INDEX.

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Footnotes

[1]. It may be doubted whether all the English writers here mentioned can be strictly classed with the physiological school as understood by M. Ribot. With regard to Mr. Spencer, for instance, this is indicated by a brief summary of his own position in a private letter to the Rev. Angus Mackay, who had presented a statement of the “confused intelligence” theory, “which I conceive to be a part of the truth,” wrote Mr. Spencer, adding that “joined with the dimly aroused association of ideas derived from the experiences of the individual, I hold that the body of the emotion consists more largely of the inherited associations of experiences and still more vague states of consciousness which result from excitement of them.” It is clear that the evolutionary view does not necessarily fall wholly into the “physiological” group.—Ed.

[2]. “La sensibilité dans le règne animal et le règne végétal”, (1876, in Science expérimentale, pp. 218 et seq.).

[3]. “Ein rein emotionneller Bewusstseinszustand kommt nicht vor; Lust und Unlust sind stets an intellektuelle Zustände geknüpft,” Die Hauptgesetze der menschlichen Gefühlslebens (1892), p. 16.

[4]. Das Körperliche Gefühl (1887), pp. 80, 81.

[5]. For observations relative to this point see Revue Philosophique, March 1896.

[6]. Descartes is a brilliant exception to this method of procedure; later on we shall have to consider his method (Part II., [Chapter vii].).

[7]. Darwin, “Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” Mind, ii. p. 285.

[8]. It is probable that the dates assigned for the first appearance of emotional manifestations by Darwin, Preyer, Perez, etc., are mostly too late, as they were not the outcome of continuous observation. Mrs. Kathleen Carter Moore, in her recent elaborate monograph dealing with the early mental development of her own baby, whom she regards as an average infant, observed the tear secretion first on the tenth day, though it was not fully established until the sixteenth week; a smile when comfortable was seen on the sixth day; the child smiled several times consecutively at his father on the seventh day with movements of excitement, and by the twentieth day smiling at persons had become more frequent and more intelligent. (See K. C. Moore, “The Mental Development of a Child,” Monograph Supplement to the Psychological Review, 1896).—ED.

[9]. Höffding, Psychologie, pp. 392-394, second German edition. J. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 56, considers emotion as a genus of which affection and passion are the species: affection is a fixed emotional disposition; passion is the violent form of the emotion. Nothing can be vaguer and more uncertain than the terminology of our subject, and yet, as Wundt says in his Essays, it has made a very appreciable progress when compared to the confusion which existed at the beginning of the century.

[10]. Letourneau, Physiologie des Passions, liv. i. Chap. I.

[11]. “Pain is a powerful and prolonged vibration of the conscious nervous centres, resulting from a strong peripheral excitation, and consequently of a sudden change of condition in the nervous centres” (Richet). “It is the most violent stimulation of certain sensorial regions—a stimulation to which contribute the more extended stimulations of other regions” (Wundt).

[12]. Sensations internes, Chap. xx., may be read for details on this point.

[13]. Archiv für Anatomie und Physiol., 1885.

[14]. Goldscheider, Ueber den Schmerz, Berlin, 1894.

[15]. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefühlslebens, pp. 46 et seq.

[16]. In his preface Sergi briefly indicates the “antecedents of his theory.” He finds it in the English anatomist Todd, in Hack Tuke, Laycock, Herbert Spencer, Brown-Séquard, etc. I may point out that Vulpian, relying on experiments of doubtful interpretation, localised the emotions exclusively in the medulla, Leçons sur l’Anatomie du système nerveux, xxiv.

[17]. Mantegazza, Fisiologia del Dolore, chap. iii.

[18]. For historical and other cases, see Hack Tuke, Influence of the Mind upon the Body, chap. iii.

[19]. For details of the experiments see Hauptgesetze, etc., pp. 77 et seq., with the accompanying graphic traces.

[20]. Pierre Janet, État Mental des Hystériques.

[21]. See especially Morel, Traité des Maladies Mentales (pp. 324 et seq.), for a summary of many curious facts.

[22]. Weir Mitchell (Medical Record, 24th December 1892, quoted by Strong, Psychological Review, 1895, vol. ii. p. 332) reports the following extraordinary case of natural analgesia: Man who died at age of fifty-six, cheerful and corpulent, weighing some 250 pounds; intelligent, and vigorous both in body and mind, with a considerable reputation as a lawyer and politician. Having a finger wounded in a crush during a political campaign, he removed it himself by biting it off and spitting it on to the ground. He had an ulcer on the toe which resisted treatment for three years without ever causing him the slightest pain. He also had an abscess in the hand which spread to the fore-arm and arm, causing enormous swelling and endangering his life; the lancet was used without precaution, and throughout he felt no pain. It was the same with an operation for cataract on both eyes; he remained motionless as a statue. It was only during his last illness that he complained of some pain, but that quickly passed away, and he had returned to his state of natural insensibility before he died.

[23]. Richet, Recherches expérimentales et cliniques sur la Sensibilité, pp. 258, 259.

[24]. See on this point Lehmann’s embarrassed explanation, Hauptgesetze, etc., pp. 51 et seq.

[25]. Richet (op. cit., pp. 289, 290 and 315, 316) gives many illustrations.

[26]. Pitres, Leçons Cliniques sur l’Hystérie, i. p. 182.

[27]. The debates on this subject have chiefly been carried on by American psychologists. See Rutgers Marshall, Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics (1895); Nichols, “Origin of Pleasure and of Pain” (Philosophical Review, i. pp. 403 and 518); Strong, “Psychology of Pain” (Psychological Review, July 1895, and for criticisms and replies, Sept. and Nov. 1895, Jan. 1896); Luckey, “Some Recent Studies of Pain” (Am. Journal of Psychology, Oct. 1895).

[28]. Schmerz. und Temperaturempfindung, Berlin, 1893.

[29]. Hartmann alone, so far as I am aware, has dealt with this point, incidentally but very clearly: “When I have pain in my teeth or my finger or my stomach; when I lose my wife, my friend, or my situation, if in all these cases we distinguish what is pain and pain alone, and not to be confounded with perception, idea, or thought, we shall recognise that this special element is identical in all the cases.”—Philosophie des Unbewussten, vol. i., Part II., chap. iii.

[30]. Hahnemann distinguished 73 kinds of physical pain, Georget 38, Renaudin 12, etc. I give these numbers as curiosities. More recently Goldscheider (Ueber den Schmerz) establishes three stages in physical pain: (1) true, real (echte) pains; they depend on the nerves of special sensibility, and are caused by mechanical, thermal, or chemical stimulations, by inflammation and poisons; (2) indirect pains, pseudo-pains, which consist especially in a state of discomfort (Schmerzweh); in the case of the head, stomach, etc., they may be as oppressive and cause as much torture as “real” pains; (3) psychic or ideal (ideel) pains, which are a hyperæsthesia of the sensitive activity; they are met with in neuroses (neurasthenia, hysteria, hypochondria), in hallucinations, the hypnotic state, etc. This classification is perhaps acceptable in physiology. For psychology, every pain, in virtue of being a fact of consciousness, is “true” and “real.”

[31]. Beaunis, Sensations internes, chap. xxiii.

[32]. Fisiologia del piacere, Part II., chap. ii. He enumerates the following expressions:—Gusto, diletto, compiacenza, soddisfazione, conforto, contentezza, allegria, buon umore, gioia, giubilo, tripudio, delizia, voluttà, felicità, solletico, rapimento, trasporto, ebbrezza, delirio. Perhaps the Italian language is in this point richer than the German.

[33]. This thesis has been principally maintained in America by H. Nichols (Philosophical Review, July 1892), and in France by Bourdon (Revue Philosophique, September 1893). The former applies it to pleasure and pain, considering them fundamental sensations as distinct from one another as they are from other sensations. This article contains some ingenious considerations on the part played by the association of ideas. Bourdon applies it only to pleasure, and considers pain irreducible. He regards pleasure as a special sensation, not a common one or an attribute of all sensations; it is “of the same nature as the special sensation of tickling.” By adducing the pleasure of tickling (in which he follows Descartes and others), Bourdon partially escapes the criticism already advanced. It must be remarked, however, that tickling is itself a sensation of which the organic conditions are very vaguely determined. Besides the cutaneous impression, there are certainly also diffused reflex actions which connect it quite as much with internal sensibility as with the sense of touch.

