DOMINION.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT.
[1.] That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. [2.] That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. [3.] That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the concord of many persons. [4.] That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. [5.] The reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. [6.] That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. [7.] What union is. [8.] In union, the right of all men is conveyed to one. [9.] What civil society is. [10.] What a civil person is. [11.] What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject [12.] Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation of peace.
1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently, that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence by such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right to all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the fulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace peace when it may be had.
That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are silent.
2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of war, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by chap. iii. [art. 27]. And we mean such a war, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of nature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they called ληστρικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the law of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of nature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.
That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the agreement of many.
3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural law security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemy’s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.
That the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace.
4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action, through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the consent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.
Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men.
5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not man only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say, ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government, and therefore those animals not to be termed political; because their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is very true, that in those creatures living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the like creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good, which among them differs not from their private. But man scarce esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude of men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways; which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition: and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial. It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice.
That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men.
6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which I call a council.
What union is.
7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a right of defending himself against violence: and this is called union. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council consists.
In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.
8. But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to act); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men unto unity and concord.
What civil society is.
9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them together, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all), is to be accounted a city. A city therefore, (that we may define it), is one person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
What a civil person is.
10. But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil person is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the companies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply and in all things, but in certain things only determined by the city, and on such terms as it is lawful for any one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate to the city.
What it is to have the supreme power, what to be subject.
11. In every city, that man or council, to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is said to have the supreme power, or chief command, or dominion. Which power and right of commanding, consists in this, that each citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or council; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power in a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the subject of him who hath the chief command.
Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner and by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of preserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a civil person, whom we have called a city. But they who submit themselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear, or some other whom they confide in for protection. They act according to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural beginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is that there are two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or one company of men, endued with the command in chief. But we will speak, in the first place, of a city political or by institution; and next, of a city natural.
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN
ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY.
[1.] There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented. [2.] The right of the greater number consenting, is the beginning of a city. [3.] That every man retains a right to protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security. [4.] That a coercive power is necessary to secure us. [5.] What the sword of justice is. [6.] That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the chief command. [7.] That the sword of war belongs to him also. [8.] All judicature belongs to him too. [9.] The legislative power is his only. [10.] The naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him. [11] Also the examination of all doctrines. [12.] Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. [13.] That the command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him. [14.] That the laws of the city bind him not. [15.] That no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. [16.] By the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. [17.] The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with an absolute power. [18.] The marks of supreme authority. [19.] If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as the human soul is in relation to the man. [20.] That the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by whose compacts it was first constituted.
There can no right be attributed to a multitude, considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which they have not given their particular consents.
1. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude[[8]] of men, gathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is; namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say this is mine, the other, that is his; yet will there not be anything of which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, this is mine, more than another’s. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said, that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city, which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever, therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.
The beginning of a city is the right of the major part agreeing.
2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent, the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the right of war, as against an enemy.
That every man retains a right of protecting himself according to his own judgment, as long as he is not secured.
3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the [sixth article], that there was required to the security of men, not only their consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed, and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others; which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security.
That a coercive power is necessary for security.
4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest, either by words or writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.
What the sword of justice is.
5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, the sword of justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.
That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command.
6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
That the sword of war belongs to him also.
7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united. And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that this right, which we may call the sword of war, belongs to the same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice, even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong to the chief command.
The power of judicature belongs to him.
8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could not execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of another, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but that other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore, in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
The legislative power is his also.
9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another’s, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the civil laws (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for direction of the future actions of his citizens.
That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to him also.
10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war and peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one council without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it appertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace.
The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.
11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one, whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions[[9]] and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.
Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.
12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right hath not sufficient power.
That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto him.
13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every perfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or where the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme power in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself. But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a man, we call absolute.[[10]] For whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing, make laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right; truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which are or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man or council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command and always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war; and then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing this power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion of all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for the government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of his may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a greater cannot be performed, we will call it simple. But the obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract, by which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately from hence, that without obedience the city’s right would be frustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I give you right to command what you will; another, if I say, I will do whatsoever you command. And the command may be such, as I would rather die than do it. Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed, much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it. For though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not frustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have contracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man to kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law; since there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed by these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God.
That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.
14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already supposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to himself; for the same party being both the obliged and the obliger, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is already actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied to the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by which, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself. Neither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will, he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a council, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of the city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular citizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this is to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.
That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against him who hath the supreme power.
15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution of a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same right, claim as his own; for where all things are common, there can be nothing proper to any man; it follows, that propriety received its beginning[[11]] when cities received their’s, and that that only is proper to each man, which he can keep by the laws and the power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief command is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-citizens hath right, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no propriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws, whose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single person is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But although there be many things which the city permits to its citizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their chief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to natural equity. Neither is it concerning what[[12]] by right he may do who hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be done; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.
It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder, adultery, and injury are.
16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries, are forbid by the laws of nature; but what is to be called theft, what murder, what adultery, what injury in a citizen, this is not to be determined by the natural, but by the civil law. For not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only another man’s goods, is theft; but what is our’s, and what another’s, is a question belonging to the civil law. In like manner, not every killing of a man is murder, but only that which the civil law forbids; neither is all encounter with women adultery, but only that which the civil law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise itself is lawful; but where there is no right to make any compact, there can be no conveyance of it, and therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the second chapter, [Article 17]. Now what we may contract for, and what not, depends wholly upon the civil laws. The city of Lacedæmon therefore rightly ordered, that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should go unpunished; for it was nothing else but to make a law, that what was so acquired should be their own, and not another’s. Rightly also is that man everywhere slain, whom we kill in war or by the necessity of self-defence. So also that copulation which in one city is matrimony, in another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts which make up marriage in one citizen, do not so in another, although of the same city; because that he who is forbidden by the city, that is, by that one man or council whose the supreme power is, to contract aught, hath no right to make any contract, and therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence no marriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither adds it any force to any unlawful contracts, that they were made by an oath or sacrament;[[13]] for those add nothing to the strengthening of the contract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. [Art. 22.] What therefore theft, what murder, what adultery, and in general what injury is, must be known by the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who hath the supreme authority.
The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with absolute power.
17. This same supreme command and absolute power, seems so harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what human nature and the civil laws are; and partly also through their default, who, when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme authority, some of them will have a city well enough constituted, if they who shall be the citizens’ convening, do agree concerning certain articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved, and do command them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To which purpose, and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy, they appoint a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a city thus constituted, that the assembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or from time to time have a certain day and place of meeting, that power will be perpetual. But if they wholly dissolve, either the city dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of war: or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who shall transgress the laws, whosoever or how many soever they be that have it; which cannot possibly be without an absolute power. For he that by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what citizens he pleaseth, hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly be given by any citizens.
The notes of supreme authority.
18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city there is some one man, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over each single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited only by the strength and forces of the city itself, and by nothing else in the world. For if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power. For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater power than he who is confined by them. Now that confining power is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other greater than itself; and so we shall at length arrive to a power, which hath no other limit but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the citizens together. That same is called the supreme command; and if it be committed to a council, a supreme council, but if to one man, the supreme lord of the city. Now the notes of supreme command are these: to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, to know and judge of all controversies, either by himself, or by judges appointed by him; to elect all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by right can do some one action, which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do beside himself, that man hath obtained the supreme power. For those things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens, the city itself can only do. He therefore that doth those things, useth the city’s right; which is the supreme power.
If the city be compared with a man, he who hath the supreme command is in order to the city, as the human soul is to the man.
19. They who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the city is in relation to the whole city, such as the head is to the whole man. But it appears by what hath been already said, that he who is endued with such a power, whether it be a man or a court, hath a relation to the city, not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will or nill. A court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the head, or one counsellor, whose only counsel (if of any one alone) the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsel, as the soul’s is to command.
That the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by their consents, by whose compacts it was constituted;
20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me, do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority. If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed, to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars, yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with his fellow, says thus: I convey my right on this party, upon condition that you pass yours to the same: by which means, that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council for the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which every man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is upheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which is due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even without his own consent.
[8]. Multitude, &c.] The doctrine of the power of a city over its citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first article; but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few things.
By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men. Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly. But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men, whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and subjects, but not a city.
[9]. Judge what opinions, &c. There is scarce any principle, neither in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions, therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church, bishops require in their’s to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not, and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
[10]. Absolute.] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right, the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed. But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied, but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government. For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature, there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
[11]. Propriety received its beginning, &c.] What is objected by some, that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain; because I have already declared, that a family is a little city. For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all things.
[12]. What by right he may do, &c.] As often as a citizen is granted to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt; in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute; in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place, saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.
[13]. That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c.] Whether matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.
CHAPTER VII
OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY,
ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY.
[1.] That there are three kinds of government only, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy. [2.] That oligarchy is not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at all. [3.] That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy. [4.] That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out of these several species. [5.] That democracy, except there be certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved. [6.] In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be short, or the administration of government during the interval committed to some one. [7.] In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man. [8.] By what acts aristocracy is constituted. [9.] In an aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people. [10.] The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings. [11.] By what acts monarchy is constituted. [12.] Monarchy is by compact obliged to none for the authority it hath received. [13.] Monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good government [14.] What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. [15.] A monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor. [16.] Of limited monarchs. [17.] A monarch, retaining his right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority. [18.] How a citizen is freed from subjection.
There are three kinds of government only; democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1. We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is committed either to one man, or council, or some one court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will himself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of government; the one, when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a democracy. The other, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only have their suffrages; and we call it an aristocracy. The third is that, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled a monarchy. In the first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the people; in the second, the nobles; in the third, the monarch.
Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.
2. Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three other kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, anarchy or confusion to democracy; oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to aristocracy, and tyranny to monarchy; yet are not these three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeased with that present government or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do usually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens that what one man calls a democracy, another calls an anarchy; what one counts an aristocracy, another esteems an oligarchy; and whom one titles a king, another styles him a tyrant. So as we see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power. For first, who sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that there is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it possible that no city should be the species of a city? Furthermore, what difference is there between an oligarchy, which signifies the command of a few or grandees, or an aristocracy, which is that of the prime or chief heads, more than that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to all men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are looked on as the best, are by others esteemed to be the worst of all men.
That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy.
3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be persuaded that a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse kinds of cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should, by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this pass; that a king, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a king; if not, they count him a tyrant. Wherefore we see a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a tyrant in way of contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.
That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.
4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme command should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in any one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular; which they call a mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the People, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of state would they call a mixed monarchy forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a state, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree, each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the private sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,[[14]] hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, [art. 6-12.]
That democracy, except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.
5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part; which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition given in the [first article] of this chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer δῆμος, the people, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, the people; the other, which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or the power.
In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening must be short, or the administration of the government committed to some one.
6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places of meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less distance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by reason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some danger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless this be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it will not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of security, every man’s right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again.
In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.
7. Democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with the people, but by mutual compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons contracting must be in being before the contract itself. But the people is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any person, but a multitude of single persons; wherefore there could then no contract pass between the people and the subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the people, it is in vain; because the people contains within its will the will of that subject, to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single persons do contract each with other, may be inferred from hence; that in vain sure would the city have been constituted, if the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or omitted. Because, therefore, such kind of compacts must be understood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the subject and the people; it follows, that they must be made between single citizens, namely, that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As if every one should say thus: I give up my right unto the people for your sake, on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine.
By what acts an aristocracy is framed.
8. An aristocracy or council of nobles endowed with supreme authority, receives its original from a democracy, which gives up its right unto it. Where we must understand that certain men distinguished from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other character, are propounded to the people, and by plurality of voices are elected; and being elected, the whole right of the people or city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the people might do before, the same by right may this court of elected nobles now do. Which being done, it is clear that the people, considered as one person, its supreme authority being already transferred on these, is no longer now in being.
In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.
9. As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the court of nobles is free from all manner of obligation. For seeing subjects not contracting with the people, but by mutual compacts among themselves, were tied to all that the people did; hence also they were tied to that act of the people, in resigning up its right of government into the hands of nobles. Neither could this court, although elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything. For being elected[elected], the people is at once dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a person, utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the person, must also vanish, and perish together with it.
The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.
10. Aristocracy hath these considerations, together with democracy. First, that without an appointment of some certain times and places, at which the court of nobles may meet, it is no longer a court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power. Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme power, unless its administration be transferred to some one man. Now the reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth article.
By what acts a monarchy is framed.
11. As an aristocracy, so also a monarchy is derived from the power of the people, transferring its right, that is, its authority on one man. Here also we must understand, that some one man, either by name or some other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest; and that by a plurality of voices the whole right of the people is conveyed on him; insomuch as whatsoever the people could do before he were elected, the same in every respect may he by right now do, being elected. Which being done, the people is no longer one person, but a rude multitude, as being only one before by virtue of the supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this one man.
That the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the authority he hath received.
12. And therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himself to any for the command he receives. For he receives it from the people; but as hath been shewed above, the people, as soon as that act is done, ceaseth to be a person; but the person vanishing, obligation to the person vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tied to perform obedience to the monarch, by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the people should command them, that is, to obey that monarch, if he were made by the people.
A monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing.
13. But a monarchy differs as well from an aristocracy as a democracy, in this chiefly; that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation and consultation of affairs, that is, for the actual exercise of it in all times and places. For the people or the nobles not being one natural person, must necessarily have their meetings. The monarch, who is one by nature, is always in a present capacity to execute his authority.
What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office to the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city.
14. Because we have declared above, (in art. [7], [9], [12]), that they who have gotten the supreme command, are by no compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily follows, that they can do no injury to the subjects. For injury, according to the definition made in chap. III. [art. 3], is nothing else but a breach of contract; and therefore where no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the people, the nobles, and the monarch may diverse ways transgress against the other laws of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict and exact notion of injury. But if the subject yield not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious, as well to his fellow-subjects, because each man hath compacted with the other to obey; as to his chief ruler, in resuming that right which he hath given him, without his consent. And in a democracy or aristocracy, if anything be decreed against any law of nature, the city itself, that is, the civil person sins not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for sin is a consequence of the natural express will, not of the political, which is artificial. For if it were otherwise, they would be guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked. But in a monarchy, if the monarch make any decree against the laws of nature, he sins himself; because in him the civil will and the natural are all one.
A monarch made without limitation of time, may elect his successors.
15. The people who are about to make a monarch, may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a certain season and time determined. If simply, we must understand that he who receives it, hath the self-same power which they had who gave it. On the same grounds, therefore, that the people by right could make him a monarch[monarch], may he make another monarch. Insomuch as the monarch to whom the command is simply given, receives a right not of possession only, but of succession also; so as he may declare whom he pleaseth for his successor.
Of limited monarchs.
16. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have regard to somewhat more than the bare gift only. First, whether the people conveying its authority, left itself any right to meet at certain times and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether it were done so as they might meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet only at the will of that temporary monarch, and not otherwise. Suppose now the people had delivered up its power to some one man for term of life only; which being done, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed from the council without making any order at all concerning the place, where after his death they should meet again to make a new election. In this case, it is manifest by the [fifth article] of this chapter, that the people ceaseth to be a person, and is become a dissolute multitude; every one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engross the supreme power to himself, and settle it on his own head. What monarch soever, therefore, hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the law of nature, set down in chap. III. [art. 8], of not returning evil for good, prudently to provide that by his death the city suffer not a dissolution; either by appointing a certain day and place, in which those subjects of his, who have a mind to it, may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor; whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received his command during life, hath an absolute power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the people departed not from the election of the temporary monarch, before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death; then the monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by virtue of the former right. For all the supreme command, as dominion, was in the people; but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the right. But if the people after the election of a temporary monarch, depart not from the court before they have appointed certain times and places to convene during the time prescribed him; as the dictators in ancient times were made by the people of Rome; such an one is not to be accounted a monarch, but the prime officer of the people. And if it shall seem good, the people may deprive him of his office even before that time; as the people of Rome did, when they conferred an equal power on Minutius, master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made dictator. The reason whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that he, whether man or council, who hath the readiest and most immediate power to act, should hold his command on such terms, as not to be able actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a right of commanding, as oft as nature allows it possible. Lastly, if the people having declared a temporary monarch, depart from the court on such terms, as it shall not be lawful for them to meet without the command of the monarch, we must understand the people to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority, who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the city anew, unless he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times; since there remains no person now in being, but at his discretion, to whom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases of a people electing a temporary monarch, will be more clearly explained by comparing them with an absolute monarch who hath no heir-apparent. For the people is lord of the subject in such a manner, as there can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects’ meeting, may be fitly compared to those times wherein the monarch sleeps; for in either the acts of commanding cease, the power remains. Furthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet again, is the death of the people; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man. As therefore a king who hath no heir, going to his rest so as never to rise again, that is, dying, if he commit the exercise of his regal authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the succession; the people also electing a temporary monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole dominion of the country. Furthermore, as a king going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administration of his kingdom to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a temporary monarch, and withal retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a king who hath committed the execution of his authority to another, himself in the meanwhile waking, can recal this commission again when he pleaseth; so the people, who during the time prescribed to the temporary monarch doth by right convene, may if they please deprive the monarch of his authority. Lastly, the king, who commits his authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake again till he whom he entrusted give consent, loses at once both his power and his life; so the people, who hath given the supreme power to a temporary monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command, is absolutely dissolved, and the power remains with him whom they have chosen.
A monarch retaining his right of government, cannot, by any promise whatsoever, be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority.
17. If the monarch promise aught to any one or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that promise or compact, whether made by oath or without it, is null. For all compact is a conveyance of right, which by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second chapter, requires meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promised to part with somewhat necessary to the supreme power, and yet retains the power itself, gives sufficient tokens that he no otherwise promised it, than so far forth as the power might be retained without it. Whensoever therefore it shall appear, that what is promised cannot be performed without prejudice to the power, the promise must be valued as not made, that is, of no effect.
By what means a subject is freed from his subjection.
18. We have seen how subjects, nature dictating, have obliged themselves[themselves] by mutual compacts to obey the supreme power. We will see now by what means it comes to pass, that they are released from these bonds of obedience. And first of all, this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off or forsake, but convey not the right of his command on some other. For what is thus rejected, is openly exposed to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of himself according to his own judgment. In the second place, if the kingdom fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he who before had the supreme authority, hath now lost it: for when the subjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling into the enemy’s hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of obedience which they made each with other; and what, being conquered, they promise afterwards to avoid death, they must with no less endeavour labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monarchy, (for a democracy and aristocracy cannot fail), if there be no successor, all the subjects are discharged from their obligations; for no man is supposed to be tied he knows not to whom; for in such a case it were impossible to perform aught. And by these three ways, all subjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty which all men have to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for the natural state hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man. Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power, namely, if he change his soil; which may be done two ways, either by permission, as he who gets license to dwell in another country; or command, as he who is banished. In both cases, he is free from the laws of his former country; because he is tied to observe those of the latter.
[14]. But that there can be no such kind of government.] Most men grant, that a government ought not to be divided; but they would have it moderated and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not only kings, but all other persons endued with supreme authority, would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and only minding their charges, contain themselves within the limits of the natural and divine laws. But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief power bounded and restrained by others: which, because it cannot be done but they who do set the limits must needs have some part of the power, whereby they may be enabled to do it, the government is properly divided, not moderated.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS.
[1.] What lord and servant signify. [2.] The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters. [3.] The obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed him by his lord. [4.] Servants that are bound, are not by any compacts tied to their lords. [5.] Servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord. [6.] The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testament [7.] The lord cannot injure his servant. [8.] He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his servants. [9.] By what means servants are freed. [10.] Dominion over beasts belongs to the right of nature.
What lord and servant are.
1. In the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an institutive or framed government, as being that which receives its original from the consent of many, who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged each other. Now follows what may be said concerning a natural government; which may also be called acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power and natural force. But we must know in the first place, by what means the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons of men. Where such a right is gotten, there is a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a king, is nothing else but to have dominion over many persons; and thus a great family is a kingdom, and a little kingdom a family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other. There are but three ways only, whereby one can have a dominion over the person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutual contract made between themselves, for peace and self-defence’s sake, they have willingly given up themselves to the power and authority of some man, or council of men; and of this we have already spoken. The second is, if a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his own forces, to avoid death, promises the conqueror or the stronger party his service, that is, to do all whatsoever he shall command him. In which contract, the good which the vanquished or inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might have been deprived of; but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By virtue therefore of this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the divine laws; for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before he knows what he will command him, is simply and without any restriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tied, is called a servant; he to whom he is tied, a lord. Thirdly, there is a right acquired over the person of a man by generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following chapter.
The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or fettered.
2. Every one that is taken in the war, and hath his life spared him, is not supposed to have contracted with his lord; for every one is not trusted with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able, if he desired it, either to fly away, or quit his service, or contrive any mischief to his lord. And these serve indeed, but within prisons or bound within irons; and therefore they were called not by the common name of servant only, but by the peculiar name of slave; even as now at this day, un serviteur, and un serf, or un esclave have diverse significations.
The obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom which is granted him by his lord.
3. The obligation therefore of a servant to his lord, ariseth not from a simple grant of his life; but from hence rather, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from contract; but where there is no trust, there can be no contract, as appears by chap. ii. [art. 9]; where a compact is defined to be the promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty; so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had happened, he might not only have made his escape, but also have killed his lord who was the preserver of his life.
Servants that are bound, are not obliged to their lord by any contract.
4. Wherefore such kind of servants as are restrained by imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of servants given above; because those serve not for the contract’s sake, but to the end they may not suffer. And therefore if they fly, or kill their lord, they offend not against the laws of nature. For to bind any man, is a plain sign that the binder supposes him that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation.
Servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord.
5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is not, than over one that is bound; for he hath a supreme power over both, and may say of his servant no less than of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine. Whence it follows, that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the lord’s; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath he, by his lord’s distribution, a propriety and dominion over his own goods: insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his own against the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow-subject.
The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testament.
6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and all that belongs to him are his lord’s, and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant, according to his own will and pleasure.
The lord cannot be injurious to his servant.
7. Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive government, namely, that he who hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also concerning servants, because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their will; but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.
He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his servants.
8. But if it happen that the lord, either by captivity or voluntary subjection, doth become a servant or subject to another, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his servants; supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now because not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord’s; therefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord have an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be derived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly passed over by the civil law.
By what means servants are freed.
9. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection. First, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission; which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city. Secondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a city is banishment; neither differs it from manumission in effect, but in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by war, whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir. For no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given. But the lord who himself serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme; for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme lord’s.
The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature.
10. We get a right over irrational creatures, in the same manner that we do over the persons of men; to wit, by force and natural strength. For if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one, by reason of that war which is of all against all, to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good; much more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their own discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by art may be tamed and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetual war as dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over beasts, hath its original from the right of nature, not from divine positive right. For if such a right had not been before the publishing of the Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy writ; a most hard condition for men indeed, whom the beasts might devour without injury, and yet they might not destroy them. Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast may kill a man, it is also by the same right that a man may slay a beast.
CHAPTER IX.
OF THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND
OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT.
[1.] Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation. [2.] Dominion over infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power. [3.] Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s. [4.] The exposed infant is his, from whom he receives his preservation. [5.] The child that hath one parent a subject, and the other a sovereign, belongs to him or her in authority. [6.] In such a conjunction of man and woman, as neither hath command over the other, the children are the mother’s, unless by compact or civil law it be otherwise determined. [7.] Children are no less subject to their parents, than servants to their lords and subjects to their princes. [8.] Of the honour of parents and lords. [9.] Wherein liberty consists, and the difference of subjects and servants. [10.] There is the same right over subjects in an hereditary government, which there is in an institutive government. [11.] The question concerning the right of succession belongs only to monarchy. [12.] A monarch may by his will and testament dispose of his supreme authority: [13.] Or give it, or sell it. [14.] A monarch dying without testament, is ever supposed to will that a monarch should succeed him: [15.] And some one of his children: [16.] And a male rather than female: [17.] And the eldest rather than the younger: [18.] And his brother, if he want issue, before all others. [19.] In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.
Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation.
1. Socrates is a man, and therefore a living creature, is right reasoning; and that most evident, because there is nothing needful to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the word man be understood; because a living creature is in the definition itself of a man, and every one makes up the proposition which was desired, namely this, man is a living creature. And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father, and therefore his lord, is perhaps a true inference, but not evident; because the word lord is not in the definition of a father: wherefore it is necessary, to make it more evident, that the connexion of father and lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent over his children, have brought no other argument than that of generation; as if it were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a triangle, it appears presently, without any further discourse, that its angles are equal to two right. Besides, since dominion, that is, supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two masters; but two persons, male and female, must concur in the act of generation; it is impossible that dominion should at all be acquired by generation only. Wherefore we will, with the more diligence, in this place inquire into the original of paternal government.
Dominion over infants belongs to him who first hath them in his power.
2. We must therefore return to the state of nature, in which, by reason of the equality of nature, all men of riper years are to be accounted equal. There by right of nature the conqueror is lord of the conquered. By the right therefore of nature, the dominion over the infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power. But it is manifest that he who is newly born, is in the mother’s power before any others; insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up or adventure him to fortune.
Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s.
3. If therefore she breed him, because the state of nature is the state of war, she is supposed to bring him up on this condition; that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey her. For since by natural necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy to that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a mother and a lord. But what some say, that in this case the father, by reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the mother becomes lord, signifies nothing. For both reason shows the contrary; because the inequality of their natural forces is not so great, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without war. And custom also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons, have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of their children at their own wills. And at this day, in divers places women are invested with the principal authority; neither do their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they who have the supreme power, are not tied at all (as hath been shewed) to the civil laws. Add also, that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the father, but by the testimony of the mother; the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it, and therefore her’s. Wherefore original dominion over children belongs to the mother: and among men no less than other creatures, the birth follows the belly.
The exposed infant is his that preserves him.
4. The dominion passes from the mother to others, divers ways. First, if she quit and forsake her right by exposing the child. He therefore that shall bring up the child thus exposed, shall have the same dominion over it which the mother had. For that life which the mother had given it, (not by getting but nourishing it), she now by exposing takes from it. Wherefore the obligation also which arose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made void. Now the preserved oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a mother, or of his service as to a lord. For although the mother in the state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may recover her son again, namely, by the same right that anybody else might do it; yet may not the son rightly transfer himself again unto his mother.
The son of a subject and chief, is his that commands.
5. Secondly, if the mother be taken prisoner, her son is his that took her; because that he who hath dominion over the person, hath also dominion over all belonging to the person; wherefore over the son also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter, in the [fifth article]. Thirdly, if the mother be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will also have the dominion over him that is born of her; for he is lord also of the mother, who is bound to obey him in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for society’s sake give herself to a man on this condition, that he shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the contribution of both parties, is the father’s, in regard of the command he hath over the mother. But if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a subject, the children are the mother’s; for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her authority. And universally, if the society of the male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himself to the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.
In such a conjunction of male and female, as neither hath the commanding power over the other, the children are the mother’s; except by pact or civil law it be otherwise determined.
6. But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the mother’s, for the reasons above given in the [third article], unless by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the mother may by pact dispose of her right as she lists; as heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed them the males, and retained females to themselves. But in a civil government, if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the father’s; because in all cities, to wit, constituted of fathers, not mothers governing their families, the domestical command belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to the civil laws, is called matrimony. But if they agree only to lie together, the children are the father’s or the mother’s variously, according to the differing civil laws of divers cities.
Children are no less subject to their parents, than servants to their lords, and subjects to their city.
7. Now because, by the [third article], the mother is originally lord of her children, and from her the father, or somebody else by derived right; it is manifest that the children are no less subject to those by whom they are nourished and brought up, than servants to their lords, and subjects to him who bears the supreme rule; and that a parent cannot be injurious to his son, as long as he is under his power. A son also is freed from subjection in the same manner as a subject and servant are. For emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication with banishment.
Of the honour due to parents and lords.
8. The enfranchised son or released servant, do now stand in less fear of their lord and father, being deprived of his natural and lordly power over them; and, if regard be had to true and inward honour, do honour him less than before. For honour, as hath been said in the [section above], is nothing else but the estimation of another’s power; and therefore he that hath least power, hath always least honour. But it is not to be imagined, that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things as if he were become wholly his equal. It must therefore be ever understood, that he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a servant, son, or some colony, doth promise all those external signs at least, whereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors. From whence it follows, that the precept of honouring our parents, belongs to the law of nature, not only under the title of gratitude, but also of agreement.
Wherein liberty doth consist; and the difference between subjects and servants.
9. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a son, or between a subject and a servant? Neither do I know that any writer hath fully declared what liberty and what slavery is. Commonly, to do all things according to our own fancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed to be liberty; not to be able to do this, is judged bondage; which in a civil government, and with the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done; because there is no city without a command and a restraining right. Liberty, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion; as water shut up in a vessel is therefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders it from running out; which, the vessel being broken, is made free. And every man hath more or less liberty, as he hath more or less space in which he employs himself: as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, than he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part, and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this and that side with hedges or stone walls, lest he spoil the vines or corn neighbouring on the highway. And these kinds of lets are external and absolute. In which sense all servants and subjects are free, who are not fettered and imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary, which do not absolutely hinder motion, but by accident, to wit, by our own choice; as he that is in a ship, is not so hindered but he may cast himself into the sea, if he will. And here also the more ways a man may move himself, the more liberty he hath. And herein consists civil liberty; for no man, whether subject, son, or servant, is so hindered by the punishments appointed by the city, the father, or the lord, how cruel soever, but that he may do all things, and make use of all means necessary to the preservation of his life and health. For my part therefore I cannot find what reason a mere servant hath to make complaints, if they relate only to want of liberty; unless he count it a misery to be restrained from hurting himself, and to receive that life, which by war, or misfortune, or through his own idleness was forfeited, together with all manner of sustenance, and all things necessary to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he will be ruled. For he that is kept in by punishments laid before him, so as he dares not let loose the reins to his will in all things, is not oppressed by servitude, but is governed and sustained. But this privilege free subjects and sons of a family have above servants in every government and family where servants are; that they may both undergo the more honourable offices of the city or family, and also enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous. And herein lies the difference between a free subject and a servant, that he is free indeed, who serves his city only; but a servant is he, who also serves his fellow-subject. All other liberty is an exemption from the laws of the city, and proper only to those that bear rule.
There is the same right in an hereditary, which there is in an institutive government.
10. A father with his sons and servants, grown into a civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction, is called a family. This family, if through multiplying of children and acquisition of servants it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the uncertain die of war it cannot be subdued, will be termed an hereditary kingdom. Which though it differ from an institutive monarchy, being acquired by force, in the original and manner of its constitution; yet being constituted, it hath all the same properties, and the right of authority is everywhere the same; insomuch as it is not needful to speak anything of them apart.
The question concerning the right of succession belongs only to monarchy.
11. It hath been spoken, by what right supreme authorities are constituted. We must now briefly tell you, by what right they may be continued. Now the right by which they are continued, is that which is called the right of succession. Now because in a democracy the supreme authority is with the people, as long as there be any subjects in being, so long it rests with the same person; for the people hath no successor. In like manner in an aristocracy, one of the nobles dying, some other by the rest is substituted in his place; and therefore except they all die together, which I suppose will never happen, there is no succession. The query therefore of the right of succession takes place only in an absolute monarchy. For they who exercise the supreme power for a time only, are themselves no monarchs, but ministers of state.
A monarch may dispose of the command of his government by testament:
12. But first, if a monarch shall by testament appoint one to succeed him, the person appointed shall succeed. For if he be appointed by the people, he shall have all the right over the city which the people had, as hath been showed in chap. VII. [art. 11]. But the people might choose him; by the same right therefore may he choose another. But in an hereditary kingdom, there are the same rights as in an institutive. Wherefore every monarch may by his will make a successor.
Or give it away, or sell it.
13. But what a man may transfer on another by testament, that by the same right may he, yet living, give or sell away. To whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift or sale, it is rightly made.
A monarch dying without testament, is ever understood to will that a monarch should succeed him:
14. But if living he have not declared his will concerning his successor by testament nor otherwise, it is supposed, first, that he would not have his government reduced to an anarchy or the state of war, that is, to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he could not do that without breach of the laws of nature, whereby he was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing to the preservation of peace; as also because, if that had been his will, it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next, because the right passeth according to the will of the father, we must judge of the successor according to the signs of his will. It is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be under a monarchical government, rather than any other, because he himself in ruling hath before approved of that state by his example, and hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it.
