CHAPTER XI
THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WAR
Mention has already been made that a large number of Germany's war books has emanated from the universities. Not the least important of these efforts is "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World War.")[[187]] Twenty well-known university professors have contributed to the work; the fact being emphasized that special facilities have been accorded to them by the German foreign office. For British readers the chapters by Professors Marcks and Oncken are the most interesting, viz., "England's Policy of Might" by the former, and "Events leading up to the War" and "The Outbreak of War" by the latter. They take up a fifth of the 686 pages of which the entire work consists.
[!-- Note Anchor 187 --][Footnote 187: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," herausgegeben von Otto Hintze, Friedrich Meinecke, Hermann Oncken und Hermann Schumacher. Leipzig und Berlin, 1915.]
The purpose of Professor Marcks' essay is to prove on historical and scientific lines the lessons which have been taught in German schools for nearly half a century, i.e., England is an astute but ruthless robber who respects no right, and no nation which stands in her way.
"England's modern history begins with the Tudors and her world policy with Elizabeth. First of all, England had to liberate herself, economically and politically, from a position of dependence on the other Powers; then she took up her particular attitude to the world. Her separation from the Roman Catholic Church was exceedingly rich in consequences; this step assigned to her a peculiar place in the camp of the nations, and exercised a deep influence upon her intellectual development. It gave her an impetus towards internal and external independence.
"But the determining factor for England's future was her insular position; this has been the case from the time Europe entered the ocean-period. Since the year 1600 England, by her commerce and politics, has influenced Europe from without, while she has maintained for herself a position of independence, and directed her energies across the ocean into the wide world. Successively she seized upon the Baltic, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became the merchant and shipbuilder for most of the European nations.
"The sea has given her everything—independence, security and prosperity—both in treasure and lands. The sea protected her and spared her the unpleasantness of mighty neighbours. It was the ocean which permitted free development to her internal life, parliament, government and administration, and saved her from the continental form of Government—a strong, armed monarchy.
"The sea has allowed the English to develop, undisturbed, the peculiarities of their race—personal energy, trained by contact with the ocean; personal freedom, favoured but not oppressed by the living organism of the State. The sea afforded them liberty of action in every direction without fear of attack from behind. Freed from the chains which bound Europe, England went out into the wide world.
"Yet she remained constantly associated with the continent, not only because Europe was her field of action. English statesmen have always seized upon every opportunity to influence European policy; at first this was from motives of defence, but afterwards from an ever-increasing spirit of aggression. The balance of power on the continent has always been one of the premises for England's security and existence.
"She is indebted to her insular position for the supreme advantage of being able to exercise her influence in Europe without allowing her forces to be tied to the continent; European countries were bound by their own conflicts and differences, enabling England to exert her influence upon them without active participation. England has become thoroughly accustomed to a state of affairs under which she has no neighbours and never permits any—not even on the sea. She has come to consider this her God-given prerogative.
"The barriers of geographical position which hampered other lands, nature did not impose upon England; the security afforded by her girdle of waves seemed as it were to impel her to strike out into the unbounded, and to look upon every obstacle as a wrong. There is a thread of daring lawlessness running through all England's world-struggles, through all periods of her history, right down to the present day.
"When England speaks of humanity she means herself; her cosmopolitan utterances refer to her own nationality. She forgets too easily that other nations have arisen on the earth who esteem their own distinguishing traits and are inspired by the ardent desire to uphold their own institutions, forms of Government and culture. England believes all too easily that the world's map should be all one colour. But the soul of the modern world demands variety."[[188]]
[!-- Note Anchor 188 --][Footnote 188: Ibid., 297 et seq.]
There is no important objection to raise against Professor Marcks' statement of English history and Britain's favoured position on the surface of the globe. Germany did not choose her own geographical situation in the world—it is hers by nature and the right of historical succession. Britain has never envied her or endeavoured to deprive her of the advantages consequent upon her "place in the sun."
