Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Friday, February 7.

John Page, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

Algerine War.

THE NAVAL FORCE.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. The Chairman read the resolution before the House for equipping a Naval force.

Mr. Madison thought this expedient unlikely to answer the purpose, and liable to many objections. Before the American squadron can be equipped, the truce between Algiers and Portugal must expire. When that expiration shall take place, she either will not renew the truce at all, or she will stipulate that the United States shall be comprehended in it. He would save the money intended for the fleet, and hire the Portuguese ships of war with it, as soon as the truce ends. He wished that the committee might reject the present motion, and when they did so, he would move a resolution, a copy of which he read to the committee. It was in substance:

"That the sum of —— dollars be provided to be employed in such a manner as should be found most effectual for obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers; and failing of this, that the sum should be applied to the end of obtaining protection from some of the European Powers."

Mr. M. considered the armament at present proposed, as quite too small to answer any efficient purpose.

A member here observed, that it would be hazardous to rely on Portugal; because, though the truce might expire in about six months, it would possibly be renewed at the end of that time, or converted into a peace.

Mr. Fitzsimons wished that gentlemen would pay some attention to attested facts, before they so abruptly declare that the six ships proposed by the committee to be built and put into commission, were incompetent to the end for which they were designed. The committee had bestowed considerable time in deliberating upon the best information which could be obtained, before they specified the force requisite to be employed, and they had been satisfied, that what was now proposed would be equal to the end. Here Mr. F. read a different statement of the ships of war in the service of the Regency of Algiers, at different times. One of these shows that in the year 1789, there were nine xebecs, from thirty-six to ten guns, and one ship of forty guns upon the stocks; but that several of the xebecs were laid up or unfit for service. A second estimate of the Algerine maritime force, had been transmitted by Mr. Humphries. He specified four frigates, two xebecs, and one brig. By advices still more recent, the fleet consisted of one vessel of forty-four guns, one of thirty-six, one of twenty-eight, three xebecs, and a brig. Mr. F. observed, that gentlemen had objected to the sending out an American fleet; that they could not always keep together. He reminded them, that from November to March or April, the corsairs of Barbary never go out to sea. There were two months during that time, when they were restrained by their religion from piratical excursions. The committee had been told, that the Portuguese are ready to assist us. There is ground to expect this assistance, but not to depend upon it. Two American frigates, along with the Portuguese vessels, would be fully equal to the task of curbing the Algerines. As to militia, he could not see of what consequence they could be in a naval contest. With regard to expense, he stated a very important fact. The United States import, annually, two millions of bushels of salt from these countries, which the Algerines will cut off from our commerce. The rise on that article must then be at least one dollar per bushel; which is a tax of two millions of dollars at once, or three times the expense of the armament. Probably, however, the loss may extend to four millions of dollars on this single article of salt, in one year only; a sum which would keep up the fleet a long time. We have been trying to buy a peace, but without success; and if we are not able to enforce it, the price of buying it must be so much the higher. As soon as Portugal is left to herself, she will certainly protect us, because it is much for her interest to do so. At present, she cannot, perhaps, from the influence of the combined powers. Mr. F., therefore, recommended an armament in the mean time.

Mr. Smilie objected to this measure, because it was unequal to the task. Britain would assist the Algerines underhandedly, as she did an enemy in another quarter, and would continue to do so. He did not think she was shameless enough to own it, but she would do it.[49]

Mr. Nicholas went on the same ground. He said that Britain had not been content with striking up a truce for Portugal, that the Algerines might be let loose on American commerce, but her Minister at the Court of Lisbon had endeavored to prevent our vessels from obtaining a Portuguese convoy. Not content with insuring a loss to America, she had striven to make that loss immediate. As to the duration of the truce, it could not last long, for the Queen of Portugal had, in fact, broken it already. She had declared that the trade to that country should pass unmolested; to which condition it was not likely that the Algerines would consent. The Portuguese nobility had clamored at the acceptance of a truce. So that, on the whole, it could hardly last long. A naval force was a very expensive affair. The greater part of the immense debt of England had been lavished on her navy. He was against building a navy.

