TESTIMONY OF EUGENE VICTOR DENNETT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, KENNETH A. MacDONALD—Resumed
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Dennett, at the time we suspended your testimony you had completed your narrative with regard to your experience in the CCC camp, and told us that immediately thereafter you had been shanghaied into working shipping.
(At this point Representative Morgan M. Moulder left the hearing room.)
Mr. Dennett. A little freight boat here in Puget Sound.
Mr. Tavenner. I am sure that would be a very interesting story, but it is not a matter we are investigating in our work here.
After you had that experience how long was it before you returned to the work of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. It was within a very few months because I didn’t know at the time I started to work in the freight-boat industry in Puget Sound that there was an organizing drive of a union to organize the employees and that they had reached the point before I came along where they had entered into an arbitration. And they were awaiting the decision of this arbitrator. Finally the decision came down, I think about 3 or 4 months after I entered the industry, and the decision was so adverse that the men stopped work as soon as the boats got into port.
Mr. Tavenner. What do you mean by saying that a decision came down?
Mr. Dennett. The arbitrator handed down his decision. He was a very long time making his decision. When it finally came down it was very disagreeable to all the employees. In fact, they rejected it; they refused to accept it and called a strike.
When they called that strike they were confronted with a problem of electing delegates to attend a meeting of the union to determine what course of action to pursue.
I was elected a delegate from the crew that I was working with.
When we arrived at this meeting—I believe the meeting was held in the labor temple—we discussed the award, and the union leaders at that time were very frankly disappointed in the results of it.
The sum total of it was that it led to a strike, and the members seemed to like the way I presented their case during the course of the arguments, getting ready for the strike. And when the strike occurred I was elected chairman of the strike committee and chairman of the negotiating committee.
So we were again brought into public attention, and the Communist Party looked me up very quickly to find out what was going on and to try to advise me how to conduct myself in the course of that strike. They really knew very little about it. They learned a great deal from me because I was working with the men. And their advice was I must immediately fight the leadership of the union.
I made a few feeble efforts in that direction and found that I didn’t have any good reason for fighting that leadership because they were carrying out the program which I had advocated in the original strike meeting to satisfy the needs of the members.
Mr. Tavenner. Apparently, the Communist Party was more interested in promoting its own objectives than it was the objectives of the union which was on strike.
Mr. Dennett. They were anxious that someone from the Communist Party gain control in that organization.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the name of the organization?
Mr. Dennett. At that time it was called the Ferry Boatmen’s Union of the Pacific. It later has changed its name, and, in making use of that name, I certainly want it to be clearly understood that using that name in nowise should be construed as meaning that it was any Communist organization because it was not.
Mr. Tavenner. It rather demonstrated just the contrary.
Mr. Dennett. And its leaders were not.
But the leaders of that organization were making as sincere an effort as they knew how to represent the wishes and needs of the membership.
While there were some tactical differences between myself and them on various occasions, we did adopt a program wherein we agreed with each other that none of us would attempt to do anything or to speak in behalf of the organization without conferring with the other. In other words, we made a mutual agreement among ourselves as officials of the strike committee which required the exchange of mutual confidence. And, to the best of my ability, I carried that out, and I think, in all fairness, it should be said that, to the best of their ability, they carried their part out. I think the value of that is demonstrated by the fact that in the final settlement of that strike we succeeded in raising the wages of the freight-boat employees from $49 per month, without any regulation of hours, to a wage of about $150 per month with a regulation of hours and provision for overtime.
Mr. Velde (presiding).
I am not quite clear about this ferry boatmen’s union. Was it a local union not affiliated with any other?
Mr. Dennett. It was a part of an American Federation affiliate. At that time it was the Ferry Boatmen’s Union of the Pacific, affiliated with the International Seamen’s Union of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.
Mr. Velde. In what year?
Mr. Dennett. That was in 1936.
Mr. Velde. How large was the local? How many members?
Mr. Dennett. I think there were in the neighborhood of 300 or 400 members in Puget Sound at that time. But that, of course, controlled all the tug boats and all the barges, all the towing, all the servicing, on the waterside of the smaller vessels.
I think that that completes the statement of what was in progress at the time of the question.
Mr. Tavenner. After this experience on the waterfront what was your next contact with the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. The next occurred in the district council of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific. That was Northwest District Council No. 1 which was in Seattle. This was the council to which delegates were sent from all the maritime unions.
(At this point Representative Morgan M. Moulder returned to the hearing room.)
Mr. Dennett. And some of the shoreside unions, which worked in the shipyards.
These unions were brought together in the 1934 strike, which was before my time. And I would be presuming on you to try to give any testimony about the exact way in which it was formed except to say that, consistent with the Communist Party policy, it was our objective, from the days of the old Marine Workers Industrial Union, which was one of the affiliates of the Red International of Labor Unions, to organize all the maritime workers into one organization.
However, it was the desire of the workers in the industry to choose their membership in the duly constituted, chartered organizations of craft unions which were already in the field, such as the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Water Tenders and Wipers Association, the Marine Cooks and Stewards of the Pacific.[2] And later on I believe the radio operators, the masters, mates, and pilots,[3] and the marine engineers.[4] Then, of course, the shoreside organizations of longshoremen, machinists and shipwrights, joiners, boilermakers. There were many organizations that were involved in any kind of waterborne traffic.
Through the Maritime Federation of the Pacific all of these were brought together, and, for a brief period of time at least, cooperated quite successfully.
However, by 1935 one organization began to object to the Communist Party influence in the federation. That was the sailors’ union under Harry Lundeberg. However, in that dispute it wasn’t clear to the average person who was in the industry just what the nature of the dispute was, and most people felt that the dispute was a personal dispute between the leaders of the sailors and the leaders of the longshoremen. My own knowledge of the situation, of a later date, would lead me to believe that that is not an adequate explanation of what the dispute was all about.
The dispute ran much deeper than personality clashes. The dispute was a fundamental policy question dispute, and that dispute centered around whether or not the organization would move closer and closer to the Red International of Labor Unions through this new form or whether it would permit itself to separate into the respective component parts and each function separately and independently without that international Red affiliation.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the outcome of that dispute?
Mr. Dennett. The outcome was that the split spread. First one organization and then another began to have misgivings as to the consequences of being full partners in the Maritime Federation of the Pacific.
The first one to show the disaffection were the sailors. Subsequently the marine firemen showed disaffection. Then the master mates and pilots showed disaffection. And the marine engineers showed disaffection. The radio operators began to show some disaffection. Some of the longshoremen showed disaffection.