[34]. Dr. G. Dumas has made experiments on the condition of the circulation in states of joy and of sadness. He has attempted an experimental verification of Lange’s theory by showing that a definite condition of the circulation always accompanies various agreeable and painful emotions, and that “joy and sadness may thus be regarded as the mental reverberation of these circulatory conditions and their organic consequences.” See “Recherches expérimentales sur la Joie et la Tristesse,” Revue Philosophique, June-August 1896.—Ed.

[35]. Richet, Recherches, etc., p. 212.

[36]. Lewes, Physical Basis of Mind, p. 327.

[37]. For further details on this point see Chapter VII.

[38]. Féré, Sensation et Mouvement, pp. 62, 63.

[39]. This also seems to be the view adopted by Rutgers Marshall (op. cit.). In the first place, he always considers “pleasure-pains” as connected states, pleasure being experienced “whenever the physical activity coincident with the psychic state to which the pleasure is attached involves the use of surplus stored force—the resolution of surplus potential into actual energy; or, in other words, whenever the energy involved in the reaction to a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy which the stimulus habitually calls forth.”—P. 204.

[40]. Beaunis, Sensations internes, pp. 246, 247.

[41]. Féré, Pathologie des Émotions, p. 223.

[42]. Bouillier, Du plaisir et de la douleur, chap. vii.

[43]. Mantegazza, Fisiologia del piacere, p. 26.

[44]. A curious study of pathological psychology might be founded on the De Vila Propria of Cardan, who was evidently what would now be called a neuropath and a déséquilibré.

[45]. Principles of Psychology, ii., § 518.

[46]. Krafft-Ebing remarks: “An abnormal mode of feeling on the part of melancholic patients is found in the enjoyment of pain (Leidseligkeit). In these individuals, ideas which, in a healthy slate, would be provocative of pain, awaken in the diseased consciousness a faint feeling of satisfaction which represents the corresponding affective tone.”

[47]. Pp. 170 et seq.

[48]. For some facts, which may or may not be well authenticated, see Féré, op. cit., p. 234.

[49]. Féré, Pathologie des Emotions, pp. 293, 294.

[50]. Schüle, Traité clinique des maladies mentales, Art. “Mélancolie” (French edition), pp. 21, 28.

[51]. G. Dumas, Les états intellectuels dans la mélancolie, where may be found several detailed observations.

[52]. Krafft-Ebing, op. cit., vol. ii., sec. 1, chap. i.

[53]. For a short historical summary of the question up to the middle of the nineteenth century, see Bouillier, Du plaisir et de la douleur, chap. xi.

[54]. See Mind, Oct. 1887, Jan. and April 1888, Jan. 1889; and J. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. pp. 4, 5.

[55]. Psychologie physiologique, iv., ch. i., pp. 309 et seq. (French edition.)

[56]. Wundt, Grundzüge der physiol. Psychologie (4th German ed.), vol. i. pp. 557 et seq.; Lehmann, Hauptgesetze, etc., §§ 236-241. One of Wundt’s most distinguished pupils, Külpe, in his Umriss der Psychologie (1895), considers the existence of a state of indifference “can hardly be doubted in the face of a long series of observations which support it.” (English edition, p. 242.)

[57]. Fouillée, Psychologie des idées-forces, i. 68.

[58]. I give an instance of a similar character, narrated by a historian, from Arabic sources. "The Emir Mohammed (at Granada, in 1408), finding himself dying, and anxious to secure the throne to his son, sent orders for his brother Yussuf, whom he was keeping in captivity at Salobreña, to be put to death. The alcalde, when he received this order, was playing at chess with his prisoner, whose gentleness had gained the heart of his gaolers. On reading the fatal despatch he was troubled, and did not dare to communicate its contents to the prince. But Yussuf guessed from his confusion what was the matter, and said to the alcalde, ‘Is it my head that is asked of thee?’ The latter, for all answer, handed to him his brother’s letter. Yussuf asked only for a few hours’ delay, in order to take leave of his wife; but the messenger of death declared that the execution must take place at once, the hour of his return being fixed beforehand. ‘Well,’ replied Yussuf, ‘let us at least finish the game.’ But the alcalde was so distressed that he advanced his pawns at random, and Yussuf was obliged to inform him of his mistakes. However, the game was never finished. Some knights, riding from Granada at full gallop, saluted Yussuf as Emir, and announced to him the death of his brother. When thus passing from the scaffold to the throne the Mussulman prince remained master of himself, as he had been in the face of death. Still doubting his good fortune, he set out for Granada, where he was received by the people with cries of joy." (Rosseuw St.-Hilaire, Histoire d’Espagne, vol. v., p. 227.) Analogous traits are recorded of various historic personages.

[59]. For the historical summary, see Bouillier, op. cit., chap. xii.

[60]. "The first cry of the new-born infant was formerly considered anything rather than a reflex action. It is, however, very probable that this first vocal manifestation, accompanying an expiration, is a reflex pure and simple. Kant wrote (without, indeed, having himself observed new-born children or animals): ‘The cry uttered by the child just after birth has not the intonation of fear, but that of irritation or anger. It is not because it is suffering, but because something displeases it. No doubt it would like to move and feels its impotence, as it might feel a chain restricting its liberty. What could have been the object of Nature in making the infant born into the world utter cries which are in the highest degree dangerous? Yet no animal save man announces its existence, at the time of birth, by similar cries.’

"This remarkable conception has been much commented on, and widely adopted. At the present time many people still think that the crying of new-born infants has considerable psychic significance. But all comments of this kind are met by the objection that a totally anencephalous infant cries at birth, and that many healthy infants do not cry, but sneeze, on their entry into the world, as noted by Darwin....

"The reflexes of pains which, in later life, show themselves in the acutest manner, are those best developed in early life. Gunzmer’s observations on about sixty infants showed him that, during the first few days, they are almost insensible, and during the first week, very slightly sensitive, to the pricking of a needle.

“New-born infants have been, in the course of their first day, pricked with fine needles, on the nose, the upper lip, and the hand, deeply enough to draw a drop of blood; yet the child manifested no symptom of consciousness, and did not start once.”—Preyer, Seele des Kindes, pp. 177, 193.

[61]. Féré, Sensation et Mouvement, p. 64. This work is to be consulted for the details of the experiments about to be summarised.

[62]. Physiological Æsthetics, p. 21. This point has been well discussed by Lehmann (op. cit., pp. 205-208).

[63]. Pathologie des émotions, p. 226.

[64]. British Medical Journal, August 14, 1886, pp. 319 et seq. We shall see, later on, that the mechanism of anger is not so simple as Clouston seems to admit.

[65]. Principles of Psychology, vol. i., §§ 125, 126.

[66]. See Lehmann, op. cit., § 201; Höffding, Psychologie in Umrissen (2nd ed.), p. 380.

[67]. Freud und Leid des Menschengeschlechts (1883), pp. 35 et seq.

[68]. Lange’s book On the Emotions first appeared in Danish, and has been translated into German (1887) by Dr. Kurella, and into French (1895) by Dr. G. Dumas. W. James first explained his theory in an article in Mind (1884), and subsequently in his Principles of Psychology (1890), vol. ii. chap. xxv.

[69]. Since the publication of James’s book, Dr. Berkeley has reported, in Brain (iv. 1892), two cases of general anæsthesia, cutaneous and sensory: the subjects are apathetic, but the presence of shame, sorrow, surprise, fear, and repulsion (the last-named as a substitute for anger) has been observed. Dr. Sollier, in an article in the Revue Philosophique (March, 1894), has reported some experiments made on subjects in a profoundly hypnotic state, in whom the peripheral and visceral sensibility had been abolished by suggestion. He comes to the same conclusions as James and Lange.