Mr. Swift had been always sensible that the situation of this country was not fit for war. We have a very heavy debt; but still it is better to bear debts than depredations. A gentleman of extensive information (Mr. S. Smith, in yesterday's debate) had stated the rise of insurance as much less than the armament would cost. Britain had always more dependence on her navy, than on the immense sums that she pays to these barbarians. Mr. S. had no doubt that the proposed fleet would have its intended effect. He despaired of either buying a truce or buying an ally. As to the militia of Algiers, they could not be brought into action against frigates. He considered the charge of hiring the Algerines, as an unfounded accusation on the honor of Britain. He could not bring himself to believe that she was capable of a conduct so exceedingly disgraceful. He had no direct evidence to convince. It might be objected to this armament, that it would augment the national debt, and throw too much influence into the hands of the Executive Government. But the same objection might be started against every armament whatever.

Mr. Murray said, the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) yesterday, observed that he was not a little surprised that those who a few days since had appeared so alarmed at the phantom of war, should on this question appear so willing to meet it. He would remark that those gentlemen were alarmed at a shadow which appeared followed by the substance of war, and were unwilling to do any thing that might lead to a war that did not yet exist. But we were now at war with Algiers, and had no choice. They had been at war with the United States ever since the end of the Revolutionary war. The Spaniards and Portuguese kept them within the Mediterranean. Gentlemen who are averse to the report, hold up two substitute measures: one, which was suggested, and has been argued by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) is, that we ought to grant a sum to Portugal for her protection of our trade. The other is, that commercial regulations will accomplish our protection. He liked neither. The last, if permanent, will withdraw all temptation from Great Britain to interpose her good offices. The first is worse; it is subsidizing Portugal at the expense of our own people, and that too without security. Gentlemen would make it the interest of Portugal to make such breaches of truce as would occasionally withdraw protection, and oblige us to subsidize her higher. It would create a disgraceful dependence on a foreign power, and weaken the spirit of our marine; whereas, if you fit out frigates, you employ your money in nourishing the roots of your own industry; you encourage your own ship-building, lumber, and victualling business. He believed, that however true might be the suspicion of British interference in Indian affairs, and he feared it was too true, he did not believe the evidence as to Algerine interference strong enough to induce an argument against the report, under a supposition that as Great Britain had effected the truce, so she would aid Algiers against us. He thought so, because it was not now as much her interest as it was in times of peace. In times of peace, had she let loose the Algerines, her own navigation would have been enabled to carry for us, but now it would be molested by the French. He did not believe nations, more than persons, would do wrong purely out of evil designs, devoid of interest; the greatest villain would not. At present, their ships are liable to attack from the French, and he had it from good authority, that so far were the British from having advantaged themselves if they had been so base, that scarcely a British ship had appeared since in our ports. The ship frigates would be able to blockade the Gut of Gibraltar; the Algerines did not sail in fleets; they wanted plunder, not glory; when they discovered they had to get the first by hard fighting, they would listen to peace, accompanied by money. Spain, it was true, had purchased a peace, but there was an hereditary inveteracy against Spain, and a facility of attacking her shores which we need not fear; so it was her interest to buy a peace when war could bring her nothing but a glory that almost disgraced her armies; as to jealousy of power in the Executive, he hoped to see a proper equipoise in the powers of this Government; but, when proper occasions occurred, he hoped Congress would never refuse the adequate means to enable the Executive to discharge its constitutional duties.

Mr. Goodhue observed, that the committee had carefully looked over the statement of the marine force of Algiers for several years back, and had no reason to doubt that the six vessels would be equal to the purpose intended. There was no ground to suppose Algiers would have more force at present than she had during her war with Portugal. He had no doubt that the Algerines were let loose on the American commerce to prevent supplies going to France, and while the war lasts, we shall not be able to buy a peace. It is said, that the truce was but for a year, and in six months it will expire. He did not wish to depend on that, when the evil is so great. And why depend on Portugal? She is more under the influence of Britain than any other nation in Europe. When Britain has been at the trouble of stipulating a peace for Portugal, will she suffer that nation to assist us? Certainly not. Or is it wise to stand by and depend upon such a resource?

Mr. Madison said, that gentlemen thought so differently on this subject, and advanced arguments against his side of the question of such a different nature, that it was difficult or impossible to give them an answer. He then proceeded to quote the speech of Mr. Goodhue; when that gentleman rose to explain. Mr. M. then proceeded to notice the speeches of Mr. Fitzsimons and Mr. S. Smith. Both of these gentlemen were up more than once to explain, as having been misquoted. In a speech of considerable length, he was not suffered long to proceed without interruptions of explanations. This produced a scene of altercation. One circumstance, however, was mentioned by Mr. Fitzsimons that deserves particular notice. From April to December next, he said, the insurance on American ships from England and the rest of Europe, will not be less than twenty-five per cent. of their value on account of the Algerines.