So the result was that by the time 1937 or 1938 rolled around the Maritime Federation was becoming sort of a bare skeleton which existed with a powerful name but did not have the moral backing and support of the members of the organizations that were affiliated to it.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the organization Communist-dominated?
Mr. Dennett. The Maritime Federation of the Pacific top leadership had at all times some prominent Communist leaders, some persons who were Communists.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you at this time give us the names of those who occupied an official position in that organization who were known to you to be members of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. One of the first ones that I knew was a man by the name of Walter Stack.
Mr. Tavenner. Did Walter Stack become very prominent in the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. Walter Stack was in the marine firemen’s union and exercised a great deal of influence in that organization here.
Another was Ernest Fox. Ernest Fox was a patrolman in the Sailors Union of the Pacific, and he exercised a great deal of influence in the sailors union. He was one of the original ones. When Mr. Lundeberg was the first president of the organization Mr. Fox was his right hand bower who did most of the leg work for Mr. Lundeberg at that time. Lundeberg was the first president of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific.
Mr. Tavenner. At that time was he anti-Communist?
Mr. Dennett. I think, from the stories that I have been told, that Mr. Lundeberg was thought so well of at that time that he was invited to take part and did participate in some top fraction meetings of the Communist Party in the Maritime Federation. And when he turned against the Communist Party a little bit later on that incensed the Communists so much that they looked upon Mr. Lundeberg as a potential traitor who might reveal a good deal more about them than they wished to have revealed, so that they launched many attacks upon Mr. Lundeberg for the political purpose of diverting the attention from the real reason for the attack.
I do not mean to say by that that I endorsed everything Mr. Lundeberg did, because I disagreed with most of the things he did on a straight trade-union basis on a later date. But this much about that relationship I do know, and I know that—continuing the answer to your question as to the others—the next one whom I knew who also became president of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific was a man by the name of James Engstrom.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell the name, please.
Mr. Dennett. E-n-g-s-t-r-o-m. Engstrom also came from the Marine Firemen’s Union here in the Seattle branch. Mr. Engstrom exercised powerful influence in the organization. However, he came to a very sad end in his relationships there because, for some reason or other, he began to have some difficulty following the Communist Party line and instructions, and ultimately took a vacation, went to Alaska, thought the situation over, and I believe that he informed some Federal Government agency of his connection and relationship at that time, and severed his connection or resigned from his position, and what happened to him after that I do not know.
Mr. Velde. I am not clear on this probably because I am not up on my organization of labor unions as well as I should be.
Was the Sailors Union of the Pacific a part of the unit within the federation?
Mr. Dennett. Yes, it was affiliated.
Mr. Velde. It was not a new organization then when it split off under——
Mr. Dennett. No. The Sailors Union of the Pacific is one of the oldest organizations on the west coast, founded originally by old Andrew Furuseth.
Mr. Velde. Is the same true of the other organizations that split from the federation? Were they at one time units within the federation?
Mr. Dennett. Yes, they were. Later on there was a man that became an official in the Maritime Federation, by the name of Pringle, P-r-i-n-g-l-e. I do not remember his first name. Pringle occupied a high position in the federation. I do not recall at this moment the exact position, but I do know that when I had business to transact on behalf of the Ferry Boatsmen’s Union at that time, as it was known, I had to deal with Mr. Pringle. And he was a member of the party also.
Later on I came to know another person who later became president of the Maritime Federation, and was the last president to the best of my recollection, a man by the name of Bruce Hannon, H-a-n-n-o-n. Mr. Bruce Hannon was a longshoreman from the city of Seattle, worked on the Seattle waterfront for a good many years. Mr. Hannon also came into conflict with the Communist Party policy while he was a member of the Communist Party, and totally disagreed with the decision to wipe out the Maritime Federation.
The policy decision arrived at on that question was due to the fact that the CIO was coming into existence in 1937, and it was the belief of the Communist Party that if the Maritime Federation were dissolved and liquidated that the affiliates of it would form a very good, solid, and substantial core of the new CIO organization and would be able to take all the fishermen unions with it into the CIO.
Mr. Hannon did not agree with that policy. He felt that the Maritime Federation still had a function to perform and it should not have been liquidated. And he came into violent dispute with the party leadership over that question. How it was finally resolved I do not know. I did not see Mr. Hannon until after the war, and I met him one day very casually and he did not at that time express anything definitive which I could contribute now to enlighten anyone as to what he felt except to say that he was still bitter.
Mr. Tavenner. As a result of that change of emphasis on the part of the Communist Party, that is, from the Maritime Federation to its component parts, which were to form another organization, was the Maritime Federation of the Pacific disbanded?
Mr. Dennett. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you give us the approximate date?
Mr. Dennett. To the best of my recollection, it would be right around 1938 or 1939. I may be a little bit off one year or another there, but it is close to that date.
Mr. Tavenner. During this period, between the time that you were shanghaied on a boat here in Seattle and 1938, did you engage in any other activities in the Communist Party not connected with maritime affairs?
Mr. Dennett. I certainly did. I was sent as a delegate from the Inlandboatmen’s Union.[5] The name didn’t become Inlandboatmen until much later, but I think of it now in that term. The name actually was Ferry Boatmen’s Union at that time.
As a result of the successful conduct of our strike in 1936, the members and the good relationship which was established between the officers and myself, the officers agreed with the membership in electing me a delegate to represent the organization in the Central Labor Council. And that, of course, involved attending a weekly meeting every Wednesday night in the labor temple.
Mr. Tavenner. Where?
Mr. Dennett. In Seattle.
Mr. Tavenner. Just tell us very briefly what the Central Labor Council was.
Mr. Dennett. It was the city organization to which all American Federation of Labor affiliates were affiliated, and sent delegates to discuss their mutual business weekly.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the fact that you were sent there as a delegate make you a member of the Central Labor Council?
Mr. Dennett. It did. Because of my activity in the Maritime Federation District Council, the delegates there, most of whom were also delegates to the Central Labor Council, elected me chairman of the maritime caucus which was comprised of all those affiliates from the maritime unions who were also affiliates of the Central Labor Council. There was a duplication of affiliation there, and I was elected chairman of that caucus. As that chairman, I was able to speak in behalf of that caucus—all those maritime delegates—which was the largest caucus at that time in the Central Labor Council.
Consequently, when I arose to speak the chairman of the Central Labor Council would recognize me rather than recognize any other member of the caucus because he was recognizing the duly elected leadership of the caucus. Consequently, it was my function to represent that caucus on the floor of the Central Labor Council on all important questions, which I did. And it caused a great deal of attention to be focused on my work and on the work of the maritime unions.
