Friday, December 28.
A memorial of the officers and soldiers of the late New Hampshire line of the Continental Army was presented to the House and read, praying that the depreciation which accrued on the certificates of debt granted them in reward for their military services during the late war may be made good to them, or such other relief afforded them as the present circumstances of the United States will admit; which was laid on the table.
Reduction of the Army.
Mr. Steele called up his resolution laid on the table some days ago, as follows:
"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill to reduce the military establishment of the United States to —— regiments or corps, consisting each of —— non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians, with such proportion of commissioned officers as the President may think proper to continue in service; and to repeal so much of an act, passed the fifth of March, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, entitled 'An act for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States,' as may contravene this intention.'"
Mr. Steele, in proposing the above resolution, said, the situation of the frontiers, and the inefficiency of the measures adopted through the medium of the War Department, to relieve them; the extreme burdens which those measures were heaping on the people, and the probability of their continuance, afforded ample scope for inquiry; and to sit silent on such an occasion, he thought, would be to partake of and support the errors from which those misfortunes may have arisen. The citizens of the United States, he said, were of a peaceable and patient disposition, and they have with cheerfulness acquiesced in the measures of the National Legislature; but they were not become so tame as to submit to immense and fruitless expenses, and the disgrace of their military character, to answer any vain projects of folly and ambition, without a prospect of guaranteeing a peace. Is it not evident, said he, that plans have been persevered in without regard to common sense, by an unnecessary increase of our army, until the indignation of the whole continent has been roused up against it?
To elucidate this position, Mr. S. recited the expenses, charges, and increase of the War Department from its first establishment under the present Government, to its present enormous demands, which for the year 1793, are no less, agreeably to the estimate furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury, than $1,171,719;[45] more than double the sum necessary for the support of all the other branches of the National Government. The better to illustrate this subject of the Indian war, he entered into comparative statements of the years 1790, '91, '92, and '93; and, animadverting on the different items of calculation, he asserted, in strong terms, that they exceeded every thing that the history of the Indian wars afforded for twenty years back; he wished any gentleman to enter into an investigation and comparison of the alarming increase of the expenses of the department, and to take a retrospect of the subject for twenty years back; and he was certain neither the Secretary of War nor any other person could account rationally for the occasion of such an establishment. There was no precedent to be found in any of the States; not one of them has a War Department; neither was it contemplated in the Constitution of the United States. Yet it has, in the short space of three or four years, been imposing on the country burdens which the people have at length expressed their abhorrence of; it has been increased from $137,000 in 1789, to the extravagant demand now required, of $1,171,719 and $50,000 contingencies for the support of 1793. This is so alarming an increase, that it calls loudly for reformation, or the entire abolition of the department, and that another system shall be adopted for the protection of the frontiers. Armies of regulars will never afford protection; they have never answered any good purpose against the Indians from the time of Braddock's defeat down to that of Major General St. Clair, although this last-mentioned unfortunate expedition cost the United States an immense sum of money, and the lives of a great number of valuable officers and citizens. History and the experience of ages have proved this fact, that unwieldy armies will never be able to fight the savages in the wilderness; indeed, the Secretary of War confesses the fact in one of his reports, which Mr. S. read, wherein the Secretary accounts for the ill success of the plans, by observing, "that it was owing to the extreme activity of the enemy and our ignorance of the wilderness through which our troops had to march." But the Secretary might have also added, our entire ignorance of the mode of carrying on the war.
Here Mr. S. took occasion to observe, that this alarmingly expensive and useless department had crept upon the country entirely from our fondness for taking up money on loans; for had it not been that the money was thus obtained with a sort of facility that was not directly felt by the people, they never would have consented to be directly taxed to support the parade of so unnecessary an establishment. This is my reason for being an enemy to loans; they deceive citizens, and lull them for a time, in order to levy double contributions afterwards.
But it may be demanded, how are the frontiers to be protected, if the army was disbanded? In reply to this Mr. S. said he wished that the former two regiments might be retained to garrison the forts, and that a militia near the scene of action should be raised, who would be able to make five expeditions against the savages in a year, if necessary, instead of one solitary fruitless attempt, which, upon an average, is as much as a regular army can do; and sometimes not so much, for it does not appear that any expedition took place during the last twelve months: moreover, it is not so easy for the Indians to discover the plans and approaches of militia, as they do the slow motions of an unwieldy army, dragging their heavy artillery through the woods. The fact is, that the Indians have the best intelligence and know every motion of the army, and they can even calculate the time and place to meet them, and the numbers of their tribes that will be necessary to receive such a force; they will always be prepared when a regular army are to march against them. But if the business be left to a militia of the frontier inhabitants, who know the country, and have their property at stake, it would not cost the Government one-fourth part of the expense to give a complete protection, and to repel all the depredations of the savages, if that be our intention. If it be the protection and happiness of our brethren on the frontiers—if we are serious to check the progress of expense, the motion which I have brought forward will be the most effectual means, and to establish a proper Militia System. On this motion, therefore, will depend the question, whether we are to continue a fruitless warfare in the present mode for seven or ten years, or shall we adopt a better system, which will not cost one-fourth of the expense, and which would completely check the Indians; nay, it would entirely exterminate them, if that was thought to be necessary.