Neither did the British select their island home; destiny and history were again the determining factors. But it would be a travesty of the truth to assert that Germany has not envied her that position, together with the advantages arising from it. Yet in the same degree as the inhabitants of these islands have used the "talents" entrusted to them through their favourable position, Germany's jealousy seems to have become more bitterly angry. By right of birth and national necessity Germany demands the domination of the Rhine, but she fails to recognize that right of birth and the demands of national existence compel Britain to claim the domination of the seas.
The remainder of Professor Marcks' essay is devoted to proving that "the freedom of our world requires that it shall not be so in future." Whatever motives actuated Germany in precipitating the war, this much is now evident—it is her supreme desire and the aim of her highest endeavour to destroy Britain's favoured situation and every advantage accruing to her from it.
To-day the issue is clear and simple for Germany—the annihilation of British power and influence in the world. Literally hundreds of German war books echo that cry, and, above all else, it is the hope of attaining this aim which has aroused the bitterest war fury in the entire German nation—man, woman and child. Reduced to first principles, this difference of geographical position and the varying advantages arising therefrom are the prime causes—if not the cause—of the present world-struggle.
It was solely the fear of perpetuating British supremacy[[189]] which has led Germany consistently to reject the extended hand of friendship. Standing side by side with Great Britain, either in friendship or alliance, Germany would have given her approval to Britain's historical position in the world. When this country departed from the policy of "splendid isolation" repeated attempts were made to establish more intimate relations with Germany (1898-1902).
[!-- Note Anchor 189 --][Footnote 189: Graf Ernst zu Reventlow: "Der Vampir des Festlandes ("England, the Vampire of the Continent"). Berlin, 1915, p. 117. "England's withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow herself to be employed against Russia. In Germany to-day, voices may be heard proclaiming that von Bülow chose wrongly in refusing England's offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friendship with iniquitous ingratitude. The latter represents the truth.
"But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in mind. The acceptance of Great Britain's offer would have placed a tie upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable. Germany would have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to fight British battles on the continent. Besides which the choice concerned Germany's world future, above all the development of the German war fleet.">[
But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes: "Germany refused the hand extended to her." Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists: "When the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has offered the hand of friendship to England."
It is only one more confirmation that the "law of necessity" is incompatible with the truth. The truth is that Germany preferred to drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her friendship. Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish her plans for unlimited naval expansion—which she believed to be the only means of destroying Britain's position, and with that resolution already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand: "I bide my time!"
Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme issue—and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day—is whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted by Germany. That is the one political thought which permeates German intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed to darken this issue.
Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in considerable detail, and to him the policy of ententes appears to be the main cause leading up to the world war. From this alone it is obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the ententes in themselves are results, not prime causes. The prime causes leading to these political agreements are to be found in Germany's attitude to the rest of Europe. In a word they were defensive actions taken by the Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.
German aggression consisted in committing herself to unlimited armaments, cherishing the irreconcilable determination to be the strongest European power. According to her doctrine of might, everything can be attained by the mightiest. British advances she answered with battleships, simultaneously provoking France and Russia by increasing her army corps. The balance of power in Europe, Germany declares to be an out-of-date British fad, invented solely in the interests of these islands.
In secret Germany has long been an apostate to the balance-of-power theory; the war has caused her to drop the mask, and it was without doubt her resolve never to submit to the chains of the balance in Europe, which forced three other States to waive their differences and form the Triple Entente. Simply stated this is cause and result. But Professor Oncken maintains—and in doing so he voices German national opinion—that the entire entente policy was a huge scheme to bring about Germany's downfall.
He goes further and proclaims that the Hague Conference (1907) was a British trick to place the guilt of armaments on Germany's shoulders. "England filled the world with disarmament projects so that afterwards, full of unction, she could denounce Germany as the disturber of the peace. At that time the Imperial Chancellor answered justly: 'Pressure cannot be brought to bear on Germany, not even moral pressure!'"[[190]] And in that sentence German obstinacy and sullen irreconcilability is most admirably expressed.
[!-- Note Anchor 190 --][Footnote 190: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 495.]
Having seen that Professor Oncken has failed to recognize the prime causes which provoked the entente policy, it is not surprising to find him equally in error when discussing the diplomatic clashes between the rival camps. The professor calls them Machtproben ("tests of power"); but how he can dare to state that these diplomatic trials of strength were engineered by Great Britain—remains his own secret.
