The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War
But though these changed conditions must, of course, modify Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, as the chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war, will ever remain invaluable in the study of war.
Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of glory—on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost endless wars between 1793 and 1815.
The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution, which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany, which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French; the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this; he conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the moral and spiritual factors in war.
His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of carnage and devastation.
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[FOOTNOTES]
[1] Book IV. Chap. 10.
[2] Book IV. Chap. 3.
[3] Book IV. Chap. 3.
[4] Book I. Chap. 8.
[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120.
[7] Book II. Chap. 6.
[8] Book II. Chap. 2.
[9] Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.
[10] Book II. Chap. 4.
[11] Book II. Chap. 2.
[12] Book II. Chap. 2.
[13] Book II. Chap. 3.
[14] Book I. Chap. 1.
[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission.
[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
[17] Book I. Chap. 1.
[18] Author's "Introduction."
[19] Book I. Chap. 1.
[20] Book VII. Chap. 5.
[21] Book VII. Chap. 21.
[22] Book VII. Chap. 21.
[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.
[24] Book I. Chap. 1.
[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
[26] Book I. Chap. 7.
[27] Book I. Chap. 8.
[28] Book I. Chap. 8.
[29] Book IV. Chap. 1.
[30] Book IV. Chap. 3.
[31] Book I. Chap. 1.
[32] Book IV. Chap. 3.
[33] Book III. Chap. 15.
[34] Book VII. Chap. 13.
[35] Book I. Chap. 4.
[36] Book I. Chap. 5.
[37] Book I. Chap. 7.
[38] Book III. Chap. 3.
[39] Book III. Chaps. 16–18.
[40] Book II. Chap. 1.
[41] Book III. Chap. 11.
[42] Book III. Chap. 8.
[43] Book V. Chap. 3.
[44] Book III. Chap. 8.
[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4.
[46] Book III. Chap. 12.
[47] Book III. Chap. 13.
[48] Book III. Chap. 12.
[49] Book III. Chap. 13.
[50] Book III. Chap. 8.
[51] Book III. Chap. 11.
[52] Book VI. Chap. 28.
[53] Book V. Chap. 10.
[54] Book I. Chap. 1.
[55] Book III. Chap. 13.
[56] Book I. Chap. 3.
[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
[60] Book I. Chap. 3.
[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been learned.—Editor's Note.
[62] Book IV. Chap. 4.
[63] Book IV. Chap. 4.
[64] "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136–146.
[65] Book IV. Chap. 4.
[66] Book VI. Chap. 1.
[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
[68] Book VI. Chap. 5.
[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
[70] Book VII. Chap. 15.
[71] Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.
[72] Book VI. Chap. 9.
[73] Book VII. Chap. 9.
[74] Book VII. Chap. 7.
[75] Book VII. Chap. 7.
[Transcriber's Notes]
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Page [133]: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.