In order to bring the matter to a point, Mr. S. suggested, that it would be proper to disband all the troops except the two former regiments of two thousand one hundred and twenty-eight men, which would be more than sufficient to garrison all the fourteen posts on the frontier. These, with a militia, under proper regulations, and the officers appointed by the President, would be found a more certain protection. The garrisons are at Fayette, Hamilton, Steuben, Knox, Tammany, Telfair, Harmar, Franklin, Jefferson, St. Clair, Marietta, Massachusetts, Matthews, and Knoxville. Most of these are commanded by captains, except two that are commanded by majors: now, reducing the establishment to two thousand one hundred and eighteen non-commissioned and privates, and average them amongst the garrisons, it will give one hundred and fifty-two men for each; the sum saved by this reduction would be six hundred and twenty-four thousand six hundred and seven dollars—the difference between the appropriations for 1792 and those required for 1793.
With regard to the expense that would be incurred from militia expeditions, none of them would cost above thirty thousand dollars; and four or five of those, if made in a year, would have ten times the success and effect that could be expected from the present system. Had the militia plan been adopted, we should not at this day hear such murmurs from our constituents, nor would the people be saddled with heavy taxes and imposts; but, on the contrary, the money that has been actually wasted would have sunk a considerable part of our National Debt. But by the system of warfare lately adopted of dragging heavy cannon and camps into a wilderness, of which we have confessed our ignorance, if it be allowed any longer, our Treasury will be exhausted, and the public revenues which the Secretary of the Treasury reported as affording a prospect of income beyond the permanent wants of Government, will not all together be sufficient for our War Establishment; we must fly to loans, and pursue a system of ruin and distress to the country. Under these impressions, said Mr. S., I have introduced the proposition now before the House; and I entreat gentlemen to think seriously of it, for thereon, in a high degree, will depend the real protection of our frontier, the safety of our garrisons, and the ultimate ease, happiness, and tranquillity of the continent.
Mr. Hartley, although he did not wish to advocate the continuance of a standing army, yet he was averse to disbanding the troops at present, while it is known that a negotiation for a peace is going forward, and may not perhaps be brought to a decision before the spring. It is a well-known maxim in politics, that a peace can always be easiest obtained by a nation which is prepared for war. He noticed the great prudence and economy of the President in forming the army into a legion; and he differed in opinion with Mr. Steele respecting the insufficiency of regular troops. No instance could be quoted where regulars had engaged the Indians without beating them.
Mr. Parker said he had always abhorred the idea of keeping up standing armies in this country; and he believed he could from experience demonstrate that it was an unwise measure at the commencement of the present Government; for it answered no better purpose than throwing out a hint to the British and Spanish Governments, on our Northern and Southern frontiers, to increase their forces, and even to administer countenance and support to the Indians, which they never would have thought of doing, but for our vain attempt at military parade. He mentioned a letter which had been written by Lord Dorchester to the Indians, informing them "that Prince Edward had arrived with a number of chosen warriors to protect them," meaning against the United States.
Thus, said Mr. P., we have been warring with our finances for the last three years, by keeping up an army in imitation of European plans, which are formed in countries altogether unanalogous to America in every possible view. The consequences have been unsuccessful, and produced military disgraces, by sending into the field a collection of beings, collected from stews and brothels and from the most unprincipled of their species, to fight against Indians well supported on both sides, and fighting, as they do, for their property, their hunting ground, their wives, and children, instead of calling forth the militia, the natural strength of the country. But the present plan has involved us in such difficulties that we are not now able to provide for the payment of our debts, without the medium of loans; nay, we are now called on for a small sum of two hundred thousand dollars at the bank, which would have been easily paid out of the surplus in the Treasury, were it not that our finances have been exhausted by those ill-judged expeditions under General Harmer and General St. Clair. He mentioned the naked, starved appearance of the men who were sent out—with shoes that would not last three days, clothes that did not half cover their miserable bodies from the inclemency of the weather, and food sometimes not fit for dogs. He could mention the particulars, if required, of some other very abominable abuses, but refrained from it at present. He concluded by expressing the same opinion of militia that Mr. S. had done; and, with regard to the starved soldiery who had appeared in the woods, they were despised so much by the Indians, that they called them Coatmen, and shot them down like wild turkeys.
