POLITICAL CHANGES IN 1882.
With a view to carry this work through the year 1882 and into part of 1883, very plain reference should be made to the campaign of 1882, which in several important States was fully as disastrous to the Republican party as any State elections since the advent of that party to national supremacy and power. In 1863 and 1874 the Republican reverses were almost if not quite as general, but in the more important States the adverse majorities were not near so sweeping. Political “tidal waves” had been freely talked of as descriptive of the situation in the earlier years named, but the result of 1882 has been pertinently described by Horatio Seymour as the “groundswell,” and such it seemed, both to the active participants in, and lookers-on, at the struggle.
Political discontent seems to be periodical under all governments, and the periods are probably quite as frequent though less violent under republican as other forms. Certain it is that no political party in our history has long enjoyed uninterrupted success. The National success of the Republicans cannot truthfully be said to have been uninterrupted since the first election of Lincoln, as at times one or the other of the two Houses of Congress have been in the hands of the Democratic party, while since the second Grant administration there has not been a safe working majority of Republicans in either House. Combinations with Greenbackers, Readjusters, and occasionally with dissenting Democrats have had to be employed to preserve majorities in behalf of important measures, and these have not always succeeded, though the general tendency of side-parties has been to support the majority, for the very plain reason that majorities can reward with power upon committees and with patronage.
Efforts were made by the Democrats in the first session of the 47th Congress to reduce existing tariffs, and to repeal the internal revenue taxes. The Republicans met the first movement by establishing a Tariff Commission, which was appointed by President Arthur, and composed mainly of gentlemen favorable to protective duties. In the year previous (1881) the income from internal taxes was $135,264,385.51, and the cost of collecting $4,327,793.24, or 3.20 per cent. The customs revenues amounted to $198,159,676.02, the cost of collecting the same $6,383,288.10, or 3.22 per cent. There was no general complaint as to the cost of collecting these immense revenues, for this cost was greatly less than in former years, but the surplus on internal taxes (about $146,000,000) was so large that it could not be profitably employed even in the payment of the public debt, and as a natural result all interests called upon to pay the tax (save where there was a monopoly in the product or the manufacture) complained of the burden as wholly unnecessary, and large interests and very many people demanded immediate and absolute repeal. The Republicans sought to meet this demand half way by a bill repealing all the taxes, save those on spirits and tobacco, but the Democrats obstructed and defeated every attempt at partial repeal. The Republicans thought that the moral sentiment of the country would favor the retention of the internal taxes upon spirits and tobacco (the latter having been previously reduced) but if there was any such sentiment it did not manifest itself in the fall elections. On the contrary, every form of discontent, encouraged by these great causes, took shape. While the Tariff Commission, by active and very intelligent work, held out continued hope to the more confident industries, those which had been threatened or injured by the failure of the crops in 1881, and by the assassination of President Garfield, saw only prolonged injury in the probable work of the Commission, for to meet the close Democratic sentiment and to unite that which it was hoped would be generally friendly, moderate tariff rates had to be fixed; notably upon iron, steel, and many classes of manufactured goods. Manufacturers of the cheaper grades of cotton goods were feeling the pressure of competition from the South—where goods could be made from a natural product close at hand—while those of the North found about the same time that the tastes of their customers had improved, and hence their cheaper grades were no longer in such general demand. There was over-production, as a consequence grave depression, and not all in the business could at once realize the cause of the trouble. Doubt and distrust prevailed, and early in the summer of 1882, and indeed until late in the fall, the country seemed upon the verge of a business panic. At the same time the leading journals of the country seemed to have joined in a crusade against all existing political methods, and against all statutory and political abuses. The cry of “Down with Boss Rule!” was heard in many States, and this