CHAPTER XLIV.
BLOCKADE OF CUBAN PORTS.
Contraband of War—Confiscation of Cargoes—Establishment of a
Blockade—Notice to Other Nations—Prizes, Lawful and Unlawful—
Privateering Abolished—Distribution of Prize Money—The Use the
Government Makes of Its Share.
While the great blockade was in progress the air was full of talk about "prizes," "contraband," "search," and "seizure," and some of the terms proved rather puzzling to the average citizen who had never had occasion to study the rules of war.
First about "contraband." It is one of the strictest rules of war that neutral nations must not interfere nor in any way give help to either party. To furnish ships or arms or ammunition might greatly prolong the conflict or even change its result, especially where this assistance is extended to a nation—like Spain to-day— ill supplied and of small resources. This would be manifestly unfair, and for a neutral to offer or abet such aid is a grave offense. For remissness in an aggravated case of this sort (that of the Alabama) England was forced to pay us heavy damages. Neither national sympathy nor national interests afford any excuse.
That is why we restrained and punished those who organized expeditions to help the Cubans while we were still at peace with Spain. But nations engaged in war must not ask too much. They may insist that a neutral shall allow no hostile operations to be carried on within its territory, but they have no right to demand that it shall punish its private citizens for engaging in trade in articles that may be helpful to the enemy, for that would be imposing too much trouble and expense upon a nation which has no concern in the quarrel. Such trade is punishable, but it is the business of the nation injured by it to catch the ships engaged in it and enforce the penalty—which is usually confiscation of the goods as "contraband of war." To do this it may stop and search any ships—except warships—which it finds at sea; and so long as no outrages are committed the neutral must submit and has no ground for complaint. Trade in contraband goods is tolerated, but it is carried on at the trader's own risk. His government will not undertake to protect him from the legitimate consequences of his venture.
As has been stated, the contraband goods are confiscated by the captor. The vessel, however, must be captured while the guilty goods are still on board; to seize the proceeds after the cargo has been sold and landed is not allowable, though it has sometimes been done. If the ship belongs to the same owner as the forfeited goods, it, too, is confiscated; otherwise it goes free after the goods are taken off.
It is very important to know just what articles are contraband and what are not; but this is often hard to decide. There is no question about weapons, military equipments and ammunition. These are plainly contraband, and the materials from which they are made are classed with them whenever they seem intended for military uses. Thus sulphur and saltpeter are always contraband. The detached parts of cannon and naval engines do escape by the trick of separation.
Cloth is not contraband in itself, but if of a quality evidently designed for the manufacture of uniform it would probably be seized. Horses are so useful in war that most nations treat them as contraband—though, oddly enough, Russia has never done so. Still more objectionable, nowadays, is coal, which will never be allowed to reach the bunkers of hostile warships if it can be prevented. This shows plainly how uncertain and changeful is the list, for fifty years ago coal was as free as provisions, though even food must not be run through the lines of a blockade.
Articles, such as coal, which are of great value in war, but are also largely used for peaceful purposes, are called "occasional contraband" and their seizure has given rise to endless disputes. There is no justice in treating them as contraband except when they are obviously destined for hostile use. Sometimes, in doubtful cases, such goods, instead of being confiscated, are seized and paid for to prevent their reaching the enemy. This is called "pre-emption;" but, fair as it seems, there is much danger that it will be made a pretext for appropriating goods which ought to go quite free, and the practice is generally condemned.
Search at sea is extremely annoying, and ships entirely innocent of contraband are often subjected to great inconvenience. That must be endured; to attempt to resist or escape would make them liable to confiscation, whatever their cargo might prove to be. Only properly commissioned vessels, however, are entitled to hold up merchantmen for this purpose. Another kind of meddling in war for which a neutral citizen may be punished by confiscation, but for which his government is not held responsible, is blockade running.
A blockade, such as we maintained around Cuba, is established by stationing war vessels at the entrances of harbors and at intervals along the blockaded coast. Its purpose is to cut off supplies and stop all communication with the enemy by sea. The merchant ships of all nations are therefore forbidden to pass or even to approach the line, and the penalty for disobedience is the confiscation of both ship and cargo—whether the latter is contraband or not here makes no difference. If the ship does not stop when hailed she may be fired upon, and if she is sunk while endeavoring to escape it is her own fault. And unlike vessels merely guilty of carrying contraband, she is no less liable to seizure on her return voyage, after her cargo has been disposed of. Altogether, blockade running is perilous business. It is usually attempted under cover of night or stormy weather, and it is as full of excitement and adventure as war itself. The motive is usually either to take advantage of famine prices, or to aid the enemy by bringing supplies or carrying dispatches.
