Our War with Spain for Cuba's Freedom

by Trumbull White

CHAPTER V.

COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA.

Efforts of the Early Governors to Encourage Trade—Cultivation of
Sugar One of the First Industries—Decree Defining Powers of the
Captain General—Attempted Annexation to the United States—The
Ostend Manifesto—Its Wonderful Predictions, in the Light of
Later Events—Exports and Imports Between Cuba and Spain—The
Future of Commercial Cuba.

The commerce of Cuba has grown in spite of the limitations that have been placed upon it and not because of any encouragement that has been given to it. Columbus called Cuba the most beautiful land that eyes had ever seen. Its resources, granted by a generous nature, have enabled it to recuperate after destructive warfare with a rapidity simply amazing to those accustomed only to the climate and the soil of the temperate zone. The immense industries of Cuba have been hampered from the beginning by Spanish oppression and the fact that they have flourished under such unfavorable conditions is a striking evidence of what may be expected under a policy of encouragement and freedom. Sugar, tobacco, and other tropical products have made fortunes for Cuba every year, only to have them stolen by Spanish officeholders, sent there to plunder all they could get their hands upon. With peace assured, the opportunities for the extension of industries in the "Pearl of the Antilles" will be enormous.

The commercial development of Cuba has come through centuries of disturbance, warfare, and oppression. A simple catalogue of all the evils with which the Cubans have had to contend would fill a volume. All that can be done here is to indicate briefly some of the more notable events in the history of the island after the British conquests and the relinquishment of the prize to the Spanish authorities upon the return of peace. Near the end of the last century there came a period which offered more encouragement to the hope of permanent prosperity in Cuba than had been offered before. The successive governors appointed varied in character, it is true, but several of them were liberal minded, public spirited men who gave to the colony far better administration that it had been accustomed to. One of these was Luis de Las Casas, who imparted a new impulse to the agriculture and commerce of the island. It was under his guidance that trade with the United States began to assume importance, and to his efforts was due the transfer of the remains of Columbus from Santo Domingo to their present resting place in the cathedral at Havana. He encouraged literature, science, the fine arts and the erection of various public charitable and educational institutions. He was the founder of the first public library and the first newspaper which had existed in the island. He showed his ability as an executive by restraining the restless population under the excitement which accompanied the revolution in the neighboring colony of Santo Domingo, which ended by the loss to Spain of that island.

One of the earliest causes of ill feeling between the islanders of Cuba and the people of Spain occurred just at the end of the administration of Las Casas in 1796. In the seventy years prior to that time a great navy yard grew up on the Bay of Havana, and 114 war vessels were built there to convoy the Spanish treasure ships. All at once this flourishing industry was closed on the demand of the ship-builders of Spain that the work should be done in the mother country. As might have been expected, this aroused great indignation among a large number of people in Havana who had been dependent upon the industry.

It was about the same time, or just a hundred years before the outbreak of our war with Spain, that sugar became an important article of general commerce. Even then, however, it was not an article of common consumption, and was held at extravagantly high prices, measured by the present cheapness of the article. Market reports of the time show that the price approximated forty cents a pound, and this at a time when the purchasing power of money was at least twice as great as it is now. As the price has fallen, the product and the consumption have increased, until of late years it has been an enormous source of revenue to the Island of Cuba. When Napoleon Bonaparte abducted the royal family of Spain and deposed the Bourbon dynasty in 1808, every member of the provincial counsel of Cuba took an oath to preserve the island for their legitimate sovereign. The Colonial government immediately declared war against Napoleon and proclaimed Ferdinand VII. as king. It was by this action that the colony earned its title of "The ever-faithful isle," which has been excellent as a complimentary phrase, but hardly justified by the actual facts. For some years following this action, affairs in the island were in an embarrassing condition, owing to the progress of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, which kept all trade disturbed and Spain in a constant condition of disorder. If it had not been for the fortunate election of one or two of the governors things might have been even worse than they were, and it was considered that Cuba was enjoying quite as much peace and prosperity as were her neighbor colonies and the mother governments of Europe. In 1812 a negro conspiracy broke out and attained considerable success, and as a result of it the Spanish governors began to be more and more severe in their administrations.

Under the influence of the spirit of freedom which was spreading all around them, Cubans became more and more restless. The revolutionary movements in Spanish America had begun in 1810, and after fourteen years of guerrilla warfare, European power had vanished in the Western hemisphere from the Northern boundary of the United States to Cape Horn, except for the Colonies of British Honduras and the Guianas, and a few of the West Indian Islands. In 1821, Santo Domingo became independent, and in the same year Florida came into the possession of the United States. Secret societies, with the purpose of revolution as their motive, began to spring up in Cuba, and the population divided into well-defined factions. There was indeed an attempt at open revolt made in 1823 by one of these societies known as the "Soles De Bolivar," but it was averted before the actual outbreak came, and those leaders of it who were not able to escape from Cuba were arrested and punished. It was as a result of these successive events that the office of Captain General was created and invested with all the powers of Oriental despotism. The functions of the Captain General were defined by a royal decree of May 28, 1825, to the following effect:

His Majesty, the King Our Lord, desiring to obviate the inconveniences that might in extraordinary cases result from a division of command, and from the interferences and prerogatives of the respective officers; for the important end of preserving in that precious island his legitimate sovereign authority and the public tranquillity through proper means, has resolved in accordance with the opinion of his council of ministers to give to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the royal ordinances are granted to the governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this, his Majesty gives to your Excellency the most ample and unbounded power, not only to send away from the island any persons in office, whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein your Excellency may deem injurious, or whose conduct, public or private, may alarm you, replacing them with persons faithful to his Majesty and deserving of all the confidence of your Excellency; but also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning any branch of the administration as your Excellency may think most suitable to the Royal Service.