And some one of his children:
15. Furthermore, because by natural necessity all men wish them better, from whom they receive glory and honour, than others; but every man after death receives honour and glory from his children, sooner than from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a father intends better for his children than any other person’s. It is to be understood therefore, that the will of the father, dying without testament, was that some of his children should succeed him. Yet this is to be understood with this proviso, that there be no more apparent tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custom may be one. For he that makes no mention of his succession, is supposed to consent to the customs of his realm.
And a male rather than female:
16. Among children the males carry the pre-eminence; in the beginning perhaps, because for the most part, although not always, they are fitter for the administration of greater matters, but specially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown a custom, because that custom was not contradicted. And therefore the will of the father, unless some other custom or sign do clearly repugn it, is to be interpreted in favour of them.
And of the males, the eldest rather than the younger:
17. Now because the sons are equal, and the power cannot be divided, the eldest shall succeed. For if there be any difference by reason of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy; for nature being judge, the most in years (because usually it is so) is the wisest; but other judge there cannot be had. But if the brothers must be equally valued, the succession shall be by lot. But primogeniture is a natural lot, and by this the eldest is already preferred; nor is there any that hath power to judge, whether by this or any other kind of lots the matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which contends thus for the first-born son, doth no less for the first-born daughter.
And his brother, if he want issue, before all others.
18. But if he have no children, then the command shall pass to his brothers and sisters; for the same reason that the children should have succeeded, if he had had them. For those that are nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest in benevolence. And to his brothers sooner than his sisters, and to the elder sooner than the younger; for the reason is the same for these, that it was for the children.
In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.
19. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession. For if the first-born die before the father, it will be judged that he transferred his right of succession unto his children; unless the father have otherwise decreed it. And therefore the nephews will have a fairer pretence to the succession, than the uncles. I say all these things will be thus, if the custom of the place (which the father by not contradicting will be judged to have consented to) do not hinder them.
CHAPTER X.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.
[1.] A comparison of the natural state with the civil. [2.] The conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike. [3.] The praise of monarchy. [4.] The government under one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest. [5.] A rejection of their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot make a city. [6.] Exactions are more grievous under a popular state, than a monarchy. [7.] Innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch, than under the people. [8.] The liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a people. [9.] It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to public deliberations. [10.] Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: [11.] In regard of eloquence: [12.] In regard of faction: [13.] In regard of the unstableness of the laws: [14.] In regard of the want of secrecy. [15.] That these inconveniences adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit. [16.] The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child. [17.] The power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy. [18.] The best state of a city is that, where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. [19.] The nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it keeps from it, the worse.
A comparing the state of nature with the civil.
1. What democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are, hath already been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike.
2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics, saith, that there are two sorts of governments; whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler, the other to that of the subjects. As if where subjects are severely dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the ruler and the subject. The damages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But those relate not to the government itself, being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy, both the commander and the parties commanded are equally concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way public treasures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the ill-administration of a well-established government.
The praise of monarchy.
3. Now that monarchy, of the foresaid forms of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, hath the pre-eminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the ancients preferred the monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government, instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men[[15]] out of the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings: although, I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over.
The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest.
4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing, that one man among so many should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge it to be as unreasonable if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality, whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man, attend his person, not his unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.
Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city.
5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord. In the [ninth article] of the fifth chapter, a city is defined to be one person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the same article of the same chapter, one person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared in the [fifth article] of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure. It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted by a lord and many servants. Neither can any reason be brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father and his sons. For to a lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of sons; for they are both his honour and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their lords, then children to their parents, as hath been manifested above in the [fifth article] of the eighth chapter.
The exactions are more grievous under command of the people, than under the monarch.
6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles, waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of government, but are more tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a democracy, look how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing), so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of themselves. A monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a democracy, where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done without the subject’s oppression. Though a monarch may promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a democracy, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it, because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it, would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those others, but even to the whole city also.
Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under a monarch, than under the people.
7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself, that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done. But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned under one ruler, than under the people. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly punished. Whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people. For each one of them can do as much as the people, and they mutually give way to each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, spare me to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow, while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care, that the common weal do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party, without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was usually practised in democracies. For the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a kingdom. In this democracy and monarchy were even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And therefore what the monarch does, is said to be done out of envy to their virtues; which if it were done by the people, would be accounted policy.
Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than under the people.
8. There are some, who therefore imagine monarchy to be more grievous then democracy, because there is less liberty in that, than in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the people; neither in democracy, nor in any other state of government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden, there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in democracy than monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the word liberty may in large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city whatsoever, yet is it not meant the subject’s, but the city’s liberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a city which is governed by the people, than that which is ruled by a monarch. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but dominion; which yet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural state would return again, in which all men may by right do all things; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the dominion? For whoso is freed from all bonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a popular, than in a monarchical state. That which deceives them, is the equal participation of command and public places. For where the authority is in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as they are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in public offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing magistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle aimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling dominion liberty. (Polit. lib. vi. cap. 2.) In a popular state there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were free out of this state. From whence, by the way, we may collect, that those subjects who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to the steerage of the commonweal.
It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to the public deliberations.
9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a popular state is much to be preferred before a monarchical; because that where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy, this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in it.
Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by reason of the unskilfulness of most men:
10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other than mere lets and impediments?
By reason of their eloquence:
11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, honest and dishonest, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to make that seem just which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are erroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their minds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the man, but in the nature itself of eloquence, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is not truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.
By reason of faction:
12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great convent is, because that thence arise factions in a commonweal; and out of factions, seditions and civil war. For when equal orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding his council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the conquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own opinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief heads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order each man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a faction is inferior in votes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms; and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do not necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
By reason of the unsettledness of the laws:
13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction, do convene. Insomuch as the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.
For want of secrecy.
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and will is as soon known abroad, as to the people itself commanding at home.
These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.
15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies, do so far forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy, as in democracy affairs of great consequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a monarchy. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother. But if the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular democracy and monarchy would be equal.
The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king who is a child.
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence, namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other side, to many than to some few. For government is the power, the administration of it is the act. Now the power in all kinds of government is equal; the acts only differ, that is to say, the actions and motions of a commonweal, as they flow from the deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal may be well governed, although the monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with the public offices and charges. And that which is said, woe to the land whose king is a child, doth not signify the condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the king being a child, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils, the government comes to be administered in a democratical manner; and that thence arise those infelicities, which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people.
The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of monarchy.
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those cities which are subject to the people or to nobles, give the whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature; which is the state of war.
The best state of a commonweal, is that where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.
18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves to be subject to some man or council, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the inheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the subjects are not only the prince’s treasure, but their bodies and wildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of his life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.
Aristocracy is so much better, by how much it approaches nearer to monarchy; the worse, by how much it is more distant from it.
19. Hitherto we have compared a monarchical with a popular state; we have said nothing of aristocracy. We may conclude of this, by what hath been said of those, that that which is hereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which simply imitates the government of monarchs most, and the people least of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than the rest.
[15]. Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.
CHAPTER XI.
PLACES AND EXAMPLES OF SCRIPTURE OF THE RIGHTS
OF GOVERNMENT, AGREEABLE TO WHAT HATH
BEEN SAID BEFORE.
[1.] The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people. [2.] Judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme commanders. [3.] That they who have the chief authority, are by right unpunishable. [4.] That without a supreme power there is no government, but anarchy. [5.] That from servants and sons there is a simple obedience due to their lords and parents. [6.] Absolute authority proved by most evident places, as well of the New as the Old Testament.
The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people.
1. We have, in the sixth chapter and the [second article], so derived the original of institutive or political government from the consent of the multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be esteemed as enemies. Such was the beginning of God’s government over the Jews instituted by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5-8): If ye will obey my voice indeed, &c. Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, &c. And Moses came and called the elders of the people, &c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath spoken we will do. Such also was the beginning of Moses’s power under God, or his vicegerency, (Exod. xx. 18-19): And all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the noise of the trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. The like beginning also had Saul’s kingdom, (1 Sam. xii. 12, 13): When ye saw that Nahash king of the children of Ammon came out against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your king. Now therefore behold the king whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired. But the major part only consenting, and not all; for there were certain sons of Belial, who said, (1 Sam. x. 27), How shall this man save us? And they despised him; those who did not consent, were put to death as enemies. And the people said unto Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 12): Who is he that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men, that we may put them to death.
The power of judicature, and determination of wars, depend on the will of the supreme officer.
2. In the same sixth chapter, the [sixth] and [seventh] articles, I have showed that all judgment and wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who bears the supreme authority; that is to say, in a monarchy, on a monarch or king; and this is confirmed by the people’s own judgment. 1 Sam. viii. 20; We also will be like all the nations, and our king shall judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles. And what pertains to judgments, and all other matters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be good or evil, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon, (1 Kings iii. 9): Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil. And that of Absolom, (2 Sam. xv. 3): There is no man deputed of the king to hear thee.
They who have the supreme authority are by right unpunishable.
3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been showed above in the sixth chapter and the [twelfth article], King David also confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him, did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbade Abishai, saying, (1 Sam. xxvi. 9): Destroy him not; for who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent? And when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6): The Lord forbid, saith he, that I should do this thing unto my master the Lord’s anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him. And (2 Sam. i. 15) commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to be put to death.
That without a supreme power there is no government, but confusion.
4. That which is said in the seventeenth chapter of Judges, at the sixth verse: In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes: as though where there were not a monarchy, there were an anarchy or confusion of all things: may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of monarchy above all other forms of government; unless that by the word king may perhaps be understood not one man only, but also a court; provided that in it there reside a supreme power. Which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to do what he hath a mind, or whatsoever shall seem right to himself; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankind. And therefore in all government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent.
That servants and sons owe their lords and parents simple obedience.
5. We have, in chap. VIII. [art. 7] and [8], said that servants must yield a simple obedience to their lords, and in chap IX. [art. 7], that sons owe the same obedience to their parents. Saint Paul says the same thing concerning servants (Coloss. iii. 22): Servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God. Concerning sons (Colos. iii. 20): Children obey your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord. Now as we by simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to the laws of God; so in those cited places of St. Paul, after the word all things, we must suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the laws of God.
The absolute power of princes proved by most evident testimonies of the Scripture, as well New as Old.