[70]. Vide infra, part ii. chap. vii.

[71]. G. Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, pp. 46 et seq.

[72]. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, 4th (German) ed., chap. xx.; Külpe, Grundriss der Psychologie, p. 250 (English edition), § 38; Sully, Sensation and Intuition, Part II.; Grant Allen, Mind, July 1879 (“The Origin of the Sense of Symmetry”).

[73]. They will be found in Beauquier, Philosophie de la musique, p. 65.

[74]. For details on this point, Wallaschek’s interesting work on Primitive Music should be consulted.

[75]. Beauquier, op. cit., p. 56.

[76]. Gurney, in a criticism of James’s hypothesis (Mind, ix. 425), says: “There is plenty of music from which I have received as much emotion in silent representation” [i.e., by purely internal audition, or merely reading the notes] “as when presented by the finest orchestra; but it is with the latter condition that I almost exclusively associate the cutaneous tingling and hair-stirring.” Professor James has, in my opinion, answered this objection (Psychology, ii. pp. 469, 470), which I should be inclined to refer to the problem of the “revivability of impressions,” to be examined later on.

[77]. I may indicate, somewhat at random, the principal documents for this controversy: Wundt, Philosophische Studien, vi. 3, p. 349 (he criticises Lange only); Gurney, Mind, July 1884; Marshall, ib., October 1884; Stanley, ib., January 1886; Worcester, Monist, January 1893; Psychological Review, September and November 1894, January 1895, etc.

[78]. “Though written in the earliest days of modern science, this work will bear comparison with anything that has been produced in recent years. It will be difficult, indeed, to find any treatment of the emotions much superior to it in originality, thoroughness, and suggestiveness. The position maintained is similar to that now held by Professor James, but Descartes does not content himself with defending in a general way the assertion that emotion is caused by physical change. After coming to the conclusion that there are six passions from which all the others are derived, he attempts to show that a special set of organic effects is concerned in the production of each of these primary states.”—D. Irons in Philosophical Review, May 1895, p. 291.

[79]. “When any great passion causes all the physical and moral troubles which it will cause, what I conceive to happen is that a physical impression made on the sense of sight or of hearing is propagated along a physical path to the brain, and arouses a physical commotion in its molecules; that from this centre of commotion the liberated energy is propagated by physical paths to other parts of the brain; and that it is finally discharged outwardly through proper physical paths, either in movements or in modifications of secretion and nutrition. The passion that is felt is the subjective side of the cerebral commotion—its motion out from the physical basis, as it were (e-motion), into consciousness.”—Pathology of Mind, 1879, p. 222.

[80]. In his lectures on Hysteria (Vol. i., Lecture 21), Pitres incidentally inquires into the existence of encephalic centres of the affective states, and concludes that “the molecular changes corresponding to the activity of the cellular elements shaken by the passions, radiate in every direction, stimulate or depress the excitability of adjacent elements, rebound on the motor and sensitive centres, and on the originatory nuclei of the visceral nerves, and finally determine the state of emotion, i.e., the psycho-physiological state which is the special expression of the reaction of the nervous centres to psychic excitations.”

[81]. Op. cit., pp. 490, 491.

[82]. For further details see Claude Bernard, La science expérimentale, Étude sur la physiologie du cœur, 1865, and Cyon’s Address to the Academy of St. Petersburg, “The Heart and the Brain,” translated in the Revue Scientifique, November 22nd, 1873. Also, Mosso, Sulla circolazione del sangue nel cervello (1880), and La Paura (Fear, English translation, 1896).

[83]. Kröner, Das körperliche Gefühl (Breslau, 1887), pp. 102-112.

[84]. Bouchard, Leçons sur les auto-intoxications; Leçons sur les maladies par ralentissement de nutrition. Régis, Traité des maladies mentales, pp. 112, 415, 423, etc. Féré, Pathologie des émotions, pp. 264, 495 et seq.

[85]. Lavater (1741-1801), Essai sur la physionomie destiné à faire connaître l’homme et à le faire aimer; Charles Bell (1806), Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression; Duchenne (1862), Mécanisme de la physionomie humaine, ou analyse électro-physiologique de l’expression des passions. For ancient works on physiognomy, consult Mantegazza’s book on Physiognomy and Expression (Contemporary Science Series).

[86]. Duchenne has the following curious passage:—"The Creator, not being obliged to study mechanical requirements, was able, according to His wisdom or (if I may be pardoned for using this form of expression) by a Divine fantasy, to put in action this or that muscle—a single one, or several at once, when it was His will that the signs of the passions, even the most evanescent, should be temporarily inscribed on the human countenance. This physiognomic language once created, it was sufficient, in order to render it universal and immutable, to give to every human being the instinctive faculty of always expressing his feelings by the contraction of the same muscles." Thus, for this writer, the question remains within the region of first causes. He has ascertained a relation of coexistence between a determinate emotion and certain movements of the muscles, but without seeking the reason and the natural explanation of this nexus. We know that certain philosophers hold the theory of the Divine institution of language; this is its equivalent, being a theory of a divinely instituted gesture-language.

[87]. L. Dumont, Théorie scientifique de la sensibilité, chap. vi. p. 236. Fouillée, Psychologie des idées-forces, i. 467, admits Darwin’s principle, but interprets it in another way.

[88]. Principles of Psychology, vol. ii. p. 545.

[89]. Physiologische Psychologie, vol. ii. chap. xxii. He has also treated the question in a special collection of articles entitled Essays.

[90]. For a historical summary of these classifications, consult especially Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii., Appendix F, p. 357, and Bain, Emotions, Appendix B.

[91]. Beaunis, Sensations internes, chap. xxi.

[92]. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 76.

[93]. H. Spencer, Essays, vol. i. (Library Ed., 1891), pp. 241-264.

[94]. The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), pp. 279-364.

[95]. See Part II., [chap. vii].

[96]. I see no reason for mentioning any authorities except H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, i., §§ 69 and 96; Bain, Emotions, ch. v.; W. James, Psychology, ii. pp. 474, 475; Fouillée, Psychologie des Idées-forces; Höffding, Psychologie (3rd German edition), vi., B. 3; Lehmann, Hauptgesetze, pp. 261-263.

[97]. See Von Vintschgau, art. “Geruch” and “Geschmack” in Hermann’s Handbuch der Physiologie, vol. iii.; Gley, art. “Gustation”; François-Franck, art. “Olfaction” in the Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences médicales.

[98]. Hack Tuke, Influence of Mind upon the Body, p. 181, where other facts of the same kind may be found.

[99]. Galton, in a note entitled “Arithmetic by Smell,” has described an arrangement by means of which he convinced himself that some arithmetical operations can be carried out by the help of olfactory images, as is done by means of visual and auditory representations. He trains himself to regard two whiffs of peppermint as equivalent to one of camphor, and three of peppermint with one of carbolic acid; he performs small additions, and, later on, operates with images only (visual and auditory representations being excluded). For details, see Psychological Review, January 1894.

[100]. The memory of internal sensations, though distinct from that of states of feeling properly so called, approximates so closely to it that the two subjects appear to me inseparable.

[101]. A great swimmer has had feelings of suffocation which he can recall with much vividness.

[102]. Fouillée, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 200, 201.

[103]. Revue positive, 1877, p. 660.

[104]. A characteristic peculiar to emotional affective revivability is the slowness with which it develops and the time required. While the visual or auditory image may be called up instantaneously and at command, the emotional representation arises slowly. This is because it passes through two stages. The first (intellectual) consists in the evocation of conditions and circumstances—a toothache, a burn, a passion. Many do not get beyond this stage, and the concomitant emotional tone, accordingly, is faint, or even nil. The second or emotional stage adds to this the rise of states of excitement and exultation, or of dejection and lowered vitality. The latter requires organic conditions, a difference in the organism, an excitement of the motor, vascular, respiratory, secretory, and other centres.

