CHAPTER XXXVIII.
STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING SQUADRONS AND ARMIES.
Growth of the White Squadron in a Single Decade—Progress of Our
Navy a Gratifying Ode after It Was Fairly Started—How the United
States Stands in Comparison with the Other Nations of the World—
List of Ships in the American Navy—List of Ships in the Navy of
Spain at the Beginning of the War—Interest of All Countries
Centered on the Result of Our Naval Battles—Modern Guns and
Projectiles—The Armies of the Two Combatants—Coast Defenses of
the United States.
Three elements enter into the fighting efficiency of nations at war: the strength of their navies, the strength of their armies and the condition of their coast defences. For the first time in many years general attention of the people of the United States was centered upon these conditions when the outbreak of hostilities began to threaten. Inasmuch as it was an admitted fact that most of the fighting would be done at sea, or at least that the efficiency of our fleets would be the most important factor, most of the attention was directed to a study of the navy.
The constructions of what we call the new navy of the United States, "the white squadron," which has placed us sixth in the rank of the naval powers of the world, instead of so far down that we were scarcely to be counted at all, has all been done in less than twelve years. It may be that to stand sixth in rank is not yet high enough, but the progress of a single decade certainly is remarkable.
After the Civil War, when hostilities on our own coast and complications abroad seemed to be at an end, the care of the navy was abandoned and ships were sold with scarcely a protest, almost as entirely as had been done eighty years before, at the end of the Revolution. There was even less reason for this policy, because in 1785 the country was poor and needed the money the ships brought, while in the twenty years following the Civil War there was no such excuse of national poverty. By 1885 there was no United States navy at all worthy the name, for the wooden vessels on the list, with their obsolete guns, were of no value whatever in the event of hostilities with a foreign power that had kept up its equipment with rifled guns and ironclads.
The movement to repair the decay began when, in 1881, Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt appointed the first advisory board, presided over by Rear-Admiral John Bodgers, "to determine the requirements of a new navy." This board reported that the United States should have twenty-one battleships, seventy unarmored cruisers of various sizes and types, twenty torpedo boats, five rams and five torpedo gunboats, all to be built of steel. The report was received by Congress and the country with the attention it merited, but to get the work started was another matter.
POLICY OF THE ECONOMISTS.
The economists had been praising the policy of idleness in naval construction, claiming first that we were at peace and did not need to spend money on expensive vessels and, next, that naval construction was in an experimental stage and that we should let the European nations go to the expense of the experiments, as they were doing, and when some result had been reached, take advantage of it, instead of wasting our own money in work that would have to be thrown away in a few years.
When the country became convinced that a navy was needed, it was found that we could not follow out that pleasant little theory. Our naval authorities could not obtain the facts and the experience they wanted from other nations, and our shipyards could not build even one of the armored ships. We could not roll even the thinnest of modern armor-plates, and could not make a gun that was worth mounting on a modern vessel if we had it.
The shipyard of John Roach did the first work on the new navy, and during Secretary Chandler's term of office built the Chicago, the Boston, the Atlanta and the Dolphin. Instead of battleships, the first of the fleet were third-rate cruisers. Armor-plate was bought in a foreign market, and we actually went abroad for the plans of one our largest cruisers—the Charleston.
In 1885 the navy department came under the administration of Secretary William C. Whitney, and it was beginning with his years of service that the greatest progress was made. While our shipyards were learning to build ships, the gunmakers and the makers of armor-plate were learning their craft too, so that progress was along parallel lines. In 1886 the sum of $2,128,000 was appropriated for modern rifled guns. The first contract for armor-plate was signed in 1887. Since that time the plants for construction have been completed and armor-plate equal to the best in the world turned out from them. Ten years of apprenticeship have taught us how to build whatever we need to carry on naval warfare.
TAKES THE RANK OF SIXTH.
By 1894 the United States had risen to the sixth among the naval powers of the world, the first ten and their relative strength expressed in percentage of that of Great Britain being as follows:
Great Britain 100 United States 17
France 68 Spain 11
Italy 48 China 6
Russia 38 Austria 5
Germany 21 Turkey 3
Since that time the relative position of the leaders has not materially changed, although some estimates are to the effect that Russia and Italy have changed places and that Spain has gained slightly on the United States. Of the ones at the foot of the procession all have dropped below the station assigned them, by the advance of Japan, which has come from outside the file of the first ten and is now eighth, ranking between Spain and China. The estimates are based on a calculation of all the elements that enter into the efficiency of the navies, such as tonnage, speed, armor, caliber and range of armament, number of enlisted men and their efficiency. Such calculations cannot be absolute, for they cannot measure at all times the accuracy of the gunnery of a certain vessel. The human equation enters so prominently into warfare that mathematical calculations must be at all times incomplete. Americans will be slow to believe, however, that they are at any disadvantage in this detail, whatever their material equipment may be.
The following table shows the strength of the navy of the United States. In that part of the table marked "first rate" the four ships placed first are first-class battle ships, the Brooklyn and New York are armored cruisers, the Columbia, Olympia and Minneapolis protected cruisers, the Texas a second-class battle ship and the Puritan a double-turret monitor. Among the second-raters all but the Miantonomah, Amphitrite, Monadnock and Terror (monitors) are protected cruisers. The newly bought boats, New Orleans and Albany, belong in this class. The third-raters are a heterogeneous lot, consisting of cruisers, gunboats, old monitors and unprotected cruisers. Of the fourth raters, Vesuvius is a dynamite ship, the Yankee and Michigan are cruisers, the Petrel, Bancroft and Pinta are gunboats and the Fern is a transport. The remaining classes of the table are homogeneous. The government has recently purchased numerous tugs and yachts not accounted for in the table:
FIRST RATE.
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull
(tons) main battery horsepower
Iowa 11,340 18 12,105 Steel
Indiana 10,288 16 9,738 Steel
Massachusetts 10,288 16 10,403 Steel
Oregon 10,288 16 11,111 Steel
Brooklyn 9,215 20 18,769 Steel
New York 8,200 18 17,401 Steel
Columbia 7,375 11 18,509 Steel
Minneapolis 7,375 11 20,862 Steel
Texas 6,315 8 8,610 Steel
Puritan 6,060 10 3,700 Iron
Olympia 5,870 14 17,313 Steel