A.

January 7, 1793.

Sir:—I have, herewith, enclosed the result of our assays, &c., of the coins of France, England, Spain, and Portugal. In the course of the experiments, a very small source of error was detected, too late for the present occasion, but which will be carefully guarded against in future.

I am, with the most perfect esteem, your most obedient humble servant,

DAVID RITTENHOUSE, Director of the Mint.

Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State.

B.

Assay of gold coins.

DateIn 24 grains.Specific gravity.
Fine gold.Alloy.
grs.32 pts.grs.32 pts.
French guineas,{1726211621617.48
{1734211921317.38
{1742212620617.58
{1753210322917.23
{1775212221017.57
Double do.{1786212221017.51
{1789212221017.50
{1790212520717.57
Spanish pistoles,{1776212121117.53
{1780210030017.57
{1786211821417.63
{1788210223017.00
English guineas,{1755212820417.78
{1777213120117.75
{1785213020217.78
{1788213120117.79
{1789220312917.78
{1791220113117.74
Half johannes of Portugal,{1739213120117.63
{1770220512717.78
{1776220512717.87
{1785213020217.68
{1788213120117.78

Silver coins.

DateIn 12 ounces.
Fine silver.Alloy.
oz.dwts.grs.oz.dwts.grs.
English half-crown of William III.101909½10014½
English shilling,1787110002½01921½
French crown,179110160010400
French half-crown,173910170010300
French half-crown,179210161910305
Spanish dollar of{177210150510419
{1782101402½10521½
{179010140010600
{1791101421½10502½

Mint, January 7, 1793.

Assayed by Mr. David Ott, under my inspection, at the mint, in pursuance of a resolution of Congress of November 29, 1792. I have added the specific gravity of each piece of gold coin.

DAVID RITTENHOUSE, Director of the Mint.

XXXII.——Report on the petition of John Rogers, relative to certain lands on the north-east side of the Tennessee.

February 16, 1793.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred, by the House of Representatives of the United States, the petition of John Rogers, setting forth, that as an officer of the State of Virginia, during the last war, he became entitled to two thousand acres of lands on the north-east side of the Tennessee, at its confluence with the Ohio, and to two thousand four hundred acres in different parcels, between the same river and the Mississippi, all of them within the former limit of Virginia, which lands were allotted to him under an act of the Legislature of Virginia, before its deed of cession to the United States; that by the treaty of Hopewell, in 1786, the part of the country comprehending these lands was ceded to the Chickasaw Indians; and praying compensation for the same,

Reports, That the portion of country comprehending the said parcels of land, has been ever understood to be claimed, and has certainly been used, by the Chickasaw and Cherokee Indians for their hunting grounds. The Chickasaws holding exclusively from the Mississippi to the Tennessee, and extending their claim across that river, eastwardly, into the claims of the Cherokees, their conterminous neighbors.

That the government of Virginia was so well apprized of the rights of the Chickasaws to a portion of country within the limit of that State, that about the year 1780, they instructed their agent, residing with the southern Indians, to avail himself of the first opportunity which should offer, to purchase the same from them, and that, therefore, any act of that Legislature allotting these lands to their officers and soldiers must probably have been passed on the supposition, that a purchase of the Indian right could be made, which purchase, however, has never been made.

That, at the treaty of Hopewell, the true boundary between the United States on the one part, and the Cherokees and Chickasaws on the other, was examined into and acknowledged, and by consent of all parties, the unsettled limits between the Cherokees and Chickasaws were at the same time ascertained, and in that part particularly, were declared to be the highlands dividing the waters of the Cumberland and Tennessee, whereby the whole of the petitioner's locations were found to be in the Chickasaw country.

That the right of occupation of the Cherokees and Chickasaws in this portion of the country, having never been obtained by the United States, or those under whom they claim it, cannot be said to have been ceded by them at the treaty of Hopewell, but only recognized as belonging to the Chickasaws, and retained to them.

That the country south of the Ohio was formerly contested between the Six Nations and the southern Indians for hunting grounds.

That the Six Nations sold for a valuable consideration to the then government their right to that country, describing it as extending from the mouth of the Tennessee upwards. That no evidence can at this time and place be procured, as to the right of the southern Indians, that is to say, the Cherokees and Chickasaws, to the same country; but it is believed that they voluntarily withdrew their claims within the Cumberland river, retaining their right so far, which consequently could not be conveyed from them, or to us, by the act of the Six Nations, unless it be proved that the Six Nations had acquired a right to the country between the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers by conquest over the Cherokees and Chickasaws, which it is believed cannot be proved.

That, therefore, the locations of the petitioner must be considered as made within the Indian territory, and insusceptible of being reduced into his possession, till the Indian right be purchased.

That this places him on the same footing with Charles Russell and others, officers of the same State, who had located their bounty lands in like manner, within the Chickasaw lines, whose case was laid before the House of Representatives of the United States at the last session, and remains undecided on; and that the same and no other measure should be dealt to this petitioner which shall be provided for them.

XXXIII.—Report relative to the Boundaries of the Lands between the Ohio and the Lakes acquired by treaties from the Indians.

March 10, 1793.

The Secretary of State, according to instructions received from the President of the United States,

Reports, That, for the information of the commissioners appointed to treat with the western Indians, he has examined the several treaties entered into with them subsequent to the declaration of Independence, and relating to the lands between the Ohio and the lakes, and also the extent of the grants, reservations, and appropriations of the same lands, made either by the United States, or by individual States within the same period, and finds that the lands obtained by the said treaties, and not so granted, reserved, or appropriated, are bounded by the following lines, to wit:

Northwardly. By a line running from the fork of the Tuscarora's branch of the Muskingum, at the crossing-place above Fort Lawrence. Westwardly (towards the portage of the Big-Miami) to the main branch of that river, then down the Miami, to the fork of that river next below the old fort, which was taken by the French in 1752, thence due west to the river De la Panse, and down that river to the Wabash; which lines were established with the Wiandots, Delawares, Chippawas, and Ottawas, by the treaty of Fort McIntosh, and with the Shawanese by that of the Great Miami.

Westwardly. By the bounds of the Wabash Indians.

Eastwardly. By the million of acres appropriated to military claimants, by the resolution of Congress of October 23, 1787, and lying in the angle between the seventh range of townships counted westwardly, from the Pennsylvania boundary, and the tenth range counted from the Ohio northwardly along the said seventh, which million of acres may perhaps extend westwardly, so as to comprehend the twelfth range of townships, counted in that direction from the Pennsylvania boundary, under which view the said twelfth range may be assumed for the eastern boundary of the territory now under consideration, from the said tenth range to the Indian line.

Southwardly. By the northern boundary of the said tenth range of townships to the Sioto river, and along the said river to what shall be the northern limits of the appropriations for the Virginia line; (which two last lines are those of the lands granted to the Sioto company,) thence along what shall be the northern limits of the said appropriations of the Virginia line to the little Miami, and along the same to what shall be the northern limit of one million of acres of land purchased by John C. Symmes; thence due west along the said northern limit of the said John C. Symmes, to the Great Miami, and down the same to its mouth, then along the Ohio to General Clark's lands, and round the said lands to the Ohio again, and down the same to the Wabash, or the lands of the Indians inhabiting it. Which several lines are delineated on the copy of Hutchins' map accompanying this report; the dotted parts of the delineation denoting that they are conjectural. And it is further necessary to apprize the commissioners that though the points at which these several lines touches the Ohio, are taken from actual surveys, yet the country included by the said lines, not being laid down from actual survey, their lengths and intersections with each other, and with the watercourses, as appearing in the maps, are not at all to be relied on. No notice is here taken of the lands at the mouth of the Ohio appropriated for military bounties by the same resolution of Congress of October 22, 1787, nor of the settlement of Cahokea, Kaskaskia, Post Vincennes, &c., because these can concern no Indians but those of the Illinois and Wabash, whose interests should be transacted with themselves separately, and not be permitted to be placed under the patronage of the western Indians.

XXXIV.—Report on the proceedings of the Secretary of State to transfer to Europe the annual fund of $40,000, appropriated to that Department.

April 18, 1793.

The Secretary of State thinking it his duty to communicate to the President his proceedings of the present year for transferring to Europe the annual fund of $40,000 appropriated to the Department of State, (a report whereof, was unnecessary the two former years, as monies already in the hands of our bankers in Europe were put under his orders,)

Reports, That in consequence of the President's order of March 23d, he received from the Secretary of the Treasury, March 31st, a warrant on the Treasurer for $39,500; that it being necessary to purchase private bills of exchange to transfer the money to Europe, he consulted with persons acquainted with that business, who advised him not to let it be known that he was to purchase bills at all, as it would raise the exchange; and to defer the purchase a few days until the British packet should be gone, on which event bills generally sunk some few per cent. He therefore deferred the purchase, or giving any orders for it till April 10th, when he engaged Mr. Vaughan (whose line of business enabled him to do it without suspicion,) to make the purchase for him. He then delivered the warrant to the Treasurer, and received a credit at the Bank of the United States for $39,500, whereon he had an account opened between "The Department of State and the Bank of the United States." That Mr. Vaughan procured for him the next day the following bills:

Willing, Morris, and Swanwich, on John and Francis Baring & Co., London, £3,000=$13,000.

Walter Stewart on Joseph Birch, March, Liverpool, £400=$1,733 33.

Robert Gilmer & Co., on James Strachan and James Mackenzie, London, endorsed by Mordecai Lewis.