This decree since that time has been substantially the supreme law of Cuba, and has never been radically modified by any concessions except those given as a last and lingering effort to preserve the sovereignty of Spain, when after three years' progress of the revolution she realized that her colony had slipped away from her authority. The decree quoted in itself offers sufficient justification for the Cuban revolution in the name of liberty.

ATTEMPTED ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES.

During the present century there have been a number of attempts on the part of men prominent in public life, both in the United States and Cuba, to arrange a peaceable annexation by the purchase by this country of the island from Spain. Statesmen of both nations have been of the opinion that such a settlement of the difficulty would be mutually advantageous, and have used every diplomatic endeavor to that end.

During Thomas Jefferson's term of office, while Spain bowed beneath the yoke of France, from which there was then no prospect of relief, the people of Cuba, feeling themselves imcompetent in force to maintain their independence, sent a deputation to Washington, proposing the annexation of the island to the federal system of North America.

In 1854 President Pearce instructed Wm. L. Marcy, his Secretary of
State, to arrange a conference of the Ministers of the United
States to England, France and Spain, to be held with a view to the
acquisition of Cuba.

The conference met at Ostend on the 9th of October, 1854, and adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle, where notes were prepared. Mr. Soule, then our Minister to Spain, said in a letter to Mr. Marcy, transmitting the joint report: "The question of the acquisition of Cuba by us is gaining ground as it grows to be more seriously agitated and considered. Now is the moment for us to be done with it, and if it is to bring upon us the calamity of war, let it be now, while the great powers of this continent are engaged in that stupendous struggle which cannot but engage all their strength and tax all their energies as long as it lasts, and may, before it ends, convulse them all. Neither England nor France would be likely to interfere with us. England could not bear to be suddenly shut out of our market, and see her manufactures paralyzed, even by a temporary suspension of her intercourse with us. And France, with the heavy task now on her hands, and when she so eagerly aspires to take her seat as the acknowledged chief of the European family, would have no inducement to assume the burden of another war."

The result of this conference is so interesting in its application to present conditions that its reproduction is required to make intelligible the whole story of Cuba, and we give it here:

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

Sir: The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the president in the several confidential despatches you have addressed to us respectively, to that effect, we have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which we are most happy to inform you has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can he obtained, not exceeding the sum of $…

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people, both of Spain and the United States, are so deeply interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank and public. They should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the world.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, us those of the United States in the purchase, of the island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances we cannot anticipate a failure, unless possibly through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to, this conclusion, and for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.

2. The probability is great that the government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then, 1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it. Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of states of which the Union is the providential nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by our government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coast begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look upon each other as if they were one people, and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers threaten an insurrection at every moment, which may result in direful consequences to the American people.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that foreign powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the island. Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible governments, that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant power to irresponsible agents, who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve their brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the island. This is rendered impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials, who, to attain their ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish government at home may be well disposed, but experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositaries of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted.

She cannot but see that such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the island would affect it in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortez. Their prosperity would date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.

France has already constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasburg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads through her northern provinces to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a center of attraction for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by remunerating prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first nations of continental Europe—rich, powerful and contented.

Whilst two-thirds of the price of the island would be ample for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might with the remaining forty millions satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold upon her own bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own government for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have already been thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new sources of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they may be realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again return.

Cuba, in her palmiest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the expense of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave a deficit, chargeable on the treasury of Spain, to the amount of six hundred thousand dollars.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the island is an encumbrance instead of a source of profit to the mother country.

Under no probable circumstance can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent, on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which corrupt, arbitrary and unrelenting local administration necessarily entail upon the inhabitants of Cuba cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is an age of adventure in which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it—a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by a stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule because, although we might have claimed them by right of conquest in a just way, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we have offered Spain a fair price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost, nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the question, whether the present condition of the island would justify such a measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger, or actually to consume, the fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue between the United States and Spain. A long series of injuries to our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana under circumstances which, without immediate redress, would have justified a resort to measures of war in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates, and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign nations, are constantly exposed, than the circumstances of that case. Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter has forborne to resort to extreme measures.

But this course cannot, with due regard to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences, and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN. J. Y. MASON. PIERRE SOULE.

HON. WM. L. MAECY, Secretary of State.

Unfortunately for Cuba the suggestions offered by this commission were not acted upon, although it is not probable that Spain, ever blind to her own interests, would have admitted the justice or reason of the argument, had the offer to purchase been made to her.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.

A table showing the amount of trade between Cuba and Spain during
the year 1894 (the last authentic report), is instructive:

Importations in Cuba from Spain $ 7,492,622
Exportation from Cuba to Spain $23,412,376
—————-
Difference in favor of export $15,919,754