Monday, December 12.
The following Message was received from the President of the United States.
Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives:
It is with great concern that I communicate to you the information received from Major General St. Clair, of the misfortune which has befallen the troops under his command.
Although the national loss is considerable, according to the scale of the event, yet it may be repaired without great difficulty, excepting as to the brave men who have fallen on the occasion, and who are a subject of public as well as private regret.
A farther communication will shortly be made of all such matters as shall be necessary to enable the Legislature to judge of the future measures which it may be proper to pursue.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
United States, December 12, 1791.
Friday, December 16.
The Post Office Bill.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the bill "for establishing the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States."
[The following is a condensed view of the arguments made on striking out the section which gives to members the privilege of franking.]
When the bill under consideration is once passed into a law, it is presumable that no gentleman will ever ask a member to frank for him, as he cannot grant the request consistently with his honor; the apprehension entertained of the existence of abuses, and of their increasing with the increase of numbers, would be an argument equally valid against every law; for no law can be framed, as that the people will not find means to evade it. But still the Legislature will have the power of correcting the abuses, as soon as discovered, by passing new laws to check them. The committee who drafted the bill, had before them all the acts of the British Legislature, respecting the post office; they saw the abuses and how they had been remedied; and with such light to guide their steps, they had proceeded in the execution of their task. The privilege of franking they had introduced into the bill, upon mature considerations; to take it away would be leveling a deadly stroke at the liberty of the press; the information conveyed by franks, may be considered as the vital juices, and the channels of the post office as the veins; and if these are stopped, the body must be destroyed; it is treading on dangerous ground, to take any measures that may stop the channels of public information, especially of that which relates to matters in which the people are interested; to check the circulation even of foreign intelligence may be dangerous; but it is highly so, to deprive the people of information respecting the measures of the General Government; nor ought the members to complain of being obliged to read so many letters and petitions as come to their hands in consequence of the exemption from postage. If any gentleman thought this a heavy task, he ought to remember that it was only his duty, and a task which every member had undertaken when he accepted a seat in the House.
The privilege of franking was granted to the members, not as a personal advantage, (for in fact it proved rather a burden), but as a benefit to their constituents, who, by means of it, derive information from those who are best qualified to give it, as they are the persons chosen to administer the General Government. The members also receive useful information through the same channel. When the impost law and the excise law were under consideration, many persons who were better acquainted with the operation of such laws, transmitted to the House much valuable information on those subjects; and to such information the House ought ever to be open; as, on the other hand, the motives for adopting certain measures, ought always to be explained to influential characters in the different parts of the Union. Such conduct will produce the most salutary effects in reconciling the people to the measures of Government, when the principles upon which every law is framed, are explained to them, as well by the correspondence of the members, as by their debates, published in the newspapers. It is the duty of the members to disperse the newspapers among those people who cannot, perhaps, otherwise obtain them, under the protection of franks. Even along the post roads, the common packets of newspapers are not safe from depredation; but when once they get into the interior parts of the country, there is hardly any chance of their escaping; whereas, under the cover of a frank, they are sure to reach their destination in safety.
If the privilege were confined, during the session, to letters sent from and received at the seat of Government, and the members limited to their own letters, and obliged to write the whole superscription, the increase of the apprehended abuses would be prevented; if it were further restricted, by limiting to those letters only what are sent to or come from the State to which the member belongs, this would convince the people, that the privilege was intended for the benefit, not of the members, but of their constituents.
Further, it was observed, that every argument, which might be adduced in favor of withdrawing the privilege from the members of Congress, might be used with equal force in the cases of President, Vice President, and every other public officer, mentioned in the same section. If the allowance of six dollars per day was a reason for subjecting the members to the payment of postage, every public officer ought also, on the same principle, to pay for his letters, as they were all compensated with equal liberality. If abuses were apprehended from the members, others were as likely to introduce them as they; if an increase of revenue was contemplated, the postage of all letters to and from the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of the Department of War, &c., would contribute to that increase; but, on the other hand, those gentlemen must have their compensations increased, if their letters were to be taxed; for they could not be expected to pay for them at their own expense. If the privilege can be guarded against abuse, with respect to those officers, it can also be guarded in the case of members of Congress.
The establishment of the post office is agreed to be for no other purpose than the conveyance of information into every part of the Union; and a greater portion of that had been conveyed into many of the interior parts of the country, by the newspapers sent by the members of the House, than could be conveyed by other means, excepting on the main roads on which stages go. That information had proved highly serviceable to the present Government; for wherever the newspapers had extended, or even the correspondence of the members, no opposition has been made to the laws; whereas, the contrary was experienced in those parts to which the information had not penetrated; and even there, the opposition ceased, as soon as the principles on which the laws had been passed, were made known to the people.
