet heard of it was on April 25th.
'On April 26th, Parnell having returned to gaol, leave was given to Captain O'Shea to go and see him at Kilmainham with full powers, but nothing in writing. On the same day a letter, which was sent me by Chamberlain, after Forster had seen it and sent it on to him, shows that Forster was still acting, or at all events being treated by Mr. Gladstone as though he was going forward with his policy. But on the 28th Chamberlain told me that Forster would resign. In my diary I say: "The Chancellor and Lord Kimberley may go with him. In this case the Irish Secretaryship would be offered to Shaw" (member for Limerick, Mr. Butt's successor as leader of the moderate Home Rulers), "but he would refuse because he could not get his county to return him. Then it must come either to Chamberlain or to myself. I said I should wish in this event that he should take it and I succeed him at the Board of Trade. He said that my appointment would make less row than his. I admitted this, but said that his would be the best for the public service. Besides, my opinion in favour of Home Rule would form a grave difficulty in my way." It will be seen that it never occurred for a moment to either Chamberlain or myself that the Irish Secretaryship would be offered without a seat in the Cabinet; but we counted without remembering Mr. Gladstone's affection for Lord Spencer…. It will also be seen that I did not count Chamberlain as being a Home Ruler like myself.
'On the 29th Forster told Harcourt at the banquet of the Royal Academy that he should resign "if it is decided to let out the men." It is necessary to be careful about one's history of this moment, for no authorities are to be trusted. My diary was written at the time from information chiefly supplied by Chamberlain, and Chamberlain has since seen and agreed to this record (1906). On Sunday, April 30th, the Observer gave an account of what had passed at a Cabinet of the previous day; but no such Cabinet was held, and on May 1st the Times also gave an account of what passed at "Saturday's Cabinet"!
'On May 1st I saw Chamberlain before the Cabinet. Parnell had written to Justin McCarthy to promise that if let out he was ready to advise payment of rent and cessation of outrages, but McCarthy would not allow the letters to be made public. Forster insisted that he should give a public promise. I suggested to Chamberlain that to call on Parnell to give a public promise was to recognize Parnell as the Government of Ireland. Chamberlain agreed to argue that the promise should be a private one so far as Parnell was concerned, but that the Government should state that such a promise had been made. After the Cabinet Chamberlain told me that at the Cabinet of the next day Forster would resign; but he thought that the Chancellor, who was restive about the remedial legislation proposed in the shape of an Arrears Bill, would "go" too. I fancy the Chancellor had promised to resign, but he didn't.'
This reference to Lord Selborne is supplemented by the Memoir for 1893, where Sir Charles has a detached note:
'Our former Chancellor at eighty-two is "not less" prosy in the Lords than he used to be, for he was always "slow." When W. E. Forster resigned in 1882, Lord Granville left the Cabinet room to go down to tell the Queen. Then, and then only, Lord Selborne said: "But I agree with him, and must resign also." "It is too late," said Harcourt, "it would not now be respectful to the Queen as Granville has started." So the Chancellor did not resign.'
The Memoir continues: 'On May 3rd Chamberlain, who had decided to take the Irish Secretaryship if offered to him, was astonished at having received no offer. At 11.30 p.m. on the same day, the 3rd, I found that the appointment had been offered to and declined by Hartington; but the offer to, and acceptance by, his brother, Lord Frederick Cavendish, came as a complete surprise both to me and to Chamberlain.
'In the night between May 4th and 5th the Queen telegraphed to Harcourt: "I can scarcely believe that Davitt, one of the most dangerous traitors, has been released without my having been consulted, as I was in the case of the three members." The fact was that Harcourt had so impressed upon the Queen the wickedness of Davitt, at the time when he withdrew Davitt's ticket-of-leave, that it was rather difficult for him to explain to the Queen his very sudden change of front.
'On the 5th I had an interview with Mr. Gladstone as to royal grants. I carefully abstained from giving any pledge as to future action, and at the Cabinet of the 8th' (after Lord Frederick Cavendish's murder), 'when the question of my being offered the Chief Secretaryship with the Cabinet came up, Mr. Gladstone stated to the Cabinet that I remained unpledged.
'On May 6th I heard from Brett and from the Duchess of Manchester that Hartington had proposed me in the Cabinet for Chief Secretary, with a seat in the Cabinet, and that both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville had said: "Dilke won't do." The Duchess asked me what this meant, and I said that it was the Queen's objection on account of the Leopold grant, which it was; but Mr. Gladstone was glad to give Spencer his own way without a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet.'
At half-past six that afternoon, May 6th, Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, the permanent Under-Secretary, were murdered in the Phoenix Park, within sight of the Viceregal Lodge.
'On the night of May 6th the scene at the party at the Admiralty was most dramatic. Mrs. Gladstone had come there from a dinner party at the Austrian Embassy, not knowing of the murder, while everybody else in the room knew. At last she was sent for suddenly to Downing Street to be told, and went away under the impression that the Queen had been shot, for she was assured that it was very dreadful, but "nothing about Mr. Gladstone."