Mr. Fitzsimons was apprehensive that it would be a dangerous experiment, so suddenly to alter the system of defence already adopted. He remarked, that when Mr. Steele had stated the War Department to have cost the United States three million five hundred and forty thousand dollars, he had committed a great mistake, for there was one million one hundred and seventy-one thousand dollars of that sum not yet granted. [Mr. Steele explained, that he had gone by the estimates for the appropriations proposed, &c.] Mr. Fitzsimons did not wish to advocate a standing army; and if any better mode of defence for the frontiers could be digested, he would be amongst the foremost who would agree to it.
Mr. White could not entirely approve of the motion for striking out, unless a proper substitute for defence was fairly brought forward.
Mr. Williamson said, it was not disbanding an army of men, but the disbanding an army of paper, that he conceived to be the object of the motion, and it should have his support. He mentioned an affair between ninety militia and two hundred and forty Indians, wherein the militia received them much better than any of the regulars could boast of having done!
Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) reverted to a clause in the law which empowers the President either to raise those three additional regiments, or to forbear to raise them, or discharge them, &c., provided he thought it consistent with the safety of the country. From this Mr. S. said it was evident there was a sort of indelicacy in the motion, as it implies a doubt that the President might fail in this instance, or vary from his usual line of prudence.
Mr. Dayton said, he would vote for referring the motion to a Committee of the Whole, although he disapproved of it. He should not have risen had he not heard from the two North Carolina members the strangest perversion of argument and the most extraordinary reasoning. The gentleman who has brought forward the motion, said Mr. D., has decried every idea of energy and efficacy in regular disciplined troops considering them not only inefficient, but contemptible, when employed against Indians; and, to confirm this assertion, he has instanced the expedition under General St. Clair, when it is well known that there were not, in fact, two companies of regular disciplined infantry among them. The other gentleman (Mr. Williamson) has extravagantly commended the back-country militia, and extolled them for their efficiency and success in Indian warfare; and instances the affair of a rencontre between Major Adair, with ninety militia, against two hundred and forty Indians. In reply to this, Mr. D. felt himself compelled to remark, that that affair did not appear so successful in his mind; for those very militia were unquestionably surprised and beaten, inasmuch as they were driven into a corner, until the Indians captured all their horses and other property in their camp; and what is still more disgraceful, one half of the Major's party deserted him at the commencement of the action, and secured themselves within their garrison.
Whilst he was up, Mr. D. would further observe on the extraordinary speech of the mover of the question, that it was such as no person could have ever expected to hear within the walls of that House. It seemed to be calculated to prejudice the minds of the people against the whole Administration; and it appeared still the more extraordinary that such a speech should come from a gentleman who so lately expressed the nicest delicacy in matters of order and decency; for, in this instance, he has committed the greatest breach of decorum and propriety, by a direct censure of the Secretary of War, the President, and both Houses of the Legislature. [Here several members called Mr. Dayton to order.] He proceeded, however, and appealed to the House, whether he had not drawn a just picture of the expressions of the gentleman from North Carolina. The very calculations which he has so laboriously produced have been questioned by other members. In regard to the surprise expressed by the gentleman at the increase of the War Department from 1791 to '92 and '93, it was not so strange that five thousand men would require greater supplies than two thousand. Yet the gentleman is surprised at the increase of expense, and seems to imply that abuses have been committed; but if an increase of expense for protecting the frontiers has accrued, the censure ought to fall on the Legislature for directing it by their laws, and not upon the Executive, who are merely the instruments for carrying them into effect.
Upon the whole, Mr. D., however he might himself be in favor of a reduction of the army, if it stood simply on its own merits, yet, as it now struck him, it being connected with some recent circumstances, he would therefore oppose it as tending only to embarrass the Executive in their attempts towards a pacification. Moreover, he said he knew the temper of Indians so well, by having lived amongst them, that there was not a nation on earth more extravagant in their demands, when they saw the force against them was lessening. So that what is intended by the motion for reduction at present, as economical, may turn out to be, in the end, the most expensive of any.
Mr. Wadsworth was also against the motion; and Mr. Ames closed the debate by a few observations on the necessity of committing to a Committee of the Whole, as there would be no other way of answering the industrious calculations of the mover.
The question on committal was carried, and made the order of the day for next Wednesday.
Wednesday, January 2.
Military Establishment.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the motion of the 28th ultimo, for reducing the Military Establishment of the United States.
Mr. Wadsworth rose and observed, that he had pledged himself to the House last Friday to show that the calculations of the gentleman from North Carolina were not true; and, if true, that the inferences drawn from them were not correct. There was a material difference (he said) between the appropriations quoted by the gentleman and those which he would now read to the House. Here he read a statement which he had prepared, from which it would appear that Mr. Steele had overrated the contingencies, hospitals, quartermasters, forage, cavalry, ordnance, pay, and subsistence, each of them.
The total difference between Mr. Steele's and Mr. Wadsworth's calculations, from this representation, was $27,080 in the year 1790.
