REDUCTION OF THE EXPENSE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS BY REDUCING THE NUMBER.

A question of permanent and increasing interest was opened at this session, which has become more exigent with time, and deserves to be pursued until its object shall be accomplished. It was the question of reducing the expenses of foreign missions, by reducing the number, and the expediency of returning to the Jeffersonian policy of having no ministers resident, or permanent succession of ministers abroad. The question was brought on by a motion from Mr. Charles Jared Ingersoll to strike from the appropriation bill the salaries of some missions mentioned in it; and this motion brought on the question of, how far the House had a right to interfere in these missions and control them by withholding compensation? and how far it was expedient to diminish their number, and to return to the Jeffersonian policy? Chargés had been appointed to Sardinia and Naples: Mr. Ingersoll thought them unnecessary; as also the mission to Austria, and that the ministers to Spain ought to be reduced to chargéships. Mr. Caleb Cushing considered the appointment of these ministers as giving them "vested rights in their salaries," and that the House was bound to vote. Mr. Ingersoll scouted this idea of "vested rights." Mr. Adams said the office of minister was created by the law of nations, and it belonged to the President and Senate to fill it, and for the Congress to control it, if it judged it necessary, as the British parliament has a right to control the war which the king has a right to declare, namely, by withholding the supplies: but it would require an extreme case to do so after the appointment had been made. He did not think the House ought to lay aside its power to control in a case obviously improper. And he thought the introduction of an appropriation bill, like the present, a fit occasion to inquire into the propriety of every mission; and he thought it expedient to reduce the expenses of our foreign missions, by reducing the number: and with this view he should offer a resolution when it should be in order to do so. Mr. Gilmer, as one of the Committee on Retrenchment, had paid some attention to the subject of our foreign representation; and he believed, with Mr. Adams, that both the grade and the destination of our foreign agents would admit of a beneficial reduction. Mr. Ingersoll rejoined on the different branches of the question, and in favor of Mr. Jefferson's policy, and for following up the inquiry proposed by Mr. Adams; and said:

"If the stand he had now taken should eventually lead to the retrenchment alluded to in the resolution of the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts, he should be content. He still thought the House might properly exercise its withholding power, not, indeed, so as to stop the wheels of government, but merely to curtail an unnecessary expenditure; and he hoped there would be enough of constitutional feeling, of the esprit du corps, to lead them to insist upon their right. He scouted the idea of the President's appointment creating a vested interest in the appointee to his salary as minister. Such a doctrine would be monstrous. The House might be bound by high considerations of policy and propriety, but never by the force of a contract, to appropriate for an appointed minister. This was carrying the principle totally extra mœnia mundi. Mr. I. disclaimed opposing these measures on the mere ground of dollars and cents; he alluded to the multiplication of missions to and from this country as introducing examples of lavish expenditure and luxurious living among our own citizens. As to the distinction between temporary and permanent missions, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Cushing] perfectly well knew that originally all public missions were temporary; such a thing as a permanent foreign mission was unheard of. This was an invention of modern times; and it had been Mr. Jefferson's opinion that such missions ought not to exist. It was high time that public attention was called to the subject; and he hoped that at the next session Mr. Adams would bring forward and press his resolution of inquiry as to the expediency of reducing the whole system of foreign intercourse."

Mr. Adams afterwards introduced his proposed resolution, which was adopted by the House, and sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations; but which has not yet produced the required reform. This was his resolve:

"Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs be instructed to inquire into the expediency of reducing the expenditures in the diplomatic department of the government, by diminishing the number of ministers and other diplomatic agents abroad, and report thereon to the House."

It would be a public benefaction, and a great honor to the member who should do it, for some ardent man to take charge of this subject—revive Mr. Adams' resolution, and pursue the inquiry through all the branches which belong to it: and they are many. First: The full mission of minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, formerly created only on extraordinary occasions, and with a few great courts, and intrusted to eminent men, are now lavished in profusion; and at secondary courts; and filled with men but little adapted to grace them; and without waiting for an occasion, but rapidly, to accommodate political partisans; and as a mere party policy, recalling a political opponent to make room for an adherent: and so keeping up a perpetual succession, and converting the envoys extraordinary into virtual ministers resident. In the second place, there are no plenipotentiaries now—no ministers with full powers—or in fact with any powers at all, except to copy what is sent to them, and sign what they are told. The Secretaries of State now do the business themselves, either actually making the treaty at home while the minister is idle abroad, or virtually by writing instructions for home effect, often published before they are delivered, and containing every word the minister is to say—with orders to apply for fresh instructions at every new turn the business takes. And communications have now become so rapid and facile that the entire negotiation may be conducted at home—the important minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary being reduced to the functions of a messenger. In the third place, all the missions have become resident, contrary to the policy and interest of our country, which wants no entangling alliances or connections abroad; and to the damage of our treasury, which is heavily taxed to keep up a numerous diplomatic establishment in Europe, not merely useless, but pernicious. In the fourth place, our foreign intercourse has become inordinately expensive, costing above three hundred thousand dollars a year; and for ministers who do not compare with the John Marshalls of Virginia, the John Quincy Adamses, the Pinckneys of South Carolina, the Pinkney of Maryland, the Rufus Kings, Albert Gallatins, James Monroes, the Livingstons, and all that class, the pride of their country, and the admiration of Europe; and which did not cost us one hundred thousand dollars a year, and had something to do, and did it—and represented a nation abroad, and not a party. Prominently among the great subjects demanding reform, is now the diplomatic intercourse of the United States. Reduction of number, no mission without an object to accomplish, no perpetual succession of ministers, no ministers resident, no exclusion of one party by the other from this national representation abroad, no rank higher than a chargé except when a special service is to be performed and then nationally composed: and the expenses inexorably brought back within one hundred thousand dollars a year. Such are the reforms which our diplomatic foreign intercourse has long required—which so loudly called for the hand of correction fifteen years ago, when Mr. Adams submitted his resolution; and all the evils of which have nearly doubled since. It is a case in which the House of Representatives, the immediate representatives of the people, and the sole constitutional originator of taxes upon them, should act as a check upon the President and Senate; and do it as the British House of Commons checks the king, the lords and the ministry—by withholding the supplies.


[CHAPTER LXXIX.]