Reflections

We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.

Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.

Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering, guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an indispensable supposition that policy knows the instrument it is going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued in another form​—​in the form of war. The statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.

Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, i.e. after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds that the two are so intimately related that the political influence cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations. Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this, that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by overwhelming political necessity.

Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed. It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course, that a politician should study all the details of naval and military matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war, and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political object of war, through the submission of the enemy.

Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that he may keep his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it. That is to say, he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without at the same time considering with his military and naval advisers the nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,

Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not) lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,​—​these points deserve the most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.

[CHAPTER IX]
STRATEGY

Clausewitz defines strategy as "the use of the battle to gain the object of the war." War is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point."[41]

"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is the first great principle of strategy, as well suited for Greeks or Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."

It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How many generals have been ruined in consequence!

Superiority in Numbers
What is Required for Strategic Certainty

Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon, Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]

The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal of strategy. "The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before all, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory. Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the hostile armed force is destroyed.

This superiority of numbers in battle as the first principle of strategy we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and "the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for us. This rests with our statesmen.