The House now adjourned, without taking any question.

Tuesday, March 4.

Estimate of Appropriations.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the sums necessary to be appropriated for the service of the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four; and after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said report under consideration, and come to a resolution thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk's table, where the same was twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That, for the support of the Military Establishment of the United States, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, there be appropriated a sum of money, not exceeding one million four hundred and fifty-seven thousand nine hundred and thirty-six dollars and one cent; that is to say:

For the pay of the Legion of the United States,	$303,684 00
For subsistence,	312,567 75
For forage,	31,632 00
For clothing,	112,000 00
For equipments for the cavalry,	7,314 05
For horses for the cavalry,	16,000 00
For bounty,	5,000 00
For the Hospital Department,	20,000 00
For the Ordnance Department,	6,715 32
For repairs and articles directed to be made and purchased by the President of the United States,	202,783 34
For defensive protection of the frontiers,	130,000 00
For the Indian Department,	50,000 00
For the Quartermaster's Department,	150,000 00
For contingencies of the War Department,	30,000 00
And for Invalid Pensions,	80,239 55
	——————
	$1,457,936 01

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Gillespie, do prepare and bring in the same.

Thursday, March 6.

Slave Trade.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the ports of the United States, Mr. Boudinot in the chair.

The two first sections of the bill were agreed to, with one alteration moved by Mr. Trumbull, which was to give the District Court as well as the Circuit Courts cognizance of the offence.

The third section which relates to the penalty &c., it was moved should be struck out. This motion was negatived. It was then moved to insert the word foreign before "ship or vessel;" which was agreed to.

The committee proceeded through the bill, which was reported to the House with sundry amendments; these were agreed to by the House, and the bill ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

Monday, March 10.

Algerine War.

Naval Armament.

Mr. Giles observed, that, from the sense of the House several times manifested on this subject, there remained no doubt but that the bill would pass. In that event, he most earnestly hoped that the success of the measure would, at least, equal the expectations of its advocates. Indeed, he hoped that their expectations would be disappointed and exceeded; for it did not seem to him that even they were very positive as to its full competency to the end proposed. He even wished that every ship could be furnished with the cap of Fortunatus and the shield of Hercules; for he was persuaded that, in the present state of things, some magical influence would be found essential to enable them to effect their undertaking. He observed, that, at present, the wisdom or folly of the proposed measure was mere matter of opinion; that the passage of the bill will furnish futurity with a complete experiment of its true character.

He intended to offer his reasons against the passage of the bill, not with a hope of making proselytes, but as a testimony of the real motives which influenced his opposition. With this view, he should only mention some of the general impressions produced on his mind by this subject, without fatiguing the House with minute exemplifications of them.

The subject had presented itself to him in two points of view—1st, as affording a protection to our commerce against the Algerine depredations; 2d, as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment.

He could not help premising that, in the course of discussion, the advocates of the bill had censured its opponents with a want of disposition for the protection of commerce, whilst they claimed a monopoly of all good intention towards this object. He did not mean to derogate from the good intention of the favorers of the bill, but he believed its opponents possessed as pure a zeal for the protection and due encouragement of commerce as its advocates. It is not a question whether commerce is, or is not, to be protected; but whether the plan proposed be the most effectual and the least exceptionable that can be devised for that purpose? The difference of opinion does not consist in the end to be produced, but in the means proposed to effect the end.

The first objection he should make to the bill would be, the obvious inadequacy of the means contemplated to effect the end proposed by them. The object proposed is an effectual resistance, not only to the whole present naval force of Algiers, but to their whole naval ability. The bill contains, in itself, essentially a declaration of war. Our calculations, therefore, should be extended to the utmost limit of the naval ability of the hostile nation. The means to be employed consist of four frigates of forty-four guns each, and two ships of thirty-six guns each. To decide with propriety upon the objection, this force should be compared with the naval ability of Algiers. He did not mean to go into a minute history of Algiers. He should only observe, in general, that it was a populous country; that it had furnished at one time one hundred thousand fighting men; that its power at this day was as great as at any preceding period; that they were a warlike people, accustomed to naval enterprises and desperate in naval engagements; that, for some time past, they had been subsidized for peace by almost every European nation. He could not help concluding, from these circumstances, that the naval ability of the nation either was or might, without any uncommon exertions, he rendered superior to four forty-four gun frigates and two thirty-six gun ships, the force contemplated by the bill; and, if the conclusions were just, the bill is unwise.

