THE FLEET RETURNS TO SPITHEAD.
The fleet was no sooner returned than the whole nation was in a ferment. The public expectation had been wound up to the highest pitch, and now the disappointment was proportioned to the sanguine hopes conceived, that the pride of France would have been humbled by so formidable an armament. The ministry, and with them the national voice, exclaimed against the commanding officers, and the military men retorted the calumny by laying the blame on the projectors of the enterprise, who had put the nation to great expense before they had obtained the necessary information. Certain it was, that blame must fall somewhere, and the ministry resolved to acquit themselves and fix the accusation, by requesting his majesty to appoint a board of officers of character and ability, to inquire into the causes of the late miscarriage. This alone it was that could appease the public clamours, and afford general satisfaction. The enemies of Mr. Pitt endeavoured to wrest the miscarriage of the expedition to his prejudice, but the whispers of faction were soon drowned in the voice of the whole people of England, who never could persuade themselves that a gentleman raised to the height of power and popularity by mere dint of superior merit, integrity, and disinterestedness, would now sacrifice his reputation by a mock armament, or hazard incurring the derision of Europe, by neglecting to obtain all the necessary previous information, or doing whatever might contribute to the success of the expedition. It was asked, Whether reason or justice dictated, that a late unfortunate admiral should be capitally punished for not trying and exerting his utmost ability to relieve fort St. Philip, invested by a powerful army, and surrounded with a numerous fleet, while no charge of negligence or cowardice was brought against those who occasioned the miscarriage of a well-concerted and well-appointed expedition? The people, they said, were not to be quieted with the resolutions of a council of war, composed of men whose inactivity might frame excuses for declining to expose themselves to danger. It was publicly mentioned, that such backwardness appeared among the general officers before the fleet reached the isle of Oleron, as occasioned the admiral to declare, with warmth, that he would comply with his orders, and go into Basque-road, whatever might be the consequence. It was asked, Why the army did not land on the night of the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, and whether the officers sent out to reconnoitre, had returned with such intelligence as seemed to render a descent impracticable? It was asked, Whether the commander-in-chief had complied with his majesty’s orders, “To attempt, as far as should be found practicable, a descent on the coast of France, at or near Rochefort, in order to attack, and, by a vigorous impression, force that place; and to burn and destroy, to the utmost of his power, all docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, as shall be found there?” Such rumours as these, everywhere propagated, rendered an inquiry no less necessary to the reputation of the officers on the expedition, than to the minister who had projected it. Accordingly, a board consisting of three officers of rank, reputation, and ability, was appointed by his majesty, to inquire into the reasons why the fleet returned without having executed his majesty’s orders.
The three general officers, who met on the twenty-first of the same month, were, Charles duke of Marlborough, lieutenant-general, major-generals lord George Sackville and John Waldegrave. To judge of the practicability of executing his majesty’s orders, it was necessary to inquire into the nature of the intelligence upon which the expedition was projected. The first and most important was a letter sent to sir John, afterwards lord Ligonier, by lieutenant-colonel Clark.. This letter had been frequently examined in the privy-council, and contained, in substance, that colonel Clark, in returning from Gibraltar, in the year one thousand-seven hundred and fifty four, had travelled along the western coast of France, to observe the condition of the fortifications, and judge how far a descent would be practicable, in case of a rupture between Great Britain and France. On his coming to Rochefort, where he was attended by an engineer, he was surprised to find the greatest part of a good rampart, with a revetment, flanked only with redans; no outworks, no covered-way, and in many places no ditch, so that the bottom of the wall was seen at a distance. He remembered, that in other places, where the earth had been taken out to form the rampart, there was left around them a considerable height of ground, whence an enemy might draw a great advantage; that for above the length of a front, or two or three hundred yards, there was no rampart, or even intrenchment, but only small ditches, in the low and marshy grounds next the river, which, however, were dry at low water, yet the bottom remained muddy and slimy. Towards the river, no rampart, no batteries, no parapet, on either side