£200 }£600$2,600
150 }
250 }
£4,000 = $17,333 33.

Averaging 4s. 7 38⁄100d. the dollar, or about 2½ per cent. above par, which added to the one per cent loss heretofore always sustained on the government bills (which allowed but 99 florins, instead of 100 do. for every $40) will render the fund somewhat larger this year than heretofore; that these bills being drawn on London, (for none could be got on Amsterdam but to considerable loss, added to the risk of the present possible situation of that place), he had them made payable to Mr. Pinckney, and enclosed them to him by Captain Cutting, in the letter of April 12th, now communicated to the President, and at the same time wrote the letters of the same date to our bankers at Amsterdam and to Col. Humphreys, now also communicated to the President, which will place under his view the footing on which this business is put, and which is still subject to any change he may think proper to direct, as neither the letters, nor bills are yet gone.

The Secretary of State proposes, hereafter, to remit in the course of each quarter $10,000 for the ensuing quarter, as that will enable him to take advantage of the times when exchange is low. He proposes to direct, at this time, a further purchase of $12,166 66, (which with the $500 formerly obtained and $17,333 33 now remitted, will make $30,000 of this year's fund,) at long sight, which circumstance with the present low rate of exchange, will enable him to remit it to advantage.

He has only further to add that he delivered to Mr. Vaughan orders on the bank of the United States in favor of the persons themselves from whom the bills were purchased, for their respective sums.

XXXV.—Opinion on the question whether the United States have a right to renounce their treaties with France, or to hold them suspended till the government of that country shall be established.

April 28, 1793.

I proceed in compliance with the requisition of the President to give an opinion in writing on the general question, whether the United States have a right to renounce their treaties with France, or to hold them suspended till the government of that country shall be established?

In the consultation at the President's on the 19th inst., the Secretary of the Treasury took the following positions and consequences. France was a monarchy when we entered into treaties with it; but it has declared itself a republic, and is preparing a republican form of government. As it may issue in a republic or a military despotism, or something else which may possibly render our alliance with it dangerous to ourselves, we have a right of election to renounce the treaty altogether, or to declare it suspended till their government shall be settled in the form it is ultimately to take; and then we may judge whether we will call the treaties into operation again, or declare them forever null. Having that right of election, now, if we receive their minister without any qualifications, it will amount to an act of election to continue the treaties; and if the change they are undergoing should issue in a form which should bring danger on us, we shall not be then free to renounce them. To elect to continue them is equivalent to the making a new treaty, at this time, in the same form, that is to say, with a clause of guarantee; but to make a treaty with a clause of guarantee, during a war, is a departure from neutrality, and would make us associates in the war. To renounce or suspend the treaties, therefore, is a necessary act of neutrality.

If I do not subscribe to the soundness of this reasoning, I do most fully to its ingenuity. I shall now lay down the principles which, according to my understanding, govern the case.

I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation; as free to transact their common concerns by any agents they think proper; to change these agents individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever they please; that all the acts done by these agents under the authority of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory to them and enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it, consequently the treaties between the United States and France, were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of America and France; and the nations remaining in existence, though both of them have since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes. The law of nations, by which this question is to be determined, is composed of three branches. 1. The moral law of our nature. 2. The usages of nations. 3. Their special conventions. The first of these only concerns this question, that is to say the moral law to which man has been subjected by his creator, and of which his feelings or conscience, as it is sometimes called, are the evidence with which his creator has furnished him. The moral duties which exist between individual and individual in a state of nature, accompany them into a state of society, and the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other; so that between society and society the same moral duties exist as did between the individuals composing them, while in an unassociated state, and their maker not having released them from those duties on their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts then, between nation and nation, are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts. There are circumstances, however, which sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts between man and man; so are there also between nation and nation. When performance, for instance, becomes impossible, non-performance is not immoral; so if performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation in others. For the reality of these principles I appeal to the true fountains of evidence, the head and heart of every rational and honest man. It is there nature has written her moral laws, and where every man may read them for himself. He will never read there the permission to annul his obligations for a time, or forever, whenever they become dangerous, useless, or disagreeable; certainly not when merely useless or disagreeable, as seems to be said in an authority which has been quoted, (Vattel, p. 2, 197) and though he may, under certain degrees of danger, yet the danger must be imminent, and the degree great. Of these, it is true, that nations are to be judges for themselves; since no one nation has a right to sit in judgment over another, but the tribunal of our consciences remains, and that also of the opinion of the world. These will revise the sentence we pass in our own case, and as we respect these, we must see that in judging ourselves we have honestly done the part of impartial and rigorous judges.

But reason which gives this right of self-liberation from a contract in certain cases, has subjected it to certain just limitations.

I. The danger which absolves us must be great, inevitable and imminent. Is such the character of that now apprehended from our treaties with France? What is that danger? 1st. Is it that if their government issues in a military despotism, an alliance with them may taint us with despotic principles? But their government when we allied ourselves to it, was perfect despotism, civil, and military, yet the treaties were made in that very state of things, and, therefore, that danger can furnish no just cause.

2d. Is it that their government may issue in a republic, and too much strengthen our republican principles? But this is the hope of the great mass of our constituents, and not their dread. They do not look with longing to the happy mean of a limited monarchy.

3d. But, says the doctrine I am combatting, the change the French are undergoing, may possibly end in something we know not what, and may bring on us danger we know not whence. In short, it may end in a Raw-head and bloody bones in the dark. Very well—let Raw-head and bloody bones come. We shall be justified in making our peace with him by renouncing our ancient friends and his enemies; for observe, it is not the possibility of danger which absolves a party from his contract for that possibility always exists, and in every case. It existed in the present one, at the moment of making the contract. If possibilities would void contracts, there never could be a valid contract, for possibilities hang over everything. Obligation is not suspended till the danger is become real, and the moment of it so imminent, that we can no longer avoid decision without forever losing the opportunity to do it. But can a danger which has not yet taken its shape, which does not yet exist, and never may exist which cannot therefore be defined—can such a danger, I ask, be so imminent that if we fail to pronounce on it in this moment, we can never have another opportunity of doing it?

4. As to the danger apprehended, Is it that (the treaties remaining valid) the clause guaranteeing their West Indian lands will engage us in the war? But does the guarantee engage us to enter into the war on any event? Are we to enter into it before we are called on by our allies?

Have we been called on by them? Shall we ever be called on?

Is it their interest to call on us?

Can they call on us before their islands are invaded, or immediately threatened?

If they can save them themselves, have they a right to call on us?

Are we obliged to go to war at once, without trying peaceable negotiations with their enemy?

If all these questions are against us, there are still others left behind.

Are we in a condition to go to war?

Can we be expected to begin before we are in condition?

Will the islands be lost if we do not save them?

Have we the means of saving them?

If we cannot save them, are we bound to go to war for a desperate object?

Many, if not most of these questions offer grounds of doubt whether the clause of guarantee will draw us into the war. Consequently, if this be danger apprehended, it is not yet certain enough to authorize us in sound morality to declare, at this moment, the treaties null.

5. Is danger apprehended from the 17th article of the treaty of commerce, which admits French ships of war and privateers to come and go freely, with prizes made on their enemies, while their enemies are not to have the same privilege with prizes made on the French? But Holland and Prussia have approved of this article in our treaty with France, by subscribing to an express salvo of it in our treaties with them. (Dutch treaty 22, convention 6. Prussian treaty 19.) And England, in her last treaty with France, (Art. 40,) has entered into the same stipulation verbatim, and placed us in her ports on the same footing in which she is in ours, in case of a war of either of us with France. If we are engaged in such a war, England must receive prizes made on us by the French, and exclude those made on the French by us. Nay, further; in this very article of her treaty with France, is a salvo of any similar article in any anterior treaty of either party; and ours with France being anterior, this salvo confirms it expressly. Neither of these three powers, then, have a right to complain of this article in our treaty.

6. Is the danger apprehended from the 22d article of our treaty of commerce, which prohibits the enemies of France from fitting out privateers in our posts, or selling their prizes here; but we are free to refuse the same thing to France, there being no stipulation to the contrary; and we ought to refuse it on principles of fair neutrality.

7. But the reception of a minister from the republic of France, without qualifications, it is thought, will bring us into danger; because this, it is said, will determine the continuance of the treaty, and take from us the right of self-liberation, when at any time hereafter our safety would require us to use it. The reception of the minister at all, (in favor of which Colonel Hamilton has given his opinion, though reluctantly, as he confessed,) is an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their government; and if the qualifications meditated are to deny that legitimacy, it will be a curious compound which is to admit and to deny the same thing. But I deny that the reception of a minister has any thing to do with the treaties. There is not a word in either of them about sending ministers. This has been done between us under the common usage of nations, and can have no effect either to continue or annul the treaties.

But how can any act of election have the effect to continue a treaty which is acknowledged to be going on still?—for it was not pretended the treaty was void, but only voidable if we choose to declare it so. To make it void, would require an act of election, but to let it go on, requires only that we should do nothing; and doing nothing can hardly be an infraction of peace or neutrality.

But I go further and deny that the most explicit declaration made at this moment that we acknowledge the obligation of the treaties, could take from us the right of non-compliance at any future time, when compliance would involve us in great and inevitable danger.

I conclude, then, that few of these sources threaten any danger at all; and from none of them is it inevitable; and consequently, none of them give us the right at this moment of releasing ourselves from our treaties.