We were trying our level best to support the policies which the Communist Party urged upon us, and that pertained especially to the question of war, fighting the program of involvement in war at that time. It involved being very critical of the top leadership of the American Federation of Labor, which many other people criticized as well as we, and by we, I mean the Communists were not the only ones that criticized; many of the rank-and-file members who had no knowledge of Communist Party policy or activity were also critical. But because of this similarity of criticism, the Communists, knowing where they were going, were able to direct this criticism along very effective lines. And I was a central instrument in that effort in the Central Labor Council in the city of Seattle.
Mr. Tavenner. As a result of your experience on the Central Labor Council were you selected for other organizational work in the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. Yes, I was.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the nature of your work?
Mr. Dennett. The Communist Party recognized that the position which I was attaining in the Central Labor Council represented a powerful political influence in the city because the city of Seattle at that time had the reputation of being the best organized labor city in the United States of America. There was hardly an industry that was not actually organized in some labor union, holding bona fide labor-union contracts with its management or employer. And the city had a very wide reputation in that respect. Some people looked upon that as good; some people looked upon it as bad. The Communist Party looked upon it as being very good because it provided us an opportunity to reach every single worker in the city indirectly.
Mr. Tavenner. Would you say that as a result of your successful efforts while a member of the Central Labor Council, you took part in other Communist Party activities?
Mr. Dennett. That is true.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you describe the nature of those activities?
Mr. Dennett. It was in the Washington Commonwealth Federation, which was an organization which came into existence, the elements of it came into existence, prior to my coming from the CCC’s. But this organization originally grew out of the transformation from the unemployed to the employed workers. And people built what was known as Commonwealth Builder Clubs. And then, of course, you recall that in that earlier period, 1933, there was a change of political administration due to a national election. And in that period there were a group of young, ambitious politicians who wanted to get elected to public office. There were many young aspiring graduates of college who felt that they had a contribution to make, and they sought audiences before these respective organizations to win political favor, make speeches and otherwise become publicly known so that when they did choose to file as a candidate for public office that they could expect enough support to get elected.
These Commonwealth Builders ultimately merged and formed what was known as the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there anything of a Communist origin that you know of in the establishment of the Commonwealth Builders?
Mr. Dennett. No. To the best of my knowledge, this was a result of the efforts of people who were not directed or led by the Communist Party. However, their efforts met with such sweeping success that the Communist Party had to concern itself if it was going to remain a political factor.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, the Communist Party in order to become the leader in the field which it desired, would have to get control of such organizations. Is that what you mean?
Mr. Dennett. Absolutely. We recognized that. And since being pushed into leadership in various activities in the city, it fell to me to do a lot of this representative work of the Communist Party in the ranks of the Washington Commonwealth Federation, because the prestige I had in the Inland Boatmen’s Union as a result of the successful strike made it a comparatively simple matter for the members to elect me a delegate and be a bona fide representative of a bona fide labor union in the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Tavenner. Without going into detail, will you tell us what the connection was, between the Commonwealth Builders and the Washington Commonwealth Federation, or how one may have succeeded the other?
Mr. Dennett. The Commonwealth Builders were the groups of small organizations which preceded the Washington Commonwealth Federation. The Communist Party became interested in the success of Commonwealth Builders and brought forth some proposals to cause the organization to expand and grow.
One of the proposals of the Communist Party was that steps should be taken by the Commonwealth Builders to make possible the affiliation not only of neighborhood groups alone——
Mr. Tavenner. Neighborhood groups of what?
Mr. Dennett. Of either Democrats or Commonwealth Builders, or unemployed organizations or Workers Alliance. There are still a few remnants of those, remnants of the old Unemployed Citizens League organizations. These had all transformed and became the foundation upon which the Commonwealth Builders rested.
The Communist Party, however, conceived that if the organization were to become as powerful as it should and ought to be, that provision should be made for the affiliation of larger organizations. And the Communist Party succeeded in prevailing upon most of its members to enter the American Federation of Labor unions. Consequently it was a simple matter to introduce resolutions in numerous labor unions urging that the American Federation of Labor unions affiliate with the Washington Commonwealth Federation. At the same time they proposed the calling of a convention to broaden the base of the organization of this Commonwealth Builders.
That was done. And the Washington Commonwealth Federation was brought into existence as an organization with affiliation from large numbers of unions in addition to Democratic clubs and unemployed clubs and fraternal organizations. Anything and everything which was willing to affiliate was certainly welcomed and urged to affiliate to the organization, pay dues, participate in its conventions, participate in the electoral activities it engaged in.
Mr. Tavenner. The method that the Communist Party used to assist in the organization of the Washington Commonwealth Federation was to induce the leadership of the particular organizations which they were members of, such as the various labor organizations that you mentioned——
Mr. Dennett. They would raise perfectly legitimate reasons which any ordinary person would recognize as proper.
Mr. Tavenner. And they brought their influence to bear on the formation of the organization through that method.
Mr. Dennett. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. As a result of that action did you say a convention was held?
Mr. Dennett. A convention of the Commonwealth Builders was held, which changed the name to Washington Commonwealth Federation.
(At this point Representative Harold H. Velde left the hearing room.)
Mr. Dennett. Because of that affiliation of whole organizations which were not geographical in nature—take a labor union: It was not geographical in nature; it was a complete affiliate without having geographical definition whereas a Democratic club in a particular district or a particular part of the city was restricted to a particular area.
I say the federation part became a necessary part of the title because of the nature of the changed affiliations.
Mr. Tavenner. Before the name was changed what was the title?
Mr. Dennett. Commonwealth Builders.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, it was a conversion of Commonwealth Builders into an overall organization.
Mr. Dennett. It was.
Mr. Tavenner. Titled “Washington Commonwealth Federation.”
Mr. Dennett. That is true.
Mr. Moulder. The committee will stand in recess for approximately 5 minutes.
(Whereupon a short recess was taken.)
(Representatives Moulder and Velde were present upon reconvening at the expiration of the recess.)
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Dennett, I think you have made it clear in your testimony that the Commonwealth Builders were not organized by the Communist Party and that there was very little, if any, Communist Party influence within those affiliated organizations as such. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Dennett. Well, that is essentially correct.
Mr. Tavenner. I want to be certain as to what the picture is with regard to the Washington Commonwealth Federation which succeeded; that is, whether or not at the inception of that organization it was heavily controlled by the Communist Party.