"King Edward's meeting with the Czar at Reval in June, 1908, was followed by a far-reaching Macedonian reform programme, the commencement of the division of European Turkey. What Britain had failed to induce Germany to help her in executing, was to be attained with the sword's point directed against Germany. And Britain proceeded in cold blood to conjure up an era of might-struggles, which, in the island language, is called preserving the balance of power."[[191]]
[!-- Note Anchor 191 --][Footnote 191: Ibid., p. 297.]
The trials of strength recounted by Oncken are the Bosnian crisis, the Morocco question, and the Austro-Serbian quarrel which led to the present war. It seems banal to have to point out that Bosnia was unlawfully annexed by Germany's vassal—Austria; that Germany, herself, brought Europe to the verge of war by sending the Panther to Agadir; and that the final catastrophic Machtprobe was likewise provoked by Germany's eastern vassal.
For good or evil Germany has been convinced for nearly two decades that the balance of power in Europe was an obstacle to her world future. Furthermore, she believed that the balance imposed fetters upon her which only mighty armaments could break. All Germany's energies in the domain of diplomacy have been set in motion to make the balance of power a mere figment of the imagination.
In pursuing this end it has suited her purpose to declare all attempts at maintaining the outward appearances of equality between the Powers of Europe to be Machiavellian schemes against her existence; or to cite the Kaiser's own words, "to deprive Germany of her place in the sun."
Britain's entente policy was the only one calculated to preserve our own existence, and to restrain Germany from establishing a hegemony in Europe. She was completely convinced that the domination of Europe belonged to her by right of mental, moral and military superiority over her neighbours. Not in vain have Germany's educational institutions inculcated the belief in her population that the British Empire is an effete monstrosity with feet of clay; France a rotten, decaying empire, and Russia a barbarian Power with no new Kultur to offer Europe except the knout.
Inspired by such conceptions, together with an astoundingly exaggerated idea of Germany's peerlessness in order, discipline, obedience, morality, genius and other ethical values, as well as an unshaken belief in Germany's invincibility by land and sea—the entire nation, from Kaiser to cobbler, has long since held that by right of these virtues—by right of her absolute superiority over all other nations—Germany could and must claim other rights and powers than those which fell to her under an antiquated balance of European power.
In few words that is the gospel of Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles. These are the motives which inspired Germany's naval expansion and forbade her to accept a compromise. The same ideals led to her endeavours to shatter the ententes, and it is alone the general acceptance of this gospel, which explains the remarkable unanimity with which the German nation has stood behind the Kaiser's Government in each trial of strength. They have learned to consider all attempts of the lesser peoples (Britain, France and Russia included) to maintain themselves against the Teutonic onset as impudent attacks on sacred Germany, which also illuminates the fact that Germans call the present struggle—"Germany's holy, sacred war."
German statesmen were quite clear as to the national course at least fifteen years ago. Hence they have persistently pursued a policy of no compromise and no agreements. A compromise recognizes and perpetuates, in part at least, the very thing which stands in the way. An agreement with Britain in regard to naval armaments would have perpetuated British naval supremacy, as well as recognized its necessity. Likewise an agreement, or the shadow of an understanding with France on the question of Alsace-Lorraine would have been a recognition of French claims. Hence on these two questions—which are merely given as examples illustrative of German mentality—every attempt at an agreement has been a failure.
A cardinal point in Germany's programme has been the consistent manner in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain in order to deal with them separately or alone. That her endeavours ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has drawn Germany's opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the increasing force of her efforts. Both in peace and war, Germany desired and endeavoured to switch off Britain's influence in Europe.
The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts to dislodge Great Britain from her ententes, while her repeated attempts to buy this country's neutrality, down to the eve of war, are proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[[192]] If she had succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.