II. A second limitation on our right of releasing ourselves, is that we are to do it from so much of the treaties only as is bringing great and inevitable danger on us, and not from the residue, allowing the other party a right at the same time, to determine whether on our non-compliance with that part, they will declare the whole void. This right they would have, but we should not. Vattel, 2. 202. The only part of the treaty which can really lead us into danger, is the clause of guarantee. That clause is all that we could suspend in any case, and the residue will remain or not at the will of the other party.

III. A third limitation is that when a party from necessity or danger withholds compliance with part of a treaty, it is bound to make compensation where the nature of the case admits and does not dispense with it. 2 Vattel, 324. Wolf, 270. 443. If actual circumstances excuse us from entering into the war under the clause of guarantee, it will be a question whether they excuse us from compensation. Our weight in the war admits of an estimate; and that estimate would form the measure of compensation.

If, in withholding a compliance with any part of the treaties we do it without just cause or compensation, we give to France a cause of war, and so become associated in it on the other side. An injured friend is the bitterest of foes, and France has not discovered either timidity, or over-much forbearance on the late occasions. Is this the position we wish to take for our constituents? It is certainly not the one they would take for themselves.

I will proceed now to examine the principal authority which has been relied on for establishing the right of self-liberation; because though just in part, it would lead us far beyond justice, if taken in all the latitude of which his expressions would admit. Questions of natural right are triable by their conformity with the moral sense and reason of man. Those who write treatises of natural law, can only declare what their own moral sense and reason dictate in the several cases they state. Such of them as happen to have feelings and a reason coincident with those of the wise and honest part of mankind, are respected and quoted as witnesses of what is morally right or wrong in particular cases. Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolf, and Vattel are of this number. Where they agree their authority is strong; but where they differ, (and they often differ,) we must appeal to our own feelings and reason to decide between them. The passages in question shall be traced through all these writers; that we may see wherein they concur, and where that concurrence is wanting. It shall be quoted from them in the order in which they wrote, that is to say, from Grotius first, as being the earliest writer, Puffendorf next, then Wolf, and lastly Vattel, as latest in time.

Grotius 2. 16. 16. Puffendorf 8. 9. 6. Wolf 1146. Vattel 2. 197.
Hither must be referred the common question concerning personal and real treaties. If indeed it be with a free people, there can be no doubt but that the engagement is in its nature real, because the subject is a permanent thing, and even though the government of the State be changed into a kingdom, the treaty remains; because the same body remains though the head is changed; and as it was before now, the government which is exercised by a king does not cease to be the government of the people. There is an exception when the object seems peculiar to the government, as if free cities contract a league for the defence of their freedom. It is certain that every alliance made with a republic is real in its nature, and continues consequently to the terms agreed on by the treaty, although the magistrates who concluded it be dead before, so that the form of government is changed even from a democracy to a monarchy, for in this case the people do not cease to be the same, and the king, in the case supposed, being established by the consent of the people who abolished the republican government, is understood to accept the crown with all the engagements which the people confessing it had contracted as being free and governing themselves. There must nevertheless be an exception of the alliances contracted with a view to preserve the present government; as if two republics league for mutual defence against those who would undertake to invade their liberty; for if one of these two people consent afterwards voluntarily to change the form of the government, the alliance ends of itself, because the reason on which it was founded no longer subsists. The alliance which is made with a free people, or with a popular government, is a real alliance; and as when the form of government changes, the people remain the same (for it is the association which forms the people, and not the manner of administering the government). This alliance subsists, though the form of government changes, unless, as is evident, the reason of the alliance was particular to the popular state. The same question presents itself in real alliances, and in general on every alliance made with a State, and not in particular with a king for the defence of his person. We ought, without doubt, to defend our ally against all invasion, against all foreign violence, and even against rebel subjects. We ought, in like manner, to defend a republic against the enterprises of an oppressor of the public liberty. But we ought to recollect that we are the ally of the state or of the nation, and not its judge. If the nation has deposed its king in form; if the people of a republic have driven away its magistrates, and have established themselves free, or if they have acknowledged the authority of an usurper, whether expressly or tacitly, to oppose these domestic arrangements—to contest their justice or validity—would be to meddle with the government of the nation, and to do it an injury. The ally remains the ally of the state, notwithstanding the change which has taken place; but if this change renders the alliance useless, dangerous, or disagreeable to it, it is free to renounce it; for it may say with truth, that it would not have allied itself with this nation, if it had been under the present form of its government.

The doctrine then of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf is, that "treaties remain obligatory, notwithstanding any change in the form of government, except in the single case, where the preservation of that form was the object of the treaty;" there the treaty extinguishes, not by the election or declaration of the party remaining in statu quo, but independently of that, by the evanishment of the object. Vattel lays down in fact the same doctrine, that treaties continue obligatory, notwithstanding a change of government by the will of the other party;—that to oppose that will would be a wrong; and that the ally remains an ally, notwithstanding the change. So far he concurs with all the previous writers:—but he then adds what they had not said nor could say; but if this change renders the alliance useless, dangerous or disagreeable to it, it is free to renounce it. It was unnecessary for him to have specified the exception of danger in this particular case, because the exception exists in all cases, and its extent has been considered; but when he adds that, because a contract is become merely useless or disagreeable we are free to renounce it,—he is in opposition to Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf, who admit no such license against the obligation of treaties, and he is in opposition to the morality of every honest man to whom we may safely appeal to decide whether he feels himself free to renounce a contract the moment it becomes merely useless or disagreeable to him. We may appeal to Vattel himself in those parts of his book where he cannot be misunderstood, and to his known character, as one of the most zealous and constant advocates for the preservation of good faith in all our dealings. Let us hear him on other occasions; and first where he shows what degree of danger or injury will authorize self-liberation from a treaty: "If simple lesion," (lesion—the loss sustained by selling a thing for less than half value, which degree of loss renders the sale void by the Roman law,) "if simple lesion," says he, "or some degree of disadvantage in a treaty does not suffice to render it invalid, it is not so as to inconvenience which would go to the ruin of the nation. As every treaty ought to be made by sufficient power, a treaty pernicious to the State is null, and not at all obligatory. No governor of a nation having power to engage things capable of destroying the State, for the safety of which the empire entrusts to him, the nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever its preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to its indispensable obligations." Here then we find that the degree of injury or danger which he deems sufficient to liberate us from a treaty, is that which would go to the absolute ruin or destruction of the State;—not simply the lesion of the Roman law, not merely the being disadvantageous or dangerous; for as he himself says, Section 158, "lesion cannot render a treaty invalid. It is his duty who enters into engagements, to weigh well all things before he concludes. He may do with his property what he pleases. He may relinquish his rights or renounce his advantages, as he judges proper. The acceptant is not obliged to inform himself of his motives nor to weigh then just value. If we could free ourselves from a compact because we find ourselves injured by it, there would be nothing firm in the contracts of nations. Civil laws may set limits to lesion, and determine the degree capable of producing a nullity of the contract; but sovereigns acknowledge no judge. How establish lesion among them? Who will determine the degree sufficient to invalidate a treaty? The happiness and peace of nations require manifestly that their treaties should not depend on a means of nullity so vague and so dangerous."

Let us hear him again on the general subject of the observation of treaties, Section 163: "It is demonstrated in natural law that he who promises another, confers on him a perfect right to require the thing promised, and that consequently, not to observe a perfect promise is to violate the right of another; it is as manifest injustice as to plunder any one of their right. All the tranquillity, the happiness and security of mankind, rest on justice or the obligation to respect the rights of others. The respect of others for our right of domain and property is the security of our actual possessions. The faith of promises is the security for the things which cannot be delivered or executed on the spot. No more security, no more commerce among men, if they think themselves not bound to preserve faith, to keep their word. This obligation, then, is as necessary as it is natural and indubitable among nations who live together in a state of nature, and who acknowledge no superior on earth. To maintain order and peace in their society, nations and their governors then ought to observe inviolably their promises and their treaties. This is a great truth, although too often neglected in practice, is generally acknowledged by all nations, the reproach of perfidy is a bitter affront among sovereigns. Now he who does not observe a treaty is assuredly perfidious, since he violates his faith. On the contrary, nothing is so glorious to a prince and his nation as the reputation of inviolable fidelity to his word." Again, Section 219, "Who will doubt that treaties are of the things sacred among nations? They decide matters the most important; they impose rules on the pretensions of sovereigns, they cause the rights of nations to be acknowledged; they assume their most precious interests. Among political bodies, sovereigns, who acknowledge no superior on earth, treaties are the only means of adjusting their different pretensions; of establishing a rule, to know on what to count, on what to depend. But treaties are but vain words, if nations do not consider them as respectable engagements, as rules inviolable for sovereigns, and sacred through the whole earth." Section 220: "The faith of treaties, that firm and sincere will, that invincible constancy in fulfilling engagements, of which a declaration is made in a treaty, is then holy and sacred among nations, whose safety and repose it ensures; and if nations will not be wanting to themselves, they will load with infamy whoever violates his faith."

After evidence so copious and explicit of the respect of this author for the sanctity of treaties, we should hardly have expected that his authority would have been resorted to for a wanton invalidation of them whenever they should become merely useless or disagreeable. We should hardly have expected that, rejecting all the rest of his book, this scrap would have been culled and made the hook whereon to hang such a chain of immoral consequences. Had the passage accidentally met our eye, we should have imagined it had fallen from the author's pen under some momentary view, not sufficiently developed to found a conjecture what he meant, and we may certainly affirm that a fragment like this cannot weigh against the authority of all other writers; against the uniform and systematic doctrine of the very work from which it is torn; against the moral feelings and the reason of all honest men. If the terms of the fragment are not misunderstood, they are in full contradiction to all the written and unwritten evidences of morality. If they are misunderstood, they are no longer a foundation for the doctrines which have been built on them.