In like manner, Mr. W. read his calculations for 1791. On comparing which with those of Mr. Steele, he said there was a difference in the total of $252,312; and in the total of 1792, he showed a difference of $567,530. He also particularly objected to Mr. Steele's statements of the ordnance expense for 1793, which had been called $23,000; but that sum, although it comes under the head of ordnance in the estimate, is not altogether appropriated for the purchase of cannon; the whole amount of the expense of cannon, he said, had been very trifling—about $700 or $800. Having proceeded thus far in attempting to controvert the calculations of the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. W. said, it would indeed have been an alarming thing to the United States, had they been founded in reality. But the gentleman had not confined himself to misstatements—he had gone further; for he had "lamented the necessity of quoting even truths from that office"—the War Office. Here Mr. W. stated that the quotation which Mr. Steele had made from a report of the Secretary of War had not been correctly quoted. After Mr. W. had thus represented Mr. Steele's calculations as erroneous, and his quotations as misstated, he said that the House ought to beware of not being led astray by them. He next observed, that the gentleman had laid a great deal of blame of the present hostilities between the United States and the Indians, and the expense attending them, to the War Department. But Mr. W. conceived that there were other causes to be assigned for the Indian war. There had never been a day, from the first settlement of America to the present moment, without our being at war with the Indians, in one place or another. The history of the country, the resolves of the old Congress, every book published by Congress, show this to have been the case. [Here he read some quotations from the resolves of 1784, to show the appropriations for defraying the expenses of Indian wars.] He wished the House to take a retrospect of the subject, from the beginning of those troubles down to the late application for assistance from the National Government by the Governor of Georgia. Although they have three thousand men on the frontier of that State, yet it is not found sufficient, and the Indians have driven them in. Indeed, there has been a time when the town of Savannah has been obliged to keep a guard.
It was not his intention to introduce commendations of the officer at the head of the War Department, but he thought it proper to observe, that he is not to be blamed on account of the expenses referred to. He is no more than an instrument acting under the Supreme Executive. It is the President of the United States who has found it necessary and proper to recommend the establishment of a military force. It is, therefore, not the Secretary's, it is the President's war; and to assert that the Secretary has had any undue influence with the Legislature, would be altogether false; for, on the contrary, his reports have been treated with disrespect in this House. Was not his report at New York ridiculed, and called "preaching," &c., because it was in favor of peace, and spoke with great humanity respecting the hardships often inflicted by the whites on the Indians? Indeed, the Secretary of War has been uniform in his endeavors to bring about a durable peace. This, however desirable an object, has been found hitherto impracticable, and the Indians have lately carried their depredations to so great a length that the President has judged it necessary to repel them by force. They have murdered in cold blood our ambassadors of peace, whilst holding a flag of truce in one hand and reaching the other out in friendship to the Indians. Perhaps they may have been excited to this degree of barbarity by many causes. It is hard to determine which are the greatest aggressors—the settlers on the frontiers or the Indians. The murder of the Moravian Indians, the proclamation of Congress against our own people, all show that the Indians have ground for complaint.
Here Mr. W. recapitulated the affairs of the banditti at Fort St. Vincennes; the representations of Judge Innis, of Kentucky, from 1783 to 1790, respecting the people there who could not be restrained from the commission of crimes against the peace of the country. From these causes and the common fatality of the times, our attempts towards peace have proved abortive, and the war has been prolonged, but the Secretary is entirely innocent of promoting it.
In regard to the other arguments of the gentleman (Mr. Steele) respecting the militia, that they would afford either a cheaper or better defence for the frontiers, he had his doubts.
Mr. W. now went over the whole history of the frontier wars; a line of posts was once established and garrisoned by militia, yet they could not prevent the Indians from coming within sixty miles of Winchester, and murdering, scalping and plundering the women and children. After the peace of 1762, the Indians drove in the militia, and advanced as far as Cumberland and Carlisle, in the State of Pennsylvania.
But Colonel Boquet, with the remains of two regiments of regular troops, who had just before arrived from the West Indies, marched against the savages, and hired pack-horses to carry some of his sick men. With these regulars, Colonel Boquet fought them and drove them with the bayonet from one end of the country to the other. The battle began at one o'clock the first day and lasted until night, and was renewed the next morning with superior force by the Indians; yet they were entirely discomfited. This news went to Fort Pitt and Virginia, and revived the spirits of the country. Virginia raised more troops—and Colonel Boquet dictated a peace to the savages.
These instances furnished sufficient arguments to show the superiority of regular troops over militia. But he could mention many others, viz: General Hartman, with eight hundred chosen men, giving a total defeat to the Indians; Colonel Willet's attack and defeat of them; and General Sullivan's affair in South Carolina.
