INDEX

[1]. See Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism.

[2]. Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on the Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 47.

[3]. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya, I. 120.

[4]. It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the guṇas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that guṇa in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable that as the Sāṃkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it was realised that there was no ultimate distinction between substance and qualities. In consequence of such a view the guṇas which were originally regarded as qualities began to be regarded as substantive entities and no contradiction was felt. Bhikshu in many places describes the guṇas as substantive entities (dravya) and their division into three classes as being due to the presence of three kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean that within the same class there were many other differences which have not been taken into account (Yoga-vārttika, II. 18). But it cannot be said that the view that the guṇas are substantive entities and that there is no difference between qualities and substances is regarded as a genuine Sāṃkhya view even as early as Śaṅkara. See Ghābhāshya, XIV. 5.

[5]. See Vyāsa-bhāshya on Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtras, II. 18, and Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on it.

[6]. See Bhikshu’s Yoga-vārttika, II. 18.

[7]. History of Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66.

[8]. The usual Sāṃkhya terms as found in Iśvarakṛshṇa’s Kārikā, having the same denotation as aviśesha and viśesha, are prakṛtivikṛti and vikṛti.

[9]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

[10]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

[11]. Tattvavaiśāradī, II. 19.

[12]. Tattvatraya, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.

[13]. Bhikshu in his Yoga-vārttika explains “māyeva” as “laukikamāyeva kshaṇabhaṇguram” evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience.

[14]. Siddhāntalleśa (Jīveśvara nirūpaiṇa).

[15]. Princess Kuntī of the Mahābhārata had a son born to her by means of a charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal she floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife of a carpenter (Rādhā). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karṇa and he thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his royal lineage was disclosed to him later in life.

[16]. Kārikā 17.

[17]. Gauḍapāda’s commentary on Kārikā 17.

[18]. Purusha is a substance (dravya) because it has independent existence (anāśrita) and has a measure (vibhu parimāṇa) of its own. So it always possesses the common characteristics (sāmānya guṇa) of substances, contact (saṃyoga), separation (viyoga) and number (saṃkhyā). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or impure on account of the possession of the above common characteristics of all substances. Yoga-vārttika, II. 17.

[19]. Thus the Bhāshya says: bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti.

[20]. Tattvavaiśāradī, IV. 14.

[21]. Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ. Yoga-sūtra, IV. 15.

[22]. “Tattvāntara-pariṇāma” means the evolution of a wholly new category of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new category of existence since all these qualities are the direct manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.

[23]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (vibhu) how can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (Yoga-vārttika, III. 52) in reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce mind antaḥkaraṇa and ākāśa) which are all-pervading, while the others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus. Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth, water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter should mean guṇas. Moreover, Yoga-sūtra, I. 40, and Vyāsa-bhāshya, I. 45, speak of paramāṇu and aṇu in the sense of earth-atoms, etc. Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms (paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides, prior (pūrvadeśa) and posterior (uttaradeśa).

[24]. Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the ultimate unit of time (kshaṇa). The whole world is nothing else but a series of kshaṇas. This view differs from the Buddhist view that everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other thing but the kshaṇas (na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate. Yoga-vārttika, III. 52).

[25]. There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word “kshaṇapratiyogi” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the growth associated with a particular kshaṇa or moment (kshaṇapracayāśraya). The word pratiyogī is interpreted by Vācaspati as related (pratisambandhī). Bhikshu, however, gives a quite different meaning. He interprets kshaṇa as “interval” and pratiyogī as “opposite of” (virodhī). So “kshaṇapratiyogī” means with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession. There is according to his interpretation no interval between the cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.

[26]. Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here intended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.

[27]. Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 25.

[28]. Tattvavaiśāradī, III. 41.

[29]. This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus in Dr. P. C. Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II.

[30]. Yoga-vārttika, I. 45.

[31]. I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the guṇas (except the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms. See Yoga-vārttika, III. 52.

[32]. Cf. Vyāsa-bhāshya—“sabdādīnāṃ mūrttisamānajátīyānāṃ,” IV. 14.

[33]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

[34]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 13.

[35]. Ibid.

[36]. Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from Heaven and was turned into a snake.

[37]. Tattravaiśāradī, IV, 3.

[38]. I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions of the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the conservative side of mind as the repository of all experiences, memory, etc.

[39]. If this is a Sāṃkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina influence.

[40]. Compare Pañcaśikha, svalpasaṇkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ, Tattvakaumudī, 2.

[41]. Pratyaya is explained in Yoga-vārttika, II. 28, as sampratyaya or prāmāṇyaniścaya.

[42]. Yudhishṭhira led falsely Droṇa to believe that the latter’s son was dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the same name as that of his son that had died.

[43]. This book has, however, not yet been published.

[44]. Dr. Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, p. 81.

[45]. Avidyā manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions (kleśa) of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy) and abhiniveśa (self-love); (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3) as error of sense. All these manifestations of avidyā are also the different forms of viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake). This bhrama in Yoga is the thinking of something as that which it is not (anyathākhyāti). Thus we think the miserable worldly existence as pleasurable and attribute the characteristics of prakṛti to purusha and vice versa. All afflictions are due to this confusion and misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis in all their transmigrations from one life to another. Sāṃkhya, however, differs from Yoga and thinks that all error (avidyā or bhrama) is due only to non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus non-distinction (aviveka) between prakṛti and purusha is the cause of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and aviveka are thus synonymous with Sāṃkhya.

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