But even had this doctrine been as true as it is manifestly false, it would have been asked, to whom is it that the treaties with France have become disagreeable? How will it be proved that they are useless?

The conclusion of the sentence suggests a reflection too strong to be suppressed, "for the party may say with truth that it would not have allied itself with this nation if it had been under the present form of its government." The republic of the United States allied itself with France when under a despotic government. She changes her government, and declares it shall be a republic; prepares a form of republic extremely free, and in the meantime is governing herself as such. And it is proposed that America shall declare the treaties void, because it may say with truth that it would not have allied itself with that nation if it had been under the present form of its government. Who is the American who can say with truth that he would not have allied himself to France if she had been a republic? Or that a republic of any form would be as disagreeable as her ancient despotism?

Upon the whole I conclude, that the treaties are still binding, notwithstanding the change of government in France; that no part of them but the clause of guarantee holds up danger, even at a distance, and consequently that a liberation from no other part would be prepared in any case; that if that clause may ever bring danger, it is neither extreme nor imminent, nor even probable that the authority for renouncing a treaty, when useless or disagreeable, is either misunderstood or in opposition to itself, to all other writers, and to every moral feeling; that were it not so, these treaties are in fact neither useless or disagreeable; that the receiving a minister from France at this time is an act of no significance with respect to the treaties, amounting neither to an admission nor denial of them, forasmuch as he comes not under any stipulation in them; that were it an explicit admission, or were it an express declaration of their obligation now to be made, it would not take from us that right which exists at all times, of liberating ourselves when an adherence to the treaties would be ruinous or destructive to the society; and that the not renouncing the treaties now is so far from being a breach of neutrality, that the doing it would be the breach, by giving just cause of war to France.

XXXVI.—Opinion relative to granting of passports to American vessels.

May 3, 1793.

It has been stated in our treaties with the French, Dutch and Prussians, that when it happens that either party is at war, and the other neutral, the neutral shall give passports of a certain tenor to the vessels belonging to their subjects, in order to avoid dissension; and it has been thought that passports of such high import to the persons and property of our citizens should have the highest sanction; that of the signature of the President, and seal of the United States. The authority of Congress also, in the case of sea letters to East India vessels, was in favor of this sanction. It is now become a question whether these passports shall be given only to ships owned and built in the United States, or may be given also to those owned in the United States, though built in foreign countries.

The persons and property of our citizens are entitled to the protection of our government in all places where they may lawfully go. No laws forbid a merchant to buy, own, and use a foreign-built vessel. She is, then, his lawful property, and entitled to the protection of his nation whenever he is lawfully using her.

The laws indeed, for the encouragement of ship building, have given to home-built vessels the exclusive privilege of being registered and paying lighter duties. To this privilege, therefore, the foreign-built vessel, though owned at home, does not pretend. But the laws have not said that they withdraw their protection from the foreign-built vessel. To this protection, then, she retains her title, notwithstanding the preference given to the home-built vessel as to duties. It would be hard indeed because the law has given one valuable right to home-built vessels, to infer that it had taken away all rights from those foreign-built.

In conformity with the idea that all the vessels of a State are entitled to its protection, the treaties before mentioned have settled that passports shall be given, not merely to the vessels built in the United States, but to the vessels belonging to them; and when one of these nations shall take a vessel, if she has not such a passport, they are to conclude she does not belong to the United States, and is therefore lawful prize; so that to refuse these passports to foreign-built vessels belonging to our merchants, is to give them up to capture with their cargoes. The most important interests of the United States hang upon this question. The produce of the earth is their principle source of wealth. Our home-built vessels would suffice for the transportation of a very small part of this produce to market, and even a part of these vessels will be withdrawn by high premiums to other lines of business. All the rest of our produce, then, must remain on our hands, or have its price reduced by a war insurance. Many descriptions of our produce will not bear this reduction, and would, therefore, remain on hand.

We shall lose also a great proportion of the profits of navigation. The great harvest for these is when other nations are at war, and our flag neutral. But if we can augment our stock of shipping only by the slow process of building, the harvest will be over while we are only preparing instruments to reap it. The moment of breeding seamen will be lost for want of bottoms to embark them in.

France and Holland permit our vessels to be neutralized with them; not even to suffer theirs to be purchased here might give them just cause to revoke the privilege of naturalization given to ours, and would inflict on the ship-building States and artizans a severe injury.

Objection. To protect foreign-built vessels will lessen the demand for ship building here.

Answer. Not at all; because as long as we can build cheaper than other nations, we shall be employed in preference to others; besides, shall we permit the greatest part of the produce of our fields to rot on our hands, or lose half its value by subjecting it to high insurance, merely that our ship builders may have brisker employ? Shall the whole mass of our farmers be sacrificed to the class of ship wrights?

Objection. There will be collusive transfers of foreign ships to our merchants, merely to obtain for them the cover of our passports.

Answer. The same objection lies to giving passports to home-built vessels. They may be owned, and are owned by foreigners, and may be collusively re-transferred to our merchants to obtain our passports. To lessen the danger of collusion, however, I should be for delivering passports in our own ports only, if they were to be sent blank to foreign ports to be delivered there, the power of checking collusion would be small, and they might be employed to cover purposes of no benefit to us (which we ought not to countenance), and to throw our vessels out of business; but if issued only to vessels in our own ports, we can generally be certain that the vessel is our property; and always that the cargo is of our produce. State the case that it shall be found that all our shipping, home-built and foreign-built, is inadequate to the transportation of our produce to market; so that after all these are loaded, there shall yet remain produce on hand. This must be put into vessels owned by foreigners. Should these obtain collusively the protection of our passport, it will cover their vessel indeed, but it will cover also our cargo. I repeat it then, that if the issuing passports be confined to our ports, it will be our own vessels for the most part, and always our cargoes which will be covered by them.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that passports ought to be issued to all vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, but only on their clearing out from our own ports, and for that voyage only.

XXXVII.—Opinion relative to case of a British vessel captured by a French vessel, purchased by French citizens, and fitted out as a Privateer in one of our ports.

May 16, 1793.

The facts suggested, or to be taken for granted, because the contrary is not known, in the case now to be considered, are, that a vessel was purchased at Charleston, and fitted out as a privateer by French citizens, manned with foreigners chiefly, but partly with citizens of the United States. The command given to a French citizen by a regular commission from his government; that she has made prize of an English vessel in the open sea, and sent her into Philadelphia. The British minister demands restitution, and the question is, whether the Executive of the United States shall undertake to make it?

This transaction may be considered, 1st, as an offence against the United States; 2d, as an injury to Great Britain.

In the first view it is not now to be taken up. The opinion being, that it has been an act of disrespect to the jurisdiction of the United States, of which proper notice is to be taken at a proper time.

Under the second point of view, it appears to me wrong on the part of the United States (where not constrained by treaties) to permit one party in the present war to do what cannot be permitted to the other. We cannot permit the enemies of France to fit out privateers in our ports, by the 22d article of our treaty. We ought not, therefore, to permit France to do it; the treaty leaving us free to refuse, and the refusal being necessary to preserve a fair neutrality. Yet considering that the present is the first case which has arisen; that it has been in the first moment of the war, in one of the most distant ports of the United States, and before measures could be taken by the government to meet all the cases which may flow from the infant state of our government, and novelty of our position, it ought to be placed by Great Britain among the accidents of loss to which a nation is exposed in a state of war, and by no means as a premeditated wrong on the part of the government. In the last light it cannot be taken, because the act from which it results placed the United States with the offended, and not the offending party. Her minister has seen himself that there could have been on our part neither permission or connivance. A very moderate apology then from the United States ought to satisfy Great Britain.

The one we have made already is ample, to wit, a pointed disapprobation of the transaction, a promise to prosecute and punish according to law such of our citizens as have been concerned in it, and to take effectual measures against a repetition. To demand more would be a wrong in Great Britain; for to demand satisfaction beyond what is adequate, is wrong. But it is proposed further to take the prize from the captors and restore her to the English. This is a very serious proposition.

The dilemma proposed in our conferences, appears to me unanswerable. Either the commission to the commander of the privateer was good, or not good. If not good, then the tribunals of the country will take cognizance of the transaction, receive the demand of the former owner, and make restitution of the capture; and there being, on this supposition, regular remedy at law, it would be irregular for the government to interpose. If the commission be good, then the capture having been made on the high seas, under a valid commission from a power at war with Great Britain, the British owner has lost all his right, and the prize would be deemed good, even in his own courts, were the question to be brought before his own courts. He has now no more claim on the vessel than any stranger would have who never owned her, his whole right being transferred by the laws of war to the captor.

The legal right then being in the captors, on what ground can we take it from him? Not on that of right, for the right has been transferred to him. It can only be by an act of force, that is to say, of reprisal for the offence committed against us in the port of Charleston. But the making reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. Remonstrance and refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; and when reprisal follows, it is considered as an act of war, and never yet failed to produce it in the case of a nation able to make war; besides, if the case were important enough to require reprisal, and ripe for that step, Congress must be called on to take it; the right of reprisal being expressly lodged with them by the Constitution, and not with the Executive.