As to the defeat of Harmer and St. Clair, their men ought not to be reckoned regular troops. They were raw recruits, undisciplined, &c. But even they stood better than the militia; for the militia ran away, and those who remained to fight the savages fell, to their honor be it spoken, whilst the militia, who were the advanced guard, ran and threw away their guns, nay, their coats.
Upon the whole, the balance of argument, Mr. W. thought, must appear in favor of regular troops.
He further took occasion to animadvert on what Mr. Williamson had said, when that gentleman expressed himself so strongly in favor of the militia under Major Adair. That officer, Mr. W. observed, had been a Continental officer, and from his own words, it appeared that he had no very great opinion of the militia, for they had fled to the garrison; and the Indians obtained their ends, notwithstanding the reception given by Major Adair. Theirs was the triumph, and when they retired, it seems to have been not so much a matter of necessity, as a thing of choice, on their part. The loss of horses, one hundred, perhaps, and the expense of this affair, amounted to a much greater sum than any regular troops would have cost. The party under Major Adair, supposing it to consist of a hundred men, cost one hundred dollars a day, reckoning the attendant circumstances—and considering it, as Mr. W. did, a complete defeat—for there are no circumstances to prove that it was otherwise—the militia having deserted him and left the few regulars he had exposed to the whole of the danger.
Mr. W. did not stop here in his details of military disgraces—he recounted many other cases. He mentioned the Grant's expedition against the Cherokees, &c. And still he drew a balance against the successes of the militia; for, he said, they had constantly been defeated, and the country left exposed to the depredations of the enemy.
Much has been said, observed Mr. W., of Clark and Sevier's successes. They, indeed, afford an exception to the cases above mentioned; but how far were they successful? The immense expense of men and money, and the interruption given to the agriculture of the country by calling away from their business so many industrious citizens, is a thing beyond the power of calculation; for my part, said he, I do not know figures enough to count it up. For the truth of this position, and for the enormous waste and expense incurred by militia, he appealed to one of the members (Col. Parker) on the other side of the House, who had experience in the matter, whether it was not absolutely impossible either to bring militia under a proper discipline, or prevent their enormous waste. A whole brigade of regular troops would not cost so much as one regiment of militia to a country. The militia of Kentucky have cost more blood and wealth than all the American war; when the circumstances are considered of calling out men from the tillage of the field, &c. It is enormous the number of lives, and the aggregate loss is countless. The causes of these things are, want of order and discipline, &c. And those causes have produced a universal reprobation of the war establishment; but all those who condemn are not well acquainted with those causes; they judge from hearing only one-half of the truth in our newspapers. It is supposed a peace can be easily effected, but I know of no peace that has not been effected by force; for, although promises have been made and peace often treated for with the Indians, yet they have as constantly broken those promises. This is a good reason for keeping up the present force of the United States. We are now able to meet the Indians and demand a safe peace. But the gentleman from North Carolina calls our establishment a mere military parade, which, it is said by another gentleman, (Mr. Parker,) will only tend to rouse the Spaniards and the British, &c.
He went on quoting the conduct of the Indians and their threatening manner, when they told you, "go to your own side of the Ohio," &c. What language do they now hold out? But I am not at liberty, said Mr. W., to mention it, as it was confidentially communicated to this House, and read with our doors shut. However, it is well known to all the members present the insolence of that language. For my part, I have little hopes of a peace from any promises of the Indians; and although a negotiation is said to be upon the carpet, I can never depend upon the promises of savages who have so often broken them.
In speaking of the recruits that have been lately raised for the regular army, Mr. W. opposed his opinion to that of Mr. Parker, who mentioned them in such contemptible terms as having been collected from the stews and brothels of the cities, &c. For his part, Mr. W. had often seen them, and he believed they were equal, if not superior in spirit and appearance, to most of the soldiery during the British war, and better than the soldiery were at the close of the war, with some exceptions, such as respects the men who cost £300 each. Before he could quit the subject, he begged leave to mention another instance of the efficacy of regular troops; it was the affair of General Wayne's surprise, when the light-horse dismounted, and cut the militia to pieces, and the infantry drove them off at the point of the bayonet.
He ridiculed the idea of calling out a militia upon every emergency. Where are they to be formed? In Pennsylvania it would be attended with a tenfold loss, if they must quit their daily labor. He would admit that the character of the Kentucky militia had been brave and intrepid; but there was still occasion for a new war, and no ultimate protection afforded to the frontier.
The Governor of North Carolina had complained of a friendly Indian being murdered, &c. On the whole, he thought it improper to take militia to fight Indian warriors. He admitted that some abuses might have been practised in the regular army, but they were as little, if not less, than in any other army he could remember.