6. But that I may not thus by piecemeal prove the right of princes, I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power; namely, that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects. And first out of the New Testament: Matth. xxiii. 2, 3: The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do. Whatsoever they bid you (says Christ) observe, that is to say, obey simply. Why? Because they sit in Moses’ seat; namely, the civil magistrate’s, not Aaron, the priest’s. Rom. xiii. 1, 2: Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. Now because the powers that were in St. Paul’s time, were ordained of God, and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects, it follows that such a power was ordained of God. 1 Peter ii. 13-15: Submit yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for so is the will of God.[God.] Again St. Paul to Titus, (chap. iii. 1): Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, &c. What principalities? Was it not to the principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to the example of Christ himself, to whom the kingdom of the Jews belonged by hereditary right derived from David himself; he, when he lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Cæsar, and pronounced it to be due to him, Matth. xxii. 21: Give unto Cæsar (saith he) the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s. When it pleased him to show himself a king, he required entire obedience, Matth. xxi. 2, 3: Go (said he) into the village over against you, and straight-way ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her; loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say aught unto you, ye shall say the Lord hath need of them. This he did therefore by the right of being lord, or a king of the Jews. But to take away a subject’s goods on this pretence only, because the Lord hath need of them, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the Old Testament are these: Deut. v. 27: Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say; and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and do it. But under the word all, is contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua (Joshua i. 16-18): And they answered Joshua, saying, all that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go; according as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee; only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death. And the parable of the bramble (Judges ix. 14, 15): Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiesce to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted to be kings over us, unless we would choose rather to be consumed by the fire of a civil war. But the regal authority is more particularly described by God himself, in 1 Sam. viii. 9, &c.: Show them the right of the king that shall reign over them, &c. This shall be the right of the king that shall reign over you; he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots, &c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the king’s right. Neither was any man among the Jews, no not the high-priest himself, exempted from this obedience. For when the king, namely, Solomon, said to Abiathar the priest (1 Kings ii. 26, 27): Get thee to Anathoth unto thine own fields; for thou art worthy of death; but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being priest unto the Lord; it cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his person at that time was any whit less acceptable to God.
CHAPTER XII.
OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE DISSOLUTION
OF ANY GOVERNMENT.
[1.] That the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is a seditious opinion. [2.] That subjects do sin by obeying their princes is a seditious opinion. [3.] That tyrannicide is lawful is a seditious opinion. [4.] That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion. [5.] That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion. [6.] That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion. [7.] That each subject hath a propriety or absolute dominion of his own goods is a seditious opinion. [8.] Not to understand the difference between the people and the multitude, prepares toward sedition. [9.] Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, prepares toward sedition. [10.] Ambition disposeth us to sedition. [11.] So doth the hope of success. [12.] Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only faculty needful to raise seditions. [13.] How the folly of the common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the destruction of a common-weal.
That the judgment of good and evil belongs to private persons, is a seditious opinion.
1. Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes and pacts commonweals are constituted, and what the rights of princes are over their subjects. Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of natural bodies three things are to be considered, namely, internal disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the external agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and the action itself: so also in a commonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves to our regard; first, the doctrines and the passions contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted and disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit, assemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms and quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, proved it in chap. I. [art. 9]. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. VI. [art. 9]) that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. XI. [art. 2], out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil? Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things; and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God’s commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil: and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God’s expostulation with man, (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil.
That subjects do sin in obeying their princes, is a seditious opinion.
2. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin; for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man’s sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right lord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly; but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey, they sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right, they do, as much as in them lies, abolish human society and the civil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sin when they obey their prince’s commands which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that original error which we have observed above, in the foregoing article. For by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil, we are the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.
That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion.
3. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that tyrannicide is lawful; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of tyrants, they mean not only monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those Thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called tyrants. But he whom men require to be put to death as being a tyrant, commands either by right or without right. If without right, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a tyrant, but an enemy. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: Who hath told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king, except that thou, being a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good and evil? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is monarchical, we may hence discern; namely, that by it every king, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every murderous villain.
That even they who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws, is a seditious opinion.
4. The fourth opinion adversary to civil society, is their’s who hold, that they who bear rule are subject also to the civil laws. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true, in chap VI. [art. 14], from this argument: that a city can neither be bound to itself, nor to any subject; not to itself, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any subject, because the single wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city; insomuch that if the city will be free from all such obligation, the subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a city, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men who have the supreme authority; for they make a city, which hath no being but by their supreme power. Now that this opinion cannot consist with the very being of government, is evident from hence; that by it the knowledge of what is good and evil, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against the laws, would return to each single person. Obedience therefore will cease, as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the civil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction; which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of government. Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle and others; who, by reason of human infirmity, suppose the supreme power to be committed with most security to the laws only. But they seem to have looked very shallowly into the nature of government, who thought that the constraining power, the interpretation of laws, and the making of laws, all which are powers necessarily belonging to government, should be left wholly to the laws themselves. Now although particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgment, and go to law with the supreme magistrate; yet this is only then, when the question is not what the magistrate may, but what by a certain rule he hath declared he would do. As, when by any law the judges sit upon the life of a subject, the question is not whether the magistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life; but whether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it. But his will was, he should, if he brake the law; else his will was, he should not. This therefore, that a subject may have an action of law against his supreme magistrate, is not strength of argument sufficient to prove, that he is tied to his own laws. On the contrary, it is evident that he is not tied to his own laws; because no man is bound to himself. Laws therefore are set for Titius and Caius, not for the ruler. However, by the ambition of lawyers it is so ordered, that the laws to unskilful men seem not to depend on the authority of the magistrate, but their prudence.
That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious opinion.
5. In the fifth place, that the supreme authority may be divided, is a most fatal opinion to all commonweals. But diverse men divide it diverse ways. For some divide it, so as to grant a supremacy to the civil power in matters pertaining to peace and the benefits of this life; but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they transfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to salvation, it happens that subjects measuring justice, not as they ought, by the civil laws, but by the precepts and doctrines of them who, in regard of the magistrate, are either private men or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their princes; through fear falling into that which they most feared. Now what can be more pernicious to any state, than that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting torments, be deterred from obeying their princes, that is to say, the laws; or from being just? There are also some, who divide the supreme authority so as to allow the power of war and peace unto one whom they call a monarch; but the right of raising money they give to some others, and not to him. But because monies are the sinews of war and peace, they who thus divide the authority, do either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another: or if they do really divide it, they dissolve the government. For neither upon necessity can war be waged, nor can the public peace be preserved without money.
That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason, but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion.
6. It is a common doctrine, that faith and holiness are not acquired by study and natural reason, but are always supernaturally infused and inspired into men. Which, if it were true, I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet; or lastly, why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do, what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, than by the precepts of his superiors or right reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of good and evil; which cannot be granted without the ruin of all governments. This opinion hath spread itself so largely through the whole Christian world, that the number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite. And it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of holy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their sermons, signifying just nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine. For he whose nonsense appears to be a divine speech, must necessarily seem to be inspired from above.
That single subjects have any propriety or absolute dominion over their own goods, is a seditious opinion.
7. The seventh doctrine opposite to government, is this; that each subject hath an absolute dominion over the goods he is in possession of: that is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but also of the magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have a lord over them, have themselves no lordship, as hath been proved chap. viii. [art. 5]. Now the magistrate is lord of all his subjects, by the constitution of government. Before the yoke of civil society was undertaken, no man had any proper right; all things were common to all men. Tell me therefore, how gottest thou this propriety but from the magistrate? How got the magistrate it, but that every man transferred his right on him? And thou therefore hast also given up thy right to him. Thy dominion therefore, and propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as he pleases; even as in a family, each son hath such proper goods, and so long lasting, as seems good to the father. But the greatest part of men who profess civil prudence, reason otherwise. We are equal, say they, by nature; there is no reason why any man should by better right take my goods from me, than I his from him. We know that money sometimes is needful for the defence and maintenance of the public; but let them who require it, show us the present necessity, and they shall receive it. They who talk thus know not, that what they would have, is already done from the beginning, in the very constitution of government; and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude and yet not fashioned government, they destroy the frame.
Not to know the difference between a people and a multitude, prepares to sedition.
8. In the last place, it is a great hindrance to civil government, especially monarchical, that men distinguish not enough between a people and a multitude. The people is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a multitude. The people rules in all governments. For even in monarchies the people commands; for the people wills by the will of one man; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects. In a democracy and aristocracy, the citizens are the multitude, but the court is the people. And in a monarchy, the subjects are the multitude, and (however it seem a paradox) the king is the people. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truths, do always speak of a great number of men as of the people, that is to say, the city. They say, that the city hath rebelled against the king (which is impossible), and that the people will and nill what murmuring and discontented subjects would have or would not have; under pretence of the people stirring up the citizens against the city, that is to say, the multitude against the people. And these are almost all the opinions, wherewith subjects being tainted do easily tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of government majesty is to be preserved by him or them, who have the supreme authority; the crimen læsæ majestatis naturally cleaves to these opinions.
Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, disposeth men to sedition.
9. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life and honour. And though there be no man but knows, that riches are gotten with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the evil government, excusing their own sloth and luxury; as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by public exactions. But men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not only labour that they may live, but fight too that they may labour. Every one of the Jews, who in Esdras’ time built the walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held the sword in the other. In all government, we must conceive that the hand which holds the sword, is the king or supreme council, which is no less to be sustained and nourished by the subjects’ care and industry, than that wherewith each man procures himself a private fortune; and that customs and tributes are nothing else but their reward who watch in arms for us, that the labours and endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to public persons, is not more just, than if they should say that they are become in want by paying of their debts. But the most part of men consider nothing of these things. For they suffer the same thing with them who have a disease they call an incubus; which springing from gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, oppressed, and stifled with a great weight. Now it is a thing manifest of itself, that they who seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the commonweal, are prone to be seditious; and that they are affected with change, who are distasted at the present state of things.
Ambition disposeth men to sedition:
10. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having little employment, want honour and dignity. All men naturally strive for honour and preferment; but chiefly they, who are least troubled with caring for necessary things. For these men are invited by their vacancy, sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the commonweal, sometimes to an easy reading of histories, politics, orations, poems, and other pleasant books; and it happens that hence they think themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and learning, to administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now because all men are not what they appear to themselves; and if they were, yet all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received to public offices; it is necessary that many must be passed by. These therefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more, partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them, partly out of hope to overwhelm them, than ill-success to the public consultations. And therefore it is no marvel, if with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations.
So doth hope of success.
11. The hope of overcoming is also to be numbered among other seditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you will, infected with opinions repugnant to peace and civil government; let there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torn with affronts and calumnies by them who are in authority; yet if there be no hope of having the better of them, or it appear not sufficient, there will no sedition follow; every man will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen than hazard a heavier weight. There are four things necessarily requisite to this hope. Numbers, instruments, mutual trust, and commanders. To resist public magistrates without a great number, is not sedition, but desperation. By instruments of war, I mean all manner of arms, munition, and other necessary provision: without which number can do nothing. Nor arms neither, without mutual trust. Nor all these, without union under some commander, whom of their own accord they are content to obey; not as being engaged by their submission to his command; (for we have already in this very chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes); but for some opinion they have of his virtue, or military skill, or resemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved with the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions by their own judgments; there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the realm, but one to stir up and quicken them.
