JOHN ADAMS TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.
Quincy, March 2, 1816.
Dear Sir,—I cannot be serious! I am about to write you the most frivolous letter you ever read.
Would you go back to your cradle and live over again your seventy years? I believe you would return me a New England answer, by asking me another question. Would you live your eighty years over again?
I am prepared to give you an explicit answer, the question involves so many considerations of metaphysics and physics, of theology and ethics, of philosophy and history, of experience and romance, of tragedy, comedy and farce, that I would not give my opinion without writing a volume to justify it.
I have lately lived over again, in part, from 1753, when I was junior sophister at college, till 1769, when I was digging in the mines as a barrister at law, for silver and gold, in the town of Boston; and got as much of the shining dross for my labor as my utmost avarice at that time craved.
At the hazard of all the little vision that is left me, I have read the history of that period of sixteen years, in the volumes of the Baron de Grimm. In a late letter to you, I expressed a wish to see a history of quarrels and calamities of authors in France, like that of D'Israeli in England. I did not expect it so soon; but now I have it in a manner more masterly than I ever hoped to see it. It is not only a narration of the incessant great wars between the ecclesiastics and the philosophers, but of the little skirmishes and squabbles of Poets, Musicians, Sculptors, Painters, Architects, Tragedians, Comedians, Opera-Singers and Dancers, Chansons, Vaudevilles, Epigrams, Madrigals, Epitaphs, Anagrams, Sonnets, &c. No man is more sensible than I am of the service to science and letters, Humanity, Fraternity and Liberty, that would have been rendered by the Encyclopedists and Economists, by Voltaire, D'Alembert, Buffon, Diderot, Rousseau La Lande, Frederick and Catherine, if they had possessed common sense. But they were all totally destitute of it. They all seemed to think that all christendom was convinced as they were, that all religion was "visions Judaicques," and that their effulgent lights had illuminated all the world. They seemed to believe, that whole nations and continents had been changed in their principles, opinions, habits and feelings, by the sovereign grace of their Almighty philosophy, almost as suddenly as Catholics and Calvinists believe in instantaneous conversion. They had not considered the force of early education on the millions of minds who had never heard of their philosophy. And what was their philosophy? Atheism; pure, unadulterated Atheism. Diderot, D'Alembert, Frederick, De La Lande and Grimm, were indubitable Atheists. The universe was matter only, and eternal; spirit was a word without a meaning; liberty was a word without a meaning. There was no liberty in the Universe; liberty was a word void of sense. Every thought, word, passion, sentiment, feeling, all motion and action was necessary. All beings and attributes were of eternal necessity; conscience, morality, were all nothing but fate.
This was their creed, and this was to perfect human nature, and convert the earth into a paradise of pleasure.
Who, and what is this fate? He must be a sensible fellow. He must be a master of science. He must be a master of spherical Trigonometry and great circle sailing. He must calculate eclipses in his head by intuition. He must be master of the science of infinitesimal—"Le science des infinimens petits." He must involve and extract all the roots by intuition, and be familiar with all possible or imaginable sections of the cone. He must be a master of arts, mechanical and imitative. He must have more eloquence than Demosthenes, more wit than Swift or Voltaire, more humor than Butler or Trumbull, and what is more comfortable than all the rest, he must be good natured; for this is upon the whole a good world. There is ten times as much pleasure as pain in it.
Why then should we abhor the word God, and fall in love with the word Fate? We know there exists energy and intellect enough to produce such a world as this, which is a sublime and beautiful one, and a very benevolent one, notwithstanding all our snarling; and a happy one, if it is not made otherwise by our own fault. Ask a mite, in the centre of your mammoth cheese, what he thinks of the "το παν."
I should prefer the philosophy of Timæus, of Locris, before that of Grimm and Diderot, Frederick and D'Alembert. I should even prefer the Shasta of Hindostan, or the Chaldean, Egyptian, Indian, Greek, Christian, Mahometan, Tubonic, or Celtic Theology. Timæus and Picellus taught that three principles were eternal, God, Matter and Form. God was good, and had ideas. Matter was necessity. Fate dead—without ideas—without form, without feeling—perverse, untractable; capable, however, of being cut into forms, spheres, circles, triangles, squares, cubes, cones, &c. The ideas of the good God labored upon matter to bring it into form; but matter was fate, necessity, dulness, obstinacy—and would not always conform to the ideas of the good God who desired to make the best of all possible worlds; but Matter, Fate, Necessity, resisted, and would not let him complete his idea. Hence all the evil and disorder, pain, misery and imperfection of the Universe.
We all curse Robespierre and Bonaparte, but were they not both such restless, vain, extravagant animals as Diderot and Voltaire? Voltaire was the greatest literary character, and Bonaparte the greatest military character of the eighteenth century. There is all the difference between them. Both equally heroes and equally cowards.
