II.
Notwithstanding his attention to domestic politics, Sir Charles was first and foremost the representative of the Foreign Office, and during the spring of 1882 he was ceaselessly concerned in the negotiations which were in progress between the Russian Government and the British India Office, over which Lord Hartington then presided.
'I had received from the India Office on January 6th a private communication suggesting arrangement with Russia as to the delimitation of the new Russo-Persian frontier. The India Office were inclined to hand over Merv nominally to Persia, regardless of the fact that the Russians would not consent to any proposal of the kind. I wrote to Lord Granville on the 9th, "I must say I don't like it at all," and he answered: "It appears to me that some of the permanent Jingoes in the I.0. want to establish that they are always pressing the F.O. to do spirited things, and constantly thwarted. I rather agree with you that it is better to do nothing than to do that which is not really effective, but Hartington is very anxious not to be altogether quiet.—G."
'On January 17th I had the first of a series of important interviews with Brett, Hartington's secretary, with regard to Central Asian affairs. He gave up Merv, and in return I agreed with him that the Foreign Office should propose to the India Office to ask Russia to define the Persian frontier by an English-Russian-Persian Commission, and the Afghan frontier by an English-Russian-Afghan Commission. Lord Granville was unfavourable, Lord Hartington favourable to this view, which after a great number of meetings at the Foreign Office prevailed, the Russians ultimately accepting the Afghan delimitation, a matter to which I shall have to return. The policy to which I have always adhered was on this occasion stated in a paper which we drew up—a secret "Memorandum on the question of the undefined frontiers between Persia, Afghanistan, and Russia"—in words which, referring to the probability that without an agreement Russia would establish herself at Herat, went on:
'"Peace might be maintained for a time, but it would always be a precarious peace, for the direct influence of Russia, backed by her show of military force, would in time overawe the Afghans, and give her a preponderance of which we should feel the effects, either in the necessity for costly defensive preparations and a large increase of the garrison of India, or in the danger to the tranquillity and permanence of our rule…. Secure on a strong line, flanked at one end by Balkh and at the other by Herat, covered towards Kabul by a zone of friendly Hazara tribes … and connected by rail and steam with her bases in the Caucasus and on the Volga, she could afford to laugh at threats from India, and might deal at leisure with Afghan tribes and leaders."'
Two later jottings on the manuscript follow:
'"This is still true in 1906."
'"In 1908 I approved the main lines of an agreement with Russia."
'On February 20th (1882) a conference took place between Lord
Granville, Lord Hartington, Tenterden, and myself as to Central Asia.
Hartington wanted to pay Persia to hold the Turcoman oasis—a most
monstrous proposition.
'On the next day, the 21st, a telegram was written to go to India,
which was so drawn by Hartington as to make the Foreign Office approve
his absurd Merv scheme. I got it altered, and Merv left out, and
guarding words put in.
'On February 22nd the Russian Ambassador promised Lord Granville that
we should be allowed to carry out my idea of a joint commission for
the Afghan frontier.
'On March 10th there was a meeting between Lord Hartington and Lord
Granville and myself as to Central Asia.'
Lord Ripon wrote from Simla on May 15th to condemn Lord Hartington's policy of
'"trying to interpose Persia as a buffer between Russia and the Afghans…. I do not believe either in the strength or in the good faith of Persia," said Lord Ripon. "…I am afraid that the India Office have by no means got rid of the notions which were afloat in Salisbury's time." On the other hand, Lord Ripon was in favour of a treaty with the Afghans, to which I was opposed except in the form of a mere frontier delimitation.'
The India Office, however, never caused Dilke so many heart-burnings as sprang from his concern with those African and Australasian matters on which the Foreign Office was obliged to secure co-operation from the Colonial Office.
'On January 13th, in addition to further trouble about Borneo, a new controversy sprang up between me and the Colonial Office. It was, I think, on January 6th, 1882, that I received from Mr. Gladstone the letter which began: "Cameroon River, West Africa. Mr. Gladstone. Dear Sir, We both your servants have meet this afternoon to write to you these few lines of writing, trusting it may find you in a good state of life, as it leaves us at present. As we heard here that you are the chief man in the House of Commons, so we write to you to tell you that we want to be under Her Majesty's control." It ended: "Please to send us an answer as quick as you can. With kind regards, we are, dear sir, your obedient servants, King Bell and King Akua."
'Lord Kimberley had absolutely refused; but I, holding that this spot was after all the best on the West Coast of Africa, and the only one where a health station could be established, urged acceptance, without being able to get my own way. Lord Granville wrote concerning Lord Kimberley' (not without a retrospective glance at his own Under-Secretary): '"Perhaps he fears Cameroon cold water too much in consequence of the scalding water from Borneo." Being entirely unable to get my way, I proposed that the letter of the Kings should be "made official," and sent to Lord Granville; that he should officially invite the opinion of the Colonial Office on it, and that if the Colonial Office wrote a despatch against it we should refuse, but not refuse without the Colonial Office opinion being on official record. The offer of the cession of the Cameroons having been renewed later, and I having again most strongly urged acceptance, a consul was sent to the country to investigate the matter, when the Germans suddenly interfered; snapped it up, and made it a new colony. Kimberley was entirely responsible, as I had persuaded Lord Granville to agree with me.'