Mr. G. proceeded to consider the bill as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment. He said there was a clause in the bill authorizing the President to suspend all proceedings in the equipment of the armament, in case of a peace with Algiers, which gave him some consolation; but it did not altogether relieve his apprehensions from this operation of the measure, because he knew that a permanent naval establishment was a favorite policy with some gentlemen, and because the argument had been urged in favor of the present bill.

He observed that a permanent naval establishment could be recommended to the United States but from one or both of the following considerations: either upon the principle of entering into a competition for naval power with the Powers of Europe; or as affording security to the collection of our own revenue.

He thought the question of a permanent naval establishment was one of the most important which could be presented to the consideration of the House, and that the most serious consequences were necessarily connected with it. In the first place, he viewed the establishment of a navy as a complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the principal of the public debt. History does not afford an instance of a nation which continued to increase their navy and decrease their debt at the same time. It is an operation exceeding the ability of any nation. The naval competition of the Powers in Europe has produced oppression to their subjects and ruin to themselves. The ruin of the French Monarchy, he believed, might be ascribed very much to that cause. A navy is the most expensive of all means of defence, and the tyranny of governments consists in the expensiveness of their machinery. The expensiveness of the French Monarchy is the true cause of its destruction. The navy of France furnished the principal item of that expense. The navy produced expense, the expense exceeded the revenue, new contributions became necessary, the people saw the tyranny, and destroyed the tyrant. The same effect, by the same policy, will probably be produced in great Great Britain. The Government is not yet destroyed, but the people are oppressed, liberty is banished. The extensiveness of the Government is the true ground of the oppression of the people. The King, the Nobility, the Priesthood, the Army, and, above all, the Navy.

All this machinery lessens the number of the productive and increases the number of unproductive hands of the nation in Great Britain. The operation has been extended so far that the poor rates alone probably afforded a greater tax per capita than the whole taxes paid in the United States. He was astonished with these fatal examples before our eyes, that there should be any gentlemen who would wish to enter into this fashionable system of politics. He said the United States had already progressed full far enough into this system; for, exclusively of the ordinary expense of the Civil List, a debt had been funded upon principles of duration. An army had been raised, at an immense expense, and now there was a proposition for a navy. He observed that, for several years past, the appropriations for the support of the Military Establishment had exceeded a million of dollars per annum—from one million to one million and a half annually. He believed that, if the expense had been foreseen, there would have been more active efforts to have avoided it. It was a policy, at this day, very generally condemned; yet we are now to exhibit a counterpart of this policy upon the ocean, with this aggravation—that it will commence with greater certain expense, and with a more uncertain object. The system of governing by debts he conceived the most refined system of tyranny. It seems to have been a contrivance devised by politicians to succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both systems were tyrannical, but the objects of their tyranny were different. The system of feuds operated upon the person of the individual—the system of debts operates upon the pockets of the individual. In the feudal system, the tenant often received some indulgence and lenity from the martial generosity which generally characterized the lord. The lord was gratified with the acknowledgment of the tenant that he was a slave, and the rendition of a peppercorn as an evidence of it. The product of the tenant's labor was left for his own support. The system of debts affords no such indulgences. Its true policy is to devise objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the people in the least visible mode. It boasts not of economizing in calls upon the people for contributions. It boasts not of economizing in the objects of expenditure. It consults the obedience, and not the happiness of the people. There is no device which facilitates the system of expense and debts so much as a navy. And he declared, from that consideration, he should value his liberty at a lower price than he now did, if the policy of a permanent Naval Establishment should obtain in the United States.

Mr. W. Smith remarked, that though it was not probable any proselytes were to be expected at this late period of the business, and after so ample a discussion as the question had received in its different stages, yet he considered it necessary to make a reply to some of the various objections which had just been made to the passing of the bill. Many of those objections appeared to him totally inapplicable to the subject, which he should pass over in silence. If it were the design of the House to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy, merely for the idle purposes of vain parade, there would be force in some of the objections; but, as this was not the case, and as the measure was a measure not of choice, but of necessity, extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events, he did not feel their force in any respect. The question was, simply, whether our commerce required protection against the Algerine corsairs, and whether this was the best mode of protection. The first part of the question was admitted on all sides. For himself, he had always considered the second equally clear. But in the course of the discussion, various difficulties had been started against the mode of protection, and various substitutes had been proposed, as offering a remedy more prompt, more effectual, and less expensive. He would first consider the proposed substitutes for a naval armament, and then answer the objections to it. The substitutes were: 1st. To purchase a peace of the Algerines. 2d. To depend on Portugal breaking her truce with Algiers, and shutting up their cruisers within the Straits. 3d. To pass commercial regulations against Great Britain. 4th. To subsidize other nations to protect our commerce.