rallied to the swelling ranks of discontent all who are naturally fond of pulling down leaders—and the United States Senatorial elections of 1883 quickly showed that the blow was aimed at all leaders, whether they were alleged Bosses or not. Then, too, the forms of discontent which could not take practical shape in the great Presidential contest between Garfield and Hancock, came to the front with cumulative force after the assassination. There is little use in philosophizing and searching for sufficient reasons leading to a fact, when the fact itself must be confessed and when its force has been felt. It is a plain fact that many votes in the fall of 1882 were determined by the nominating struggle for the Presidency in 1880, by the quarrels which followed Garfield’s inauguration, and by the assassination. Indeed, the nation had not recovered from the shock, and many very good people looked with very grave suspicion upon every act of President Arthur after he had succeeded to the chair. The best informed, broadest and most liberal political minds saw in his course an honest effort to heal existing differences in the Republican party, but many acts of recommendation and appointment directed to this end were discounted by the few which could not thus be traced, and suspicion and discontent swelled the chorus of other injuries. The result was the great political changes of 1882. It began in Ohio, the only important and debatable October State remaining at this time. The causes enumerated above (save the assassination and the conflict between the friends of Grant and Blaine) operated with less force in Ohio than any other section—for here leaders had not been held up as “Bosses;” civil service reform had many advocates among them; the people were not by interest specially wedded to high tariff duties, nor were they large payers of internal revenue taxes. But the liquor issue had sprung up in the Legislature the previous winter, the Republicans attempting to levy and collect a tax from all who sold, and to prevent the sale on Sundays. These brief facts make strange reading to the people of other States, where the sale of liquor has generally been licensed, and forbidden on Sundays. Ohio had previously passed a prohibitory constitutional amendment, in itself defective, and as no legislation had been enacted to enforce it, those who wished began to sell as though the right were natural, and in this way became strong enough to resist taxation or license. The Legislature of 1882, the majority controlled by the Republicans, attempted to pass the Pond liquor tax act, and its issue was joined. The liquor interests organized, secured control of the Democratic State Convention, nominated a ticket pledged to their interests, made a platform which pointed to unrestricted sale, and by active work and the free use of funds, carried the election and reversed the usual majority. Governor Foster, the boldest of the Republican leaders, accepted the issue as presented, and stumped in favor of license and the sanctity of the Sabbath; but the counsels of the Republican leaders were divided, Ex-Secretary Sherman and others enacting the role of “confession and avoidance.” The result carried with it a train of Republican disasters. Congressional candidates whom the issue could not legitimately touch, fell before it, probably on the principle that “that which strikes the head injures the entire body.” The Democratic State and Legislative tickets succeeded, and the German element, which of all others is most favorable to freedom in the observance of the Sabbath, transferred its vote almost as an entirety from the Republican to the Democratic party.
Ohio emboldened the liquor interests, and in their Conventions and Societies in other States they agreed as a rule to check and, if possible, defeat the advance of the prohibitory amendment idea. This started in Kansas in 1880, under the lead of Gov. St. John, an eloquent temperance advocate. It was passed by an immense majority, and it was hardly in force before conflicting accounts were scattered throughout the country as to its effect. Some of the friends of temperance contended that it improved the public condition; its enemies all asserted that in the larger towns and cities it produced free and irresponsible instead of licensed sale. The latter seem to have had the best of the argument, if the election result is a truthful witness. Gov. St. John was again the nominee of the Republicans, but while all of the remainder of the State ticket was elected, he fell under a majority which must have been produced by a change of forty thousand votes. Iowa next took up the prohibitory amendment idea, secured its adoption, but the result was injurious to the Republicans in the Fall elections, where the discontent struck at Congressmen, as well as State and Legislative officers.