Mr. Dennett. No; it was not. And, as a matter of fact, it was quite anti-Communist at the very beginning.
Mr. Tavenner. The original method used by the Communist Party to become entrenched in the federation was through the various organizations which were affiliated with it.
Mr. Dennett. Through the process of building the organization larger and bringing into affiliation organizations in which it did have influence and ultimately getting top influence in the WCF.
Mr. Tavenner. I think that explains it.
You made reference to a convention that was being called. When and where was the convention held? That is, the convention of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Dennett. In the year 1936 it held two conventions. One was in April and another one was later in the year. The one in April was concerned with several important questions. It was the largest convention of any of the WCF conventions that I ever attended, and I understood it was the largest convention ever held. It was in Everett, Wash., in April 1936.
It must be remembered that 1936 was a Presidential campaign. The political situation in the whole country was quite alive. Many new people were rising in the political sphere. And, of course, the Washington Commonwealth Federation was an open and ready instrument through which ambitious political persons could make their first bid for public office and fame.
Many of them did so. Many young graduates of the university did so. I have very little personal knowledge about them, and I wish to make sure that you understand, and everyone else does, that I am not referring to these persons as Communists. They are not. And I make no inference of that kind. I simply recite the fact that here was an organization which was capable of exerting a great deal of political power, and it attracted all persons who had political ambitions. As a matter of fact, there were some Republicans as well as Democrats and Independents who beat a path to the door of the Washington Commonwealth Federation to obtain political endorsement.
Now this convention in 1936, in April, had before it several important policy questions. At that particular time the Communist Party had to exercise its influence by indirection. The top leadership of the federation were not Communists at that time.
The Communist Party was striving to obtain an endorsement of that federation convention which would call for the organization of either a farmer-labor party or a new independent political party. In other words, our effort, speaking of the Communists, was to drive the federation into making a completely new, independent, separate political organization. However, our plans were dependent upon approval from the central committee of the Communist Party. And the central committee of the Communist Party kept us dangling on the end of a string for many, many weeks prior to the opening of this convention.
The reason they kept us dangling on a string was that nationally the Communist Party wanted to see organized and wanted to have a part in organizing a new national organization which would be separate from and independent from the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. And it hoped to attract all persons known as liberals or progressives to support and participate in such an organization. But its chief difficulty was to obtain some national figure of great prominence to lead the thing to give it the initiative and give it the original sendoff that it needed to draw the strength necessary to win something in the next election.
The party leadership felt that the person most capable of accomplishing that purpose and fulfilling that objective was the then Governor of Minnesota. I think it is Minnesota. Yes. His name was Floyd Olson. He was Governor there. And he was a Farmer-Labor Governor there.
The very designation lent itself to the spreading of a nationwide farmer-labor party. And it was the original hope of the Communist Party that through various forms of manipulation——
It was the Olson from Minnesota. I am quite sure, thinking back on it now, it was Floyd.
But be that as it may, it was the Governor Olson of Minnesota who was Governor in 1936 as a Farmer-Labor Governor.
However, at the very last moment when we had the resolution all ready to press before the convention, we finally received word that this Governor Olson was not well enough to undertake the job of organizing a new national farmer-labor party because of ill health, and begged off from the responsibility. Nationally, we were unable to find another figure of as much prominence whom we thought would be capable of leading such a successful effort. Consequently, we had to whip our party machinery into shape rather rapidly and change our tactics right on the floor of the WCF convention, and reverse ourselves in the process of debating the question.
Actually the resolutions committee had come in with a report in which a majority had objected to going the independent route. But I was one of the delegates who was in the minority who was leading a fight for going the independent route. And in the process of starting the debate we got the official word that it was a hopeless task, and we had to withdraw that effort.
We made a last-minute switch in our strategy and tactics, and some of those who had been fighting us so vigorously on the floor were completely dumfounded to find that we compromised—what appeared to be a compromise—when we changed our policy during the course of the debate on the resolution itself and withdrew our minority position.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you change your policy as a result of directions from the Communist Party head in New York?
Mr. Dennett. Yes. And the district organizer of the party was in the anteroom of the convention hall, sending word and direction to those of us who were up near the microphone who had an opportunity to command the microphone and the debate. And there were runners running back and forth to us rather rapidly telling us what the latest news of the party line was.
And the executive secretary of the Commonwealth Federation at that time was a man by the name of Howard Costigan who became somewhat alarmed to see such an obvious maneuver where between 15 and 20 different people were running back and forth passing messages to me and to others up in the front from Rappaport advising us what the official party policy was. He later on commented that he could see the party line running all over the place, but he didn’t know what was in it.
Mr. Tavenner. Was Howard Costigan a member of the Communist Party at that time?
Mr. Dennett. Not at that time.
But that demonstration of power that we exercised in that convention was very convincing to him that if he wanted to remain as head of that organization he would have to make his peace with us, which he did before that summer was over.
Mr. Tavenner. And did he become a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. He did.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that Mr. Howard Costigan has appeared before the committee and has testified regarding some of the matters which have been mentioned here, including the fact that he did become a member of the Communist Party at about the time indicated by this witness, and at a later time, at approximately 1940, he left the Communist Party.
Mr. Dennett. I could substantiate that.
There was another matter which arose as a serious issue in that convention, and it concerned a proposal for an initiative measure which became known as the production-for-use initiative.
Many people, because of the Communist Party influence in the unemployed days, were quite concerned and alarmed over the problem of unemployment, insecurity, possible impoverishment, et cetera. All the consequences of economic dislocation. They had read many of the so-called utopian pieces of literature such as Bellamy’s Looking Backward and other documents of the kind. They had also read Mr. Upton Sinclair’s program in California. They were somewhat acquainted with the propaganda of the Soviet Union, to the effect that production-for-use was the solution to the problems of capitalist lack of planning. In other words, planned economy.
Mr. Velde. Mr. Dennett, you testified that you received the party line by courier, by runners from Rappaport. Do you have any idea how Rappaport received it from headquarters of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. Yes. Sometimes he received it by telegraph. In this particular instance, about this Governor Olson, he received that by telegram.
Mr. Velde. Was there any secrecy involved, especially at that time?
Mr. Dennett. No; there was no secrecy in that communication. As a matter of fact, they took parallel measures to see that somebody in Governor Olson’s staff also sent word to Howard Costigan directly. He also received the word. So that there was parallel information. At least we did make that concession to Costigan, that he would have official information about it.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the rank-and-file membership of the Washington Commonwealth Federation know of the Communist Party manipulations which you have just described?