[!-- Note Anchor 192 --][Footnote 192: Professor Schiemann: "Wie England eine Verständigung mit Deutschland verhinderte" ("How England prevented an Understanding with Germany"). Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21: "From the very commencement Berlin was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack was exceedingly small, if England's entrance to this Germanophobe combination could be prevented. Therefore we endeavoured to secure England's neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German alliance could not be achieved—an alliance which would have guaranteed the world's peace." (Schiemann's insinuation that Germany desired an alliance is an instance of suggestio falsi. Germany had decided in 1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.—Author.)]
Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the Central Empires. The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them, for the British Ambassador declared to the Russian Government on July 24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian question. Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with Germany.
"On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit, and assured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no circumstances wage war on Germany. A ministry which made preparations for war, would be immediately overthrown."[[193]]
[!-- Note Anchor 193 --][Footnote 193: Ibid., p. 27. In the light of this revelation it would be interesting to know what was the real motive which induced Mr. Trevelyan to resign his office when war broke out. Either he was conscious of having seriously compromised his position as a Minister of the Crown, or he conscientiously believed that Britain was drawing the sword in an unjust cause. Unfortunately a section of the British public accepted the latter interpretation. In any case, Mr. Trevelyan's indiscretion affords overwhelming proof that he had an utterly false conception of Germany.—Author.]
Professor Schiemann affirms that his good impression was strengthened by a visit to London during March and April, 1914, and reports a conversation which he had with Lord Haldane when dining privately with the latter in London. After returning to Berlin, he says he received a letter from Lord Haldane dated April 17th, 1914, but from Schiemann's quotation it is not evident whether the following is an extract or the entire letter:
"It was a great pleasure to see you and to have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is like yours, to bring Germany and Great Britain into relations of ever-closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation which I believe is now beginning become closer and closer.[[194]]
[!-- Note Anchor 194 --][Footnote 194: Lord Haldane has stated during the war that his visit to Berlin in 1912 had filled his mind with doubt and suspicion in regard to Germany.—Author.]
"Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear.[[195]] Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."[[196]]
[!-- Note Anchor 195 --][Footnote 195: A word or phrase appears to have been dropped in this sentence.—Author.]
[!-- Note Anchor 196 --][Footnote 196: Professor Schiemann's book, pp. 27-8.]
It is not difficult to conceive that such utterances, on the part of two British ministers, would raise hopes in the German mind, for it would be useless to imagine that Professor Schiemann would keep them secret for his own private edification. And it is possible that they led the German Government into a false reckoning as to what this country would do under certain circumstances, and so encouraged Germany into taking up an irreconcilable attitude in the crisis of July, 1914.
Whatever Germany expected must, however, for the present, remain a matter of conjecture. Schiemann's comment on the above letter leaves no doubt that he expected Lord Haldane[[197]] to resign. "When one remembers that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and was therefore privy to all the secret moves of Sir Edward Grey, it is hard to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments expressed in this letter. Besides, he did not resign like three other members of the Cabinet (Lord Morley, Burns and Charles Trevelyan) when Sir Edward's foul play lay open to the world on August 4th."
[!-- Note Anchor 197 --][Footnote 197: Lord Haldane seems to have injured his reputation both in Great Britain and Germany. Professor Oncken designates him: "the one-time friend of Germany, the decoy-bird of the British cabinet." Vide "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 561.]
The most regrettable side of the whole incident is that the resignation of the above gentlemen has been proclaimed by innumerable German writers as proof of Sir Edward Grey's double dealing, and proof that Britain is waging an unjust war. Still, it may console these gentlemen to know that the nation which wages war on women and children acclaims them to-day "all honourable men," and doubtless without the Shakespearian intonation.
By reason of the above incidents, and more of a similar nature, Germans accuse the late Liberal Government with perfidy of the basest kind. The author is not in the least inclined to admit the charge, but thinks, rather, that the Government in question—individually and collectively—was astonishingly ignorant of European conditions and problems, especially those prevailing in the Germanic Empires.
To what a degree Germany was obsessed by the idea that Britain was trying to strangle her by an encircling policy, is apparent in a diplomatic document quoted by Professor Oncken. Its author's name is not given, and it was doubtless a secret report sent to the German Foreign Office in 1912; its freedom from bias is also questionable. Moreover, it is probable that it belongs to the same category of documents as those quoted in the French Yellow Book—reports intended to exercise due influence on the mind of the Emperor.