To these several substitutes, he might, in a few words, object that the first was impracticable, the second precarious, the third inoperative, and the fourth dishonorable.

Mr. S. next reviewed the principal objections to the bill. These were, he said, 1st. That the force contemplated was incompetent. 2d. That sending an armed force on the ocean would be the means of involving us in a war with some of the maritime powers. 3d. That we had no friendly ports in Europe, which our frigates could resort to for supplies or refitment. 4th. That the expense would exceed the object to be protected. 5th. That our trade would be deprived of the seamen required to man the frigates. 6th. That it was now so late in the season we could not protect our vessels the ensuing summer, and that some favorable events might occur before the frigates could be equipped, which would render them unnecessary. 7th. That this was the beginning of a Naval Establishment, which would hereafter involve this country in immense debts and maritime wars.

[To the arguments against a Naval Establishment, Mr. Smith answered:]

The dangers resulting from a large Navy Establishment, and the immense debts they have created in other countries, had been depicted, and the House had been warned against such evils. How a bill providing six frigates, which were to exist only during the war with Algiers, could excite an apprehension of a large and permanent navy, and an enormous debt, Mr. S. said he was at a loss to discover. The clause which authorized the President, in the event of a peace with the Regency of Algiers, to discontinue the armament, was a complete answer to all the reasoning which had been indulged on the subject of navies and debts. Admitting there had been no such clause, he did not feel the weight or applicability of the reasoning.

This country is peculiarly fitted for a navy: abounding in all kinds of naval resources, we have within ourselves those means which other maritime nations were obliged to obtain from abroad. The nature of our situation, and the navigating disposition of a considerable proportion of our citizens, evince still more the propriety of some Naval Establishment. Perhaps the country is not yet mature for such an establishment, to any great extent; but he believed the period was not far distant, when it would be. Sweden, with a population not greater than that of the United States, and with more slender resources, maintained a large navy. He saw no reason why the United States, with an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable national resources, might not, without ruin, do as much, or why the equipment of a squadron, inferior to that of any of the petty nations of Italy, should involve us in an insupportable expense.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 50, nays 39, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Fisher Ames, John Beatty, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Lambert Cadwalader, David Cobb, Peleg Coffin, Joshua Coit, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, Samuel Dexter, Thomas Fitzsimons, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Samuel Griffin, George Hancock, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Samuel Holten, John Wilkes Kittera, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, William Lyman, Francis Malbone, Peter Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, Josiah Parker, Thomas Scott, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Thomas Sprigg, Zephaniah Swift, Silas Talbot, George Thatcher, Uriah Tracy, Jonathan Trumbull, John E. Van Allen, Peter Van Gaasbeck, Peleg Wadsworth, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, John Watts, and Richard Winn.

Nays.—Messrs. Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, Thomas Blount, Thomas P. Carnes, Gabriel Christie, Thomas Claiborne, Isaac Coles, William Findlay, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Christopher Greenup, William Barry Grove, Carter B. Harrison, John Heath, Daniel Heister, John Hunter, William Irvine, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, Joseph McDowell, Alexander Mebane, William Montgomery, Andrew Moore, Joseph Neville, Anthony New, John Nichols, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Francis Preston, John Smilie, Israel Smith, Thomas Tredwell, Philip Van Cortlandt, Abraham Venable, Francis Walker, Benjamin Williams, Paine Wingate, and Joseph Winston.

Thursday, March 27.

Sequestration of British Debts.

Mr. Dayton submitted the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That provision ought to be made, by law, for the sequestration of all the debts due from the citizens of the United States to the subjects of the King of Great Britain.

"Resolved, That provision ought, in like manner, to be made for securing the payment of all such debts into the Treasury of the United States, there to be held as a pledge for the indemnification of such of the citizens of the said States as shall have suffered from the ships of war, privateers, or from any person, or description of persons, acting under the commission of authority of the British King, in contravention of the law of nations, and in violation of the rights of neutrality."