[105]. This opinion will be discussed later on.

[106]. Psychology, ii. 474.

[107]. Mémoires, vol. i. p. 77. The italics are not in the original.

[108]. This has recently been experimentally demonstrated; the observations made by Dr. Toulouse (with the assistance of specialists) on M. Zola may be specially mentioned. In this case the coincidence of a somewhat low degree of sensory acuteness with a very high degree of delicacy and precision in revived sensory impression was found not only in the case of vision, but especially in that of smell. (Toulouse, Emile Zola: Enquête Médico[Médico]-psychologique, 1896, pp. 164, 173, 179, 206.)—Ed.

[109]. This chapter was first published in the Revue Philosophique for October 1894. It called forth some new communications, two only of which have been added to the original text. The affirmation of a type of affective memory has, as I expected, provoked both criticism and denial. My principal opponent, Prof. Titchener, has published on this subject a somewhat extensive article in the Philosophical Review (November 1895), in which he reproaches me with not having cited a single case of pure emotional memory—i.e., memory from which all sensory and ideational elements are absent, and where there is a revival of feeling as such. An example of this kind, which should be quite conclusive, seems to me almost impossible to produce. A pleasure, a pain, an emotion, are always associated with a sensation, a representation, or an act; revival necessarily bringing back the intellectual state which forms part of the complexus and supports it. But the real question is elsewhere: Is revival, in certain persons at least, a dry record, or a felt state? In this last case—and it does occur—there is the recollection of the emotional state as such.

There is another objection: Can it be said that an emotion is the reproduction of an antecedent emotion, and not a new emotion? The reproduction of an emotion can itself be nothing other than an emotion, but it bears the marks of repetition. Without returning to what has been said above, I remark that those contemporary psychologists, who study with admirable patience the mechanism of memory, neglect that of its most general conditions. Now the chief of these is that every recollection must be a reversion, by virtue of which, the past once more becoming a present, we live at present in the past. The recollection of an emotion as such does not escape the action of this law; it must become actual once more—must be a real emotion, whether acute or obtuse.

Taking account of the criticisms, and of the new material supplied to me, I may once again sum up my inquiry thus—

1. The emotional memory is nil in the majority of people.

2. In others there is a half intellectual, half emotional memory, i.e., the emotional elements are only revived partially and with difficulty, by the help of the intellectual states associated with them.

3. Others, and these the least numerous, have a true—i.e., complete—emotional memory; the intellectual element being only a means of revival which is rapidly effaced.

[110]. I may specially mention Horwicz, Psychologische Analysen, vol. i. pp. 160 et seq., 265-331, 369 et seq.; Fouillée, Psychologie des idées-forces, vol. i. pp. 221 et seq.; J. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. pp. 76-80; Shadworth Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 266; W. James, Psychology, i. 571; Höffding, Psychologie (2nd ed.), p. 331.

[111]. Shadworth Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 266; quoted by W. James, i. 572.

[112]. Biographia Litteraria, chap. vii. p. 61 (Bohn’s ed.); quoted by James, i. 572.

[113]. A Chapter on some Organic Laws of Personal and Ancestral Memory, 1875.

[114]. Principles of Psychology, i., § 214.

[115]. Hauptgesetze, etc., pp. 268, 250-357; Sully, The Human Mind, ii. 78; cf. Outlines of Psychology, p. 349.

[116]. The Human Mind, ii. 79.

[117]. This point has been well treated by Lehmann, op. cit., p. 244.

[118]. The mechanism of the suppression of the presentative intermediary between the initial state A and the distant states O, II, I, etc., has been studied by J. Sully (ii. 79). I do not insist on this point, which belongs rather to the psychology of association than to that of the emotions.

[119]. Th. Flournoy, Des phénomènes de Synopsie (1893), p. 20.

[120]. Suarez de Mendoza, L’audition colorée (1890), pp. 58, 59.

[121]. Leçons cliniques sur l’hystérie et l’hypnotisme, vol. ii., lecture 39. Here will be found the historical part of the subject (Braid, Chambard, Féré) and the personal observations of the author.

[122]. Sommer (Zeitschrift für Psychologie, vol. ii.) reports an observation on an aphasic patient, which admits of an analogous interpretation.

[123]. Among the causes which have given some impulse to the psychology of the feelings during the last half of this century, Ladd (Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 163, 164) mentions: (1) the theory of evolution, because the affective phenomena are fundamental and permanent, and men differ from one another far less in their appetites, emotions, and passions than in their ideas and thoughts; and because this doctrine affirms that, underlying the highest forms of feeling, there is always some instinctive tendency; and (2) the literary and artistic movement which began with J. J. Rousseau, and asserts itself more and more in the Wagnerian music and the modern novel, and which should invite psychologists to attempt its analysis. It would be well to add the contemporary sociological studies which have shown the important part played by emotional elements, simple or complex, deliberately eliminated by the economists from their theories of social organisation.

[124]. For further details, see my Hérédité psychologique, Bk. I. chap. v. and Bk. III. chap. iii. Bain has discussed the question at great length from the strictly psychological point of view (The Emotions, chap. ii.). He inclines to a “probability” of transmission in certain cases.

[125]. The discussion is to be found in his Civilisation in England (vol. i., chap. iv.). It may be summed up in the very questionable sentence quoted by him from Cuvier, “Le bien qu’on fait aux hommes, quelque grand qu’il soit, est toujours passager; les vérités qu’on leur laisse sont éternelles.” He thus counts for nothing the institutions which have arisen from an original effort, a new growth of moral sentiment. The saying is a purely academic aphorism.

[126]. Höffding, Psychologie (4th edit., German translation, 1893), pp. 411-412, where this point is briefly but ably treated.

[127]. James, Psychology, ii. pp. 403-440.

[128]. Brugia, Patologia della cenestesia (1893).

[129]. I must here repeat Briquet’s remark on this point: “However strange these appetites may appear, their origin can frequently be discovered. Thus a young woman, who would greedily devour the embers of her foot-warmer, told me that she had, from the beginning, been fond of the crust of bread; from this she came to like the crust of toasted bread, then charred bread, and so gradually acquired the taste for small pieces of charcoal. I am inclined to think that, were we to inquire into the origin of many of these strange tastes, we should find it as simple as the above.” Pierre Janet (État mental des hystériques, ii. p. 71) transcribes this passage, and adds, “I have often followed this advice and been in a position to appreciate its value.” This psychological inquiry is very ingenious, but only removes the difficulty a stage further back. It shows us through what series of associations the final result is attained; but association alone is not sufficient to arrive at this result, still less to render it permanent. It is only the external mechanism which explains, at the utmost, why the deviation should have taken this particular direction. Many persons are fond of crust, even of burnt crust, who will never come to have the slightest appetite for charcoal. Many have eaten charcoal out of curiosity, or by accident, but without acquiring a taste for it. It is some deeper and more powerful cause than association which lies at the root of these feelings and renders them active.

[130]. For details, see Campbell “On the Appetite in Insanity,” in the Journal of Mental Science, July 1886, pp. 193 et seq., and Belmondo, “Pervertimenti dell’istinto di nutrizione,” in Tamburini’s Rivista, 1888, pp. 1 et seq., where is cited the case of an insane patient in whose stomach were found 1841 objects, such as nails, bits of lead, and the like, weighing in all eleven (English) pounds, ten ounces.

[131]. “On the Causes of Disgust,” in L’Homme et l’Intelligence, pp. 41-84.

[132]. J. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 91. The reader should also consult Mosso’s well-known monograph on Fear (English tr.), and Bain, The Emotions, ch. viii. Fear has been tolerably well studied. The absence of monographs concerned with the other emotions is another proof that emotional psychology is yet in its infancy, whereas for the memory, perceptions, images, etc., we find, on the contrary, a large number of special studies on special points.

[133]. Die Seele des Kindes, chap. vii.