Eloquence alone without wisdom is the only faculty needful to raise seditions.
12. Sallust’s character of Cataline, than whom there never was a greater artist in raising seditions, is this: that he had great eloquence, and little wisdom. He separates wisdom from eloquence; attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions; adjudging that as an instructress of peace and quietness. Now eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant and clear expression of the conceptions of the mind; and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, partly from an understanding of words taken in their own proper and definite signification. The other is a commotion of the passions of the mind, such as are hope, fear, anger, pity; and derives from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. That forms a speech from true principles; this from opinions already received, what nature soever they are of. The art of that is logic, of this rhetoric; the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use; that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never disjoined from wisdom, but this almost ever. But that this kind of powerful eloquence, separated from the true knowledge of things, that is to say, from wisdom, is the true character of them who solicit and stir up the people to innovations, may easily be gathered out of the work itself which they have to do. For they could not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and civil society, unless they held them themselves; which sure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man. For he that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which are the rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evil; what makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it; what is his, and what another’s; lastly, what he would have done to himself, that he may do the like to others: is surely to be accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are well-affected, seem evil; that they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving their minds, makes all things to appear to be such as they in their minds, prepared before, had already conceived them.
How the folly of the common people, and the eloquence of ambitious men, concur to the dissolution of a commonweal.
13. Many men, who are themselves very well affected to civil society, do through want of knowledge co-operate to the disposing of subjects’ minds to sedition, whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their schools, and all the people in their pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this disposition into act, place their whole endeavour in this: first, that they may join the ill-affected together into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction. They gather them into faction, while they make themselves the relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions of single men, and nominate the persons and places to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction, the faction must be kept in a faction; that is to say, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of them shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest and most popular men of the faction to their side. And thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing of affairs. And thus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth, namely, where there is no other faction to oppose them; but for the most part they rend it, and introduce a civil war. For folly and eloquence concur in the subversion of government, in the same manner (as the fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, conspired with Medea against their father. They going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again, by the counsel of Medea they cut him into pieces, and set him in the fire to boil; in vain expecting when he would live again. So the common people, through their folly, like the daughters of Pelias, desiring to renew the ancient government, being drawn away by the eloquence of ambitious men, as it were by the witchcraft of Medea; divided into faction they consume it rather by those flames, than they reform it.
CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.
[1.] The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise. [2.] The safety of the people is the supreme law. [3.] It behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man. [4.] That by safety is understood all manner of conveniences. [5.] A query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best according to their own consciences. [6.] Wherein the safety of the people consists. [7.] That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. [8.] That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness, in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the people. [9.] A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace. [10.] Equal distributions of public offices conduces much to the preservation of peace. [11.] It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses. [12.] It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down ambitious men. [13.] And to break factions. [14.] Laws whereby thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce to the enriching of the subject. [15.] That more ought not to be defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his subjects requires. [16.] That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. [13.] Subjects must have right done them against corrupt judges.
The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise.
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the power of the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said nothing of the duties of rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme authority; for they can be divided. As for example, when he who hath the right, either cannot or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where the right and exercise are severed, there the government of the commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties, who exercise authority, whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of each commonweal.
The safety of the people is the supreme law.
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, the safety of the people is the supreme law. For although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in any state.
It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.
3. By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person, namely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects which are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal; and therefore he hath fully discharged himself, if he have thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which could not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men do suffer.
By safety is understood all manner of benefits.
4. But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin against the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.
Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best in their own consciences.
5. And first of all, princes do believe that it mainly concerns eternal salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what manner of worship he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it may be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever they be, whether one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the law of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised, or permit a contrary to be taught and practised, as they believe necessarily conduceth to the eternal salvation of their subjects. It is manifest that they act against their conscience; and that they will, as much as in them lies, the eternal perdition of their subjects. For if they willed it not, I see no reason why they should suffer (when being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they believe them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this difficulty in suspense.
Wherein the safety of the people consists.
6. The benefits of subjects, respecting this life only, may be distributed into four kinds. 1. That they be defended against foreign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they enjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme commanders can confer no more to their civil happiness, than that being preserved from foreign and civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own industry.
That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people.
7. There are two things necessary for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be forearmed. For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile. Neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values his security not according to the pacts, but the forces and counsels of his adversary. And this by natural right, as hath been showed in chap. II. [art. 11], from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore necessary to the defence of the city, first, that there be some who may, as near as may be, search into and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For discoverers to ministers of state, are like the beams of the sun to the human soul. And we may more truly say in vision political, than natural, that the sensible and intelligible species of outward things, not well considered by others, are by the air transported to the soul; that is to say, to them who have the supreme authority: and therefore are they no less necessary to the preservation of the state, than the rays of the light are to the conservation of man. Or if they be compared to spider’s webs, which, extended on all sides by the finest threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes, of all outward motions; they who bear rule, can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without spies, than those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and whither they shall repair, without the motion of those threads.
To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness in time of peace, is necessary for the people’s defence.
8. Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the people’s defence, that they be forearmed. Now to be forearmed is to be furnished with soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger be instant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a blow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like manner, not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient places before the frontiers are invaded, is to be like those country swains, (as Demosthenes said), who ignorant of the art of fencing, with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other charges of war, when the danger begins to show itself, they consider not, surely, how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men, what they once reckon in the number of their goods, do judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to employ but the least part of it for the public good. Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs. We must therefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard up good sums, if we intend the safety of the commonweal. Since therefore it necessarily belongs to rulers, for the subjects’ safety to discover the enemy’s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have money in continual readiness; and that princes are, by the law of nature, bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their subjects: it follows, that it is not only lawful for them to send out spies, to maintain soldiers, to build forts, and to require monies for these purposes; but also not to do thus is unlawful. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by slight or force. For rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence.
A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace.
9. But many things are required to the conservation of inward peace; because many things concur (as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter) to its perturbation. We have there showed, that some things there are, which dispose the minds of men to sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse doctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief authority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but against the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the foregoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly from the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by reason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to study; and they got into these men’s minds by the teachers of their youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the academies. There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine are to be laid; wherewith young men, being once endued, they may afterward, both in private and public, instruct the vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach. For seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no more intelligible than if a man should join together a company of terms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings and the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of supreme officers, to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to be written, and to command them to be taught in all the colleges of their several dominions.
Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace.
10. In the next place we showed, that grief of mind arising from want did dispose the subjects to sedition; which want, although derived from their own luxury and sloth, yet they impute it to those who govern the realm, as though they were drained and oppressed by public pensions. Notwithstanding, it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just; namely, when the burthens of the realm are unequally imposed on the subjects; for that which to all together is but a light weight, if many withdraw themselves it will be very heavy, nay, even intolerable to the rest: neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen itself, as at the inequality. With much earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from taxes; and in this conflict the less happy, as being overcome, do envy the more fortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, it is the interest of the public quiet, and by consequence it concerns the duty of the magistrate, to see that the public burthens be equally borne. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to public use, is nothing else but the price of their bought peace, it is good reason that they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an equal part, either by contributing their monies or their labours to the commonweal. Now it is the law of nature, (by [art. 15], chap. III), that every man in distributing right to others, do carry himself equal to all. Wherefore rulers are, by the natural law, obliged to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on their subjects.
It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not to what he possesseth.
11. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of money, but of burthen; that is to say, an equality of reason between the burthens and the benefits. For although all equally enjoy peace, yet the benefits springing from thence are not equal to all; for some get greater possessions, others less; and again, some consume less, others more. It may therefore be demanded, whether subjects ought to contribute to the public according to the rate of what they gain, or of what they spend: that is to say, whether the persons must be taxed, so as to pay contribution according to their wealth; or the goods themselves, that every man contribute according to what he spends. But if we consider, where monies are raised according to wealth, there they who have made equal gain, have not equal possessions, because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally rejoicing in the benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the burthens of the commonweal: and on the other side, where the goods themselves are taxed, there every man, while he spends his private goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably pays part due to the commonweal, according to, not what he hath, but what by the benefit of the realm he hath had: it is no more to be doubted, but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and therefore against the duty of rulers; the latter is agreeable to reason, and the exercise of their authority.
It conduces to the preservation of peace, to depress the ambitious.
12. In the third place we said, that that trouble of mind which riseth from ambition, was offensive to public peace. For there are some, who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more sufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their virtue would prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming it. But because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out of the minds of men, it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so order it, that men may know that the way to honour is not by contempt of the present government, nor by factions and the popular air, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers. If with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punished and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more ambition to obey than withstand. Notwithstanding, it so happens sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this when the commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those whose authority and power is entire. Their duty, I say, it is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depress the factious all they can; nor can the public power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects’ quiet without it.
And to dissolve factions.
13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves. Now I call a faction, a multitude of subjects gathered together either by mutual contracts among themselves, or by the power of some one, without his or their authority who bear the supreme rule. A faction, therefore, is as it were a city in a city: for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a city receives its being, so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a faction. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject, or have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the city, is a faction. Also favour with the vulgar, if it be so great that by it an army may be raised, except public caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges, contains faction in it. The same may be said of private wealth, if it exceed; because all things obey money. Forasmuch therefore as it is true, that the state of cities among themselves is natural and hostile, those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they received an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the subjects’ safety, and therefore also against the law of nature.
Laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great expenses restrained, do conduce much to the enriching of the subject.
14. There are two things necessary to the enriching of the subjects, labour and thrift; there is also a third which helps, to wit, the natural increase of the earth and water; and there is a fourth too, namely, the militia, which sometimes augments, but more frequently lessens the subjects’ stock. The two first only are necessary. For a city constituted in an island of the sea, no greater than will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing or fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts only; but there is no doubt, if they have a territory, that they may be richer with the same number, or equally rich being a greater number. But the fourth, namely, the militia, was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining arts, under the notion of booting or taking prey; and it was by mankind, dispersed by families before the constitution of civil societies, accounted just and honourable. For preying is nothing else but a war waged with small forces. And great commonweals, namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the spoils of war, foreign tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their arms, have sometimes so improved the commonwealth, that they have not only not required any public monies from the poorer sort of subjects, but have also divided to each of them both monies and lands. But this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into rule and fashion. For the militia, in order to profit, is like a die; wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since therefore there are three things only, the fruits of the earth and water, labour, and thrift, which are expedient for the enriching of subjects, the duty of commanders in chief shall be conversant only about those three. For the first those laws will be useful, which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth and water; such as are husbandry and fishing. For the second all laws against idleness, and such as quicken industry, are profitable; as such whereby the art of navigation, by help whereof the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only, are brought into one city; and the mechanics, under which I comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen; and the mathematical sciences, the fountains of navigatory and mechanic employments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third those laws are useful, whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats as in clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with usage, is forbidden. Now because such laws are beneficial to the ends above specified, it belongs also to the office of supreme magistrates to establish them.
That more ought not to be determined by the laws, than the benefit of prince and subjects require.
15. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the laws of the city, or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what laws they have a mind to. But because all the motions and actions of subjects are never circumscribed by laws, nor can be, by reason of their variety; it is necessary that there be infinite cases which are neither commanded nor prohibited, but every man may either do or not do them as he lists himself. In these, each man is said to enjoy his liberty; and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place, namely, for that part of natural right which is granted and left to subjects by the civil laws. As water inclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having no bounds, it spreads too largely, and the more passages it finds the more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might do nothing without the commands of the law, would grow dull and unwieldy; if all, they would be dispersed; and the more is left undetermined by the laws, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes are faulty; for laws were not invented to take away, but to direct men’s actions; even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but to guide the course of the stream. The measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects’ and the city’s good. Wherefore, in the first place, it is against the charge of those who command and have the authority of making laws, that there should be more laws than necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects. For since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there are more laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity, they must through ignorance, without the least evil intention, fall within the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their harmless liberty; which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the laws of nature.
That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws.
16. It is a great part of that liberty, which is harmless to civil government and necessary for each subject to live happily, that there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and look for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at all defined by the laws, or greater not required than are defined. Where there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is supposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws, by what we have said in chap. III. [art. 11], and therefore supreme commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public benefit. But where the punishment is defined; either by a law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words that he that shall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the penalty, not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning, is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent; (for natural equity commands that equal transgressors be equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty than is defined by the law, is against the law of nature. For the end of punishment is not to compel the will of man, but to fashion it, and to make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting; where that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its inclination prevail with us. If therefore the legislator doth set a less penalty on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable with us than our lust, that excess of lust above the fear of punishment, whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed to the legislator, that is to say, to the supreme; and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment than himself hath determined in his laws, he punisheth that in another in which he sinned himself.
Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt judges.
17. It pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary liberty of subjects, that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the laws. For it is in vain to have our own distinguished by the laws from another’s, if by wrong judgment, robbery, or theft, they may be again confounded. But it falls out so, that these do happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence, namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed. For we esteem the future by what is past, seldom expecting what seldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted either by gifts, favour, or even by pity itself, do often forbear the execution of the penalties due by the law, and by that means put wicked men in hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed with murderers, thieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other, nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard; nay, the city itself is dissolved, and every man’s right of protecting himself at his own will returns to him. The law of nature therefore gives this precept to supreme commanders, that they not only do righteousness themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the judges, by them appointed, to do the same; that is to say, that they hearken to the complaints of their subjects; and as oft as need requires, make choice of some extraordinary judges, who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.
CHAPTER XIV.
OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES.
[1.] How law differs from counsel. [2.] How from covenant. [3.] How from right. [4.] Division of laws into divine and human: the divine into natural and positive; and the natural into the laws of single men and of nations. [5.] The division of human, that is to say, of civil laws into sacred and secular. [6.] Into distributive and vindicative. [7.] That distributive and vindicative are not species, but parts of the laws. [8.] All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it. [9.] The precepts of the decalogue of honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witness, are civil laws. [10.] It is impossible to command aught by the civil law contrary to the law of nature. [11.] It is essential to a law, both that itself and also the lawgiver be known. [12.] Whence the lawgiver comes to be known. [13.] Publishing and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. [14.] The division of the civil law into written and unwritten. [15.] The natural laws are not written laws; neither are the wise sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power. [16.] What the word sin, most largely taken, signifies. [17.] The definition of sin. [18.] The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice. [19.] Under what kind of sin atheism is contained. [20.] What treason is. [21.] That by treason not the civil, but the natural laws are broken. [22.] And that therefore it is to be punished not by the right of dominion, but by the right of war. [23.] That obedience is not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
How law differs from counsel.
1. They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes confound law with counsel, sometimes with covenant, sometimes with right. They confound law with counsel, who think that it is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their counsellors, but also to obey them; as though it were in vain to take counsel, unless it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between counsel and law, from the difference between counsel and command. Now counsel is a precept, in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing itself which is advised; but command is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the commander. For it is not properly said, thus I will and thus I command, except the will stand for a reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser’s will, the law is not a counsel, but a command, and is defined thus: law is the command of that person, whether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws. Law and counsel therefore differ many ways. Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth; counsel to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by law, is duty; what by counsel, is free-will. Counsel is directed to his end, that receives it; law, to his that gives it. Counsel is given to none but the willing; law even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the counsellor is made void by the will of him to whom he gives counsel; the right of the law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a law imposed.
How it differs from a covenant.
2. They confound law and covenant, who conceive the laws to be nothing else but certain ὁμολογήματα, or forms of living determined by the common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle, who defines law on this manner; Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is to say, law is a speech, limited according to the common consent of the city, declaring every thing that we ought to do. Which definition is not simply of law, but of the civil law. For it is manifest that the divine laws sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the laws of nature. For if they had their original from the consent of men, they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed, that is no right definition of a civil law. For in that place, a city is taken either for one civil person, having one will; or for a multitude of men, who have each of them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those words common consent are ill-placed here; for one person hath no common consent. Neither ought he to have said, declaring what was needful to be done, but commanding; for what the city declares, it commands its subjects. He therefore by a city understood a multitude of men, declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirmed by votes) some certain forms of living. But these are nothing else but some mutual contracts, which oblige not any man (and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power being constituted, which can compel, have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Laws therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but naked and weak contracts; which then at length, when there is one who by right doth exercise the supreme power, shall either become laws or no laws at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds contracts with laws, which he ought not to have done; for contract is a promise, law a command. In contracts we say, I will do this; in laws, do this. Contracts oblige us;[[16]] laws tie us fast, being obliged. A contract obligeth of itself; the law holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal contract of yielding obedience. Therefore in contract, it is first determined what is to be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in law, we are first obliged to perform, and what is to be done is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civil law thus: a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city, commanding everything behoveful to be done. Which is the same with that we have given above, in chap. VI. [art. 9]: to wit, that the civil laws are the command of him, whether man or court of men, who is endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future actions of his subjects.
How it differs from right.
3. They confound laws with right, who continue still to do what is permitted by divine right, notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civil law. That which is prohibited by the divine law, cannot be permitted by the civil; neither can that which is commanded by the divine law, be prohibited by the civil. Notwithstanding, that which is permitted by the divine right, that is to say, that which may be done by divine right, doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civil laws; for inferior laws may restrain the liberty allowed by the superior, although they cannot enlarge them. Now natural liberty is a right not constituted, but allowed by the laws. For the laws being removed, our liberty is absolute. This is first restrained by the natural and divine laws; the residue is bounded by the civil law; and what remains, may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular towns and societies. There is great difference therefore between law and right. For law is a fetter, right is freedom; and they differ like contraries.
The division of laws into divine and human; and of the divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into those laws of single men, and those of nations.
4. All law may be divided, first according to the diversity of its authors into divine and human. The divine, according to the two ways whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold; natural or moral, and positive. Natural is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born with them, to wit, their natural reason; and this is that law, which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold. Positive is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of prophecy, wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man. Such are the laws which he gave to the Jews concerning their government and divine worship; and they may be termed the divine civil laws, because they were peculiar to the civil government of the Jews, his peculiar people. Again, the natural law may be divided into that of men, which alone hath obtained the title of the law of nature; and that of cities, which may be called that of nations, but vulgarly it is termed the right of nations. The precepts of both are alike. But because cities once instituted do put on the personal proprieties of men, that law, which speaking of the duty of single men we call natural, being applied to whole cities and nations, is called the right of nations. And the same elements of natural law and right, which have hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole cities and nations, may be taken for the elements of the laws and right of nations.
The division of human, that is to say, civil laws into secular and sacred.
5. All human law is civil. For the state of men considered out of civil society, is hostile; in which, because one is not subject to another, there are no other laws beside the dictates of natural reason, which is the divine law. But in civil government the city only, that is to say, that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is committed, is the legislator; and the laws of the city are civil. The civil laws may be divided, according to the diversity of their subject matter, into sacred or secular. Sacred are those which pertain to religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies and worship of God: to wit, what persons, things, places, are to be consecrated, and in what fashion; what opinions concerning the Deity are to be taught publicly; and with what words and in what order supplications are to be made; and the like; and are not determined by any divine positive law. For the civil sacred laws are the human laws (which are also called ecclesiastical) concerning things sacred; but the secular, under a general notion, are usually called the civil laws.
Into distributive and vindicative.
6. Again, the civil law (according to the two offices of the legislator, whereof one is to judge, the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his judgments) hath two parts; the one distributive, the other vindicative or penal. By the distributive it is, that every man hath his proper rights; that is to say, it sets forth rules for all things, whereby we may know what is properly our’s, what another man’s; so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own, and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of their’s; and what is lawful for every man to do or omit, and what is not lawful. Vindicative is that, whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the law.
Distributive and vindicative are not two species of the laws.
7. Now distributive and vindicative are not two several species of the laws, but two parts of the same law. For if the law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you take with your net in the sea, be it yours, it is in vain. For although another should take that away from you which you have caught, it hinders not but that it still remains yours. For in the state of nature where all things are common to all, yours and others are all one; insomuch as what the law defines to be yours, was yours even before the law, and after the law ceases not to be yours, although in another man’s possession. Wherefore the law doth nothing, unless it be understood to be so yours, as all other men be forbidden to interrupt your free use and secure enjoyment of it at all times, according to your own will and pleasure. For this is that which is required to a propriety of goods; not that a man may be able to use them, but to use them alone; which is done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain do they also prohibit any men, who do not withal strike a fear of punishment into them. In vain therefore is the law, unless it contain both parts, that which forbids injuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of them, which is called distributive, is prohibitory, and speaks to all; the second, which is styled vindicative or penary, is mandatory, and only speaks to public ministers.
All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it.
8. From hence also we may understand, that every civil law hath a penalty annexed to it, either explicitly or implicitly. For where the penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example of any who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed law, there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary; namely, to depend on the will of the legislator, that is to say, of the supreme commander. For in vain is that law, which may be broken without punishment.
The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witnesses, are the civil laws.
9. Now because it comes from the civil laws, both that every man have his proper right and distinguished from another’s, and also that he is forbidden to invade another’s rights; it follows that these precepts: Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defined by the laws, unto thy parents: Thou shalt not kill the man, whom the laws forbid thee to kill: Thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden by the laws: Thou shalt not take away another’s goods, against the lords will: Thou shalt not frustrate the laws and judgments by false testimony: are civil laws. The natural laws command the same things, but implicitly. For the law of nature (as hath been said in chap. III. [art. 2]) commands us to keep contracts; and therefore also to perform obedience, when we have covenanted obedience, and to abstain from another’s goods, when it is determined by the civil law what belongs to another. But all subjects (by chap. VI. [art. 13]) do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme power, that is to say, the civil laws, in the very constitution of government, even before it is possible to break them. For the law of nature did oblige in the state of nature; where first, because nature hath given all things to all men, nothing did properly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to invade another’s right; next, where all things were common, and therefore all carnal copulations lawful; thirdly, where was the state of war, and therefore lawful to kill; fourthly, where all things were determined by every man’s own judgment, and therefore paternal respects also; lastly, where there were no public judgments, and therefore no use of bearing witness, either true or false.