As long as the privilege can be thus used for the general advantages of the citizens, it ought not to be relinquished by the members merely through fear of its being thought a personal privilege; it might be confined to members actually attending the session; they might be obliged to write the whole superscription, and even to add the date. In short, the wisdom of the House, it was hoped, would prevent all the evils apprehended from it, and retain the advantages.
The question being taken on the motion, for withdrawing the privilege from the members, it passed in the negative; yeas 21, nays 35.
Tuesday, December 20.
Post Office Bill.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for establishing the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States.
Mr. Wadsworth moved an amendment, to withdraw the privilege of franking from the members of both Houses of Congress.
In support of this motion, it was said, that the grand security which the people of the United States have in their Representatives is, that those Representatives are subject to the same regulations as their constituents. In the article of postage, this was not the case. Congress, in this case, assume to themselves a privilege, which they refuse to the people; they took money from their constituents, and paid none themselves. The people viewed this privilege with a jealous eye, and could not be pleased to see it enjoyed by Congress, whilst neither the members of the State Assemblies, nor even the Governors were indulged in it. Congress enjoys only chartered rights; and all rights not expressly mentioned in the charter, are of course excluded. The constitution is their charter; the Convention, who framed it, had, no doubt, well considered the whole subject of privileges and accurately defined all such as they wished the Legislative body should enjoy distinct from their constituents. In the enumeration of those privileges, there is not a syllable tending to exonerate them from their share of the common burden of postage; they have no constitutional claim to such an immunity, and if they assumed it they would increase the burden on their constituents. The post office, if unable to maintain itself, must derive its support from other sources of revenue. Already the members of both Houses send and receive, during their session, as many letters through the General Post Office as all the other inhabitants of Philadelphia; those letters, if paid at the usual rates, would amount to half the postage of the United States. The number and bulk of the franked letters and packets excluded the newspapers from the mail, and thus prevented the circulation of intelligence; if the evil increased (and there was no probability of its being diminished, except by the utter abolition of the privilege) it would eventually prove the ruin of the post office. The example of Britain showed to what an enormous height the abuse of such a privilege may be carried; and though similar abuses may not as yet have taken place here, yet it could hardly be doubted that many unnecessary letters were daily sent by the post, which never would have been written if subject to postage; those letters are not only unproductive, but an actual expense to the post office, as the postmaster receives a certain percentage on these, as well as upon other letters. The privilege of franking is moreover unequal in its operation; while some members use it only for the purpose of transmitting political information to their constituents, others, absent perhaps during the whole session, use it for very different purposes: to men in trade it was a considerable advantage, amounting probably, in some instances, to a hundred dollars a year. It would be better to take away the privilege entirely, and reduce the general rates of postage one-half, or to allow the members, at the close of each session, to make a charge for all letters on public business, from their constituents, or to make them an allowance in gross to defray the expense of postage; better, even, if necessary, to make an addition to the compensation which the members receive for their services, if the present one be found incompetent to their honorable support.
On the other hand, it was observed, that the privilege of franking was not assumed by the members for their own private accommodation, but for the benefit of their constituents, to transmit to them every necessary information respecting the operations of the General Government, and to receive from them such information as they might have to communicate. Petitions are frequently enclosed to members; and if these were to be subject to the payment of postage, the privilege of petitioning the House, would be in a great measure destroyed. The diminution of revenue which the post office might in some instances suffer from the privilege of franking, ought not to be deemed a sufficient reason for abolishing that privilege; since it is allowed, that the object contemplated in the establishment was the general convenience, and an easy and speedy mode of disseminating public and private intelligence. Revenue was but a secondary consideration. Although the citizens who live at the seat of Government, and have daily opportunities of learning from the newspapers what public measures are going forward, may not be materially affected by the abrogation of the privilege, yet the case would be widely different with those who live at a distance, especially when fiscal operations were on foot; those who are informed, will make a prey of those who are ignorant, and destructive speculation will enrich the few, at the expense of the many. In a government of opinion (which is the Government of America) much greater reliance is to be placed on the confidence of the people than upon any other circumstance: that confidence can only be the result of the fullest information; but if the privilege of franking were taken away, the avenues of information would be, in a great measure, closed, for the members could not undertake, at their own private expense, to transmit intelligence to every part of the Union; yet the citizens have a right to expect information, not only of the acts of Government, but also the principles upon which they were grounded. The abuses of the privilege, that have prevailed in England, do not prevail here; and its abolition would give general dissatisfaction, particularly in the more distant parts of the Union, where information would be subject to a very high tax, if circulated through the post office, at the ordinary rates of postage. Of those bundles of letters received and dispatched by members of Congress, many (though far from being unnecessary, as had been said) would perhaps never be written, if they were not to pass free of postage; and thus that free communication of sentiment between the Representative and constituent, which is so essential in a Government like this, would be in a great measure cut off; and the post office would gain little or nothing by it, as those packets of newspapers, bills, reports, &c., would either be sent by private hand, or not sent at all; even here an inequality would prevail, as the people who live near the seat of Government, and all along the main road, could, from the greater frequency of opportunities, receive such packets with more ease and regularity, whilst those in more remote situations could seldom or never receive them, unless by the mail. The expense arising from the percentage to the postmaster on the free letters, is but trifling, as in such cases he receives no more for a packet of two ounces than for a single letter; and as to the idea of allowing the members to make a charge for their letters, this would be no better than receiving with one hand and paying away with the other. If, however, it were found absolutely necessary to take precautions against the abuses that were apprehended, this might be done by limiting the number or weight of letters that should go free by any one post, without entirely preventing the interchange of sentiments between the Representative and his constituents.