"French diplomacy is succeeding more and more in entangling England in the meshes of her net. The encouragement which England gives, directly or indirectly, to French chauvinism may one day end in a catastrophe in which English and French soldiers must pay with their blood on French battlefields for England's encircling policy. The seeds sown by King Edward are springing up."
Another link in the chain of proof of Britain's guilt, is found in the documents seized by the Germans in Brussels. The enemy seems to attach great importance to them, for they are being employed in much the same way that parliamentary candidates use pamphlets during an election. Yet they do not contain a particle of proof that Britain had hostile intentions against Germany, but only confirm the presence of the German menace.
The documents[[198]] in question are reports sent by the Belgian Legation Secretaries in London, Paris and Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels. These gentlemen held opinions identical with those expressed again and again in German newspapers, and even in some British and French organs. Messieurs Comte de Lalaing (London), Greindl (Berlin), Leghait (Paris), evidently believed that the activities of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente endangered the peace of Europe.
[!-- Note Anchor 198 --][Footnote 198: Published by the Berlin Government as supplements to the Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29th and 31st; August 4th, 8th and 12th, 1915.]
Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian Government. If read as a modern edition of "Pepys' Diary" they form entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they be classed as historical sources. A gentleman who reports to his Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delcassé and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly rank as an historian.
Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M. Greindl as a gentleman of German origin. If this be true it would probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said documents, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials.
German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government has not deigned to reply to these "revelations." There is really nothing to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911. But a brutal sequence of events in 1914 showed them—if they had not been convinced during the preceding three years—that they had drawn false conclusions from their observations.
To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies German participation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.
His comment on Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace is characteristic: "England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace. It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals. But mere good-will is not everything. It is much more important to weigh their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed: Whether they were intended to preserve the world's peace under conditions honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the Entente a one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future predominance."[[199]]
[!-- Note Anchor 199 --][Footnote 199: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 544.]
"Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal. On the evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia's consent, he proposed to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London ambassadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of the conflict.
"The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an indirect recognition on her part of Russia's interest in the conflict.
"Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a 'London Centre' during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the role—to say nothing of Italy—which Russia's two comrades would have played in the conference. During its course Russia would have continued her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge herself not to mobilize.
"Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare assert that the man (Sir Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.
"Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[[200]]
[!-- Note Anchor 200 --][Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 et seq.]
An analysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results: First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental principle underlying the Germanic attitude is again exposed, viz., that Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe (vide, p. 63). Thirdly, a diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the two groups of Powers.
In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable consequence.
If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M. de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.
The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a decade—the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited assertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual Alliance would have survived the shock.
Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in Germany as a man of peace—the man who had prevented the Balkan War from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same nation of being the originator of the world war.
Oncken[[201]] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey initiated only two members of the Cabinet—Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane—into the details of the agreement with France, and these three gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy, succeeded in harnessing the revanche idée and the spirit of Russian aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France, Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a lie in essentials."
[!-- Note Anchor 201 --][Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G. B. Shaw and the Labour Leader.—Author.]
Following the development of events after the conference proposal had been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this false conception, i.e., openly joining Russia and France.
"It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought. Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning England's eventual attitude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to energetic measures.
"But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands—and in truth with England's co-operation—to such a degree that their acceptance would have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.
"And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision (mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support and with it England's, turned the scale—against peace.
"That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will admit."[[202]]
[!-- Note Anchor 202 --][Footnote 202: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 553-4.]
Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into their hands.
Overwhelming importance is attached to this document by German war writers. The more important passages of the despatch run as follows: "The last two days have passed in the expectation of events which are bound to follow[[203]] upon Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most contradictory reports were in circulation, without any possibility of confirming their truth or falsity.
[!-- Note Anchor 203 --][Footnote 203: Thus the impartial witness whom Germans quote to prove their innocence definitely states that Russia had no other course left open to her by Austria's actions.—Author.]