Neutral ships, however, are entitled to some sort of warning that a blockade exists. Notice is therefore sent to all neutral governments, announcing the fact and stating exactly the extent of coast covered. Besides this, until the blockade has lasted for some time and thus has become generally known it is customary for the officers of the blockading fleet to visit and warn every ship that approaches, the warning, with the date, being entered upon her register. If, after that, she approaches the forbidden coast, she is liable to confiscation—though possibly great stress of weather might excuse her provided she landed no cargo. Instructions of this sort were issued by President McKinley to our squadron blockading Cuba. A reasonable time, also, was granted to ships that were lying in the blockaded ports at the time when the blockade was declared, to make their escape. President McKinley allowed thirty days for this purpose, which was unusually liberal.
Nations engaged in war have sometimes assumed that they could establish a blockade by simply issuing a proclamation forbidding neutrals to approach the enemy's coast, without stationing ships to enforce it. For example, during the Napoleonic wars, France declared the whole coast of England to be blockaded at a time when she scarcely dared send out a ship from her ports, having been soundly thrashed at Trafalgar. But these "paper blockades" are a mere waste of time and ink. They are not valid, and except in the way of angry and contemptuous protest, no nation would consider them worthy of the slightest attention. If Spain, for instance, should attempt a desperate game of bluff by declaring New Orleans, New York and Boston under blockade, all neutral ships would come and go just the same, and she would meddle with them at her peril. This question—if it ever was a question—was finally decided by the epoch-making convention of the powers at the close of the Crimean war (treaty of Paris, 1856), which, along with other rules that have revolutionized naval warfare, declared that "blockades in order to be binding must be effective." This means that they must be maintained by a force actually stationed on the blockaded coast, strong enough to make it decidedly dangerous to attempt to run through. The temporary absence of some of the ships, however, either in pursuit of an enemy or on account of a violent storm, would not invalidate the blockade, and ships seeking to take advantage of such an opening would be liable to the full penalty if caught.
And now a few words about "prizes"—a particularly interesting and timely theme, for during the very first week of the war our fleet captured no fewer than fifteen of them.
In time of war properly commissioned ships are entitled to capture not only the armed vessels but also the helpless merchantmen of the enemy. It does seem a good deal like piracy, but it has been the universal practice from time immemorial. These captured vessels are taken to some convenient port of the captor's own country that the courts may pass judgment on them, and if there has been no mistake made in the seizure they are forthwith condemned as "lawful prize." Then they are sold, and "prize money" is awarded the captors in proportion to the value of the prize. The cargo is treated in the same way, unless it happens to belong to a neutral, in which case it is free; though the owner must put up with the inconvenience and delay resulting from the seizure, since he deliberately took that risk when he placed his goods in a hostile craft. Formerly his property was sometimes confiscated under these circumstances, but the treaty of Paris, already mentioned, put a stop to that. Formerly, too, the goods of enemies could be taken from neutral ships and confiscated in the same manner as contraband of war, but the treaty of Paris made an end of that also.
Another excellent rule adopted on that notable occasion abolished privateering. Privateers were armed ships belonging to private citizens who had obtained from their own government a commission (letter of marque) which authorized them to make prize of the enemy's merchant vessels and appropriate the proceeds. The abolition of privateering was a long step in the right direction, for the privateer's motive was mainly plunder, and the whole business was really close kin to piracy. Neither the United States nor Spain signed the original agreement, but both have acceded to it now—Spain, evidently, very much against her will, for her citizens thirsted for the rich booty of our commerce, a fact which makes supremely ridiculous her crazy ravings against our legitimate captures as "American piracy."
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZE MONEY.
The prize money adjudged to captors is distributed in the following proportions:
1. The commander of a fleet or squadron, one-twentieth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his immediate command.
2. To the commander of a division of a fleet or squadron, a sum equal to one-fiftieth of any prize money awarded to a vessel of the division under his command, to be paid from the moiety due the United States, if there be such moiety; if not, from the amount awarded the captors.
3. To the fleet captain, one-hundredth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel of the fleet in which he is serving, in which case he shall share in proportion to his pay, with the other officers and men on board such vessel.
4. To the commander of a single vessel, one-tenth of all the prize money awarded to the vessel.
5. After the foregoing deductions, the residue is distributed among the others doing duty on board, and borne upon the books of the ship, in proportion to their respective rates of pay.
All vessels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel making the capture, and in such condition as to be able to render effective aid if required, will share in the prize. Any person temporarily absent from his vessel may share in the captures made during his absence. The prize court determines what vessels shall share in a prize, and also whether a prize was superior or inferior to the vessel or vessels making the capture.
The share of prize money awarded to the United States is set apart forever as a fund for the payment of pensions to naval officers, seamen and marines entitled to pensions.