I therefore think that the satisfaction already made to the government of Great Britain is quite equal to what ought to be desired in the present case; that the property of the British owner is transferred by the laws of war to the captor; that for us to take it from the captor would be an act of force or reprisal, which the circumstances of the case do not justify, and to which the powers of the Executive are not competent by the Constitution.

XXXVIII.-Opinion on the proposition of the Secretary of the Treasury to open a new Loan.

June 5, 1793.

Instructions having been given to borrow two millions of florins in Holland, and the Secretary of the Treasury proposing to open a further loan of three millions of florins, which he says "a comprehensive view of the affairs of the United States, in various relations, appears to him to recommend," the President is pleased to ask whether I see any objections to the proposition?

The power to borrow money is confided to the President by the two acts of the 4th and 12th of August, 1790, and the monies, when borrowed, are appropriated to two purposes only: to wit, the twelve millions to be borrowed under the former, are appropriated to discharge the arrears of interest and instalments of the foreign debt; and the two millions, under the latter, to the purchase of the public debt, under direction of the trustees of the sinking fund.

These appropriations render very simple the duties of the President in the discharge of this trust. He has only to look to the payment of the foreign debt, and the purchase of the general one. And in order to judge for himself of the necessity of the loan proposed for effecting these two purposes, he will need from the treasury the following statements:—

A. A statement of the nett amount of the loans already made under these acts, adding to that the two millions of florins now in course of being borrowed. This will form the debit of the trust.

The credit side of the account will consist of the following statements, to wit:—

B. Amount of the principal and interest of foreign debt, paid and payable, to the close of 1792.

C. Ditto, payable to the close of 1793.

D. Ditto, payable to the close of 1794 (for I think our preparations should be a year beforehand).

E. Amount of monies necessary for the sinking fund to the end of 1794.

If the amount of the four last articles exceeds the first, it will prove a further loan necessary, and to what extent.

The treasury alone can furnish these statements with perfect accuracy. But to show that there is probable cause to go into the examination, I will hazard a statement from materials which, though perhaps not perfectly exact, are not much otherwise.

Report of January 3, 1793. New Edition.

Dr.
The trust for loans.
A.To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792, as stated in the treasury report, to wit, 18,678,000 florins, at 99 florins to $40, the treasury exchange$7,545,912
To loan now going on for 2,000,000 florins 808,080
$8,353,992
Cr.
Florins.
B.By charges on remittances to France10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers105,000
795,093 1= $321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers191,316 90
By amount of French debt, principal and interest, payable to end of 1791Livres.
26,000,000
By ditto, for 17923,450,000
29,450,000= 5,345,171
C. By ditto, for 17933,410,000= 618,915
D. By ditto, for 17943,250,000= 569,876
E. By necessary for sinking fund at $50,000 a month, from July 1, 1793, to Dec. 31, 1794900,000
Balance which will remain in hands of the trust, at end of 1794387,474 64
$8,353,992 60

So that instead of an additional loan being necessary, the monies already borrowed will suffice for all the purposes to which they can be legally applied to the end of 1794, and leave a surplus of $387 474 64 to cover charges and errors. And as, on account of the unsettled state of the French government, it is not proposed to pay in advance, or but little so, any further sum would be lying at a dead interest and risk. Perhaps it might be said that new monies must be borrowed for the current domestic service of the year. To this I should answer, that no law has authorized the opening of a loan for this purpose.

If it should be said that the monies heretofore borrowed are so far put out of our power that we cannot command them before an instalment will be due, I should answer, that certainly I would rather borrow than fail in a payment; but if borrowing will secure a payment in time, the two millions of florins now borrowing are sufficient to secure it. If we cannot get this sum in time, then we cannot get an additional sum in time.

The above account might be stated in another way, which might, perhaps, be more satisfactory, to wit:

Dr.
The trust for loans.
To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792. 18,678,000 florins, at 99 florins to $40$7,545,912
Cr.
Florins
By charges on remittances to France10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers105,000
795,073 1= $321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers191,316 90
By payments to France10,073,043 8 = 4,069,918 54
Livres.
By payments to St. Domingo4,000,000 = 726,000
By payments to St. Domingo3,000,000 = 544,500
By payments to Mr. Ternant [I state this by memory]24,000= 4,356
Balance in hand to be carried to new debit1,688,581 10
$7,545,912 00
Dr.
The trust for loans.
To balance as per contra$1,688,581 10
To two millions of florins, new loan, when effected808,080
$2,496,661 10
Cr.
By the following payments when made, to wit:Livres.
Balance due to France, to close of year 1792
($5,345,171-$5,344,774 54)		$396 46
Instalments and interest to close of year 17933,410,000= 618,915
Instalments and interest to close of year 17943,250,000= 589,875
Necessary for sinking fund from July 1, 1793, to December 31, 1794900,000
Balance will then be in hand to be carried to new debit387,474 64
$2,496,661 10

By this statement, it would seem as if all the payments to France, hitherto made and ordered, would not acquit the year 1792. So that we have never yet been clear of arrears to her.

The amount of the French debt is stated according to the convention, and the interest is calculated accordingly. Interest on the ten million loan is known to have been paid for the years 1784, 1785, and is therefore deducted. It is not known whether it was paid on the same loan for the years 1786-7-8-9, previous to the payment of December 3, 1790, or whether it was included in that payment; therefore this is not deducted. But if, in fact, it was paid before that day, it will then have lessened the debt so much, to wit, 400,000 livres a year, for four years, making 1,600,000 florins, equal to $290,400, which sum would put us in advance near half of the instalments of 1793. Note,—livres are estimated at 18⁄100 cents, proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to the French ministry as the par of the metals, to be the rate of conversion.

This uncertainty with respect to the true state of our account with France, and the difference of the result from what has been understood, shows that the gentlemen who are to give opinions on this subject, must do it in the dark, and suggests to the President the propriety of having an exact statement of the account with France communicated to them, as the ground on which they are to give opinions. It will probably be material in that about to be given on the late application of Mr. Genet, on which the Secretary of the Treasury is preparing a report.

XXXIX.—Opinion relative to the policy of a new loan.

June 17, 1793

I cannot see my way clear in the case which the President has been pleased to ask my opinion, but by recurring to these leading questions:

Of the $7,898,999 88 borrowed, or rather of the $7,545,912, nett proceeds thereof, how much has been applied to the payment of the foreign, and purchase of the general debt?

To the balance thereof, which should be on hand, and the two millions of florins now borrowing, is any and what addition necessary, for the same objects, for the years 1793, 1794?

The statement furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury does not answer these questions. It only shows what has been done with somewhat less than three millions out of near eight millions of dollars which have been borrowed, and in so doing it takes credit for two sums which are not to come out of this sum, and therefore not to be left in the account. They are the following:

1. A sum of $284,901 89 expended in purchases of the public debt. In the general report of the trustees of the sinking fund, made to Congress the 23d of February last, and printed, it appears, page 29, that the whole amount of monies laid out by them was $1,302,407 64, from which were to be deducted, as is mentioned in the note there subjoined, the purchases made out of the interest fund (then about $50,000 as well as I recollect). Call the sum paid then $1,252,407 64. By the Treasury report, p. 38, (new edition,) it appears that the surplus of domestic revenue to the end of 1790, appropriated to this object, was $1,374,656 40, and p. 34, that the monies drawn from Europe on account of the foreign loans, were not the instrument of these purchases; and in some part, to which I am not able just now to turn, I recollect pretty certainly that it is said these purchases were actually carried to account, as was proper, against the domestic surplus, consequently they are not to be allowed in the foreign account also. Or if allowed in this, the sum will then be due from the surplus account, and so must lessen the sum to be borrowed for the sinking fund, which amounts to the same.

2. The 1st instalment due to the bank $200,000. Though the first payment of the subscription of the United States to the bank might have been made, in the first instant, out of the foreign monies to be immediately repaid to them by the money borrowed of the bank, yet this useless formality was avoided, and it was a mere operation of the pen on paper, without the displacement of a single dollar. See reports p. 12. And, in any event, the final reimbursement was never to be made out of the foreign fund, which was appropriated solely to the payment of the foreign, and purchase of the general debt.

These two sums, therefore, of $284,901 89 and $200,000 are to be added to the balance of $575,484 28 subject to future disposition, and will make $1,050,386 17 actually here, and still to be applied to the proper appropriation.

However, this account, as before observed, being only of a part of the monies borrowed, no judgment can be formed from it of the expediency of borrowing more; nor should I have stopped to make a criticism on it, but to show why no such sums as the two above mentioned, were inserted in the general account sketched for the President, June 5. I must add that the miscellaneous sum of $49,400 in this account, is probably covered by some other articles of that as far as it is chargeable on this fund; because that account, under one form or another, takes up all the articles chargeable on this fund which had appeared in the printed reports.

I must, therefore, proceed to renew my statement of June 5, inserting therein the 1st instalment of the Dutch loan of $404,040 40 payable this month, which not having been mentioned in any of the reports heretofore published, was not inserted in my statement. I will add a like sum for the year 1794, because I think we should now prepare for the whole of that year.