Mr. Dennett. I am quite sure that most of them did not, although the behavior of many of the Democratic Party leaders at that convention would lead me to believe that they suspected it, because they fought us so bitterly and so hard.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please.
Mr. Dennett. The story on the production-for-use initiative is simply this:
Because there was such a popular demand for some change in the economic situation to assure continued production and a cooperative effort, many people tried to translate an ideal of a cooperative commonwealth into some form of legislative effort. This resulted in many conferences and the calling in of legal talent to try to draft a measure which would be legal and which would satisfy the ambitions of the people to have the so-called dream of a cooperative commonwealth organization.
Mr. Tavenner. Describe in a practical sense what production-for-use meant?
Mr. Dennett. I wish I could satisfy you completely on that point because that is one of the problems we ran into in trying to draw up this initiative measure.
We could never satisfy ourselves that we had it satisfactorily organized. However, the staff who worked on it worked long and hard and finally produced a measure which was known as the production-for-use initiative. It was ready for presentation to that convention. However, some of us in the Communist Party, while we agreed that such a measure was a good propaganda weapon and felt that it was an excellent means of popularizing the ideas which we understood and claimed were the basis of the operation of the economy in the Soviet Union, we were startled when we read the document and found that it sounded a little bit more like the Fascist corporate state that the Italian leader Mussolini had established. We became so alarmed about it, and were so perplexed that we asked a very world-famous person, who happened to be a guest of the convention, what this person thought about it.
The person to whom I refer is Anna Louise Strong, who had just come from the Soviet Union, extended greetings to us, to the convention, and otherwise gave a very enlightening report on her travels, and won wide acclaim for that effort.
Mr. Tavenner. Did she, on the floor of the convention, address herself to the problem of production-for-use?
Mr. Dennett. She did not. Not at that moment. She spoke only in general terms about it, referring to it in a complimentary way and hoping for success. But at that moment she did not know very much about what was in that document.
However, we felt that she, coming from the Soviet Union with fresh knowledge, might know quite a lot about it and might be able to assist us in revising the document so that it would be possible to satisfy us that it was, in fact, a step in the direction of a cooperative commonwealth.
So she consented very graciously to take the document and work on it overnight. She did exactly that. And we read it the next morning, and, much to our surprise, she had moved the emphasis in the control even more in the direction of top control and less in the direction of allowing the members or the organizations to have anything to say about it, which was just the reverse of the trend that we had hoped for.
Consequently, we began to ask ourselves, that is, the Communists asked themselves, if this is the end result of an effort to draw up an initiative, maybe it would be smarter politically for us to see that this measure dies aborning. Consequently, we came to the conclusion that it was impossible to draw up an initiative measure which would be adequate and which would answer our propaganda needs and our desires to satisfy us that it was in harmony with our program. So we embarked upon a campaign in the course of the election——
Mr. Tavenner. Was this a campaign to pass the proposed measure or to defeat it?
Mr. Dennett. Well, we all went out presumably to win support to get the measure adopted. That is, it was an initiative measure and it was before the voters. The voters were to cast a vote yes or no on this initiative.
(The witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Dennett. My counsel asked me if I knew the number of it, and I have forgotten the exact number of that initiative at this moment. So I can’t furnish that. I wish I could. It is a matter of official record, however, and it can be verified if anyone is curious about it.
The Communist Party found itself in that predicament. We were committed to support the measure, but we were determined to bring about its defeat. Consequently, we campaigned far and wide all over the State of Washington, explaining the measure in such a way as to convince the people that they should not vote for it.
At the same time we represented ourselves as campaigning for the measure.
And we did it so successfully that the measure was defeated. If we hadn’t of done it I am afraid it would have been adopted.
(The witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Dennett. My counsel asked me who was the “we.”
I am referring to the Communist Party in that instance.
The leaders of the Washington Commonwealth Federation were terribly disturbed by the nature of the campaign that we were carrying on, that is, the Communists.
Mr. Tavenner. I should think it would be a rather confusing campaign where the Communist Party, in order to defeat it, actually supported it.
Mr. Dennett. That is true. It was very confusing to everyone, even to us at times.
Mr. Tavenner. That is a very interesting thing. The Communist Party, in order to defeat this measure, went out and conducted a state-wide campaign in favor of it. But in order to accomplish its defeat, if I understand you correctly, the Communist Party so represented the issues that people would be bound to vote against it.
Mr. Dennett. That is true.
Mr. Moulder. I understood the situation to be that because of Communist Party support of the measure, the public sentiment opposed it.
Mr. Dennett. Not necessarily so, sir, because they didn’t know that we who were speaking were Communists. They thought we were representatives of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Moulder. Proceed.
Mr. Dennett. There is triple deception in this maneuver, which is rather hard to follow. I hope I have explained it.
Mr. Tavenner. I am afraid that the point may not be absolutely clear in the record, and I want to be sure that it is clear:
If I understand you correctly, it was not the fact that the Communist Party was supporting this measure that caused its defeat.
Mr. Dennett. You are correct, sir. That was not the reason. It was the way we, as disguised Communists, carried on the campaign, ostensibly for it, but, in fact, against it.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, your representations were of such a character as to make known the weaknesses in the bill; and a person would actually think you were supporting it.
Mr. Dennett. True. You understand it quite clearly.
Mr. Tavenner. I think the bill was properly named when you used the word “initiative” because that certainly is the use of initiative. I am glad to know it is Communist Party initiative. It is a very deceptive type of campaign.
Mr. Dennett. Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one observation about my testimony earlier this afternoon.
I get the feeling, and I have a fear that perhaps people listening to this presentation might think that because of my testimony I was the only figure who was active in the Washington Commonwealth Federation carrying on this activity.
I hope that no one assumes that because I was one of a team. There were several others.
Mr. Tavenner. Who composed the team?
Mr. Dennett. Well, I didn’t mean to bring that up because I don’t like to have to do that. But I was fearful that people might think I was too much of a braggart in this thing, and I don’t mean to be because it is all ancient history and I am simply trying to furnish such information as I know of my own knowledge about that experience so that other people may comprehend it in full.
Mr. Tavenner. I am sure, Mr. Dennett, that the committee, having heard as many witnesses as it has on the subject of communism, recognizes that it is teamwork that has enabled the Communist Party to get where it is, rather than grandstand playing.
Who were the other members of the team?
Mr. Dennett. Well, that takes me into a description of the district bureau of the Communist Party in that particular period.