Ordered, That the said resolutions be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into said committee.

Mr. Dayton then rose in support of his propositions. When he brought them forward he did not accompany them (he said) with many observations, because he was then laboring under indisposition. The same cause would render him very concise now.

The injuries and insults we have suffered from Great Britain, he conceived, need not be dwelt upon. They are well known, and it is universally acknowledged that we ought to adopt such measures as would screen us from a repetition of them, and secure to us reparation. The resolutions he had brought forward he intended as part of that system of defence and preservation, other portions of which had already received the sanction of the House. These resolutions, he conceived, would not be the least efficient part of that system.

He believed that, when the conduct of Great Britain is reviewed, it would be found that it is treating their subjects with great lenity to speak of sequestration only; we should be warranted in confiscating, for they have subjected our property to condemnation, without an appearance of an intention to indemnify.

As to restitution of the property of which we have been plundered on the high seas, it is impossible. It is condemned, sold, and scattered, and no hope can be entertained that they intend to indemnify our suffering citizens. If it had been their intention to indemnify, their Court, in explanation of the instruction of the 6th of November, would not have given orders to condemn vessels detained in suspense in the West Indies until that elucidation was received.

Since, then, restitution is impossible, and not a shadow of hope exists that indemnification will be granted; we have only to determine whether we shall give up the property of which we have been plundered, or claim it with effect—claim it, and enforce the claim, by showing that we have the means of retaliation within our power.

After the proceedings of the British towards us, he believed, we should have been warranted in confiscating the property now proposed to be sequestered, without negotiation. This would have been meting to them as they meted to us. If sequestration is hostility, as he had heard it called, what, he asked, is condemnation? Besides, they have impressed American citizens into their service. We have reason to believe, (he concluded by remarking,) from the negotiation of our Minister with Lord Grenville, from private information on the tables of Congress, and from the conduct of some of their officers high in command, that to make war on us is part of their system.

Mr. S. Smith said he always had wished for peace, as the first desideratum. With this view, agreeably to the wise recommendation of the President, he agreed to those measures calculated to put the country in a posture of defence. This was the best mode of securing peace. With the same view, he proposed an embargo to be laid, which would have drawn to our ports the remainder of our maritime possessions, and have left them no longer within the grasp of a nation whose only rule of right is the measure of her power. He still wished, as long as a shadow of hope exists, to secure the blessings of peace. With the resolutions now offered, he was of opinion that we might yet have peace; but, without them, we shall certainly have war. They will arrest twenty millions of dollars in our hands, as a fund to reimburse the three or four millions which we have been stripped of by that piratical nation, Great Britain, according to the instructions of that king of sea robbers—that leviathan, which aims at swallowing all that floats on the ocean—that monster, whose only law is power, and who neither respects the rights of nations nor the property of individuals! This character the nation he had mentioned had long deserved. Many proofs might be cited in support of the assertion. He would only refer to their conduct at St. Eustatia, when they robbed their allies, the Dutch, and their generals and admirals turned vendue-masters, and conducted the plundering, to collect rewards for their exploits. Is it from such a nation (he asked) that we are to hope for justice? They know not what justice is. It is said that they showed their love of justice when they so liberally compensated the Tories after their war with us. Though they despise traitors, yet self-interest will lead them to reward the treachery, to encourage a principle which may again be useful to them. Self-interest, then, and not justice, actuated them on that as on every other occasion.

Let us pass the resolutions, then send an envoy to Great Britain, and we shall have peace. We shall then be able to speak to them of their interest. But if war should be the inevitable issue, Americans, he was sure, would meet it like men, rather than submit to insult and suffer the honor of the country to be prostrated.

If we were able, while in infancy as a nation, to assert our rights, will it be said, that, now we have arrived at a state of manhood, we shall fear them? No! our young men burn for an opportunity to defend the liberty, rights, and property of their country. They will step out as one, and meet the event like men.

He read a quotation from Vattel, to show that a nation has a right to pay her citizens for losses inflicted by another nation, contrary to right, by confiscating the property belonging to the citizens of that nation. The tie of interest, he concluded by remarking, is the strongest tie we have upon Great Britain. Let us pass the resolutions, and that nation will never again give us cause to pass similar ones. The people out of doors will say that we have done right. The nations of Europe will rejoice to see this power, which is committing depredations on all nations, humbled. The resolutions, he observed, do not regard the property in the funds. To touch this is not one of the means of retaliation warranted by the law of nations. Public contracts should be sacred.