The same amendment had been proposed in Pennsylvania, a Republican House in 1881 having passed it by almost a solid vote (Democrats freely joining in its support), but a Republican Senate defeated, after it had been loaded down with amendments. New York was coquetting with the same measure, and as a result the liquor interests—well organized and with an abundance of money, as a rule struck at the Republican party in both New York and Pennsylvania, and thus largely aided the groundswell. The same interests aided the election of Genl. B. F. Butler of Massachusetts, but from a different reason. He had, in one of his earlier canvasses, freely advocated the right of the poor to sell equally with those who could pay heavy license fees, and had thus won the major sympathy of the interest. Singularly enough, Massachusetts alone of all the Republican States meeting with defeat in 1882, fails to show in her result reasons which harmonize with those enumerated as making up the elements of discontent. Her people most do favor high tariffs, taxes on liquors and luxuries, civil service reforms, and were supposed to be more free from legal and political abuses than any other. Massachusetts had, theretofore, been considered to be the most advanced of all the States—in notions, in habit, and in law—yet Butler’s victory was relatively more pronounced than that of any Democratic candidate, not excepting that of Cleveland over Folger in New York, the Democratic majority here approaching two hundred thousand. How are we to explain the Massachusetts’ result? Gov. Bishop was a high-toned and able gentleman, the type of every reform contended for. There is but one explanation. Massachusetts had had too much of reform; it had come in larger and faster doses than even her progressive people could stand—and an inconsistent discontent took new shape there—that of very plain reaction. This view is confirmed by the subsequent attempt of Gov. Butler to defeat the re-election of Geo. F. Hoar to the U. S. Senate, by a combination of Democrats with dissatisfied Republicans. The movement failed, but it came very near to success, and for days the result was in doubt. Hoar had been a Senator of advanced views, of broad and comprehensive statesmanship, but that communistic sentiment which occasionally crops out in our politics and strikes at all leaders, merely from the pleasure of asserting the right to tear down, assailed him with a vigor almost equal to that which struck Windom of Minnesota, a statesman of twenty-four years’ honorable, able and sometimes brilliant service. To prejudice the people of his State against him, a photograph of his Washington residence had been scattered broadcast. The print in the photograph intended to prejudice being a coach with a liveried lackey. It might have been the coach and lackey of a visitor, but the effect was the same where discontent had run into a fever.
Political discontent gave unmistakable manifestations of its existence in Ohio, Massachusetts, New York (where Ex-Governor Cornell’s nomination had been defeated by a forged telegram), Michigan, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Connecticut, California, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. The Republican position was well maintained in New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Illinois, and Wisconsin. It was greatly improved in Virginia, where Mahone’s Republican Readjuster ticket carried the State by nearly ten thousand, and where a United States’ Senator and Congressman at large were gained, as well as some of the District Congressmen. The Republicans also improved the situation in North Carolina and Tennessee, though they failed to carry either. They also gained Congressmen in Mississippi and Louisiana, but the Congressional result throughout the country was a sweeping Democratic victory, the 48th Congress, beginning March 4, 1883, showing a Democratic majority of 71 in a total membership of 325.
In Pennsylvania alone of all the Northern States, were the Republican elements of discontent organized, and here they were as well organized as possible under the circumstances. Charles S. Wolfe had the year previous proclaimed what he called his “independence of the Bosses,” by declaring himself a candidate for State Treasurer, “nominated in a convention of one.” He secured 49,984 votes, and this force was used as the nucleus for the better organized Independent Republican movement of 1882. Through this a State Convention was called which placed a full ticket in the field, and which in many districts nominated separate legislative candidates.
The complaints of the Independent Republicans of Pennsylvania were very much like those of dissatisfied Republicans in other Northern States where no adverse organizations were set up, and these can best be understood by giving the official papers and correspondence connected with the revolt, and the attempts to conciliate and suppress it by the regular organization. The writer feels a delicacy in appending this data, inasmuch as he was one of the principals in the negotiations, but formulated complaints, methods and principles peculiar to the time can be better understood as presented by organized and official bodies, than where mere opinions of cotemporaneous writers and speakers must otherwise be given. A very careful summary has been made by Col. A. K. McClure, in the Philadelphia Times Almanac, and from this we quote the data connected with the—