As I look back over it I might call it the golden age of the Communist Party’s efforts in the Northwest because it did at that time enjoy, that is, the leaders of the Communist Party did enjoy a relationship among each other and among themselves, and in the organizations to which each were members—they did enjoy a very full and rich democratic experience in procedure.
This, I think, was due largely to the efforts of Mr. Morris Rappaport who was the district organizer whom I mentioned earlier, who had, by his adroitness in calling the political moves, established himself in the eyes of the central committee of the Communist Party of the United States as a person capable of directing the political activities in the Northwest without the need of daily supervision on the part of national headquarters of the Communist Party. In other words, they did accord him the recognition that comes of confidence that he knew what he was doing and was capable of carrying it out.
And I am quite certain that the way he coordinated the efforts of each of us in the district bureau at that time were so gratifying to the central committee that most of the members of the central committee didn’t dare to try to interfere with our efforts for fear that they might be responsible for upsetting the applecart so to speak.
Now in that team were, first of all, Mr. Morris Rappaport, the district organizer. His right-hand man, who was also the trade-union secretary of the district, was a man known to me by the name of Henry or Harry Jackson. I know that that is not his real name, but I do not know what his real name was. That was his party name. That is the only name I knew him by in this area.
Mr. Tavenner. How long was he in this area?
Mr. Dennett. He came shortly after Morris Rappaport came.
Mr. Tavenner. Did he come from New York?
Mr. Dennett. He did. His original home was San Francisco.
Mr. Tavenner. I am sure we know him.
Mr. Dennett. Mr. Jackson had his early training in the Marine Workers Industrial Union organizing maritime workers. He came here originally for that purpose, and then his assignment was switched to that of trade-union secretary for the district in the Northwest.
I was one of his closest associates because I was footloose and free and available to carry the Jimmy Higgins load that had to be carried at that time. We were working daily and devoting all of our time to that effort.
We had a few people who were prominent in the University of Washington at that time who were active members of our district bureau. One was Mr. Harold Ebey, E-b-e-y.
And another was Mr. Hugh DeLacy.
Mr. Tavenner. Was he at one time a Member of Congress?
Mr. Dennett. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, he is the same person who was called as a witness before this committee at Dayton, Ohio, in September 1954, and who refused to answer material questions on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him.
Mr. Dennett. I mentioned Mr. DeLacy’s name with a great deal of regret because I was a very close associate of Mr. DeLacy and I had a great deal of respect for him, and he for me. It is only under the compulsion of the subpena and the fact that I am testifying and I have to testify when I mention his name. I do so with regret. I wish the rules were such that it wasn’t necessary because it is a source of great embarrassment to me. But I feel that I owe a big obligation to the men that I work for, and, under the rules as constituted by this committee and the way it is operating, I have no choice in the matter.
I make my apologies to Mr. DeLacy for having to do this. I regret it. But at the same time, in the long run, I don’t think it is going to hurt him, and I think it may do him some good. I hope so.
Others who were prominent in the district bureau were, of course, Mr. Howard Costigan, Mr. Jess Fletcher, Mr. William K. Dobbins, Mr. Karley Larsen.
Mr. Tavenner. Let me make this suggestion to you.
If you know whether any of these persons whose names you have mentioned, testified publicly before this or other committees and acknowledged their Communist Party membership and a withdrawal from the Communist Party, I think you should state it.
Mr. Dennett. I can state that about three persons whom I know. I know that Mr. Jess Fletcher separated from the Communist Party, and he has testified in a number of instances. He began testifying before the Canwell committee when he was separated from the Communist Party and from his union as a consequence of that fight. He later testified before a number of Government agencies in a number of court cases.
Mr. Howard Costigan testified before this committee. I read his testimony in the proceedings which have been published by the committee.
Mr. Harold Ebey also appeared before the Canwell committee and testified there. He is out of the Communist Party and has been for quite a considerable period of time. At least, I believe, since this period 1936, 1937, and 1938.
Costigan is out of the Communist Party. He left shortly after later political difficulties arose, which I will soon get into.
There may have been a few others who were in and out of the district bureau. This district bureau was the leading body, the leading organ in the district. It was the top body which had the top authority to determine party policy in this area.
At one time I believe there were about 12 or 14 members of this bureau. It may have been confined to nine. I have some recollection that there were nine members officially on the bureau, but there were a few who were candidates. That is, they were the next alternates to become members in the event of any vacancy on the bureau so that we could always have a reserve to fill any vacancies which might occur.
That district bureau covered the Northwest area which were the States of, at that time, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska.
Mr. Tavenner. Do I understand you to mean that it was that group of individuals who took the leadership in the work within the Washington Commonwealth Federation?
Mr. Dennett. Yes; they did.
Mr. Rappaport could not directly participate in the work of the Washington Commonwealth Federation because he was what was generally called the face of the party. He was the official representative of the party. And the Washington Commonwealth Federation, even though there were Communist leaders in it, it at no time accepted an affiliation from the Communist Party, and it at no time would acknowledge a Communist as a Communist in the organization unless it be someone like Rappaport who had the authority to represent the party as such.
By that I mean that if I presented myself to the Washington Commonwealth Federation to speak on any matter or to urge anything before its body, I could not speak in the name of the Communist Party even though other members of that executive board may know that I was a member of the Communist Party. I could not speak as a Communist. I could only speak as a member of that executive board, and it was the presumption that I was representing the affiliate from which I had been sent as a delegate.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you tell the committee, please, which of these Communist Party bureau members became officials in the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Dennett. Mr. Costigan already was an official. He was the executive secretary.
Mr. DeLacy became the president of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
I became the vice president of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Harold Ebey served in some advisory capacity. I think that he came from a teachers’ union affiliate at that time.
Mr. Dobbins was a member there, but I do not recall the exact relation that he held to obtain his position.
Mr. Karley Larsen was a leader there by virtue of the fact that he was a leader in the Northern Washington District Council of the International Woodworkers of America.
Mr. Tavenner. It would seem that the Communist Party had complete control of the organization.
Mr. Dennett. We had another person there who is now deceased, but I don’t think that it gives a complete picture without mentioning him, and that is Mr. William Pennock, because Bill Pennock was the workhorse. Bill Pennock carried the load. He was a very efficient man, one of the fastest shorthand artists that I ever knew, and was capable of keeping up with the fast pace that Mr. Costigan set.
Mr. Pennock deserves honorable mention for the work that he did in that setup.
Mr. Tavenner. What position did Pennock hold in the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. He attended the bureau meetings, but I do not remember exactly whether he was a member of the bureau. But he attended most of the bureau meetings by virtue of the fact that he became the head of the pension union which was one of the big affiliates of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Mr. Tavenner. You have given a very full description of how the Communist Party maneuvered to capture this organization.