[134]. Since the above was written the same conclusion has been reached by Professor Stanley Hall in a report founded on a statistical inquiry into the fears (some 6500 in number) of 1700 children and young persons. He concludes that “we must assume the capacity to fear or to anticipate pain, and to associate it with certain objects and experiences, as an inherited Anlage, often of a far higher antiquity than we are wont to appeal to in psychology.” He considers that such fears are analogous to rudimentary physical organs, though they still retain a certain use. (“A Study of Fears,” American Journal of Psychology, vol. viii., No. 2, 1897.)—Ed.

[135]. J. Sully, op. cit., ii. 91.

[136]. Dégénérescence et Criminalité, pp. 28 sqq., with the illustrative figures.

[137]. Gélineau, Des peurs maladives, p. 34; see also pp. 18, 109, 126, 169, etc.

[138]. Many “phobias” seem to me fresh proofs in favour of the existence of a true emotional memory.

[139]. Fear, chap. xi.

[140]. See a curious case in Gélineau, op. cit., p. 99.

[141]. For detailed descriptions see Darwin, chap. x.; Lange, op. cit.; Mantegazza, op. cit., chap. xiii. The latter transcribes the picture drawn by Seneca in his De Ira, and is of opinion—in which I agree with him—that it is traced by a master hand.

[142]. Tamburini distinguishes three kinds of fixed ideas: simple, emotive, and impulsive, according as the obsession determines forced attention, a state of anguish, or an action.

[143]. Morel, Maladies mentales, pp. 420 et seq.

[144]. The psychology of imitation does not form part of our subject. Baldwin has made an excellent study of it (Mental Development in the Child and Race, pp. 263-366). He defines it as "a sensori-motor reaction, which finds its differentia in the single fact that it imitates; that is, its peculiarity is found in the locus of its muscular discharge. It is what I have called a ‘circular activity’ on the bodily side,—brain-state due to stimulating conditions, muscular reaction which reproduces or retains the stimulating conditions,—same brain-state again, due to same stimulating conditions, and so on." Imitation appears early in the child, at fifteen weeks (Preyer) or four months (Darwin). Are we to consider it as an instinct? Popular opinion is inclined to do so, as are also several psychologists—Stricker, James, and others. The contrary is maintained by Preyer, Bain, Sully, and Baldwin—a view I am myself inclined to take. Imitation does not present the true characteristics of an instinct; it is not adapted at the first attempt; it gropes its way, it is tentative, it fails again after success, it retrogrades, or progresses but slowly. It is an ideo-motor reflex; it takes its place above instinct (a blind and innate tendency inferior to the voluntary activity for which it prepares the way), because it is the first attempt at convergence towards an end.

[145]. Principles of Psychology, vol. iv. p. 565.

[146]. The point has been very well treated by this author (The Emotions, chap. vii. p. 127). See also Mantegazza, chap. xi. Lange does not mention it.

[147]. Sully, The Human Mind, ii. pp. 104, 105.

[148]. For these facts see Romanes, Mental Evolution, chap, xx., and Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life, pp. 397, 398.

[149]. Bain, Emotions, chap. vi. p. 111.

[150]. The pathology of tender emotion does not offer sufficient interest to detain us. The altruistic tendency may be totally wanting in certain hypochondriac and demented patients, who, entrenched in an impenetrable egoism, have undergone a real “moral ossification.” Tenderness may become sentimentality towards persons, animals (zoophily), and things (nostalgia), etc. Morel (Études cliniques, vol. ii. sec. 4) quotes the case of a man of high intellectual capacity, in whom the most futile and ridiculous causes excited absurd accès de sensibilité. “The loss of domestic animals which he had reared threw him into a state of bewilderment and convulsions of tears, as if it had been the death of his best friends. I saw him one day almost delirious with grief at the death of one of the numerous frogs which he kept in his garden.” This morbid emotivity, coinciding with congenital or acquired weakness, and with convalescence or other adynamic states, throws into relief, by its exaggerated character, that state of relaxation which is, as we have seen, one of the principal marks of the tender emotion.

[151]. See Darwin (chap. xi.) and Mantegazza (chap. xiv.).

[152]. Consult James, Psychology, ii. 305, 329; Bain, Emotions, chap. x., xi.; J. Sully, Psychology, ii. 97 et seq.

[153]. For details on this point the reader should consult Ireland, The Blot on the Brain, p. 88 (where he will find a study of the Cæsars, the Hindoo Sultans, Ivan the Terrible, etc.), and Jacoby, Études sur la sélection et l’hérédité.

[154]. Dagonet, Traité des maladies mentales, pp. 360 et seq.

[155]. Among the very copious existing literature on suicide I must mention Morselli’s monograph, Il Suicidio, in which the various causes—cosmic, ethnic, social, biological, and psychological—are studied in great detail. His principal theoretical conclusions are—(1) Among all civilised nations suicide increases more rapidly than the geometrical ratio of the population and the general mortality; (2) suicides are in inverse proportion to homicides at any given time or in any given country. This last “law” has been strongly contested by Tarde and others.

[156]. For further details see my Hérédité psychologique, Part I., chap. viii.

[157]. M. Pierre Janet mentions the case of a woman in whom “the family feelings, the affective emotions, modesty, and the sensitiveness of the genital organs appeared and disappeared simultaneously.” He adds: “Which of these phenomena brings the others in its train? Is genital sensibility a centre round which other psychological syntheses are constructed? I draw no conclusion.”—État mental des Hystériques, i. pp. 217, 218.

[158]. This psychological thesis has been maintained, in all its rigour, by Delbœuf: “That girl and that young man, in being attracted to one another, obey the will, unknown to both, of a spermatozoid, an ovule. But it may be taken as certain that this will is not unknown either to the spermatozoid or the ovule; both know what they want, and seek it. To this end they give their orders to their respective brains through the medium of the heart, and the brain obeys without knowing why. Sometimes it imagines that it has been convinced by reason and explains its own choice to itself. At bottom it has been but an unconscious instrument in the hand of an imperceptible workman who knew both what he wanted and what he was doing.” (Revue philosophique, March 1891, p. 257.)

[159]. Principles of Psychology, vol. i., § 215.

[160]. For some curious observations on this point see especially Moreau (of Tours), Psychologie morbide, pp. 264-278.

[161]. See Danville, Psychologie de l’amour, ch. vi., for a detailed discussion of this question, which the author also answers in the negative.

[162]. Dallemagne, Dégénérés et Déséquilibrés, p. 327.

[163]. Traité des Passions, sec. 69.

[164]. As all the emotions to be enumerated in this chapter have been already—or are about to be—studied separately, they will only be mentioned briefly, by way of example, and in order to illustrate the work of the mind in the creation of composite forms.

[165]. Sibbern’s Psychologie (1856), having been published in Danish, is only known to me through extracts quoted by his compatriots, Höffding (Psychologie, 2nd German ed., pp. 330, 331) and Lehmann (Hauptgesetze, pp. 247 et seq.). These two authors may also be consulted with advantage on this question.

[166]. Sergi, Piacere e Dolore, pp. 210 et seq.

[167]. W. James, Psychology, ii. pp. 435-437.

[168]. For the general study of this question see Espinas, Les Sociétés Animales, 2nd ed. (1878), and Ed. Perrier, Les Colonies Animales.

[169]. For a detailed study of this question see Espinas, Les Sociétés Animales (2nd ed.), pp. 334 et seq., 411 et seq., 444 et seq.

[170]. Bain, The Emotions, p. 140.

[171]. Espinas, Les Sociétés Animales, pp. 444 et seq.

[172]. For the theories on this matter see Espinas, pp. 401 et seq.

[173]. Descent of Man, chap. iii. See also Espinas, op. cit., sec. iv.

[174]. Herbert Spencer, Psychology, ii. § 503 et seq.

[175]. Houssay, Revue philosophique, May 1893, p. 487.

[176]. Mutterrecht, pp. 17-19. See also his interpretation of the myths of Orestes and Bellerophon as expressing the triumph of the patriarchate, p. 85.