As the Secretary of the Treasury does not seem to contemplate the furnishing any fixed sum for the sinking fund, I shall leave that article out of the account. The President can easily add to its result any sum he may decide to have furnished to that fund. The account, so corrected, will stand thus:

Dr.
The trust for loans.
To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792$7,545,912
To loan now going on for 2,000,000 florins808,080
$8,353,992
Cr.
Florins.
By charges on remittances to France10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers105,000
795,073 1= $321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers191,316 90
Livres.
By amount of French debt, principal and interest payable to end of 179126,000,000
By ditto for 1792 3,450,000
29,450,000= 5,345,171
By ditto for 17933,410,000= 618,915
By 1st instalment of Dutch debt due June 1793 404,040 40
By instalments and interest to France for 17943,250,000= 569,875
By instalment to Holland for 1794404,040 40
Balance will then remain in hands of the trust,499,393 84
$8,353,992 00

So that it appears there would be a balance in the hands of this trust, at the close of 1794, of $499,393 84, were no monies to be furnished in the meantime to the sinking fund; but should the President determine to furnish that with the $900,000 proposed in my statement of June 5, then a loan would be necessary for about $400,000, say in near round numbers, 1,000,000 of guilders, in addition to the 2,000,000 now borrowing. I am, individually, of opinion that that sum ought to be furnished to the sinking fund, and consequently that an additional loan, to this extent, should be made, considering the subject in a legal point of view only.

The reasons in favor of the extension are,

The apprehension of the extension of our war to other Indian nations, and perhaps to Europe itself.

The disability this might produce to borrow at all, [this is, in my judgment, a weighty consideration.]

The possibility that the government of France may become so settled as that we may hazard the anticipation of payment, and so avoid dead interest.

The reasons against it are,

The possibility that France may continue, for some time yet, so unsettled as to render an anticipation of payments hazardous.

The risk of losing the capital borrowed by a successful invasion of the country of deposit, if it be left in Europe; or by an extension of the bankruptcies now shaking the most solid houses; and when and where they will end we know not.

The loss of interest on the dead sum, if the sum itself be safe.

The execution of a power for one object, which was given to be executed but for a very different one.

The commitment of the President, on this account, to events, or to the criticisms of those who, though the measures should be perfectly wise, may misjudge it through error or passion.

The apprehension that the head of the department means to provide idle money to be lodged in the banks ready for the corruption of the next legislature, as it is believed the late ones were corrupted, by gratifying particular members with vast discounts for objects of speculation.

I confess that the last reasons have most weight with me.

XL.—Report on the privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the United States in foreign countries.

December 16, 1793.

Sir,—According to the pleasure of the House of Representatives, expressed in their resolution of February 23, 1791, I now lay before them a report on the privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the United States in foreign countries. In order to keep the subject within those bounds which I supposed to be under the contemplation of the House, I have restrained my statements to those countries only with which we carry on a commerce of some importance, and to those articles also of our produce which are of sensible weight in the scale of our exports; and even these articles are sometimes grouped together, according to the degree of favor or restriction with which they are received in each country, and that degree expressed in general terms without detailing the exact duty levied on each article. To have gone fully into these minutiæ, would have been to copy the tariffs and books of rates of the different countries, and to have hidden, under a mass of details, those general and important truths, the extraction of which, in a simple form, I conceived would best answer the inquiries of the House, by condensing material information within those limits of time and attention, which this portion of their duties may justly claim. The plan, indeed, of minute details which have been impracticable with some countries, for want of information.

Since preparing this report, which was put into its present form in time to have been given in to the last session of Congress, alterations of the conditions of our commerce with some foreign nations have taken place—some of them independent of war; some arising out of it.

France has proposed to enter into a new treaty of commerce with us, on liberal principles; and has, in the meantime, relaxed some of the restraints mentioned in the report. Spain has, by an ordinance of June last, established New Orleans, Pensacola, and St. Augustine into free ports, for the vessels of friendly nations having treaties of commerce with her, provided they touch for a permit at Corcubion in Gallicia, or at Alicant; and our rice is, by the same ordinance, excluded from that country. The circumstances of war have necessarily given us freer access to the West Indian islands, whilst they have also drawn on our navigation vexations and depredations of the most serious nature.

To have endeavored to describe all these, would have been as impracticable as useless, since the scenes would have been shifting while under description. I therefore think it best to leave the report as it was formed, being adapted to a particular point of time, when things were in their settled order, that is to say, to the summer of 1792. I have the honor to be, &c.

To the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States of America.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred, by the House of Representatives, the report of a committee on the written message of the President of the United States, of the 14th of February, 1791, with instruction to report to Congress the nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following Report:

The countries with which the United States have their chief commercial intercourse are Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, the United Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, and their American possessions; and the articles of export, which constitute the basis of that commerce, with their respective amounts, are,

Bread-stuff, that is to say, bread grains, meals, and bread, to the annual amount of$7,649,887
Tobacco4,349,567
Rice1,753,796
Wood1,263,534
Salted fish941,696
Pot and pearl ash839,093
Salted meats599,130
Indigo537,379
Horses and mules339,753
Whale oil252,591
Flax seed236,072
Tar, pitch and turpentine217,177
Live provisions137,743
Ships
Foreign goods620,274

To descend to articles of smaller value than these, would lead into a minuteness of detail neither necessary nor useful to the present object.

The proportions of our exports, which go to the nations before mentioned, and to their dominions, respectively, are as follows:

To Spain and its dominions$2,005,907
Portugal and its dominions1,283,462
France and its dominions4,698,735
Great Britain and its dominions9,363,416
The United Netherlands and their dominions1,963,880
Denmark and its dominions224,415
Sweden and its dominions47,240

Our imports from the same countries, are,

Spain and its dominions335,110
Portugal and its dominions595,763
France and its dominions2,068,348
Great Britain and its dominions15,285,428
United Netherlands and their dominions1,172,692
Denmark and its dominions351,364
Sweden and its dominions14,325

These imports consist mostly of articles on which industry has been exhausted.

Our navigation, depending on the same commerce, will appear by the following statement of the tonnage of our own vessels, entering in our ports, from those several nations and their possessions, in one year; that is to say; from October, 1789, to September, 1790, inclusive, as follows:

Tons.
Spain19,695
Portugal23,576
France116,410
Great Britain43,580
United Netherlands58,858
Denmark14,655
Sweden750

Of our commercial objects, Spain receives favorably our bread-stuff, salted fish, wood, ships, tar, pitch, and turpentine. On our meals, however, as well as on those of other foreign countries, when re-exported to their colonies, they have lately imposed duties of from half-a-dollar to two dollars the barrel, the duties being so proportioned to the current price of their own flour, as that both together are to make the constant sum of nine dollars per barrel.

They do not discourage our rice, pot and pearl ash, salted provisions, or whale oil; but these articles, being in small demand at their markets, are carried thither but in a small degree. Their demand for rice, however, is increasing. Neither tobacco nor indigo are received there. Our commerce is permitted with their Canary islands under the same conditions.

Themselves, and their colonies, are the actual consumers of what they receive from us.

Our navigation is free with the kingdom of Spain; foreign goods being received there in our ships on the same conditions as if carried in their own, or in the vessels of the country of which such goods are the manufacture or produce.

Portugal receives favorably our grain and bread, salted fish, and other salted provisions, wood, tar, pitch, and turpentine.

For flax-seed, pot and pearl ash, though not discouraged, there is little demand.

Our ships pay 20 per cent. on being sold to their subjects, and are then free-bottoms.

Foreign goods (except those of the East Indies) are received on the same footing in our vessels as in their own, or any others; that is to say, on general duties of from 20 to 28 per cent., and, consequently, our navigation is unobstructed by them. Tobacco, rice, and meals, are prohibited.

Themselves and their colonies consume what they receive from us.

These regulations extend to the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape de Verd islands, except that in these, meals and rice are received freely.

France receives favorably our bread-stuffs, rice, wood, pot and pearl ashes.

A duty of 5 sous the quintal, or nearly 4½ cents, is paid on our tar, pitch, and turpentine. Our whale oils pay 6 livres the quintal, and are the only foreign whale oils admitted. Our indigo pays 5 livres the quintal, their own 2½; but a difference of quality, still more than a difference of duty, prevents its seeking that market.

Salted beef is received freely for re-exportation; but if for home consumption, it pays five livres the quintal. Other salted provisions pay that duty in all cases, and salted fish is made lately to pay the prohibitory one of twenty livres the quintal.

Our ships are free to carry thither all foreign goods which may be carried in their own or any other vessels, except tobaccoes not of our own growth; and they participate with theirs, the exclusive carriage of our whale oils and tobaccoes.

During their former government, our tobacco was under a monopoly, but paid no duties; and our ships were freely sold in their ports, and converted into national bottoms. The first national assembly took from our ships this privilege. They emancipated tobacco from its monopoly, but subjected it to duties of eighteen livres, fifteen sous the quintal, carried in their own vessels, and five livres carried in ours—a difference more than equal to the freight of the article.

They and their colonies consume what they receive from us.

Great Britain receives our pot and pearl ashes free, whilst those of other nations pay a duty of two shillings and three pence the quintal. There is an equal distinction in favor of our bar iron; of which article, however, we do not produce enough for our own use. Woods are free from us, whilst they pay some small duty from other countries. Indigo and flax seed are free from all countries. Our tar and pitch pay eleven pence, sterling, the barrel. From other alien countries they pay about a penny and a third more.

Our tobacco, for their own consumption, pays one shilling and three pence, sterling, the pound, custom and excise, besides heavy expenses of collection; and rice, in the same case, pays seven shillings and fourpence, sterling, the hundred weight; which, rendering it too dear, as an article of common food, it is consequently used in very small quantity.