Why was the Communist Party so interested in obtaining control of the Washington Commonwealth Federation?
Mr. Dennett. Because we wanted to ultimately obtain political power for the Communist Party in the United States of America.
(The witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Tavenner. In the same manner, I assume, that you were attempting to gain power for the Communist Party in every other field of endeavor.
Mr. Dennett. Of course.
My counsel has suggested that I indicate the total membership of the Washington Commonwealth Federation in that period.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, I think you should.
Mr. Dennett. I am unable to give that in exact numbers, but I can give you a proportionate situation which may indicate something of value.
It was our estimate and the result of our study from the election returns of the candidates that we endorsed and the propositions that we supported——
Mr. Tavenner. When you say “we” are you speaking of the Communist Party or the Washington Commonwealth?
Mr. Dennett. The Washington Commonwealth Federation.
It was our estimate that it was capable of influencing and obtaining the vote of one-third of the members who voted in the Democratic Party slate or side of the ticket. And because of that fact and because we were in a higher state of mobilization than the rest of the Democratic Party, when primaries came along we could exercise a more direct influence in the primaries than anybody else because our members in the Washington Commonwealth Federation had a greater zeal and a greater devotion to carrying out their objectives than the other Democrats who frequently relied upon making their decisions in the general elections.
Mr. Moulder. What do you mean by other Democrats?
Mr. Dennett. Those who voted in the Democratic Party who were not members of the Washington Commonwealth Federation through affiliation.
Mr. Moulder. How many Communists would you estimate were members of the Washington Commonwealth Federation?
Mr. Dennett. The nearest I can give you by indication of that is that in the period 1937-38, the high point of membership in the Communist Party, as I recall the reports made to the district bureau by the organization secretary, was in the neighborhood of 5,500 members of the Communist Party in the Northwest, in the 3 States of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, and Alaska, the Territory of Alaska. Those 5,500 members of course, were scattered throughout all the other organizations in the Northwest. And I am firmly of the belief that fully 90 to 95 percent of that were members of the Washington Commonwealth Federation through affiliations of one kind or another.
(At this point Representative Morgan M. Moulder left the hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. Did the Washington Commonwealth Federation extend throughout the entire 12th district, or, that is, in the Northwest area? Or was it confined only to the State of Washington?
Mr. Dennett. It was confined to the State of Washington. However, there were some efforts made in the State of Oregon to develop an Oregon Commonwealth Federation, but I have no direct knowledge of that, and I would be unqualified to give you any testimony about it because I did not participate in it and I do not know the people who did.
Mr. Velde (presiding). Did your district committee of the Communist Party, however, have representatives from Alaska and from Oregon?
Mr. Dennett. No, there was no territorial representation like that. The representatives of the district bureau of the Communist Party were chosen because of their capability as political leaders, not because of any particular area that they came from. And it was determined largely by their ability to influence public opinion and to intervene in the decision of public affairs.
Mr. Velde. Did the district bureau act for the 12th district of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dennett. Yes, it did.
Mr. Velde. But were they all from the State of Washington?
Mr. Dennett. That is true. I think perhaps it is necessary at this point to clear up one little problem of organizational structure that existed in the Communist Party at that time.
It was not based upon territory. Representatives of the higher committees did not have to come from any particular territory. They were chosen because of their availability and their influencing ability to carry the party policy into the mass organizations or before the public.
Mr. Velde. Were they actually chosen by the national committee of the Communist Party.
Mr. Dennett. Not in this district they were not, no.
Mr. Velde. Just how were they chosen?
Mr. Dennett. Well, that is another organizational problem of interorganization of the Communist Party which is rather difficult for persons not familiar with it to comprehend. But let me try to do it as briefly as possible this way.
When I first came into the Communist Party the usual procedure was something that went under the title of “Cooption.” Cooption meant that the district organizer could appoint anybody he wanted to the district committee or to the district bureau and could call them in to serve, and everybody else had to accept such a person as being a fully qualified member of that body. In other words, it was a handpicked staff which represented the wishes of that particular leader who held the authority at that time. That was the process of cooption in the event of a vacancy. He could appoint someone to fill that vacancy, and he did so. It was his responsibility to do so.
However, with the rise of Hitler Germany, the trials of the Reichstag, an international leader by the name of Dimitrov acquired world fame because, in his defense against the frameup which Goering tried to put over on him, he learned that the Communist tactics and the Communist policies in Germany had turned the masses of German workers against the Communist Party and had resulted or had certainly played a part in contributing to making it possible for Hitler Germany to result with Hitler’s ascension to power.
Therefore, Mr. Dimitrov, when offered asylum by the Soviet Government, immediately went to work for the Comintern, and, in that capacity as leader of the Comintern, brought forth what was known as a new line. And that new line called for introducing the practice of democracy into the ranks of the Communist Party organization. He urged and advised that the practice of cooption be abolished, and that the higher committees be elected by a democratic process. And he, in fact, insisted that that must be done in all countries where the party was not illegal.
Recognizing that it was not possible to hold conventions where the party was illegal, and that applied especially to the United States, when Mr. Rappaport came to this district he tried his best to follow out the decisions which were laid down by the Communist International and the national headquarters of the Communist Party, and that practice of electing the leadership was followed. However, at the district convention there was always a nominating committee who carefully screened the names of persons who were being proposed for leadership or election to these committees, and, in doing so, succeeded in accomplishing the original result, only satisfying ourselves that we were practicing democracy.
Mr. Velde. What year did that change take place, Mr. Dennett?
Mr. Dennett. Right around 1936.
Mr. Tavenner. So the matter of making nominations through a committee was a mere matter of form.
(At this point Representative Morgan M. Moulder returned to the hearing room.)
Mr. Dennett. The district organizers still carefully looked it over and still had a controlling influence there. But in this particular case Mr. Rappaport exercised his influence not in any arbitrary way but in a convincing way, because we all recognized that his broader experience and his tremendous capacity for work equipped him to give us the benefit of better wisdom than we had.
Mr. Tavenner. Going back to the Washington Commonwealth Federation, you were asked a question as to what the membership of the Communist Party was in the district. Do you know what the membership of the Communist Party was in the State of Washington at that time?
Mr. Dennett. Well, most of that membership was in the State of Washington. And I don’t know the exact number, but I think it would be quite safe to say that around 85 to 90 percent of it was in the State of Washington.