'Early on Sunday morning, the 7th, Parnell came to see me with Justin McCarthy. He was white and apparently terror-stricken. He thought the blow was aimed at him, and that if people kept their heads, and the new policy prevailed, he himself would be the next victim of the secret societies. [Footnote: In the letters of Justin McCarthy to Mrs. Campbell Praed (Our Book of Memoirs, p. 97) there is an account of what happened in London on that Sunday. There was a gathering of Irish leaders at Parnell's rooms.
"Then Parnell and I talked together, and we thought the best thing for us—we two—was to go and consult some of our English friends. We started out, and went first to see Sir Charles Dilke. Our impression was that either Dilke or Chamberlain would be asked to take the post of Irish Secretary. Indeed, the general impression was that either one man or the other would have been asked at the time when Lord Frederick Cavendish was appointed…. We saw Dilke. He was perfectly composed and cool. He said that if Gladstone offered him the post of Irish Secretary, nothing that had happened lately would in the least deter him from accepting it….
"He went on to say that he was a Home Ruler quand même; that he would be inclined to press Home Rule on the Irish people, even if they were not wholly inclined for it, because he so fully believed in the principle, whereas Chamberlain would only give Home Rule if the Irish people refused to accept anything less. But on the other hand, Chamberlain was an optimist in the matter, and thought he could do great good as Irish Secretary; and he (Dilke) was not so certain, seeing the difficulty of dealing with the Castle and the permanent officials, and therefore they agreed that as far as they were concerned it was better Chamberlain should go.
"He said, 'If Chamberlain goes, he'll go to smash things'—meaning the
Dublin Castle system.
"Then we went to Chamberlain and had a long talk with him. We found him perfectly willing to go to Ireland, but he said he must have his own way there and he would either make or mar—by which we understood the Castle system….">[
'On this day, May 8th, I noted that I thought it most unlikely that Mr. Gladstone would send Chamberlain to Ireland, inasmuch as to do so would be to admit that he had been wrong in not sending him in the previous week. To Grant Duff I sent the reason for Mr. G.'s decision: "Spencer wishes the policy to be his policy, and does not want his Chief Secretary in the Cabinet." At three o'clock Chamberlain sent a note across to me from the Cabinet: "Prepare for an offer." I was somewhat surprised at this, because Chamberlain knew that I would not take it without the Cabinet, and that I would take it with the Cabinet, whereas his note seemed to imply a doubt. At four he came across himself, and the first difference that had ever occurred between us took place, because although he knew that I would not accept, he urged acceptance of the post without the Cabinet. He argued that it carried with it the Privy Council, that it established great personal claims upon the party, and that it afforded a means of getting over the difficulty with the Queen. I declined, however, without hesitation and with some anger. It was obvious that I could not consent to be "a mere mouthpiece." Mr. Gladstone and Lord Carlingford then sent back to say, personally from each of them, that I was to be present at the Cabinet at every discussion of Irish affairs; and I then asked: "Why, then, should I not be in the Cabinet?" Carlingford came back to the Foreign Office again and again, and cried over it to me; and Lord Granville came in twice, and threatened me with loss of prestige by my refusal, by which I certainly felt that I had lost Mr. Gladstone's confidence. I was angry with Chamberlain at having placed me in this position…. Had he acted on this occasion with the steadiness with which he acted on every other, he would have told the Cabinet that the offer would be an insult, because he knew that this was my view. The ground on which the refusal of the Cabinet was put to me was the impossibility of having both myself and Spencer in the Cabinet. Lord Granville came in finally, and said in his sweetest manner (which is a very disagreeable one) that he had vast experience, and had "never known a man stand on his extreme rights and gain by it." This I felt to be a monstrous perversion of the case, and I was glad on the morning of the 9th to find that my reasons were very fairly stated in the Standard, the Telegraph, and the Daily News. Chamberlain had seen Escott of the Standard, and Lawson of the Telegraph, and I had seen Hill of the Daily News.
'That the Cabinet position towards me was dishonest is shown by the fact that they had given Lord Spencer Cowper's place when they had still reason to suppose that Forster was going to continue in the Irish Secretaryship and in the Cabinet, and had afterwards asked Hartington to take the Chief Secretaryship.
'An honourable (I trust) defence of myself is in a letter in the possession of Grant Duff under date "May 5th, closed on 11th."
The letter to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, which has separate brief jottings on May 5th, 6th, and 7th, has so far been reproduced almost textually from Sir Charles's Memoir. The rest runs as follows:
"8th.—Mr. Gladstone is determined not to send Chamberlain to Ireland, and does not want a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet, and to send Chamberlain and so have a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet would be to admit that the decision of last week was wrong. I, of course, refused to go. I should have had to defend any policy that Spencer chose to adopt without having a voice in it. Acceptance would not have been only a personal mistake; it would have been a political blunder. Outside the Cabinet I should not have had the public confidence, and rightly so, because I could not have had a strong hand. I should have inherited accumulated blunders, and I was under no kind of obligation to do so, for I have never touched the Irish Question. Never have I spoken of it from first to last. Many of the measures rendered necessary by the situation are condemned by my whole past attitude; but they have really been made inevitable by blunders for which I had no responsibility and which I should not have been allowed to condemn.