"One thing is, however, indisputable, viz., that Germany has done everything possible both here and in Vienna[[204]] to find a means of avoiding a general conflict, but has only been met with the determination of the Vienna cabinet, on the one hand, not to yield a single step, and on the other hand Russian distrust of Vienna's declaration that they merely intend a punitive expedition against Serbia.
[!-- Note Anchor 204 --][Footnote 204: How could M. de l'Escaille know what had passed in Vienna?—Author.]
"One must really believe that everybody wants war, and is only anxious to postpone the declaration in order to gain time. At first England gave out, that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said that definitely. But to-day they are firmly convinced in St. Petersburg, indeed they have received an assurance, that England will stand by France. This support is of extraordinary importance, and has contributed not a little to the war-party gaining the upper hand.
"In the cabinet sitting held yesterday, there were differences of opinion, and the mobilization order was postponed. This morning at four o'clock mobilization was ordered.
"The Russian army feels itself strong, and is full of enthusiasm. The reorganization of the navy is still so incomplete that it would be out of the count in case of war. For that reason England's assurance of help was of the greatest consequence."[[205]]
[!-- Note Anchor 205 --][Footnote 205: "Kriegs-Depeschen, 1914" ("German War-Telegrams, 1914"). Berlin, 1914; p. 96 et seq.]
If Professor Oncken is correct in stating that Sir Edward Grey's measures were calculated to exercise a pressure on Germany and Austria, then he merely confirms what this country has hitherto believed—Sir Edward Grey acted rightly. Where else should he have exerted pressure except in the quarter from whence a provocative, insolent challenge had proceeded?
With regard to the assertion that Russia—stiffened by England—took a "momentous decision" on the evening of July 30th, Professor Oncken is guilty of distortion. The decision to mobilize had been taken earlier, and as M. de l'Escaille wrote, was made public at four o'clock on the morning of July 30th.
Whether Russia had increased her demands ("peremptorily sharpened" are Oncken's words) the reader can judge for himself by comparing the two texts.
I: "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which infringe the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60.)
II: "If Austria agrees to stay the advance of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro—Serbian dispute has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers shall examine the satisfaction which Serbia might give to the Austro—Hungarian Government without affecting her sovereign rights and independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (French Yellow Book, No. 133.)
Oncken, in making this comparison, comments: "It is most remarkable that the original formula chosen by Sasonow had been peremptorily sharpened (einschneidend verschärft) on July 31st at the request of the British Ambassador. This interference by England in the formulation of the proposal must arouse the gravest doubt regarding the peaceful tendencies of England's policy. Sasonow had every reason to thank Grey 'for the firm, amicable tone which he has employed in his pourparlers with Germany and Austria.'"[[206]]
[!-- Note Anchor 206 --][Footnote 206: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 553. Oncken's quotation in the last lines taken from the Russian Orange Book, No. 69.]
Sir Edward Grey had proposed five days earlier (July 26th) that all military measures should cease pending a settlement. Hence the introduction of this clause is not a new demand. Moreover, in the meantime Russia and Germany—in spite of the latter's denial—had commenced to mobilize; Austria had mobilized and commenced hostilities against Serbia. Thus there were far more urgent reasons to include the cessation of military measures on July 31st than before. Lastly, it was the only acceptable pledge of Austrian sincerity which Russia could accept. Whether the formula would have met with Austria's approval cannot be determined, for Austria was saved from what Oncken terms "complete submission" by Germany's ultimatum to Russia, despatched on the same day, July 31st.
It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia should demobilize.
If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de l'Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of German diplomacy. But, as the same gentleman testifies: "Austria would not yield a step"—the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered her to stand firm. Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany's peace endeavours.
Oncken further mentions Britain's refusal to remain neutral in return for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits the question of French colonies. His analysis of the Belgian question deserves quotation: "Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found one in the question of Belgian neutrality. It was just such a reason as he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion. And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied by appeals to international law and humanity, by England's and the world's Press.
"But there is more than one irrefutable proof at hand, to show that this reason for war, was merely a veil covering the real ones. Anticipating Grey's intentions, before the German Government had finally declared themselves on the subject,[[207]] Prince Lichnowsky put the question to Sir Edward Grey on August 1st, as to whether England would remain neutral if Germany undertook to respect the neutrality of Belgium.