Mr. Tavenner. How long did the Communist Party succeed in bringing its influence to bear on political elections through this organization known as the Washington Commonwealth Federation?
Mr. Dennett. Until the international situation became unstable in about the year 1938.
Mr. Tavenner. How did the international situation affect political matters locally here in the State of Washington as far as the Communist Party was concerned?
Mr. Dennett. The Communist Party had as one of its principal objectives and one of its chief propaganda weapons, which it used upon other persons of political mindedness, that the Communist program was a consistent program on a domestic policy and on foreign policy, that our program was liberal domestically and liberal internationally. However, in 1938, after a long period of struggle and effort, the Communist Party succeeded in prevailing upon many people to accept the slogan of collective security as the proper policy to pursue in foreign affairs. That, of course, was quite consistent with the policy of the Soviet Union because it was the Soviet delegates to the League of Nations who had continually agitated for a policy of collective security.
I think it was some time in 1938 that the Italian Premier launched his attack in Ethiopia, and while we were clamoring for collective security to be applied to that situation, it wasn’t too long afterwards when the Soviet Union had a serious dispute with Finland, and hostilities broke out and the Soviet Union smashed the Finnish Army and the Finnish military installations.
We were confronted with the necessity of making an immediate switch demanding nonintervention.
Mr. Tavenner. What do you mean by we?
Mr. Dennett. The Communist Party.
So our insistence upon nonintervention contradicted our prior insistence upon collective security. This presented no end of trouble, especially to those who had to meet the public and had to answer to the public for the consistency of their program and policies from one day to the next. It ultimately led to the disaffection of Mr. Howard Costigan. And the chief reason that Mr. Costigan disaffected at that time was because of his loyalty to Franklin D. Roosevelt as then President of the United States, who came out in bitter denunciation against the Soviets for attacking Finland, which left him in the position of having a consistent policy because he had complained bitterly against Mussolini’s march into Ethiopia. He had also been critical of the Japanese invasion of China. He had also been critical of each military venture where one country had attempted to impose its will upon another by military means.
So Costigan felt that he was on sounder ground to continue his support of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he did so with as much effort as he dared, without bringing down the wrath of the Communist Party on him at that particular moment. However, the Communist Party sensed that he was beginning to disaffect, and we proceeded to isolate him from everything we could. I mean the Communists proceeded to isolate Mr. Costigan.
Mr. Tavenner. Was this the period when the Communist Party was crying from the rooftops that the President of the United States was a warmonger?
Mr. Dennett. Yes, it was. I am a little bit fearful that if anyone looks at the record very carefully they will find that I made a few speeches on that subject myself.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, as a result of the international situation the Communist Party had gotten itself into a position which adversely affected its interests locally.
Mr. Dennett. That is very true.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the result of that adverse effect upon the Communist Party locally?
Mr. Dennett. The most damaging effect to the Communist Party was that it shook the faith of many of those who were members of the district bureau at that time. I must admit that I tried to present the appearance myself of not losing faith in the integrity of the Soviet foreign policy. However, I must also admit that there was a little bit of deception in that for the reason that I could not completely justify it, no matter how hard I tried, and I found that Mr. Costigan became very bitter about it. I found also that Mr. Ebey had a few misgivings. He didn’t express them at that time too sharply because he is a very mild-mannered sort of person. But those of us who were in the rough and tough political battles put on a case-hardened outward appearance which was intended to inspire the ranks to hold the line.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the final result?
Mr. Dennett. The final result was that various organizations affiliated to the Washington Commonwealth Federation found their political conviction to be inconsistent with the official policy expressed by disguised Communist leaders in the Washington Commonwealth Federation. So that many of them began to disaffiliate and leave the organization, so that it did not embrace the commanding minority which it had previously had.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, your position of control in that organization was weakened, if not virtually destroyed, by this disaffection that had arisen within the Communist Party ranks largely as a result of international problems.
Mr. Dennett. That is very true.
Those of us who presented what might be referred to as a case-hardened outward appearance did so largely in the hope and faith that our loyalty to the Soviet Union under those circumstances would be rewarded by the Soviet Union remaining loyal and true to the socialist ideals which all of us held.
However, at a later date, after the Second World War, just to make the comment without going into detail at this moment, many began to find out through their experience in the Army and military efforts, and through persons who traveled abroad and came into contact directly with the Russian military effort—many became convinced that there was a considerable difference between the democracy that had been preached about in the Soviet Union and the actual practice which they found.
Also there was a serious disillusionment when large numbers of soldiers learned, to their dismay, that even during the war period the Soviet Union had in labor camps very large numbers of persons who were held in those camps as political prisoners, a policy which we had been led to believe, through all the official propaganda, that the Communist Party in the Soviet Union wouldn’t possibly indulge in such a practice, that only the capitalist countries would practice such a heinous crime.
But it was a terrible shock and disillusionment when large numbers of people found, out of their own direct knowledge, that these huge forced labor camps did in fact exist and that people who were committed to them were committed to them for terms ranging from 25 years to life instead of the official propaganda which has been preached, to the effect that no sentence was over 10 years in length in the Soviet Union. And we found there was a great deal of difference between fact and fancy.
(At this point Representative Harold H. Velde left the hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. Is the Washington Commonwealth Federation in existence today?
Mr. Dennett. It is not. It was liquidated by the Communist Party leadership during the Second World War.
In my records there will be found some correspondence between Hugh DeLacy and myself because I was a vice president of the federation, but I was in the military service at the time this disillusion took place.
Mr. DeLacy had written me something about it, and I disagreed with it. He had also written to me suggesting that since I was in the military service maybe it would be better for me to give up my share of stock which entitled me to be a member of the board of directors of the New World, which was the official newspaper published under the federation at that time.
I found occasion to disagree violently with him over the suggestion for the reason that I felt that those who were in the armed services should not be removed from their official positions because they were in the armed services. I felt that they were more entitled to continue their representation on the organization because they were in the armed services.
We had an exchange of correspondence there which was quite acrimonious at points, and I am amazed when I look back at it and see how it developed.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a satisfactory point to suspend the examination of this witness.
Mr. Moulder. Yes, Mr. Dennett. We thank you for your patience and the information which you have given the committee. We are endeavoring, whenever possible, to give you a rest so there will not be this long stress upon you for a long period of time.
Mr. Dennett. I appreciate that. In my younger days I used to have a marathon endurance, but I find I don’t have it any more.
Mr. Moulder. Do you wish to call another witness?
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Lawrence Earl George.
Mr. Moulder. Will you hold up your right hand and be sworn, please.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. George. I do.