Our salted fish and other salted provisions, except bacon, are prohibited. Bacon and whale oils are under prohibitory duties; so are our grains, meals, and bread, as to internal consumption, unless in times of such scarcity as may raise the price of wheat to fifty shillings, sterling, the quarter, and other grains and meals in proportion.

Our ships, though purchased and navigated by their own subjects, are not permitted to be used, even in their trade with us.

While the vessels of other nations are secured by standing laws, which cannot be altered but by the concurrent will of the three branches of the British legislature, in carrying thither any produce or manufacture of the country to which they belong, which may be lawfully carried in any vessels, ours, with the same prohibition of what is foreign, are further prohibited by a standing law, (12 Car. 2, 18, sect. 3,) from carrying thither all and any of our own domestic productions and manufactures. A subsequent act, indeed, has authorized their executive to permit the carriage of our own productions in our own bottoms, at its sole discretion; and the permission has been given from year to year by proclamation, but subject every moment to be withdrawn on that single will; in which event, our vessels having anything on board, stand interdicted from the entry of all British ports. The disadvantage of a tenure which may be so suddenly discontinued, was experienced by our merchants on a late occasion,[33] when an official notification that this law would be strictly enforced, gave them just apprehensions for the fate of their vessels and cargoes despatched or destined for the ports of Great Britain. The minister of that court, indeed, frankly expressed his personal conviction, that the words of the order went farther than was intended, and so he afterwards officially informed us; but the embarrassments of the moment were real and great, and the possibility of their renewal lays our commerce to that country under the same species of discouragement as to other countries, where it is regulated by a single legislator; and the distinction is too remarkable not to be noticed, that our navigation is excluded from the security of fixed laws, while that security is given to the navigation of others.

Our vessels pay in their ports one shilling and nine pence, sterling, per ton, light and trinity dues, more than is paid by British ships, except in the port of London, where they pay the same as British.

The greater part of what they receive from us, is re-exported to other countries, under the useless charges of an intermediate deposit, and double voyage. From tables published in England, and composed, as is said, from the books of their customhouses, it appears, that of the indigo imported there in the years 1773, '4, '5, one-third was re-exported; and from a document of authority, we learn, that of the rice and tobacco imported there before the war, four-fifths were re-exported. We are assured, indeed, that the quantities sent thither for re-exportation since the war, are considerably diminished, yet less so than reason and national interest would dictate. The whole of our grain is re-exported when wheat is below fifty shillings the quarter, and other grains in proportion.

The United Netherlands prohibit our pickled beef and pork, meals and bread of all sorts, and lay a prohibitory duty on spirits distilled from grain.

All other of our productions are received on varied duties, which may be reckoned, on a medium, at about three per cent.

They consume but a small proportion of what they receive. The residue is partly forwarded for consumption in the inland parts of Europe, and partly re-shipped to other maritime countries. On the latter portion they intercept between us and the consumer, so much of the value as is absorbed in the charges attending an intermediate deposit.

Foreign goods, except some East India articles, are received in vessels of any nation.

Our ships may be sold and neutralized there, with exceptions of one or two privileges, which somewhat lessen their value.

Denmark lays considerable duties on our tobacco and rice, carried in their own vessels, and half as much more, if carried in ours; but the exact amount of these duties is not perfectly known here. They lay such as amount to prohibitions on our indigo and corn.

Sweden receives favorably our grains and meals, salted provisions, indigo, and whale oil.

They subject our rice to duties of sixteen mills the pound weight, carried in their own vessels, and of forty per cent. additional on that, or twenty-two and four-tenths mills, carried in ours or any others. Being thus rendered too dear as an article of common food, little of it is consumed with them. They consume some of our tobaccoes, which they take circuitously through Great Britain, levying heavy duties on them also; their duties of entry, town duties, and excise, being 4.34 dollars the hundred weight, if carried in their own vessels, and of forty per cent. on that additional, if carried in our own or any other vessels.

They prohibit altogether our bread, fish, pot and pearl ashes, flax-seed, tar, pitch, and turpentine, wood, (except oak timber and masts,) and all foreign manufactures.

Under so many restrictions and prohibitions, our navigation with them is reduced to almost nothing.

With our neighbors, an order of things much harder presents itself.

Spain and Portugal refuse, to all those parts of America which they govern, all direct intercourse with any people but themselves. The commodities in mutual demand between them and their neighbors, must be carried to be exchanged in some port of the dominant country, and the transportation between that and the subject state, must be in a domestic bottom.

France, by a standing law, permits her West India possessions to receive directly our vegetables, live provisions, horses, wood, tar, pitch, turpentine, rice, and maize, and prohibits our other bread stuff; but a suspension of this prohibition having been left to the colonial legislatures, in times of scarcity, it was formerly suspended occasionally, but latterly without interruption.

Our fish and salted provisions (except pork) are received in their islands under a duty of three colonial livres the quintal, and our vessels are as free as their own to carry our commodities thither, and to bring away rum and molasses.

Great Britain admits in her islands our vegetables, live provisions, horses, wood, tar, pitch, and turpentine, rice and bread stuff, by a proclamation of her executive, limited always to the term of a year, but hitherto renewed from year to year. She prohibits our salted fish and other salted provisions. She does not permit our vessels to carry thither our own produce. Her vessels alone may take it from us, and bring in exchange rum, molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa-nuts, ginger, and pimento. There are, indeed, some freedoms in the island of Dominica, but, under such circumstances, as to be little used by us. In the British continental colonies, and in Newfoundland, all our productions are prohibited, and our vessels forbidden to enter their ports. Their governors, however, in times of distress, have power to permit a temporary importation of certain articles in their own bottoms, but not in ours.

Our citizens cannot reside as merchants or factors within any of the British plantations, this being expressly prohibited by the same statute of 12 Car. 2, c. 18, commonly called the navigation act.

In the Danish American possessions a duty of 5 per cent. is levied on our corn, corn meal, rice, tobacco, wood, salted fish, indigo, horses, mules and live stock, and of 10 per cent. on our flour, salted pork and beef, tar, pitch and turpentine.

In the American islands of the United Netherlands and Sweden, our vessels and produce are received, subject to duties, not so heavy as to have been complained of; but they are heavier in the Dutch possessions on the continent.

To sum up these restrictions, so far as they are important:

First. In Europe—

Our bread stuff is at most times under prohibitory duties in England, and considerably dutied on re-exportation from Spain to her colonies.

Our tobaccoes are heavily dutied in England, Sweden and France, and prohibited in Spain and Portugal.

Our rice is heavily dutied in England and Sweden, and prohibited in Portugal.

Our fish and salted provisions are prohibited in England, and under prohibitory duties in France.

Our whale oils are prohibited in England and Portugal.

And our vessels are denied naturalization in England, and of late in France.

Second. In the West Indies—

All intercourse is prohibited with the possessions of Spain and Portugal.

Our salted provisions and fish are prohibited by England.

Our salted pork and bread stuff (except maize) are received under temporary laws only, in the dominions of France, and our salted fish pays there a weighty duty.

Third. In the article of navigation—

Our own carriage of our own tobacco is heavily dutied in Sweden, and lately in France.

We can carry no article, not of our own production, to the British ports in Europe. Nor even our own produce to her American possessions.

Such being the restrictions on the commerce and navigation of the United States; the question is, in what way they may best be removed, modified or counteracted?

As to commerce, two methods occur. 1. By friendly arrangements with the several nations with whom these restrictions exist: Or, 2. By the separate act of our own legislatures for countervailing their effects.

There can be no doubt but that of these two, friendly arrangement is the most eligible. Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of regulating laws, duties and prohibitions, could it be relieved from all its shackles in all parts of the world, could every country be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted it to produce, and each be free to exchange with others mutual surplusses for mutual wants, the greatest mass possible would then be produced of those things which contribute to human life and human happiness; the numbers of mankind would be increased, and their condition bettered.

Would even a single nation begin with the United States this system of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with that nation; since it is one by one only that it can be extended to all. Where the circumstances of either party render it expedient to levy a revenue, by way of impost, on commerce, its freedom might be modified, in that particular, by mutual and equivalent measures, preserving it entire in all others.

Some nations, not yet ripe for free commerce in all its extent, might still be willing to mollify its restrictions and regulations for us, in proportion to the advantages which an intercourse with us might offer. Particularly they may concur with us in reciprocating the duties to be levied on each side, or in compensating any excess of duty by equivalent advantages of another nature. Our commerce is certainly of a character to entitle it to favor in most countries. The commodities we offer are either necessaries of life, or materials for manufacture, or convenient subjects of revenue; and we take in exchange, either manufactures, when they have received the last finish of art and industry, or mere luxuries. Such customers may reasonably expect welcome and friendly treatment at every market. Customers, too, whose demands, increasing with their wealth and population, must very shortly give full employment to the whole industry of any nation whatever, in any line of supply they may get into the habit of calling for from it.

But should any nation, contrary to our wishes, suppose it may better find its advantage by continuing its system of prohibitions, duties and regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties and regulations, also. Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and vexations; nor are they likely to produce a relaxation of them.

Our navigation involves still higher considerations. As a branch of industry, it is valuable, but as a resource of defence, essential.

Its value, as a branch of industry, is enhanced by the dependence of so many other branches on it. In times of general peace it multiplies competitors for employment in transportation, and so keeps that at its proper level; and in times of war, that is to say, when those nations who may be our principal carriers, shall be at war with each other, if we have not within ourselves the means of transportation, our produce must be exported in belligerent vessels, at the increased expense of war-freight and insurance, and the articles which will not bear that, must perish on our hands.