He insisted that the scheme of the Department of War was not a scheme of the Secretary, but a scheme of the United States from the President down to the members of the Legislature, and the meanest of their constituents. He took a retrospect of the great skill of the President after Braddock's defeat. The President must be the best judge of the disposition of Indians, and the best way of treating with them; he approves the scheme of the present war, and shall we imprudently attempt to change his plan, by sending out a few men to be knocked on the head by the Indians, as those coat men were? so called by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Parker,) but instead of coat men, he, Mr. W. thought they might also have been called petty-coat men, &c. He finished his observations by again remarking, that the calculations of the gentleman (Mr. Steele) who had introduced the motion for reducing the present war establishments were founded in error and ought not to have any weight with the House.
Mr. Steele.—When the House have deliberated upon the merits of the gentleman's arguments, and the truth of my statements; and when they have decided the question, I will submit to their decision; but, in the mean time, I insist that my calculations are founded on the reports of the Secretary and the public printed documents on the table, of the appropriations and laws, &c. I wish the gentleman (Mr. Wadsworth) had told us where he has found those papers, from which he attempts to controvert such authentic documents as I have quoted. I wish he had made the House understand them; for my part they appear unintelligible.
Mr. Wadsworth said it was from the laws.
Mr. Steele explained some things in his former statements; and in reply to some suggestions that might be thrown out with respect to his indelicate mode of attacking the Secretary of War, or the President, he defied any member to show that he had acted beyond the line of his duty, or that he had ever shown any disrespect towards the President. On the contrary, he was of opinion that that gentleman's character would for ever be secured against all the possible attacks of ingratitude or malice, &c. He also used some other very handsome expressions on this occasion. But whilst he was ready to declare these things, and to prove that he had no personal intentions of injuring the Secretary of War, yet, he would not suffer himself to be deprived of his privilege, whilst he had the honor of a seat in that House; and, in the present instance, he thought it his duty to hold up his opposition against the rapid increase of expenses in all the Departments of Government, which he said were grown to an enormous burden upon the people, and unwarranted by the constitution; that they therefore ought to be immediately checked. He hoped, for the future, gentlemen would confine their arguments to measures, and not apply them to persons. He sat down, for the present, with this proviso: that he would reserve to himself the right of answering to what might be advanced against his proposition, which he could prove to be salutary; and that the present system is fundamentally wrong.
Mr. Hartley was against adopting the motion under the present circumstances of the country, and he entered into a particular investigation of the merits of the question. When the last law for the more effectual protection of the frontiers passed, the subject now under consideration was very fully and ably discussed, and the gentlemen who were averse to the augmentation, had several alterations made to satisfy them.
Instead of the President's being obliged to raise the whole of the three regiments, he was to exercise his discretion either to make the augmentation complete, or raise a part, and he had authority to disband them after being raised.
The 12th section of that law is thus expressed: "It shall be lawful for the President of the United States to forbear to raise, or to disband after they shall be raised, the whole or any part of the said three additional regiments, in case events shall in his judgment render his so doing consistent with the public safety."
We should therefore consider whether circumstances have so materially changed since that time as to render it proper that the Legislature should interfere, repeal the powers given to the President, and discharge the three regiments. This necessarily leads us first to view the situation of our finances, and the state of the frontiers at and immediately before the time of passing the law. The extent of our revenue was not as well known then as at present, and every good man deprecated the misfortune which obliged him to increase the taxes. The war was a disagreeable one, but necessary, if peace could not otherwise be obtained. The Legislature considered the expense, and were of opinion that we had means and abilities to defray the same. Many murders and ravages had been committed by the savages on the frontiers. One army had suffered in the year 1790, and nearly a whole army cut off on the 4th of November, 1791. And we had every reason to suppose that the Indians would act in great force against us. Our finances are still respectable. It is true, I should be happy if we could apply the money towards discharging the national debt already contracted, but the unfortunate situation of our frontiers prevent it. War, though an evil, may (from the present disposition of the world) be sometimes necessary, when nations are unreasonable and justice cannot be otherwise obtained. Hostilities have lately been committed on our troops commanded by Major Adair, and several of the Southern tribes show themselves inimical, and we have no absolute assurances that we shall have peace in the spring. The agreement by some tribes to a suspension of hostilities, was only convenient to them as it protected their families for the winter.
The great object of the additional armament was to obtain peace: this is not yet effected. May we promise ourselves more success in negotiation by laying down our arms, or by retaining them? History is in favor of the latter. Indeed, I hold it as a maxim, that the nation which is prepared for war can most easily obtain peace. For my own part, I can discover no existing causes for altering the system established by the act to which I have before referred. The expense has been made a very serious objection. It ought to have weight; but where measures have been proper, America has not regarded it. She has freely expended her treasure to support her rights. We are bound in justice and honor to protect our fellow-citizens on the frontiers; we demand from them an excise. They require from the General Government protection. I am for making peace with all the Indians upon reasonable terms; but any country which has been fairly purchased from the Indians, they should not be permitted to repossess or hold by conquest. If an offensive war be necessary says the gentleman from North Carolina, regular troops are not the most proper to carry it on. They are more expensive, and unfit to meet the savages of the wilderness. As to the expense, I have partly answered before. But if the gentleman is to have five expeditions in one year, I believe he would find that his calculations are not correct: a misfortune to either detachments or party would bear very hard upon the district they came from; the partial loss of regulars would not be equally felt, very few of them having families.