[!-- Note Anchor 207 --][Footnote 207: Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether she would respect Belgium's neutrality.—Author.]
"Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could—if he was really concerned about Belgium—have spared that unhappy land its terrible fate. But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality had been taken from our opponent's hand in advance. Yet Grey actually considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British Cabinet. Yes, he dared even more.
"After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the Labour Leader, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August 27th, as to whether Lichnowsky's proposal had been submitted to the Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful negotiations with Germany. Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate between official proposals made by a government, and a private question asked by an ambassador.
"When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was cried down. The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from this Parliamentary incident: 'That all Sir Edward Grey's answers to Mr. Keir Hardie's questions are examples of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.' His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value as objective evidence.
"After Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate England's conditions for her neutrality. At the same time the Ambassador increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies in return for England's neutrality. Grey suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans. Only an immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.
"Even before he could assume that Belgian neutrality was in danger, he pledged English policy to the wishes of France. On the afternoon of the same August 1st, he gave the French Ambassador—who was anxiously pressing for a decision—reason to believe that he would be able to give a formal promise on the following day. At the Cabinet meeting on August 2nd—the same in which he suppressed Germany's offer!—he got a motion accepted empowering him to assure Cambon that if Germany attacked the French coast, England would intervene."
It is necessary to return to Germany's proposal in regard to Belgian neutrality. In simple language it means that Germany wanted to sell her pledged word, given in 1839, for British neutrality in 1914. In view of the fact that Professor Oncken looked upon this as a legitimate bargain, one wonders in silence at his standard of morality and honour. Is he not a scoundrel who first gives his word of honour and afterwards tries to strike a bargain with the same? Stripped of all verbiage that is Germany's proposal in its naked immorality, and the author chronicles with pleasure that the House of Commons cried down even its discussion. It recalls to his memory the fact, that the Reichstag—Germany's highest legislative assembly—cheered to the echo Bethmann-Hollweg's announcement that German armies, in violating the dictates of moral and international law, by breaking Germany's word of honour, had occupied Luxembourg and entered Belgium. The two incidents are drastic, concrete illustrations of the gulf which separates British and German conceptions of right and wrong.
Furthermore, there are two questions of a disciplinary nature arising out of this incident which "the man in the street" has a perfect right to raise. Assuming that Sir Edward Grey exercised his discretion and concealed the "infamous proposal" from the Cabinet, which of his colleagues afterwards betrayed the fact and from what source—German or English—did he obtain his information?
Full knowledge on these points would probably be of great assistance in destroying the "trail of the serpent" (i.e., German influence and intrigues) in the political and national life of Great Britain.
Professor Oncken praises German disinterestedness in offering to guarantee the integrity of French continental and colonial territories in case Germany gained a victory in the war. Sir Edward Grey's refusal to guarantee British neutrality in return for this promise, the professor considers supreme and final proof that Britain was bent on war. The nation has rightly approved of this policy and the point need not be argued in this place; but Professor Oncken in the seclusion of his German study would do well to weigh two problems:
If Germany had gained a victory—and in August, 1914, she was absolutely convinced that France and Russia would succumb if they faced her alone—then Germany would have obtained the long sought upper and "free hand" in Europe. What earthly powers could have compelled her in that moment to respect her promise in regard to French territories? Certainly Germany's sense of honour could not be counted upon to do so.
The second problem refers to the bull and the china-shop. Presuming that the bull could talk, would Professor Oncken advise the guardian of the proverbial china-shop to accept the bull's promise to respect the status quo ante of his property, before letting him (the bull) run amock amongst the china?
Lastly, readers are advised when studying the German "case" to remember that Germany never offered to respect the integrity of French territories and, the neutrality of Belgium. Although German writers—with malice aforethought—seek to give that impression. Yet, had this combined offer been made, the author submits that in spite of such a promise, it would still have been ruinous to British interests to stand aside and see Germany gain the upper and "free hand" in Europe. Having obtained that, all else would have followed to the desire of Germany's heart.