[177]. Starcke, La famille primitive, p. 116.

[178]. “The Australians attribute the death of their friends to spells cast by some neighbouring tribe; for this reason they consider it a sacred obligation to avenge the death of a relative by killing a member of the tribe in question. A native having lost one of his wives, announced his intention of going to kill a woman belonging to a distant tribe. The magistrate told him that if he committed this act, he would be confined in prison for the rest of his life. He therefore did not start on his journey; but, month by month, he wasted away: remorse preyed on his mind, he could neither sleep nor eat; the ghost of his wife haunted him, reproaching him with his negligence. One day he disappeared; a year later he came back, having accomplished his duty” (Guyau, Esquisse d’une Morale, etc., p. 109). Here we have an example of instinctive morality and rational immorality. It should be noted that in this work Guyau has returned to the view of the moral instinct, adopted by him, after having previously criticised it, in his Morale Anglaise (III. chap. iv.).

[179]. Friedmann, “Genesis of Disinterested Benevolence,” Mind, vol. i. (1878), p. 404.

[180]. About 1820, during the time of scarcity consequent on Tshaka’s wars, certain of the Natal tribes (the natives say, at the suggestion of a chief named Umdava) adopted the practice of cannibalism. It was abandoned when food again became plentiful, and has always been regarded with great horror; those individuals who had acquired such a taste for human flesh as to prefer it to other food, fled into the recesses of the Drakensberg and Maluti mountains. Moshesh, the great Basuto chief, directed his efforts for years to the extirpation of the practice, though unwilling to do so, as his advisers desired, by means of a summary massacre of the offenders. The Amazimu (Modimo) are now a myth to both Zulus and Basutos; indeed the word, as now used, is frequently synonymous with “ogre.” It is to be noted that Moshesh was not in any way acting under European influence, in fact the last of the cannibals had disappeared long before the country came under British rule, and though the memory of their atrocities was still fresh when the French missionaries arrived in 1833, the chief had already been proceeding against them for some time. See Casalis, Les Bassoutos.

[181]. Staniland Wake, Evolution of Morality, vol. i. pp. 427 et seq. To be consulted for facts of this kind.

[182]. Letourneau, L’évolution juridique chez les différents peuples.

[183]. “Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam quæ extra fines cujusque civitatis fiunt.”—De Bell. Gall., vi. 21.

[184]. It should perhaps be added that the more scientific writers on criminal anthropology do not regard the chief causes suggested above as rival theories, but rather as factors which may co-operate to produce criminality, the biological factor (heredity, arrest of development, infantilism, etc.) acting as predisposing cause, the sociological factor as exciting cause.—Ed.

[185]. According to Krafft-Ebing, Lehrbuch (vol. i., sec. 2, chap, iii.), Regiomontanus already maintained, in 1513, that depravity is quite independent of the accurate knowledge of good and evil; he attributed this anomaly to the influence of the planet Venus.

[186]. Especially Despine, Psychologie naturelle (ii. pp. 169 et seq.), and Maudsley, Pathology of Mind.

[187]. Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, art. “Criminal Anthropology.” Here it is stated that, at Elmira, 34 per cent. criminals on admission exhibit entire absence of moral susceptibility; while (according to Dr. Salsotto, at Turin) in 130 women guilty of murder, or complicity in murder, genuine remorse was only observed in 6.

[188]. Since the above was written two lengthy and valuable studies of the psychology of religion, and more especially of the phenomena of “conversion,” have been published by Leuba and Starbuck, largely inspired by Prof. Stanley Hall (Am. Jour. Psych., 1896-97). Both these studies are founded on original data, in part obtained by a questionnaire.—Ed.

[189]. Max Müller, Origin and Development of Religion (Hibbert Lectures), p. 227.

[190]. For a discussion of this point see Goblet d’Alviella, L’idée de Dieu, pp. 60 et seq.

[191]. Goblet d’Alviella, op. cit., p. 50.

[192]. Principles of Sociology, vol. i. pp. 130-142.

[193]. For the facts see Goblet d’Alviella, op. cit., p. 178.

[194]. Goblet d’Alviella, ib., pp. 176-198.

[195]. For details, consult Tiele, Manuel de l’histoire des Religions, Goblet d’Alviella, pp. 153-163. “The divine feudality is the primordial fact in Egyptian religion, as political feudality is the primordial fact of Egyptian history” (Maspero, Histoire Ancienne).

[196]. The theory of do ut des is expressed with naïve completeness in a Brahmanic hymn. “Well filled, O spoon [of the sacrifice], fly down; well filled, return. As having agreed on a price, let us make exchanges of strength and vigour. Give me, I give to thee; bring to me, I bring to thee.” Better still: "If thou wilt injure any one, say to Surya: ‘Strike such an one, and I will make thee an offering,’ and Surya, to obtain the offering, will strike him." (Barth, Les Religions de l’Inde, pp. 25, 26.)

[197]. This prayer will be found in full in Maspero, op. cit. (4th ed.), p. 38.

[198]. For many original and quoted observations showing the close connection between the sexual and religious emotions, see the recent series of valuable papers by Vallon and Marie, “Des Psychoses Religieuses,” Archives de Neurologie, 1897.—Ed.

[199]. For this discussion, Tylor, Primitive Culture, I. xi., and Réville, Religions des Peuples non Civilisés, i., pp. 10 et seq., may be consulted.

[200]. Hack Tuke says he has met with only a single case among Catholics. (Dict. of Psychol. Medicine, Art. “Religious Insanity.”)

[201]. For some recent observations see Krafft-Ebing, op. cit., vol. ii. § 1; Dagonet, Maladies mentales, pp. 321 et seq.

[202]. For further details respecting ecstasy I refer the reader to my Maladies de la volonté, ch. v., and to Godfernaux, Le Sentiment et la Pensée, p. 49. Purely medical works contain little that is instructive with regard to the psychology of this state; the works of the mystics themselves may be studied with far more profit.

[203]. This theory of play, however, appears, from recent researches, to be of English origin, and due to Home (1696-1782), so that, when taken up again by Herbert Spencer (Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., last chapter), it would seem only to have returned to its original home.

[204]. In a recent book, very rich in observations on the play of animals (Die Spiele der Thiere, 1896, the only existing monograph on the subject), Groos substitutes for the thesis of a superabundance of energy that of a primary instinct, of which play, in all its forms, is the expression. I cannot see that the two theses exclude one another. Some base their argument on external manifestations. Groos connects them with an instinct—i.e., a motor disposition sui generis. I am inclined to take Groos’s view, the more so as the fundamental idea of the present work is that of finally reducing the affective life to the sum of a set of tendencies fixed in the organisation.

For the rest, the psychology of play is still awaiting treatment in its totality. The word, in fact, denotes several entirely different psychical manifestations. In its first stage, it is unconscious in its origin, spontaneous, an expenditure for the mere pleasure of spending; but, however disinterested in its source and its aim, it is useful; in children, play is often a form of imitation, often a form of experimentation, an attempt at easy and unconstrained exploration of beings and things. In the second stage, it has become reflective; pleasure is sought for its own sake, and with full consciousness of the reason; it is a complex state formed by the fusion of variable elements. In a special study, which, however, is merely tentative (Die Reize des Spieles, 1883), Lazarus adopts the following classification: (a) games connected with physical activity, (b) the attraction of all kinds of spectacles, (c) intellectual games, (d) games of chance. This last item alone might well prove a tempting one to a psychologist. It has a quasi-passive, somewhat blunted form, being what Pascal called a diversion (that which turns aside, distracts), a way of pretending to work, or filling up the blanks of existence, of “killing time.” It has an active form, the gambling passion, whose tragedy is as old as humanity, and which is made up of attraction towards the unknown and the hazardous, of daring, of emulation, of the desire of victory, the love of gain, and the fascination of acquiring wealth wholesale, instantaneously, without effort. These and other elements show that, in play as in love, it is complexity which produces intensity. The absence of any complete first-hand studies on this subject shows once more the scarcity of monographs relating to the psychology of the feelings.

