MRS. HARRISON'S BILL: SPEECH OF MR. BENTON EXTRACTS.
Mr. Benton said he was opposed to this bill—opposed to it on high constitutional grounds, and upon grounds of high national policy—and could not suffer it to be carried through the Senate without making the resistance to it which ought to be made against a new, dangerous, and unconstitutional measure.
It was a bill to make a grant of money—twenty-five thousand dollars—out of the common Treasury to the widow of a gentleman who had died in a civil office, that of President of the United States; and was the commencement of that system of civil pensions, and support for families, which, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, has divided England, and other European countries into two classes—the tax payers and the tax consumers—and which sends the laboring man supperless to bed.
It is a new case—the first of the kind upon our statute book—and should have been accompanied by a report from a committee, or preceded by a preamble to the bill, or interjected with a declaration, showing the reason for which this grant is made. It is a new case, and should have carried its justification along with it. But nothing of this is done. There is no report from a committee—from the two committees in fact—which sat upon the case. There is no preamble to it, setting forth the reason for the grant. There is no declaration in the body of the bill, showing the reason why this money is voted to this lady. It is simply a bill granting to Mrs. Harrison, widow of William H. Harrison, late President of the United States, the sum of $25,000. Now, all this is wrong, and contrary to parliamentary practice. Reason tells us there should be a report from a committee in such a case. In fact, we have reports every day in every case, no matter how inconsiderable, which even pays a small sum of money to an individual. It is our daily practice, and yet two committees have shrunk from that practice in this new and important case. They would not make a report, though urged to do it. I speak advisedly, for I was of the committee, and know what was done. No report could be obtained; and why? because it was difficult, if not impossible, for any committee to agree upon a reason which would satisfy the constitution, and satisfy public policy, for making this grant. Gentlemen could agree to give the money—they could agree to vote—but they could not agree upon the reason which was to be left upon the record as a justification for the gift and the vote. Being no report, the necessity became apparent for a preamble; but we have none of that. And, worse than all, in the absence of report and preamble, the bill itself is silent on the motive of the grant. It does not contain the usual clause in money bills to individuals, stating, in a few words, for what reason the grant or payment is made. All this is wrong; and I point it out now, both as an argument against the bill, and as a reason for having it recommitted, and returned with a report, or a preamble, or a declaratory clause.
We were told at the last session that a new set of books were to be opened—that the new administration would close up the old books, and open new ones; and truly we find it to be the case. New books of all kinds are opened, as foreign to the constitution and policy of the country, as they are to the former practice of the government, and to the late professions of these new patriots. Many new books are opened, some by executive and some by legislative authority; and among them is this portentous volume of civil pensions, and national recompenses, for the support of families. Military pensions we have always had, and they are founded upon a principle which the mind can understand, the tongue can tell, the constitution can recognize, and public policy can approve. They are founded upon the principle of personal danger and suffering in the cause of the country—upon the loss of life or limb in war. This is reasonable. The man who goes forth, in his country's cause, to be shot at for seven dollars a month, or for forty dollars a month, or even for one or two hundred, and gets his head or his limbs knocked off, is in a very different case from him who serves the same country at a desk or a table, with a quill or a book in his hand, who may quit his place when he sees the enemy coming; and has no occasion to die except in his tranquil and peaceful bed. The case of the two classes is wholly different, and thus far the laws of our country have recognized and maintained the difference. Military pensions have been granted from the foundation of the government—civil pensions, never; and now, for the first time, the attempt is to be made to grant them. A grant of money is to be made to the widow of a gentleman who has not been in the army for near thirty years—who has since that time, been much employed in civil service, and has lately died in a civil office. A pension, or a grant of a gross sum of money, under such circumstances, is a new proceeding under our government, and which finds no warrant in the constitution, and is utterly condemned by high considerations of public policy.
The federal constitution differs in its nature—and differs fundamentally from those of the States. The States, being original sovereignties, may do what they are not prohibited from doing; the federal government, being derivative, and carved out of the States, is like a corporation, the creature of the act which creates it, and can only do what it can show a grant for doing. Now the moneyed power of the federal government is contained in a grant from the States, and that grant authorizes money to be raised either by loans, duties or taxes, for the purpose of paying the debts, supporting the government, and providing for the common defence of the Union. These are the objects to which money may be applied, and this grant to Mrs. Harrison can come within neither of them.
But, gentlemen say this is no pension—it is not an annual payment, but a payment in hand. I say so, too, and that it is so much the more objectionable on that account. A pension must have some rule to go by—so much a month—and generally a small sum, the highest on our pension roll being thirty dollars—and it terminates in a reasonable time, usually five years, and at most for life. A pension granted to Mrs. Harrison on this principle, could amount to no great sum—to a mere fraction, at most, of these twenty-five thousand dollars. It is not a pension, then, but a gift—a gratuity—a large present—a national recompense; and the more objectionable for being so. Neither our constitution, nor the genius of our government, admits of such benefactions. National recompenses are high rewards, and require express powers to grant them in every limited government. The French Consular Constitution of the year 1799, authorized such recompenses; ours does not, and it has not yet been attempted, even in military cases. We have not yet voted a fortune to an officer's or a soldier's family, to lift them from poverty to wealth. These recompenses are worse than pensions: they are equally unfounded in the constitution, more incapable of being governed by any rule, and more susceptible of great and dangerous abuse. We have no rule to go by in fixing the amount. Every one goes by feeling—by his personal or political feeling—or by a cry got up at home, and sent here to act upon him. Hence the diversity of the opinions as to the proper sum to be given. Some gentlemen are for the amount in the bill; some are for double that amount; and some are for nothing. This diversity itself is an argument against the measure. It shows that it has no natural foundation—nothing to rest upon—nothing to go by; no rule, no measure, no standard, by which to compute or compare it. It is all guess-work—the work of the passions or policy—of faction or of party.