"Yours ever,"
"CHS. W. D."
"Closed on 11th."
He wrote also this month in a letter to Mrs. Pattison:
"In a matter of this sort it is essential to have the look of the thing in view, when a question of personal courage is involved. Of course, I know that I have personal courage, but the public can only judge from the look of things. The reason why Chamberlain even doubted if I ought not after the murder to go—though I was not to have gone before it—lay in the doubt as to how the public would take the look of it. It has turned out right, but it might have turned out wrong. If the public had gone the other way, I should have said I ought to have taken it, and resigned."
But, as Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff pointed out when replying to the letter of May 11th, in the state of things then existing in Ireland a Minister could hardly have resigned without the gravest embarrassment to the Government, and he cordially approved Sir Charles's refusal: "You could not have accepted the Secretaryship without a seat in the Cabinet." That refusal was also approved and understood by the heir to the Throne:
'On the 8th the Prince of Wales wrote to me through Knollys to ask me as to the Chief Secretaryship, and on my informing him how matters stood, replied: "If you had accepted the post without a seat in the Cabinet, your position, especially at the present moment, would be a very unsatisfactory one. If the policy, whatever it is, prove a success, I doubt whether you would have obtained much credit for it; and if it turned out a failure, you may be quite sure that a great deal of the blame would fall upon you without your having been responsible for the initiation of the steps that were adopted."'
The Phoenix Park murders having immediately followed the appointment of Lord Frederick Cavendish, those who had always pressed for further powers of police now asserted themselves with vehemence. Sir William Harcourt spoke strongly on Ireland and the necessity for coercion in the House of Commons. Mr. Gladstone, in whom the Radicals had always found a mainstay against these tendencies, was broken in spirit and suddenly aged. All relations in the Cabinet were jarred and embittered, as the successive entries in this Memoir show:
'In the night between May 11th and 12th the Irish, although angry at Harcourt's coercion speech, sent O'Shea to Chamberlain at 3 a.m. with the olive-branch again.
'On May 13th Mr. Gladstone again stated privately that he intended to
give up the Exchequer on account of his advancing years.
'On this day the Cabinet unanimously decided to give an extradition
treaty to Russia—to my mind a most foolish proposal.
'On Monday, May 15th, Mr. Gladstone sent Chamberlain to O'Shea to see if Parnell could be got to support the new Coercion Bill with some changes. When Harcourt heard of this, which was done behind his back, he was furious, and went so far as to tell me: "When I resign I shall not become a discontented Right Honourable on a back bench, but shall go abroad for some months, and when I come back rat boldly to the other side." This reminds me of Randolph Churchill on Lord Derby, "A man may rat once, but not rat and re-rat."
'On Tuesday, May 16th, Mr. Gladstone wrote, on Chamberlain's suggestion, to Harcourt to try to smooth him over, and proposed a Cabinet on the matter for the next day, Wednesday, May 17th, at which Harcourt declared that if any change was made in the principle of his Coercion Bill he would resign; but then nobody knew what was the principle of the Bill. At this Cabinet Harcourt … told the Cabinet that the Kilmainham Treaty would not be popular when the public discovered that it had been negotiated by Captain O'Shea, "the husband of Parnell's mistress." He informed the Cabinet that … after this it would hardly "do for the public" "for us to use O'Shea as a negotiator." I wrote to Grant Duff on this day (closed 18th) as to Parnell's relations to Mrs. O'Shea as disclosed in Cabinet.
'On Friday, May 19th, Lord Derby said to me: "You were right to refuse the Chief Secretaryship; still Mr. Gladstone must say to himself: 'Surely I am about to die, for I am not obeyed.'" On Monday, the 22nd, Mr. Gladstone was very strongly in favour of accepting Parnell's privately suggested amendments to the new Coercion Bill, obtained through O'Shea, but Hartington going with Harcourt against touching the Bill, Mr. Gladstone got no support except from Chamberlain.
'On May 25th Chamberlain was anxious to resign on account of
Harcourt's position as to coercion; but the fit passed off again.
'On June 5th I noted in my diary that I heard that Goschen was soon to
be asked to become Chancellor of the Exchequer.
'On the 9th Lord Granville told me that the hatred of Mr. Gladstone for Goschen was such that he had point blank refused to make him Chancellor of the Exchequer; but this proved to be untrue, for an offer was as a fact made to him, although perhaps very privately.
'At this time I received a letter from Lord Ripon in India as to the Kilmainham Treaty, in which he said that he was convinced that Forster's policy had completely broken down, and went on: "But between ourselves is not the Government still … on a wrong track in its coercive measures? I do not like the suspension of trial by jury…. Again, if Reuter is right, it is proposed to take a power to expel dangerous foreigners. I am too much of a Foxite to like an Alien Bill, and, besides, if you are not very careful, the expulsion of foreigners will land you in a very disagreeable state of relations with the United States." These, I noted, were exactly the arguments which Chamberlain was using against Harcourt without avail.'