The committee then rose, without taking the question on the amendment.
Thursday, December 22.
Election of President, &c.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President, in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice President."
The bill was read by the Clerk. The first section being again read by the Chairman,
Mr. Tucker moved to amend this clause by striking out these words, "except in cases in which an extraordinary election of President and Vice President shall take place, as hereinafter specified." This motion was agreed to.
Mr. Sedgwick made some general observations on the great objects of the bill, and adverting to the term proposed for the choice of Electors of President and Vice President, observed that he had his doubts whether it would not be best to give a longer time. He enlarged on the disagreeable consequences which would probably ensue, in case there should not be a choice by the Electors; as the matter must then be determined by the House, voting according to the constitution, by States. He descanted on the pernicious consequences which might result from the collision of parties, and the working of passions in the breasts of men whose ardor would probably be excited to the greatest degree on such an occasion; every reasonable measure should be adopted to prevent the evils which he deprecated; he therefore moved that the words "thirty days" should be struck out, in order to give the people a longer time to give in their votes for Electors.
Mr. White objected to the motion. He conceived it was calculated to produce the very mischiefs the gentleman appeared to deprecate. If it had been possible, he could have wished that the Electors should meet and give in their votes on the very day of their being chosen; he wished as much as the gentleman to adopt measures to prevent the evils he mentioned; but did not think the motion would conduce to that object; he thought the time should rather be contracted than extended.
Mr. Dayton also objected to the motion; he thought fourteen days would be a more proper time; it was the design of the constitution, though it is not expressed, that the President should not know the characters to whom he is indebted for his election.
Mr. Sedgwick observed, that the objections would be very proper was it certainly known that the Electors would always agree in a choice; but this he conceived, it was hardly possible should always be the case; and what will then take place? The election devolves on this House, and the Electors will then be known, and liable to all that intrigue and cabal which has prevailed in other countries. He left it to the consideration of the committee to determine on the immense importance of providing in season against the evils of a contested election, in the case now before them.
Mr. Baldwin objected to the motion; but said if it was struck out, he should then move to insert a clause which should assign different periods according to the circumstances of the several States, so that the Electors should meet as nearly as possible at the same time in all the States.
Mr. Niles objected to the motion; and the question being put it was negatived.
The clause which makes it the duty of the Executive of the several States to cause the names of the Electors to be certified, was objected to.
Mr. Niles observed that no person could be called upon to discharge any duty on behalf of the United States, who had not accepted of an appointment under their authority. He thought that this was opening the door too wide, and involves a blending of the respective powers and duties of each, which is not warranted by the constitution; and he observed that he should be sorry that the Government of the United States should attempt to exercise a power which they are not competent to carry into execution. He moved that the clause should be struck out.
Mr. Sedgwick observed that if Congress were not authorized to call on the Executives of the several States, he could not conceive what description of persons they were empowered to call upon.
Mr. Niles said he considered this section as degrading to the Executive of the several States; and inquired, what is to be done in case those Executives should refuse to comply with the requisition?
Mr. Clark said, it appeared to him that the committee was creating difficulties where none before existed. He observed that the choosing these Electors was a privilege conferred on the people, and that this was merely pointing out the mode of exercising this privilege; he thought the clause stood very well and would create no uneasiness whatever.
Mr. Hillhouse said, he considered the provision improper. It imposed a duty on the Supreme Executives of the several States, which they might or might not execute; and thus the necessary certificates may not be made. He seconded the motion to strike out the clause, and proposed a substitute making it the duty of the Electors to procure for themselves the necessary certificates.
Mr. Livermore spoke in favor of the clause; he did not consider it either as an undue assumption of power, or degrading to the Executives of the respective States.