I have a high opinion of the backwoods riflemen, but I am confident that we cannot certainly rely upon their turning out as often as they might be wanted; we could not rely on such uncertainty; and yet this is offered as a favorite project. If you cannot rely upon them, you may say that the ordinary militia can be drafted. You would find them unfit for such a service; they would in general be composed of substitutes, inexperienced and undisciplined, and it would be unfair to take them all from the frontiers, and some of the States, or at least one, have no militia laws. I am for retaining the regular troops.
The President has practised economy in organizing the troops voted for, and I am told they have made considerable progress in discipline; they are formed into legionary corps, composed of horse, riflemen, light-infantry, and battalion-men. The three former will be fit for active service in the field, the latter for the common duties in the camp or garrison. I will allow volunteers and militia their full credit; but I do not think the regular troops merit the disparagement attempted. Volunteer corps have not been free from misfortunes. Colonel Crawford, at the head of five hundred volunteers from Virginia and Pennsylvania, was defeated in the Western country, and he was burnt at the stake. General Braddock, it is said, was obstinate, and his European troops were undisciplined for such a service. The army under General St. Clair was lost, because the men were undisciplined and unfitted for that service. I can mention several instances where regular troops have successfully penetrated the Indian country, among warlike tribes, with success: Colonel Montgomery, into the Cherokees; Colonel Armstrong to the Kittaning; Colonel Boquet's campaign of 1763, and 1764. Three detachments of the American army, in the year 1778, (one under the command of General Broadhead, one under Lieutenant Colonel Butler, and the last commanded by your humble servant,) penetrated the country possessed by the Six Nations. Neither of the detachments was large, and the last had to contend against superior numbers. In General Sullivan's campaign, the year following, his vanguard beat an equal, if not a superior number of Indians. I might mention the Roman legions; they almost constantly were successful against those they called Barbarians, until their enemies adopted the Roman discipline. I have a high opinion of the personal bravery and prowess of an Indian, but I do deny that they can act to the best advantage in large bodies. They have not an experience of that kind; disciplined troops would have the advantage. I reprobate the idea of a standing army, which might endanger the liberty of this country; but I consider the troops contemplated in the act of Congress to be absolutely necessary, until peace shall be obtained, and therefore shall vote against a reduction. Every step has been taken, and I dare say will be taken, by the President, to procure a peace without bloodshed. Our messengers of peace have, in some places, been murdered, and yet he has sent messengers to others.
Mr. Clark.—One would suppose from the style of the debate, that we were going to abandon the frontiers, the safety of the country, &c., and to disband the whole of the army: for, the arguments of those gentlemen who are opposed to the motion seem to be calculated to mislead the House in that way, and to prove that the question under consideration is for reducing the whole of the troops now existing. But this is so far from being the true state of the matter, that it is not even contemplated to disband a single man of them; it only goes to the prevention of raising any more troops, which perhaps would be the safest policy under the present circumstances and temper of the United States. There are about three thousand three hundred effective men already raised, who are sufficient to garrison the forts on the frontier, agreeably to the gentleman's statement who introduced the motion; and, indeed, it seems as if they were fully competent, if we believe the report that the whole of the Indian force, at the time of meeting General St. Clair, and when they exerted themselves to the utmost, was but one thousand two hundred warriors.
Mr. C. made some further remarks on the sentiments which had been expressed by the gentleman last up; and, in speaking of the discretionary powers vested in the President, he was of opinion that the situation of the Chief Magistrate in this respect was extremely delicate: for, supposing he might be inclined to stop the recruiting service, and reduce the war establishment; and supposing the frontiers to be again harassed, it might be charged to him for not having kept up the legal complement of men. Under this impression, Mr. C. wished that some way could be adopted of conveying to the President the sentiments of the Legislature on this subject, without the tedious form of a law.
Mr. Parker.—The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hartley) has been reading a section of the law, to inform us of the discretionary powers vested in the President, which we have heard from other members before he rose, and which we all knew as well as himself. I am sorry to hear gentlemen, when they have no other resource of argument left, so often resorting to the name of the President, to carry their measures; and yet, in the present instance, I much doubt whether those sentiments are avowed by the President, which have been laid to his charge in the course of this debate: however, if they were really so, this is not a sufficient reason to silence me, or to prevent me from delivering my own sentiments, and those of my constituents who sent me here to do so. He vindicated the character of the militia, in opposition to the disgraceful picture which Mr. Wadsworth had painted of this respectable class of citizens, whom he (Mr. P.) insisted were always more spirited soldiery, and fitter for fighting the Indians than the regulars, although they did not always move at the sound of a trumpet or beat of a drum, which were necessary to rouse the attention of heart-broken, mercenary troops, who seldom act but from force, or fear of the whipping-post. Militia were not so well acquainted with military show, or the display of columns; neither did the President of the United States, when acting Major of a regiment little better than militia, find that the doctrine of tactics was of any great service to him.