When you ask my opinion of a University—it would have been easy to advise Mathematics, experimental Philosophy, Natural History, Chemistry and Astronomy, Geography and the Fine Arts; to the exclusion of Metaphysics and Theology. But knowing the eager impatience of the human mind to search into eternity and infinity, the first cause and last end of all things—I thought best to leave it its liberty to inquire till it is convinced, as I have been these fifty years, that there is but one Being in the Universe who comprehends it; and our last resource is resignation.
This Grimm must have been in Paris when you were there. Did you know him, or hear of him?
I have this moment received two volumes more, but these are from 1777 to 1782,—leaving the chain broken from 1769 to 1777. I hope hereafter to get the two intervening volumes. I am your old friend.
March 13, 1816.
A writer in the National Intelligencer of February 24th, who signs himself B., is endeavoring to shelter under the cloak of General Washington, the present enterprise of the Senate to wrest from the House of Representatives the power, given them by the constitution, of participating with the Senate in the establishment and continuance of laws on specified subjects. Their aim is, by associating an Indian chief, or foreign government, in form of a treaty, to possess themselves of the power of repealing laws become obnoxious to them, without the assent of the third branch, although that assent was necessary to make it a law. We are then to depend for the secure possession of our laws, not on our immediate representatives chosen by ourselves, and amenable to ourselves every other year, but on Senators chosen by the legislatures, amenable to them only, and that but at intervals of six years, which is nearly the common estimate for a term for life. But no act of that sainted worthy, no thought of General Washington, ever countenanced a change of our constitution so vital as would be the rendering insignificant the popular, and giving to the aristocratical branch of our government, the power of depriving us of our laws.
The case for which General Washington is quoted is that of his treaty with the Creeks, wherein was a stipulation that their supplies of goods should continue to be imported duty free. The writer of this article was then a member of the legislature, as he was of that which afterwards discussed the British treaty, and recollects the facts of the day, and the ideas which were afloat. The goods for the supplies of the Creeks were always imported into the Spanish ports of St. Augustine, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, &c., (the United States not owning then one foot of coast on the gulf of Mexico, or south of St. Mary's,) and from these ports they were carried directly into the Creek country, without ever entering the jurisdiction of the United States. In that country their laws pretended to no more force than in Florida or Canada. No officer of their customs could go to levy duties in the Spanish or Creek countries, out of which these goods never came. General Washington's stipulation in that treaty therefore, was nothing more than that our laws should not levy duties where we have no right to levy them, that is, in foreign ports, or foreign countries. These transactions took place while the Creek deputation was in New York, in the month of July 1790, and in March preceding we had passed a law delineating specially the line between their country and ours. The only subject of curiosity is how so nugatory a stipulation should have been placed in a treaty? It was from the fears of Mr. Gillevray, who was the head of the deputation, who possessed from the Creeks themselves the exclusive right to supply them with goods, and to whom this monopoly was the principle source of income.
The same writer quotes from a note in Marshal's history, an opinion of Mr. Jefferson, given to General Washington on the same occasion of the Creek treaty. Two or three little lines only of that opinion are given us, which do indeed express the doctrine in broad and general terms. Yet we know how often a few words withdrawn from their place may seem to bear a general meaning, when their context would show that their meaning must have been limited to the subject with respect to which they were used. If we could see the whole opinion, it might probably appear that its foundation was the peculiar circumstances of the Creek nation. We may say too, on this opinion, as on that of a judge whose positions beyond the limits of the case before him are considered as obiter sayings, never to be relied on as authority.
In July '90, moreover, the government was but just getting under way. The duty law was not passed until the succeeding month of August. This question of the effect of a treaty was then of the first impression; and none of us, I suppose, will pretend that on our first reading of the constitution we saw at once all its intentions, all the bearings of every word of it, as fully and as correctly as we have since understood them, after they have become subjects of public investigation and discussion; and I well remember the fact that, although Mr. Jefferson had retired from office before Mr. Jay's mission, and the question on the British treaty, yet during its discussion we were well assured of his entire concurrence in opinion with Mr. Madison and others who maintained the rights of the House of Representatives, so that, if on a primâ facie view of the question, his opinion had been too general, on stricter investigation, and more mature consideration, his ultimate opinion was with those who thought that the subjects which were confided to the House of Representatives in conjunction with the President and Senate, were exceptions to the general treaty power given to the President and Senate alone; (according to the general rule that an instrument is to be so construed as to reconcile and give meaning and effect to all its parts;) that whenever a treaty stipulation interferes with a law of the three branches, the consent of the third branch is necessary to give it effect; and that there is to this but the single exception of the question of war and peace. There the constitution expressly requires the concurrence of the three branches to commit us to the state of war, but permits two of them, the President and Senate, to change it to that of peace, for reasons as obvious as they are wise. I think then I may affirm, in contradiction to B., that the present attempt of the Senate is not sanctioned by the opinion either of General Washington or of Mr. Jefferson.
I meant to confine myself to the case of the Creek treaty, and not to go into the general reasoning, for after the logical and demonstrative arguments of Mr. Wilde of Georgia, and others on the floor of Congress, if any man remains unconvinced I pretend not the powers of convincing him.