[205]. For a detailed criticism of this view, see Guyau’s Problèmes de l’esthétique contemporaine, p. 12. This writer, afraid of dilettantism, substituted for the theory of play that of life, as a source of art. I do not see what is to be gained by substituting a vague formula for a definite one. Moreover, are not all emotions connected with life?

[206]. We must except Sergi, from whom I have borrowed the above definition. In his Psychologie Physiologique, Bk. IV., chap. vi., sec. 374, he gives some interesting historical details.

[207]. Weismann, Essais sur l’hérédité (French ed., p. 475); Wallace, Darwinism, chap. xv. Before these, Schneider (Freud und Leid, pp. 28, 29), an adherent of the English theory of the inherent uselessness of the æsthetic activity, has tried to connect it with the conservation of the individual and the species by an extremely bold and problematical hypothesis resting on heredity. If we experience different feelings before a stormy sea, or a calm, blue lake, covered with boats, or a vast plain, or snow-covered mountains, “it is because our feelings are those of primitive man, when he lived really in the midst of nature and had to wrest his daily bread from it. Through countless generations our ancestors, on finishing their daily task, in the evening have thought with satisfaction of the work accomplished; it was in this frame of mind that they looked on the approach of evening and the sunset. Why does a landscape representing it produce on us an impression of repose and peace? We have no other answer than this: for countless generations past the evening sky has been associated with the consciousness of work finished and a feeling of rest and satisfaction.” Apart from its extreme flimsiness, this hypothesis would not be applicable to all the arts.

[208]. Wallaschek, Primitive Music, chap. x., which may be consulted for details.

[209]. Die Anfänge der Kunst (1894). This book, extremely lucid and interesting, full of ethnographic documents and general considerations, may be consulted with great advantage on the question of the beginnings of art. On the special point which occupies us, see pp. 191 et seq.

[210]. For a historical survey of the question see Grosse, Anfänge der Kunst, pp. 12 et seq.

[211]. Letourneau, L’évolution littéraire chez les différents peuples, p. 66, a work which may be consulted for documentary evidence.

[212]. Quoted by Grosse (p. 48), who gives an acute criticism of this view, rightly pointing out that a strictly individualistic art is “neither thinkable nor discoverable.”

[213]. Grant Allen (Mind, xx., Oct. 1880) points out that Homer describes beautiful districts as “fertile,” “rich in wheat,” “horse-feeding,” etc. He heard a peasant in the neighbourhood of Hyères praising the magnificence of a cultivated plain covered with vegetables, while showing the greatest contempt for a picturesque bit of woodland. An American visiting England said, “Your country, sir, is very beautiful. In many parts you may go for miles together and never see a tree except in a hedge.” Any one who has had much to do with the peasantry could quote hundreds of remarks similar to the above.

[214]. See Spencer, Essays, i. 434, 435.

[215]. Mind, 1880, p. 445.

[216]. I shall be pardoned for introducing the following passage from Théophile Gautier; it is, under its humorous form, so just from a psychological point of view: “Ideals torment even the coarsest natures. The savage, when he tattooes himself, or smears his body with red and blue, or sticks a fish-bone through his nose, is only obeying a confused sense of the beautiful. He is seeking for something beyond what exists; he is trying to perfect his type, guided by a dim notion of art. The taste for ornament distinguishes man from brute more clearly than any other peculiarity. No dog ever thought of putting rings into his ears; and the stupid Papuans, who eat clay and earthworms, make themselves earrings of shells and coloured berries.”

[217]. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 144.

[218]. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 146.

[219]. Mind, October 1878.

[220]. The Human Mind, ii. p. 148.

[221]. Æsthetic activity is that form of play which uses images as its creative materials. It is generally admitted that visual and auditory perceptions or representations are the only ones which provoke æsthetic emotion; yet Guyau (followed perhaps by others) has maintained that we must attribute this power to all external sensations, without exception (Problèmes de l’esthétique contemporaine, chap. vi.), heat, cold, contacts, tastes, and odours; but the facts he enumerates are in most cases referable to association, especially where odours are concerned. The so-called lower sensations do not act directly, they only revive the representations of sight and hearing. A delicious coolness, a soft contact, an intoxicating odour produce an agreeable state—i.e., a physical pleasure, and nothing more, if there is no association. Besides, without entering into an idle and hair-splitting discussion, it is sufficient to observe that, as a matter of fact, there exists no art, in the æsthetic sense, based on any other sensations than those of sight and hearing, unless we are to look on perfumery and cookery as such.

Why is this privilege exclusively confined to two species of sensations? Various reasons have been given: because they are more remote from the life-serving functions with which the sensations of touch, taste, and smell are closely connected (II. Spencer); or because their pleasures and pains have, in general, a moderate character, and their special nerves are rarely subjected to a violent shock (Gurney); or, according to Grant Allen, because the nerves of the lower senses are excited in mass, and those of the higher by isolated fibres (? ?). It appears to me that one of the principal reasons has been forgotten. If we refer back to the inquiries detailed in Chap. IX. (Part I.) as to the olfactory and gustatory images, we shall see that they have their own peculiar characters. For visual and auditory images, revival and association are easy, whether simultaneously, in groups, or successively, in series. For images of smell and taste, it is quite the contrary; their revivability is feeble or nil, their power of association with each other nil. (The tactile-motor images form an intermediate group, but nearer to the lower senses.) These psychological conditions render them quite unsuitable for a place in a constructive scheme. Called up with great difficulty by the memory, incapable of being grouped, either in simultaneities or in series, they can supply neither an art in rest nor an art in movement.

[222]. Hobbes, Human Nature (2nd ed.), 1650.

[223]. Bain, The Emotions, p. 257.

[224]. Sully, Sensation and Intuition, p. 262; The Human Mind, i. p. 148.

[225]. “Physiology of Laughter,” Essays, vol. i. (1883) pp. 194 et seq.

[226]. Physiologie und Psychologie des Lachens und des Komischen (1873). For criticisms, see Léon Dumont, Theorie scientifique de la sensibilité, p. 211; Piderit, Mimik, pp. 138 et seq.

[227]. The only attempt in this direction I am acquainted with is Nordau’s book, Degeneration (Entartung), which is limited to the present day, and, moreover, treats of other questions as well.

[228]. There is, with regard to this point, a very complete observation of Grant Allen’s (“Note Deafness,” in Mind, iii. 1878). The subject, a young man of great intellectual cultivation, had studied music during his childhood without result. It was discovered, later on, that he was incapable of distinguishing one note from another, except at intervals which were sometimes as much as an octave, or even more. He was quite unconscious of harmonies and discords, or the timbre of instruments. The distinctive features of the latter were, for him, only clearly perceived noises of different kinds—a sound of wire-work for the piano, a scraping for the violin, a puff of air for the organ. He was very sensitive to the rhythm of poetry. It is not known whether anomalies of this kind originate in Corti’s organs or in the cerebral centres.

[229]. Bain, The Emotions, ch. iv. pp. 85, 86; Sully, Psychology, vol. ii. p. 126.

[230]. Descartes, Traité des Passions, Part ii., § 70.

[231]. I have given further details on this point in my Psychologie de l’attention.

[232]. See for facts as to the curiosity of animals, Romanes, Mental Evolution, pp. 283-351.

[233]. Principles of Sociology, i. pp. 98, 99.

[234]. Psychology, vol. ii. p. 131.

[235]. In the following, reported by a traveller, we have an instance of this spontaneous transition to disinterested curiosity, in the case of an intelligent Basuto. “Twelve years ago” [the man himself is speaking] “I went to feed my flocks. The weather was hazy. I sat down upon a rock and asked myself sorrowful questions; yes, sorrowful, because I was unable to answer them. Who has touched the stars with his hands? On what pillars do they rest? I asked myself. The waters are never weary; they know no other law than to flow without ceasing,—from morning till night, and from night till morning; but where do they stop? and who makes them flow thus? The clouds also come and go, and burst in water over the earth. Whence come they? Who sends them? The diviners certainly do not give us rain; for how could they do it? and why do I not see them with my own eyes, when they go up to heaven to fetch it? ... I cannot see the wind; but what is it? Who brings it, makes it blow? ... Then I buried my face in both my hands.”—Quoted by Vignoli, Mito e Scienza, p. 63. This passage is from The Basutos, by the French missionary Casalis (p. 239).

