CHAPTER XV.

THE PEACE OF ZANJON AND ITS VIOLATED PLEDGES

Spanish Hypocrisy and Deceit—Cubans Denied Representation—
Increase of Taxation—The Royal Edicts—A Plausible Argument,
Which Is Not Borne Out by Facts—Spain's Promises Always Broken.

If Spain had been sincere in the promises of reform she made her Cuban colony when the treaty of Zanjon was signed, it is probable that the present war would have never occurred. For while a few of the leaders—notably General Maceo—refused to become pacified, the great majority of the better classes were glad to accept a peaceful settlement on terms that gave them, in fact, if not in name, nearly every concession for which they had fought.

But it did not take them long to learn that they had been duped. Spain granted to Cuba the liberties of Puerto Rico, which had none. On this deceitful ground was laid the new situation, through which ran a current of falsehood and hypocrisy. Spain, whose mind did not change, hastened to change the name of things. The captain-general was called the governor-general. The royal decrees took the name of authorizations. The commercial monopoly of Spain was named coasting trade. The right of banishment was transformed into the law of vagrancy. The brutal attacks of defenseless citizens were called "componte." The law of constitutional guarantees became the law of public order. Taxation without the consent or knowledge of the Cuban people was changed into the law of estimates (budget) voted by the representatives of Spain.

The painful lesson of the Ten Years' War was entirely lost on Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy that would heal the recent wounds, allay public anxiety, and quench the thirst for justice felt by the people, who were desirous to enjoy their natural rights, the Peninsula, while lavish in promises of reform, persisted in carrying on, unchanged, its old and crafty system, namely: to exclude every native Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs; the ungovernable exploitation of the colonists' labor for the benefit of Spanish commerce and Spanish bureaucracy, both civil and military. To carry out the latter purpose it was necessary to maintain the former at any cost.

Mr. Clarence King, a recognized authority on political subjects connected with Cuban affairs, says:

"The main concession for which the insurgents accepted peace was the promise of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, there promptly followed four royal edicts as follows: June 9, entitling Cuba to elect deputies to the Cortes, one for each 40,000 people; June 9, dividing the island into the present six provinces; June 21, instituting a system of provincial and municipal government, followed on August 16 by the necessary electoral regulations. But the system was immediately seen to be the shadow without the substance of self-government. The Provincial Assembly could nominate only three candidates for presiding officer. It was the inevitable governor-general who had the power to appoint, not necessarily one of the three nominees, but any member of the Assembly he chose. But all this provincial machinery is in reality an empty form, since expressly by law the governor-general was given the power to prorogue the assemblies at will. The deputies have never been able to accomplish anything in the Cortes. Moreover the crux of the whole financial oppression—tariff, taxes, and absolute control and expenditure of the revenue—remained with Spain."

The loyal Spaniard insists that every agreement entered into by his government was faithfully carried out; that the Cubans were given from time to time even greater liberties than the treaty promised them; and that in several matters of importance, immunities have been granted them that the people of the mother country did not share.

The Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain concludes a voluminous defense of the policy of his government in Cuba as follows:

There is thus no reason in Cuba to complain of the illiberality of the laws. If there has been any shortcoming in respect to morals, the nation is not to blame; none but the colonial provinces are to blame for this; if we proposed to seek comfort in comparisons, it would not be necessary to look for them in South America, in the countries that have emancipated themselves from the Spanish mother-country, because examples (some of them very recent) of acts of violence, anarchy and scandalous outbreaks could be found in the States of the Union itself.

In respect to another matter, a great deal of foolish talk is indulged in. From the statements of some people it would appear that Cuba does nothing but contribute, by the taxes which it pays, to alleviate the burdens of the peninsular treasury, whereas, in reality, just the contrary is the truth. The nation has, of late, guaranteed the conversion of Spanish debts in Cuba, which took place in 1886 and 1890. Owing to these operations, and to the fact that all taxes which did not have to be met directly by its government have been rigorously eliminated from the budget of Cuba, it was possible to reduce the Cuban budget from forty-six and one-half million dollars, which was its amount at the close of the former war (for the fiscal year of 1878-79) to a little more than twenty-three millions of dollars, as appears from the budget of 1893.

The financial laws have been assimilated, and if the system of taxation has not been entirely assimilated, this is because of the fact that direct taxes are very repugnant to the popular feeling in Cuba, especially the tax on land, which is the basis of the Peninsular budget. It appears, however, that our Cuban brethren have no reason to complain in this respect. The direct tax on rural property is two per cent, in Cuba, whereas in Spain it is seventeen, and even twenty per cent. It is evident that every budget must be based on something; in Cuba, as in all other countries in which the natural conditions are similar, that something must necessarily be the income from customs duties. Notwithstanding this, it may be remarked that in the years when the greatest financial distress prevailed, the Spanish Government never hesitated to sacrifice that income when it was necessary to do so in order to meet the especial need of the principal agricultural product of Cuba. Consequently the Spanish commercial treaty with the United States was concluded, which certainly had not been concluded before, owing to any fault of the Spanish Government. Under that treaty, the principal object of which was to encourage the exportation of Cuban sugar, which found its chief market in the States of the Union, many Spanish industries were sacrificed which have formerly supplied the wants of the people of Cuba. That sacrifice was unhesitatingly made, and now that the treaty is no longer in force, is due to the fact that the new American tariff has stricken sugar from the free list.

Attention may also be called to the fact that the colonial provinces alone enjoy exemption from the blood tax, Cuba never having been obliged to furnish military recruits.

The disqualifications of the Cubans to hold public office is purely a myth. Such disqualifications is found on the text of no law or regulation, and in point of fact there is no such exclusion. In order to verify this assertion it would be sufficient to examine the lists of Cuban officers, especially of those employed in the administration of justice and in all branches of instruction. Even if it were desired to make a comparison of political offices, even of those connected with the functions which are discharged in the Peninsula, the proportion would still be shown in which Spaniards in Cuba aspire to both. The fact is that a common fallacy is appealed to in the language habitually used by the enemies of Spain, who call persons "Peninsulars" who were not born in Cuba, but have resided there many years and have all their ties and interests there, and do not call those "Cubans" who were born there and have left the island in order to meet necessities connected, perhaps, with their occupation. This was done in the Senate, when the advocates of the separation of Cuba only were called "Cubans," while those only who refused allegiance to the Spanish mother-country were called patriots.

In conclusion, I will relate a fact which may appear to be a joke, but which, in a certain way, furnished proof of what I have just said. When Rafael Gasset returned from Habana, he came and asked me for some data showing the proportion of Cubans holding office under our Government. I asked him, as a preliminary question, for a definition of what we were to understand by "Cuban" and what by "Peninsular." He immediately admitted that the decision of the whole question was based upon that definition, and I called his attention to the fact that here, in the Ministry of the Colonies, at the present time, there are three high governmental functionaries. One is a representative from Habana, being at the same time a professor in its University, and another, viz., your humble servant, is a Spaniard because he was born in Habana itself. Is the other man a Peninsular, and am I not a Cuban?

GUILLERMO. Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain.

This is the argument from the Peninsular standpoint, and it is probably made in good faith. But while the Spanish rule in Cuba may seem to be just and equitable in theory, it is oppressive and tyrannical in fact. While the government may have partly carried out the letter of its promises, there has been no effort to fulfill the spirit of the compact in the slighest degree, and the violated pledges of the treaty of Zanjon only add new chapters to the long record of Spanish treachery and deceit.