IV.
During this time the Government continued to waver as to the Soudan expedition.
On June 21st
'with regard to Gordon it was decided to wait ten days before settling anything, and to see whether we heard from him in reply to the silly questions which had been asked.'
On June 27th came the definitive news that Berber had fallen on May 26th. On July 5th
'We discussed the Egyptian army of the future, and then the question of whether we should send an expedition to Khartoum, as to which we again could come to no decision; Mr. Gladstone still opposing.'
Dilke, backed by Chamberlain, was still pressing the military solution which he favoured. On July 16th
'Hartington on this occasion gave up the Berber-Suakim route, and pressed for a decision as to an immediate expedition by the Nile. He was supported by the Chancellor, Northbrook, Carlingford, and Dodson. Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Childers opposed.
'Chamberlain and I opposed a large expedition by the Nile, and supported a small expedition, under the control of the navy, with a body of picked men. Baring was called in about the police in Egypt, and his views in support of Nubar were approved. Nubar was to have his own way in the appointment of Inspectors of Police in Egypt.'
'On July 22nd we found that Mr. Gladstone had again taken up Zebehr, and was anxious to send him to Khartoum in order to avoid a British expedition.
'On July 25th there was a full Cabinet, Spencer being present, which first discussed the Conference and then the Gordon expedition, for which for the first time a large majority of the Cabinet pronounced. The issue was narrowed down to that of sending some sort of British force to or towards Dongola; and this was supported by Hartington, the Chancellor, Derby, Northbrook, Spencer, Carlingford, Dodson, Chamberlain, and me, while on the other side were only Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Kimberley. Lord Granville said nothing. By the stoutness of their resistance the three for the moment prevailed over the nine.
'On July 31st a storm was brewing about Gordon, and Harcourt went about declaring that the Government would break up upon the question. On the next day, August 1st, a way out of the difficulty was found in an agreement that we should ask for a small vote of credit, which we were to use or not as should be thought right later.'
It must be remembered that communications with Gordon were now interrupted, though occasionally renewed, and this added to the confusion.
'On September 17th we received a telegram from Gordon which looked as though he were perfectly mad, although some of the other telegrams from him sent at the same time were sane enough.'
Since Parliament had risen and the Cabinet scattered, preparations had been going on apace.
'When Hartington came to me on September 15th he told me that he had already spent "£750,000 out of the £300,000" for the Gordon expedition.' [Footnote: 'On August 9th Lord Hartington again asked us for permission to embody militia or call out a portion of the First-Class Army Reserve.']
'On October 4th Chamberlain had written strongly against Wolseley's great expedition, Harcourt was still opposing the whole thing. After this meeting of the Cabinet Northbrook wrote to Gordon a long letter based on the Cabinet decision. He stated that the expedition under Wolseley was not sent for the purpose of defeating the Mahdi, but only of enabling the Egyptian garrison of Khartoum, the civil employees and their families, with Gordon, to return to Egypt. He offered the Grand Cross of the Bath' (to Gordon) 'as from the Queen personally. He explained our refusal of Zebehr, and he suggested the placing at Khartoum of the Mudir of Dongola. It was easy, however, to write to Gordon, but it was not easy to get the letters to him; and we had to attempt even to send them by Tripoli and the desert.' [Footnote: As to the last communications with Gordon, see Life of Granville, vol. ii., pp. 397-399. Besides the authorities already quoted, the Parliamentary Papers Nos. 2, 6, 12, 13, and 25, for 1884, may be referred to.]
That is the last detailed reference to Gordon in the Memoir until
February 5th, 1885, when the news of the fall of Khartoum reached
London. The matter had passed out of the hands of the Cabinet into those
of the soldiers.
This comment in the Diary may fitly end this chapter:
'On February 20th I noted (conversation, I think, not printed), Lord Acton says of Gladstone: "Cannot make up my mind whether he is not wholly unconscious when working himself up to a change of position. After watching him do it, I think that he is so. He lives completely in what for the moment he chooses to believe."'