Mr. P. further mentioned, that the forerunners of General Burgoyne's army were taken by General Stark's militia near Bennington; and the capture of the whole of Burgoyne's army was chiefly brought about by militia, as General Lincoln had very few regular troops at the time of his surrender. In short, the militia bore a conspicuous share of almost every engagement during the war. At Trenton, the men who took the Hessians were little other than militia, as they had been raised but a short time before. Mr. P. could vouch for them, as he was a witness of their activity and bravery. Another instance offered of their success at Charleston, after it was taken by the British and the regulars drove off; the militia kept possession of the country and supported themselves. He also remembered having been called away from the regular army in the North to take the command of some militia in Virginia, who supported themselves for twelve months without either pay or provisions from the United States; and yet they were never once defeated or disgraced, neither did they leave the country unprotected and exposed; and all they received for their services was certificates which necessity obliged them to alienate at three shillings in the pound to persons who are now in possession of them drawing an annual interest of nearly as much, and who never perhaps had a good wish toward the Revolution. He next quoted the militia under Colonel Mercer, at Yorktown, who were successful in a skirmish with the enemy under Tarleton. These and several other arguments in favor of the militia, whom he still maintained to be the best security of a country, were used by Mr. P. He would not advocate the raising them from all parts of the United States, but only in such places as the safety of the frontiers required it most: they were not, to be sure, accustomed to the display of the column, &c., but they knew how to take the Indians in a proper way through the woods.
It gave him pain to hear the character of the militia so much traduced, and it also was a painful reflection to think of the two disgraceful defeats of our armies under Generals Harmar and St. Clair; indeed, it would have a strange appearance to the world, to think that this country is inhabited by the same men who lived in 1776. He repeated what he had before asserted, that most of the present regulars were collected from the stews and brothels of the cities, and had none of the spirit or principles of the honest yeomanry, who composed the militia during former wars, when every man turned out impressed with a good cause.
It was not, he said, his desire to criminate any individual in office, although he would maintain his right of expressing his opinion on that floor, so long as he held a seat in the House. But with regard to myself, said he, I am not disposed to pour incense into any man's cup; I respect the President as much as any man, and think him incapable of doing wrong, at least on those principles that foreign despots are supposed to do no wrong, because the people are their subjects, and dare not to say their sovereigns do wrong, and dare not contradict this tyrannic maxim. If the House, or if the President, have committed an error, they ought to correct it; for my part, I conceived the whole of the plan wrong from the beginning. From the present appearances, he was convinced we should get no peace with the Indians, unless it were dictated by the British agents in Canada; for it was clear, as long as they can do us the injustice to withhold territory from us, we can have little reason to expect their aid or friendship in bringing about a peace which is so desirable. He hoped to live to see the day that America will be able to show herself superior to her enemies, and chastise them: at present, it would be improper to engage in any war, if it could be avoided.
In addition to the foregoing reasons offered by Mr. P. for being opposed to a war establishment, he also remarked, that it was from a desire to see the public debt redeemed without resorting to new taxes; for if they once should get fixed there, (pointing up to the Senate Chamber,) we should never be able to withdraw them, whether they were necessary or not. He concluded by a hearty wish that the motion made by his friend from North Carolina might succeed.
Mr. Boudinot was against the motion, as he thought any immediate alteration of the present system would be attended with dangerous consequences, under the present circumstances of the United States. He did not think it would be justifiable to alter it. It would show an instability in our public measures, especially at this moment, when we have done every thing to bring about a peace with the hostile Indians: and, when it is just advancing to the season for effecting it—when it is at the eve of completion—shall we rashly counteract the whole? and after having brought the enemy, who were so much elated on account of their recent success, to a proper sense of our power and force to impose an honorable peace, would it not be extremely imprudent to lessen our own consequence before we have accomplished the object? The Indians would, in this case, most indubitably raise their demands in proportion to what they supposed to be our weakness. Mr. B. added several other observations.
Mr. Willis had always been strongly impressed with a dislike for standing armies; but when he considered the situation of the frontiers, and particularly of the State of Georgia, he must give his vote against the motion. Neither did he think two regiments by any means a sufficient force, even to garrison the posts.
On motion, the committee rose and reported progress.
The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of State, enclosing a list of the several persons employed in his office, with the salary allowed to each, pursuant to the resolution of this House of the thirty-first ultimo; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making compensation to the widows and orphans of certain persons who were killed by Indians, under the sanction of flags of truce, and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported progress.