[236]. I give a specimen, choosing a classification which is neither one of the longest nor one of the shortest: (1) Emotions arising from logical relations (reasonable, unreasonable, contradictory, logical satisfaction, ignorance, the unknown, the hypothetical; possibility or impossibility of coming to a conclusion). (2) Emotions arising from relations of time (present, past, future, anticipation, hope, presentiment; feeling of the irremediable, of opportunity, of routine, etc.). (3) Emotions arising from relations of space (size, nearness, distance, etc.). (4) Emotions arising from relations of coexistence and non-existence, quantity, identity, etc. This is a much abridged catalogue; there are thirty-two subdivisions in all.

[237]. Quoted by Letourneau, Physiologie des Passions, p. 23.

[238]. See Hack Tuke’s Dictionary of Psych. Medicine, article, “Insanity of Doubt.” Analogous cases have been reported by various authors, Griesinger, Clouston, etc.

[239]. Two American psychologists, without mentioning the principal forms we have just studied, reckon among contemporary aberrations of the intellectual feeling some tendencies which appear to me to be very slight infirmities by comparison: (1) “A more subtle form is that distinctively nineteenth-century disease, the love of culture, as such. When the feeling is directed, not towards objects, but towards the state of mind induced by the knowledge of the objects, there originates a love of knowing for the sake of the development of the mind itself. The knowledge is acquired because it widens and expands self. Culture of our mental powers is made an end in itself, and knowledge of the universe of objects is subordinated to this. The intellectual feelings are separated from their proper place as functions of the integral life, and are given an independent place in consciousness. Here, as in all such cases, the attempt defeats itself. The only way to develop self is to make it become objective; the only way to accomplish this is to surrender the interests of the personal self. Self-culture reverses the process and attempts to employ self-objectification or knowledge as a mere means to the satisfaction of these personal interests. The result is that the individual never truly gets outside of himself” (Dewey, Psychology, pp. 305, 306). This criticism is just. We might say, more simply, that the pursuit of intellectual emotion for its own sake borders on scientific dilettantism—i.e., a superficial disposition and a tendency of the mind to run in every direction without going very deeply into anything. But we cannot reckon as morbid the love of abstract and purely speculative research; for in this the intellectual feeling remains faithful to its nature, i.e. curiosity, and its mission, i.e. the pursuit of truth. Besides, the speculations which in appearance are the most useless and merely theoretical, may some day show themselves in results susceptible of practical application. (2) Ladd, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 566 et seq., considers as a morbid form of the intellectual sentiment the personification of Science, which is so popular at the present day (in my opinion, it is rather a disease of thought, an instance of the incurable tendency of the human mind to realise abstractions and bow the knee before idols of its own fabrication), and also criticises the growing love of minutiæ and the obstinate pursuit of small facts. It must be acknowledged that this tendency sometimes becomes a nuisance in sciences founded on observation, experiment, or documents, and that those whose attention has been confined to this kind of work have a natural disposition to exaggerate its importance; but it is nevertheless necessary, and is the price paid for all progress in science. Each individual contributes in his degree and according to his strength; there is no architecture without labourers.

[240]. This chapter was published as an article in October 1893; it has been left unchanged as far as the main argument is concerned.

[241]. B. Perez, Le caractère de l’enfant à l’homme, chap. i. With this objective classification may be compared the work of graphologists and of those who have devoted themselves to the expression of the emotions.

[242]. Paulhan, Les caractères (1894); Fouillée[Fouillée], Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes, et les races (1895). These two works have appeared since the first publication of the present chapter.

[243]. Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, vol. iii.

[244]. I refer the reader to the brilliant chapter of Schopenhauer entitled “On the Primacy of Will,” while reminding him that, with this writer, “will” signifies tendency or feeling. (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, supplement to Book II., chap. xix.) I shall return to this subject in the Conclusion of this work.

[245]. Op. cit., supplement to Book III., chap. xxxi.

[246]. Need we recall the often-quoted cases of Francis Bacon, D’Alembert, etc.? On this point see Dr. Le Bon’s article in the Revue philosophique, vol. iv. p. 496.

[247]. Bain, Study of Character, p. 214.

[248]. Reproduced in extenso in Bain, The Will, p. 413 (chap. vii.).

[249]. “It has been asserted that every temperament is equal to every other, and that all are equally necessary to the progress of humanity: I do not believe this.”

[250]. “Le tempérament au point de vue psychologique et anthropologique,” a paper published (in French) in the Bulletins du Congrès International d’Anthropologie, iv. St. Petersburg, 1892, pp. 91-154.

[251]. Le Caractère dans les Maladies, p. 188 et seq.

[252]. Régis, Maladies mentales, p. 200.

[253]. Brain, No. 32, p. 570, and Brain Surgery (1863), chap. i.

[254]. I owe these observations to the kindness of Dr. Dumas, who collected them with a view to a special study of the decay of feeling.

[255]. “When the mind undergoes degeneration, the moral feeling is the first to show it, as it is the last to be restored when the disorder passes away; the latest and highest gain of mental evolution, it is the first to witness by its impairment to mental dissolution.... In undoing a mental organisation, nature begins by unravelling the finest, most delicate, most intricately woven, and last completed threads of her marvellously complex network. Were the moral sense as old and firmly fixed an instinct as the instinct to walk upright, or the more deeply planted instinct of propagation,—as many people in the presumed interests of morality have tried to persuade themselves and others that it is,—it would not be the first to suffer in this way when mental degeneration begins; its categorical imperative would not take instant flight at the first assault, but would assert its authority at a later period of the decline; but, being the last acquired and the least fixed, it is most likely to vary, not only ... in the pathological way of degeneracy, but also ... in physiological ways, according to the diversities of conditions in which it is placed.” (Maudsley, Body and Will, p. 266.)

[256]. Itard, Mémoire sur le sauvage de l’Aveyron, éd. Bourneville, pp. xlviii. sqq.

[257]. Ireland (Journal of Mental Science, July 1894) has published some observations which tend to favour the idea of this slow retrogression in dementia. He gives the case of a patient, sinking into dementia, who not only retained her musical ability, but could even pick up new tunes; and mentions cases where the patient, seated before a piano, could play old melodies though incapable of anything else. A girl, aged fourteen, became demented through brain fever and had ceased to speak, save a few words, but was still fond of music and would play fragments of tunes.[tunes.] Two lady patients, though incoherent in speech, played with great accuracy on the piano—one by ear only, the other from musical notes, although she was quite unable to read a book, etc. (Perhaps in this last case there was “word-blindness” applying to words only.)

[258]. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Part III., chap. xix.

[259]. Ethica, iii. prop. 9, schol.

Transcriber’s Note

The Index topics beginning with 'Su' preceded those 'St'. They have been moved to their proper position to avoid unnecessary confusion.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

[20.14][“]it is a violent and sustained desireAdded.
[49.13]sometimes in the other.[’/”]Replaced.
[106.7]The resea[r]ches of Boudet de ParisInserted.
[117.36](accord[ing] to Claude Bernard)Added.
[147.32][“]general lassitude, of a diffused kindAdded.
[167.3]revival of affective impressions[.]Added.
[170.n2.7]Emile Zola: Enquête M[e/é]dico-psychologiqueReplaced.
[196.26]consequent interstitial exchangesRemoved.
[236.2]organs assuag[e]ing assuaging painRemoved.
[278.3]question of the point of view[.]Added.
[336.23]exercised on this point[.]Added.
[384.n2.1]FoulléeInserted.
[434.n1.9]play fragments of tunes[.]Added.