appeared, and on the land-side he observed some high ground within the distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards of the town; in which condition, the colonel was told by the engineer, the place had remained for above seventy years. To prevent giving umbrage, he drew no plan of the place, and even burnt the few sketches he had by him: however, as to utility, the colonel declared himself as much satisfied as if he had taken a plan. He could not ascertain the direct height of the rampart, but thought it could not exceed twenty-five feet, including the parapet. The river might be about one hundred and thirty feet broad, and the entrance defended by two or three small redoubts. As to forces, none are ever garrisoned at Eochefort, except marines, which at the time the colonel was on the spot amounted to about one thousand. This was the first intelligence the ministry received of the state of Rochefort, which afforded sufficient room to believe, that an attack by surprise might be attended with happy consequences. It was true that colonel Clark made his observations in time of peace; but it was likewise probable that no great alterations were made on account of the war, as the place had remained in the same condition during the two or three last wars with France, when they had the same reasons as now to expect their coasts would be insulted. The next information was obtained from Joseph Thierry, a French pilot, of the protestant religion, who passed several examinations before the privy-council. This person declared, that he had followed the business of a pilot on the coast of France for the space of twenty years, and served as first pilot in several of the king’s ships; that he had, in particular, piloted the Magnanime, before she was taken by the English, for about twenty-two months, and had often conducted her into the road of the isle of Aix; and that he was perfectly acquainted with the entrance, which indeed is so easy as to render a pilot almost unnecessary. The road, he said, afforded good anchorage in twelve or fourteen fathoms water, as far as Bayonne; the channel between the islands of Oleron and Rhé was three leagues broad, and the banks necessary to be avoided lay near the land, except one called the Board, which is easily discerned by the breakers. He affirmed, that the largest vessels might draw up close to the fort of Aix, which he would undertake the Magnanime alone should destroy; that the largest ships might come up to the Vigerot, two miles distant from the mouth of the river, with all their cannon and stores; that men might be landed to the north of fort Fouras, out of sight of the fort, upon a meadow where the ground is firm and level, under cover of the cannon of the fleet. This landing-place he reckoned at about five miles from Rochefort, the way dry, and no way intercepted by ditches and morasses. He said, great part of the city was encompassed by a wall; but towards the river, on both sides, for about sixty paces, it was enclosed only with pallisadoes, without a fosse. To the intelligence of colonel Clark and Thierry, the minister added a secret account obtained of the strength and distribution of the French forces, whence it appeared highly probable that no more than ten thousand men could be allowed for the defence of the whole coast, from St. Valéry to Bourdeaux. In consequence of the above information the secret expedition was planned; instructions were given to sir John Mordaunt and admiral Hawke to make a vigorous impression on the French coast, and all the other measures projected, which, it was imagined, would make an effectual diversion, by obliging the enemy to employ a great part of their forces at home, disturb and shake the credit of their public loans, impair the strength and resources of their navy, disconcert their extensive and dangerous operations of war, and, finally, give life, strength, and lustre to the common cause and his majesty’s arms. The board of inquiry took next into consideration the several letters and explanatory instructions sent to sir John Mordaunt, in consequence of some difficulties which might possibly occur, stated by that general in letters to the minister, previous to his sailing. Then they examined the report made to sir Edward Hawke by admiral Broderick, and the captains of the men of war sent to sound the French shore from Rochelle to fort Fouras, dated September the twenty-ninth; the result of the councils of war on the twenty-fifth and twenty-eighth; sir Edward Hawke’s letter to sir John Mordaunt on the twenty-seventh, and the general’s answer on the twenty-ninth: after which sir John Mordaunt was called upon to give his reasons for not putting his majesty’s instructions and orders into execution. This he did in substance as follows: the attempt on Rochefort, he understood, was to have been on the footing of a coup de main or surprise, which it would be impossible to execute if the design was discovered, or the alarm taken. He also understood that an attempt could not be made, nay that his majesty did not require it should, unless a proper place for debarking, and a