Mr. Barnwell said, a small addition to the clause would in his opinion obviate every difficulty; the words he proposed to insert were—"or such person as the Executive may appoint."
Mr. Sturges moved to strike out "Executive," and insert "the Legislature."
Mr. J. Smith said, it appeared to him that the proposed alteration would amount to exactly the same thing; for the duty of giving the certificate would eventually devolve on the Executive.
The motion for striking out the clause was negatived.
The ninth section provides, that in case of vacancies in the offices of President and Vice President, the President of the Senate pro tem., or the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President.
Mr. White moved the section should be struck out. He said the House had formerly discussed the subject and could not agree; the first part of the bill is necessary; this is not of immediate importance to be attended to.
Mr. Fitzsimons said, he supposed the question must be determined some time or other, and he knew of no reason why it should not be decided at this time; to strike out the clause would, in effect, be to declare that the House could not agree.
Mr. Williamson was in favor of striking out.
Mr. Livermore objected to the motion; he said no two subjects could possibly be more intimately connected; and the provisions of the bill are such as to render the intermission, during which this regency was to take place, as short as possible; he hoped the clause would not be stricken out.
Mr. White added some further objections to the section; he said it was distinct from the bill, and though a majority of the committee were in favor of the characters nominated, yet he thought it would be best to make it the object of another bill, and of an independent discussion.
Mr. Sedgwick said, he hoped the section would not be struck out, especially if there is a majority of the committee in favor of it. He observed, that last session there was no decision in the case; he conceived it necessary that the business should be now decided on; and adverting to the particular characters named, he said they were as far removed from any influence of the Executive as any persons that could be possibly pointed out.
Mr. Barnwell was in favor of going into a discussion of the subject at this time. He said there was a large number of the present House who had not heard the observations offered in the last Congress; he supposed the present as proper a time to consider the subject as any that could occur. If gentlemen who are opposed to the section will offer their objections, he should be glad to hear them; if they were conclusive, he should vote to strike out the section. If nothing was offered, he should vote against the motion.
Mr. Sturges mentioned several objections to the section, which in his opinion rendered it unconstitutional; he could not find that the Speaker of the House, or President of the Senate pro tem. were officers of the Government in the sense contemplated by the constitution. The compensations of the President and Vice President are settled by the House; the Speaker would have to decide on those compensations; this he said rendered him evidently improper. He further observed that the consequence would be caballing and electioneering in the choice of Speaker.
Mr. White said, the Speaker was not a permanent officer, if he could be considered as one in any point of view; but he was of opinion, that he was no more an officer of the Government than every other member of the House.
The question for striking out the section was negatived.
Mr. Sturges then moved to strike out the words, "the President of the Senate pro tempore, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives."
Mr. Giles stated the reasons which he conceived fully proved the unconstitutionality of the clause. The characters referred to he did not think were officers. If they had been considered as such, it is probable they would have been designated in the constitution; the constitution refers to some permanent officer to be created pursuant to the provisions therein contained. These persons are not permanent; a permanent officer was contemplated; the subject was not to be left to any casuality, if it could possibly be prevented.
Mr. Sedgwick said, he did not know what officer could with propriety be said to be permanent; offices are held during good behavior in some instances, and in others during pleasure; but it will be impossible to say that any officer is a permanent officer, for the expression is very extensive. He was surprised to hear the idea controverted, that the Speaker of the House, or the President of the Senate pro tem., is not an officer. In common parlance he was sure there was no difficulty in the matter.
Mr. Gerry observed, that some gentleman had said the Speaker is not an officer; but if he is not an officer, what is he? He then read a clause from the constitution, which says that the House shall choose their Speaker and other officers. He hoped, however, that the Speaker of the House of Representatives would be struck out, in order to avoid blending the Legislative and Executive branches together. He considered this measure as a political stroke of the Senate; but he hoped that the House would never consent to making their Speaker an amphibious animal. He moved therefore that the words "Speaker of the House of Representatives" should be struck out.
Mr. Hillhouse objected to any officer appointed by the Executive being inserted. He said, if that should be the case, the appointments would in most cases be made with reference to that object; and hence important offices would often be filled with improper and incompetent persons. Besides, it was taking away the choice from the people, and thus violating the first principle of a free elective Government. The Senate are appointed by the people, or their Representatives, and hence, in his opinion, filling the vacancy would devolve with the greatest propriety on that body.
Mr. Williamson was in favor of the motion for striking out both the characters. He observed, that this extensive construction of the meaning of the word officer, would render it proper to point out any person in the United States, whether connected with the Government or not, as a proper person to fill the vacancy contemplated.
Before taking the question upon the amendment, the committee rose.