Mr. Boudinot said, he had not intended to take part in the debate at this early stage of it; but what had fallen from the member last up, convinced him that the House should not go into a consideration of the subject at this time. It should be considered with coolness, and all passions put out of the question.

No doubt we have a right to make reprisals, as the Legislature has a right to declare war; but he doubted whether the United States, in their present situation, would find it their interest to go into such measures. The authority read from Vattel by the member last up, he observed, made against that member's opinion. Vattel expressly says that reprisals should not be made on property intrusted to public faith. The debts of British subjects here are in that predicament. He had heard that gentleman, not long since, with pleasure, expatiate with warmth on the advantages of credit, especially to this country. Should that credit be destroyed (he asked) by destroying the confidence of foreigners in our faith? But, even if this retaliation is lawful, will it be the interest of the citizens, or rather of the Government, to take such a step at the present time? We have no doubt been cruelly treated; but we have made proper application for redress, and received an answer? We should first send a special envoy and insist on an immediate answer. This would be the mode of securing peace; at least, it offers the best chance of securing it.

The aggressions on our commerce made by Great Britain are no doubt enough to rouse any American's feelings; but the Legislature ought not to be swayed by passions; they should discuss the subject calmly and deliberately. He hoped the committee would rise and allow time, at least, to take the necessary measures of defence; for, could the Legislature justify to their constituents this step of retaliation, should immediate hostilities, warlike hostilities, be the consequence? To justify a measure of this kind time should be given for the defensive system adopted to be carried into operation.

Mr. Mercer next spoke. He owned the measures proposed appeared to him great and momentous, and, had he any powers of declamation, he should think it improper to give loose to them on a question of this kind. We should weigh well our interest, examine carefully the situation in which we stand, and determine calmly where we shall place our next step. The proposition is, to arrest, not to confiscate, the debts due to British subjects. From his recollection of the positions established by the best jurisprudence writers, no doubt remained in his mind that we have a clear right to secure to ourselves reparation in that way, and, in our predicament, confiscation even would be warranted, and by a point as firmly established as any principle which has the general practice of nations for a basis.

One of the latest writers on national law (Binkershoek) is of opinion that debts are property, as well as any thing else, and sees no reason why they should not, as well as other kinds of property, be seized to secure indemnity for injuries. This is the opinion of Wolfius, of Vattel, Grotius, and of his commentators. He could go on with a long list of authorities, and refer to actual treaties to show that it has been the practice of nations. Having established the right, he proceeded to consider the expediency of the propositions. Gentlemen, he hoped, did not wish that we should make a solemn declaration of war before we acted. This is no longer the custom among nations. It would be a pompous display of candor which no longer exists. Have any nations in the present European war, premised their operations by a declaration? No; their first step was to do all the injury in their power to their enemies. Then, we having taken what steps will best tend to our security, and give us the best hold of our enemy, let us not, however, lose sight of a settlement by negotiation. Let us show mankind that peace is our first wish. When we are thus prepared, let us step forward to an amicable negotiation. Let us call on the Executive to send forward some proper person to the Court of Great Britain, to assure them that we have a high sense of the injury done us; that we have it in our power to resent it, but wish to see the difference settled by receiving an indemnification. We shall thus make it their interest as well as duty to allow it. This he conceived to be the line of conduct we should adopt if we wished to preserve the Western Hemisphere from the scourges that desolate the Old World. By some such measure as that proposed, we should make their motives for peace more weighty, and we should give assurances of our amicable disposition, by showing that all we wish is a just compensation.

In a matter of this kind he was sensible of the danger of precipitation. The best mode of arresting the property proposed should be calmly weighed. He believed that something like the proposition made by Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, before the House resolved itself into a committee—a stop to all transfers of British property—would be proper as a preliminary step.

He concluded with some observations on the respect which nations, however weak, will command from their superiors in strength, by showing that they will not suffer imposition, by joining heart and hand in defence of their rights. This spirit, he was sure, animates Americans, and now their power is better able to keep pace with that spirit than when we humbled that nation. At that time we were in our infancy—an infancy by no means thriving under the trammels of the mother country—and, when they turned us adrift, and began their hostile spoliations, they carried with them all our means of defence; but now, thank Providence, we have spirit and power to defend ourselves. If the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) would modify his proposition, and make the term thirty days, it should have his assent in preference to that now before the committee.