But it is as a resource of defence that our navigation will admit neither neglect nor forbearance. The position and circumstances of the United States leave them nothing to fear on their land-board, and nothing to desire beyond their present rights. But on their seaboard, they are open to injury, and they have there, too, a commerce which must be protected. This can only be done by possessing a respectable body of citizen-seamen, and of artists and establishments in readiness for ship-building.

Were the ocean, which is the common property of all, open to the industry of all, so that every person and vessel should be free to take employment wherever it could be found, the United States would certainly not set the example of appropriating to themselves, exclusively, any portion of the common stock of occupation. They would rely on the enterprise and activity of their citizens for a due participation of the benefits of the seafaring business, and for keeping the marine class of citizens equal to their object. But if particular nations grasp at undue shares, and, more especially, if they seize on the means of the United States, to convert them into aliment for their own strength, and withdraw them entirely from the support of those to whom they belong, defensive and protecting measures become necessary on the part of the nation whose marine resources are thus invaded; or it will be disarmed of its defence; its productions will lie at the mercy of the nation which has possessed itself exclusively of the means of carrying them, and its politics may be influenced by those who command its commerce. The carriage of our own commodities, if once established in another channel, cannot be resumed in the moment we may desire. If we lose the seamen and artists whom it now occupies, we lose the present means of marine defence, and time will be requisite to raise up others, when disgrace or losses shall bring home to our feelings the error of having abandoned them. The materials for maintaining our due share of navigation, are ours in abundance. And, as to the mode of using them, we have only to adopt the principles of those who put us on the defensive, or others equivalent and better fitted to our circumstances.

The following principles, being founded in reciprocity, appear perfectly just, and to offer no cause of complaint to any nation:

1. Where a nation imposes high duties on our productions, or prohibits them altogether, it may be proper for us to do the same by theirs; first burdening or excluding those productions which they bring here, in competition with our own of the same kind; selecting next, such manufactures as we take from them in greatest quantity, and which, at the same time, we could the soonest furnish to ourselves, or obtain from other countries; imposing on them duties lighter at first, but heavier and heavier afterwards, as other channels of supply open. Such duties having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic manufactures of the same kind, may induce the manufacturer to come himself into these States, where cheaper subsistence, equal laws, and a vent of his wares, free of duty, may ensure him the highest profits from his skill and industry. And here, it would be in the power of the State governments to co-operate essentially, by opening the resources of encouragement which are under their control, extending them liberally to artists in those particular branches of manufacture for which their soil, climate, population and other circumstances have matured them, and fostering the precious efforts and progress of household manufacture, by some patronage suited to the nature of its objects, guided by the local informations they possess, and guarded against abuse by their presence and attentions. The oppressions on our agriculture, in foreign ports, would thus be made the occasion of relieving it from a dependence on the councils and conduct of others, and of promoting arts, manufactures and population at home.

2. Where a nation refuses permission to our merchants and factors to reside within certain parts of their dominions, we may, if it should be thought expedient, refuse residence to theirs in any and every part of ours, or modify their transactions.

3. Where a nation refuses to receive in our vessels any productions but our own, we may refuse to receive, in theirs, any but their own productions. The first and second clauses of the bill reported by the committee, are well formed to effect this object.

4. Where a nation refuses to consider any vessel as ours which has not been built within our territories, we should refuse to consider as theirs, any vessel not built within their territories.

5. Where a nation refuses to our vessels the carriage even of our own productions, to certain countries under their domination, we might refuse to theirs of every description, the carriage of the same productions to the same countries. But as justice and good neighborhood would dictate that those who have no part in imposing the restriction on us, should not be the victims of measures adopted to defeat its effect, it may be proper to confine the restriction to vessels owned or navigated by any subjects of the same dominant power, other than the inhabitants of the country to which the said productions are to be carried. And to prevent all inconvenience to the said inhabitants, and to our own, by too sudden a check on the means of transportation, we may continue to admit the vessels marked for future exclusion, on an advanced tonnage, and for such length of time only, as may be supposed necessary to provide against that inconvenience.

The establishment of some of these principles by Great Britain, alone, has already lost us in our commerce with that country and its possessions, between eight and nine hundred vessels of near 40,000 tons burden, according to statements from official materials, in which they have confidence. This involves a proportional loss of seamen, shipwrights, and ship-building, and is too serious a loss to admit forbearance of some effectual remedy.

It is true we must expect some inconvenience in practice from the establishment of discriminating duties. But in this, as in so many other cases, we are left to choose between two evils. These inconveniences are nothing when weighed against the loss of wealth and loss of force, which will follow our perseverance in the plan of indiscrimination. When once it shall be perceived that we are either in the system or in the habit of giving equal advantages to those who extinguish our commerce and navigation by duties and prohibitions, as to those who treat both with liberality and justice, liberality and justice will be converted by all into duties and prohibitions. It is not to the moderation and justice of others we are to trust for fair and equal access to market with our productions, or for our due share in the transportation of them; but to our own means of independence, and the firm will to use them. Nor do the inconveniences of discrimination merit consideration. Not one of the nations before mentioned, perhaps not a commercial nation on earth, is without them. In our case one distinction alone will suffice: that is to say, between nations who favor our productions and navigation, and those who do not favor them. One set of moderate duties, say the present duties, for the first, and a fixed advance on these as to some articles, and prohibitions as to others, for the last.

Still, it must be repeated that friendly arrangements are preferable with all who will come into them; and that we should carry into such arrangements all the liberality and spirit of accommodation which the nature of the case will admit.

France has, of her own accord, proposed negotiations for improving, by a new treaty on fair and equal principles, the commercial relations of the two countries. But her internal disturbances have hitherto prevented the prosecution of them to effect, though we have had repeated assurances of a continuance of the disposition.

Proposals of friendly arrangement have been made on our part, by the present government, to that of Great Britain, as the message states; but, being already on as good a footing in law, and a better in fact, than the most favored nation, they have not, as yet, discovered any disposition to have it meddled with.

We have no reason to conclude that friendly arrangements would be declined by the other nations, with whom we have such commercial intercourse as may render them important. In the meanwhile, it would rest with the wisdom of Congress to determine whether, as to those nations, they will not surcease ex parte regulations, on the reasonable presumption that they will concur in doing whatever justice and moderation dictate should be done.

XLI.—Report on the Mint. Communicated to the Senate, December 31, 1793.

Philadelphia, December 30, 1793.

Sir,—I am informed, by the Director of the Mint, that an impediment has arisen to the coinage of the precious metals, which it is my duty to lay before you.

It will be recollected, that, in pursuance of the authority vested in the President, by Congress, to procure artists from abroad, if necessary, Mr. Drost, at Paris, so well known by the superior style of his coinage, was engaged for our mint; but that, after occasioning to us a considerable delay, he declined coming. That thereupon, our minister at London, according to the instructions he had received, endeavored to procure, there, a chief coiner and assayer; that, as to the latter, he succeeded in sending over a Mr. Albion Coxe, for that office, but that he could procure no person there more qualified to discharge the duties of chief coiner, than might be had here; and, therefore, did not engage one. The duties of this last office have consequently been, hitherto, performed, and well performed, by Henry Voight, an artist of the United States, but the law requiring these officers to give a security, in the sum of ten thousand dollars each, neither is able to do it. The coinage of the precious metals has, therefore, been prevented for some time past, though, in order that the mint might not be entirely idle, the coinage of copper has been going on; the trust in that, at any one point of time, being of but small amount.

It now remains to determine how this difficulty is to be got over. If by discharging these officers, and seeking others, it may well be doubted if any can be found in the United States, equally capable of fulfilling their duties; and to seek them from abroad, would still add to the delay; and if found either at home or abroad, they must still be of the description of artists whose circumstances and connections rarely enable them to give security in so large a sum. The other alternative would be to lessen the securityship in money, and to confide that it will be supplied by the vigilance of the director, who, leaving as small masses of metal in the hands of the officers, at any one time, as the course of their process will admit, may reduce the risk to what would not be considerable.

To give an idea of the extent of the trust to the several officers, both as to sum and time, it may be proper to state the course of the business, according to what the director is of opinion it should be. The treasurer, he observes, should receive the bullion; the assayer, by an operation on a few grains of it, is to ascertain its fineness. The treasurer is then to deliver it to the refiner, to be melted and mixed to the standard fineness; the assayer here, again, examining a few grains of the melted mass, and certifying when it is of due fineness; the refiner then delivers it to the chief coiner, to be rolled and coined, and returns it, when coined, to the treasurer. By this it appears, that a few grains only, at a time, are in the hands of the assayer, the mass being confided, for operation, to the refiner and chief coiner. It is to be observed that the law has not taken notice of the office of refiner, though so important an officer ought, it should seem, to be of the President's nomination, and ought to give a security nearly equal to that required from the chief coiner.

I have thought it my duty to give this information under an impression that it is proper to be communicated to the Legislature, who will decide, in their wisdom, whether it will be expedient to make it the duty of the treasurer to receive and keep the bullion before coinage;

To lessen the pecuniary security required from the chief coiner and assayer; and

To place the office of the refiner under the same nomination with that of the other chief officers; to fix his salary, and require due security.

I have the honor to be, with the most perfect respect and attachment, sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.

END OF VOL. VII.

INDEX TO VOL. VII.