By our constitution, the persons who fill offices are to receive a compensation for their services; and, in many cases, this compensation is neither to be increased nor diminished during the period for which the person shall have been elected; and in some there is a prohibition against receiving presents either from foreign States, or from the United States, or from the States of the Union. The office of President comes under all these restrictions, and shows how jealous the framers of the constitution were, of any moneyed influence being brought to bear upon the Chief Magistrate of the Union. All these limitations are for obvious and wise reasons. The President's salary is not to be diminished during the time for which he was elected, lest his enemies, if they get the upper hand of him in Congress, should deprive him of his support, and starve him out of office. It is not to be increased, lest his friends, if they get the upper hand, should enrich him at the public expense; and he is not to receive "any other emolument," lest the provision against an increase of salary should be evaded by the grant of gross sums. These are the constitutional provisions; but to what effect are they, if the sums can be granted to the officer's family, which cannot be granted to himself?—if his widow—his wife—his children can receive what he cannot? In this case, the term for which General Harrison was elected, is not out. It has not expired; and Congress cannot touch his salary or bestow upon him or his, any emolument without a breach of the constitution.
It is in vain to look to general clauses of the constitution. Besides the general spirit of the instrument, there is a specific clause upon the subject of the President's salary and emoluments. It forbids him any compensation, except at stated times, for services rendered; it forbids increase or diminution; and it forbids all emolument. To give salary or emolument to his family, is a mere evasion of this clause. His family is himself—so far as property is concerned, a man's family is himself. And many persons would prefer to have money or property conveyed to his family, or some member of it, because it would then receive the destination which his will would give it, and would be free from the claims or contingencies to which his own property—that in his own name—would be subject. There is nothing in the constitution to warrant this proceeding, and there is much in it to condemn it. It is condemned by all the clauses which relate to the levy, and the application of money; and it is specially condemned by the precise clause which regulates the compensation of the President, and which clause would control any other part of the constitution which might come in conflict with it. Condemned upon the constitutional test, how stands this bill on the question of policy and expediency? It is condemned—utterly condemned, and reprobated, upon that test! The view which I have already presented of the difference between military and naval services (and I always include the naval when I speak of the military) shows that the former are proper subjects for pensions—the latter not. The very nature of the service makes the difference. Differing in principle, as the military and civil pensions do, they differ quite as much when you come to details, and undertake to administer the two classes of rewards. The military has something to go by—some limit to it—and provides for classes of individuals—not for families or for individuals—one by one. Though subject to great abuse, yet the military pensions have some limit—some boundary—to their amount placed upon them. They are limited at least to the amount of armies, and the number of wars. Our armies are small, and our wars few and far between. We have had but two with a civilized power in sixty years. Our navy, also, is limited; and compared to the mass of the population, the army and navy must be always small. Confined to their proper subjects, and military and naval pensions have limits and boundaries which confine them within some bounds; and then the law is the same for all persons of the same rank. The military and naval pensioners are not provided for individually, and therefore do not become a subject of favoritism, of party, or of faction. Not so with civil pensions. There is no limit upon them. They may apply to the family of every person civilly employed—that is, to almost every body—and this without intermission of time; for civil services go on in peace and war, and the claims for them will be eternal when once begun. Then again civil pensions and grants of money are given individually, and not by classes, and every case is governed by the feeling of the moment, and the predominance of the party to which the individual belonged. Every case is the sport of party, of faction, of favoritism; and of feelings excited and got up for the occasion. Thus it is in England, and thus it will be here. The English civil pension list is dreadful, both for the amount paid, and the nature of the services rewarded; but it required centuries for England to ripen her system. Are we to begin it in the first half century of our existence? and begin it without rule or principle to go by? Every thing to be left to impulse and favor—by the politics of the individual, his party affinities, and the political complexion of the party in power.
Gentlemen refuse to commit themselves on the record; but they have reasons; and we have heard enough, here and elsewhere, to have a glimpse of what they are. First, poverty: as if that was any reason for voting a fortune to a family, even if it was true! If it was a reason, one half of the community might be packed upon the backs of the other. Most of our public men die poor; many of them use up their patrimonial inheritances in the public service; yet, until now, the reparation of ruined fortune has not been attempted out of the public Treasury. Poverty would not do, if it was true, but here it is not true: the lady in question has a fine estate, and certainly has not applied for this money. No petition of hers is here! No letter, even, that we have heard of! So far as we know, she is ignorant of the proceeding! Certain it is, she has not applied for this grant, either on the score of poverty, or any thing else. Next, election expenses are mentioned; but that would seem to be a burlesque upon the character of our republican institutions. Certainly no candidate for the presidency ought to electioneer for it—spend money for it—and if he did, the public Treasury ought not to indemnify him. Travelling expenses coming on to the seat of government, are next mentioned; but these could be but a trifle, even if the President elect came at his own expense. But we know to the contrary. We know that the contest is for the honor of bringing him; that conveyances and entertainments are prepared; and that friends dispute for precedence in the race of lifting and helping along, and ministering to every want of the man who is so soon to be the dispenser of honor and fortune in the shape of office and contracts. Such a man cannot travel at his own expense. Finally, the fire in the roof of the west wing of the North Bend mansion has been mentioned; but Jackson had the whole Hermitage burnt to the ground when he was President, and would have scorned a gift from the public Treasury to rebuild it. Such are the reasons mentioned in debate, or elsewhere, for this grant. Their futility is apparent on their face, and is proved by the unwillingness of gentlemen to state them in a report, or a preamble, or in the body of the bill itself.