safe retreat for the troops was discovered, particularly where the ships could protect them; and a safe communication with the fleet, and conveyance of supplies from it, were found. His sentiments, he said, were confirmed by a paper to this purpose, delivered to him by sir John Ligonier, on his first being appointed to command the expedition. It was likewise probable, he thought, that although Rochefort should have remained in the situation in which colonel Clark and the pilot Thierry had seen it three years before, yet that a few days’ preparation could make it sufficiently defensible against a coup de main. Judging therefore the dependence on such an operation alone improper, he applied to the ministry for two more old battalions, and artillery for a regular attack to force the place, which, from its construction, appeared as difficult to be made defensible against the latter, as easily secured against the former. But this request being refused, he still thought it his duty to obey his orders on the footing on which the expedition was planned, especially as he understood his instructions were discretionary, regarding the circumstances of the time, the condition of the place, and the nature of the service. He recited the positive and credible intelligence received, as well before the embarkation as during the voyage, of the alarm given to France, and the preparations made along the French coasts from Brest and St. Maloes to Rochefort; the accidents that kept the fleet hovering along the coasts, and prevented the possibility of an attempt by surprise; the reports of all the gentlemen employed in sounding the coasts, so contrary to the intelligence given by Thierry the pilot; the opinion of the council of war, by which he was enjoined to act, and with which his own judgment concurred; the endeavours used, after the twenty-sixth, to find out some expedient for annoying the enemy and executing his majesty’s instructions; the attempt made to land, in consequence of the resolution of the second council of war, which was prevented by boisterous and stormy weather; and lastly, the reasons that determined him, in concert with the other land officers, to return to England.
Having considered all these circumstances, and examined several officers who served in the expedition, the court of inquiry gave in the following report to his majesty:—“It appears to us, that one cause of the expedition having failed is, the not attacking fort Fouras by sea, at the same time that it could have been attacked by land, agreeably to the first design, which certainly must have been of the greatest utility towards carrying your majesty’s instructions into execution. It was at first resolved by admiral Hawke; (Thierry, the pilot, having undertaken the safe conduct of a ship to fort Fouras for that purpose), but afterwards laid aside, upon the representation of vice-admiral Knowles, that the Bar-fleur, the ship designed for that service, was a-ground, at the distance of between four and five miles from the shore; but as neither sir Edward Hawke nor the pilot could attend to give any information upon that head, we cannot presume to offer any certain opinion thereupon. We conceive another cause of the failure of the expedition to have been, that, instead of attempting to land when the report was received, on the twenty-fourth of September, from rear-admiral Broderick, and the captains who had been out to sound and reconnoitre, a council of war was summoned and held on the twenty-fifth, in which it was unanimously resolved not to land, as the attempt on Rochefort was neither advisable nor practicable; but it does not appear to us that there were then or at any time afterwards, either a body of troops or batteries on shore sufficient to have prevented the attempting a descent, in pursuance of the instructions signed by your majesty; neither does it appear to us that there were any reasons sufficient to induce the council of war to believe that Rochefort was so changed in respect to its strength, or posture of defence, since the expedition was first resolved on in England, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon the place, in order to burn and destroy the docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, in obedience to your majesty’s command. And we think ourselves obliged to remark, in the council of war on the twenty-eighth of September, that no reason could have existed sufficient to prevent the attempt of landing the troops, as the council then unanimously resolved to land with all possible despatch. We beg leave also to remark, that after its being unanimously resolved to land, in the council of war of the twenty-eighth of September, the resolution was taken of returning to England, without any regular or general meeting of the said council; but as the whole operation was of so inconsiderable a nature, we do not offer this to your majesty as a cause of the failure of the expedition; since we cannot but look upon the expedition to have failed from the time the great object of it was laid aside in the council of war of the twenty-fifth.”
GEORGE II. 1727-1760