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) said, that the proposition he had read before the House went into committee was in the nature of an embargo on debts, securing them from transfer until the necessity of sequestering them more plainly appeared. The proposition did not then appear to meet the wishes of the House. When the committee should rise he would again bring it forward. The question now before the committee is, whether they will agree to a sequestration of British debts. He wished this object had not been coupled with the indemnification to our own citizens, because it is fairer to decide each question upon its own merits. That part of the resolutions which contemplates an indemnification may give a weight to the first part which it might not intrinsically deserve.

He made some observations on the propriety of cool deliberation on the present important subject. The passions should be banished, and calm reason more than ever courted. It requires all the wisdom of the Legislative body now to combine our national honor with our national safety. He had doubts on the propriety of the resolutions proposed, but acknowledged that the arguments used in their favor had great weight in his mind. If the situation of this country be compared with that of other commercial nations, the propriety of something like the present resolutions would appear more evident. When other commercial nations wish to quarrel with us, their navies enable them to seize our vessels, and we cannot retaliate in the same way. Then we must fly to such means of retaliation as are in our power. If they take our property of one description, and we cannot lay our hands upon the same kind, we must take any of theirs within our reach. This reasoning has, no doubt, great force; but the sacredness with which the modern usages of nations has shielded debts is a great bar to our proceeding in the present case. Contracts between individuals are now considered as out of the reach of governments, and it is the modern usage not to meddle with them. In the beginning of our late war, debts were not confiscated. The State of South Carolina, though certainly not wanting provocation, while confiscating all other property, left debts untouched, under the idea that private contracts are sacred. But this, in a case of war, and urgent necessity, might be overlooked; but if we are not in a state of war, perhaps meddling with private contracts might provoke it. Credit is certainly important to this country. We should consider how far the operation of the resolutions proposed would give a shock to it. Besides, they might have a tendency to involve us in future wars. We shall yet long be under the necessity of receiving certain supplies from Europe, and shall have debtors among us for those supplies. These debtors may at any time, when the burden weighs heavy, think of easing it by fomenting dissensions with the foreign creditor nation, in expectation that a confiscation of the debts may be an effect. It is true that, in such a case, they will not be exonerated. But it cannot be supposed that the government to whom the debts would be transferred could prosecute the recovery of them with as much ardor as an individual.

The gentleman last up had relied on the authority of ancient and foreign jurists. Some among this class of writers warrant putting prisoners to death—a principle which modern custom has put a stop to. They also, it is true, warrant the confiscation of debts; but Burlamaqui says this is not the practice of modern nations. None, or very few trifling examples can be cited, he believed, of a departure from this principle, in modern times, among nations where commerce is cherished. This country depends on commerce, and credit is one of the means by which it flourishes; we should, then, not endeavor to weaken it. If we are once over the barrier, by trifling extensions of the principle we may be carried to immoderate lengths, indeed. Some persons who are in favor of sequestering private debts, speak with horror of touching the public funds. For his part, he did not see much difference between confiscating private and public debts. The object is the injury of an enemy, and to retaliate for injuries. Again: if we go to war with Great Britain, it is probable we shall be involved with her allies, then will it be said, that we shall confiscate what the Dutch lent us at a time of distress or since the peace. The Dutch have bought largely in our funds. The same principle will lead us to lay our hands upon that property. It will be difficult to draw a line, if we admit the principle.

Under these impressions, if called upon to give his vote, he should now feel much embarrassment. It had been said that the adoption of the present resolutions would be a means of obliging Great Britain to do us justice; that it would strike a terror among the subjects of that country, and make them clamorous for peace. It might, he feared, have a very different effect exasperate them, and unite the people with the Government against us. Some further forbearance on our part may separate them. It will convince the people of Great Britain that we really wish for peace, and then, if war is the issue, the impression will be severely felt by that Government. We shall render the Administration very unpopular, and hasten its dismission for one more friendly to this country. He was of opinion this crisis was fast approaching.

He concluded by again adverting to his propositions for preventing the transfer of British debts, which he hoped would be considered as a sufficient provision in the present exigency, and would give time to deliberate on further measures, and to watch the course of events in Europe, which, he believed, would have great influence upon the conduct of Great Britain towards us, and probably bring forward the change in the Administration of Great Britain.

The committee now rose and reported progress.