It is not possible to command aught by the civil law, contrary to the laws of nature.
10. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws is more ancient than the promulgation of the laws themselves, as being contained in the very constitution of the city; by the virtue of the natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the law of nature commands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to obedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are universally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no civil law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Deity, (in respect of whom cities themselves have no right of their own, and cannot be said to make laws), can possibly be against the law of nature. For though the law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c; yet if the civil law command us to invade anything, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c. For when the Lacedæmonians of old permitted their youths, by a certain law, to take away other men’s goods, they commanded that these goods should not be accounted other men’s, but their own who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen sexes, according to their laws, were lawful marriages.
It is essential to a law, that both it and the legislator be known.
11. It is necessary to the essence of a law, that the subjects be acquainted with two things: first, what man or court hath the supreme power, that is to say, the right of making laws; secondly, what the law itself says. For he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tied to, cannot obey; and by consequence is in such a condition as if he were not tied at all. I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a law, that either one or the other be perpetually known, but only that it be once known. And if the subject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law, or the law itself, that makes him no less tied to obey; since he might have remembered it, had he a will to obey.
Whence the legislator is known.
12. The knowledge of the legislator depends on the subject himself; for the right of making laws could not be conferred on any man without his own consent and covenant, either expressed or supposed; expressed, when from the beginning the citizens do themselves constitute a form of governing the city, or when by promise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one; or supposed at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the realm and laws for their protection and conservation against others. For to whose dominion we require our fellow subjects to yield obedience for our good, his dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request. And therefore ignorance of the power of making laws, can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knows what he hath done himself.
Promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law.
13. The knowledge of the laws depends on the legislator; who must publish them; for otherwise they are not laws. For law is the command of the law-maker, and his command is the declaration of his will; it is not therefore a law, except the will of the law-maker be declared, which is done by promulgation. Now in promulgation two things must be manifest; whereof one is, that he or they who publish a law, either have a right themselves to make laws, or that they do it by authority derived from him or them who have it; the other is the sense of the law itself. Now, that the first, namely, published laws, proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from the mouth of the commander. The rest believe; but the reasons of their belief are so many, that it is scarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a democratical city, where every one may be present at the making of laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must believe those that were present. But in monarchies and aristocracies, because it is granted but to few to be present, and openly to hear the commands of the monarch or the nobles, it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest. And thus we believe those to be the edicts and decrees of princes, which are propounded to us for such, either by the writings or voices of them whose office it is to publish them. But yet, when we have these causes of belief; that we have seen the prince or supreme counsel constantly use such counsellors, secretaries, publishers, and seals, and the like arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any authority from them; that they have been punished, who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law; not only he who thus believing shall obey the edicts and decrees set forth by them, is everywhere excused, but he that not believing shall not yield obedience, is punished. For the constant permission of these things is a manifest sign enough and evident declaration of the commander’s will; provided there be nothing contained in the law, edict, or decree, derogatory from his supreme power. For it is not to be imagined that he would have aught taken from his power by any of his officers, as long as he retains a will to govern. Now the sense of the law, when there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes or judgments; for to judge, is nothing else than by interpretation to apply the laws to particular cases. Now we may know who they are that have this office granted them, in the same manner as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish laws.
The civil law divided into written and unwritten.
14. Again the civil law, according to its two-fold manner of publishing, is of two sorts, written and unwritten. By written, I understand that which wants a voice, or some other sign of the will of the legislator, that it may become a law. For all kind of laws are of the same age with mankind, both in nature and time; and therefore of more antiquity than the invention of letters, and the art of writing. Wherefore not a writing, but a voice is necessary for a written law; this alone is requisite to the being, that to the remembrance of a law. For we read, that before letters were found out for the help of memory, that laws, contracted into metre, were wont to be sung. The unwritten, is that which wants no other publishing than the voice of nature or natural reason; such are the laws of nature. For the natural law, although it be distinguished from the civil, forasmuch as it commands the will; yet so far forth as it relates to our actions, it is civil. For example, this same, thou shalt not covet, which only appertains to the mind, is a natural law only; but this, thou shalt not invade, is both natural and civil. For seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universal rules, whereby all future contentions, which perhaps are infinite, may be determined; it is to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written laws, the law of natural equity is to be followed, which commands us to distribute equally to equals; and this by the virtue of the civil law, which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly do actually transgress the laws of nature.
That the natural laws are not written laws, neither are the sentences of lawyers or customs laws of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power.
15. These things being understood, it appears, first, that the laws of nature, although they were described in the books of some philosophers, are not for that reason to be termed written laws: and that the writings of the interpreters of the laws, were no laws, for want of the supreme authority; nor yet those orations of the wise, that is to say, judges, but so far forth as by the consent of the supreme power they part into custom; and that then they are to be received among the written laws, not for the custom’s sake, (which by its own force doth not constitute a law), but for the will of the supreme commander; which appears in this, that he hath suffered his sentence, whether equal or unequal, to pass into custom.
What the word sin, taken in its largest sense, signifies.
16. Sin, in its largest signification, comprehends every deed, word, and thought against right reason. For every man, by reasoning, seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to himself. If therefore he reason right, that is to say, beginning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary, he will proceed in a most direct way. Otherwise he will go astray, that is to say, he will either do, say, or endeavour somewhat against his proper end; which when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred, but in action and will to have sinned. For sin follows error, just as the will doth the understanding. And this is the most general acception of the word; under which is contained every imprudent action, whether against the law, as to overthrow another man’s house, or not against the law, as to build his own upon the sand.
The definition[definition] of sin.
17. But when we speak of the laws, the word sin is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason, but that only which is blameable; and therefore it is called malum culpæ, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be culpable, it is not presently to be termed a sin or fault; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately after looks on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies, because they increase their honours, goods, and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife of honours which is among them; both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should say that all men account those things evil, to which they[they] have given names which are usually taken in an evil sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another, because of the equality of human nature; and there are no other reasons in being, but only those of particular men, and that of the city: it follows, that the city is to determine what with reason is culpable. So as a fault, that is to say, a sin, is that which a man does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of the city, that is, contrary to the laws.
The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice.
18. But a man may do somewhat against the laws through human infirmity, although he desire to fulfil them; and yet his action, as being against the laws, is rightly blamed, and called a sin. But there are some who neglect the laws; and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only the deeds, but even the minds of these men are against the laws. They who sin only through infirmity, are good men even when they sin; but these, even when they do not sin, are wicked. For though both the action and the mind be repugnant to the laws, yet those repugnances are distinguished by different appellations. For the irregularity of the action is called ἀδίκημα[ἀδίκημα], unjust deed; that of the mind ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, injustice and malice; that is the infirmity of a disturbed soul, this the pravity of a sober mind.
Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.
19. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some law, and that there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he will say: that he never submitted his will to God’s will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being: and granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech seems so far forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence;[[17]] but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is punished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted under God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps not the laws; but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring against God. For whosoever are not subject either to some common lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.
What the sin of treason is.
20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience (such as is defined above, chap. VI. [art. 13]) to the city, that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which trespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin always, is worse than to sin once. And this is that sin which is called treason; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or subject declares, that he will no longer obey that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted. And the subject declares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth or endeavours to do violence to the sovereign’s person, or to them who execute his commands. Of which sort are traitors, regicides, and such as take up arms against the city, or during a war fly to the enemy’s side. And they show the same will in word, who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tied to any such kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that we must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God entire) simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should say, that he had no right to wage war at his own will, to make peace, enlist soldiers, levy monies, elect magistrates and public ministers, enact laws, decide controversies, set penalties, or do aught else without which the state cannot stand. And these and the like words and deeds are treason by the natural, not the civil law. But it may so happen, that some action, which before the civil law was made, was not treason, yet will become such if it be done afterwards. As if it be declared by the law, that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience, that is to say, for treason, if any man shall coin monies, or forge the privy-seal; he that after that declaration shall do this, will be no less guilty of treason than the other. Yet he sins less, because he breaks not all the laws at once, but one law only. For the law by calling that treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons; but it makes not the sin itself more grievous.
Treason breaks not the civil, but the natural law.
21. But that sin, which by the law of nature is treason, is a transgression of the natural, not the civil law. For since our obligation to civil obedience, by virtue whereof the civil laws are valid, is before all civil law, and the sin of treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it follows, that by the sin of treason that law is broken which preceded the civil law, to wit, the natural, which forbids us to violate covenants and betrothed faith. But if some sovereign prince should set forth a law on this manner, thou shalt not rebel, he would effect just nothing. For except subjects were before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to rebel, all law is of no force. Now the obligation which obligeth to what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.
And therefore is punished not by the right of sovereignty, but by the right of war.
22. Hence it follows, that rebels, traitors, and all others convicted of treason, are punished not by civil, but natural right; that is to say, not as civil subjects, but as enemies to the government; not by the right of sovereignty and dominion, but by the right of war.
Obedience not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
23. There are some who think that those acts which are done against the law, when the punishment is determined by the law itself, are expiated, if the punished willingly undergo the punishment; and that they are not guilty before God of breaking the natural law, (although by breaking the civil laws, we break the natural too, which command us to keep the civil), who have suffered the punishment which the law required; as if by the law the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price, whereby a license might be bought of doing what the law forbids. By the same reason they might infer too, that no transgression of the law were a sin; but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own peril. But we must know, that the words of the law may be understood in a two-fold sense. The one as containing two parts, (as hath been declared above in [art. 7]), namely, that of absolutely prohibiting, as, thou shalt not do this; and revenging, as, he that doth this, shall be punished. The other, as containing a condition, for example, thou shalt not do this thing, unless thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus the law forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth it sins, because he doth what the law forbids to be done; if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to do what is forbidden him, that performs the condition. For in the first sense, all men are forbidden to do it; in the second, they only who keep themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative part of the law obligeth not the guilty, but the magistrate to require punishment; in the second, he himself that owes the punishment, is obliged to exact it; to the payment whereof, if it be capital or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what sense the law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath the sovereignty. When therefore there is any doubt of the meaning of the law, since we are sure they sin not who do it not, it will be sin if we do it, howsoever the law may afterward be explained. For to do that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he hath freedom to forbear it, is a contempt of the laws; and therefore by chap. III. [art. 28], a sin against the law of nature. Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into active and passive; as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by human decrees, which is a sin against the law of nature, which is the law of God; or as though they sinned not, who sin at their own peril.
[16]. Contracts oblige us.] To be obliged, and to be tied being obliged, seems to some men to be one and the same thing; and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the law.
[17]. Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence.] Many find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a God by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates; and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said, that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this; except they think, that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and honour; also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it; lastly, fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.