Monday, November 14.
A petition of James Jackson, of the State of Georgia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of the undue election and return of Anthony Wayne, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State.
Ratio of Representation.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.
Mr. Findlay declared himself to be in favor of one Representative for every thirty thousand persons. The opinion of the people should be the guide of the committee; that opinion, he conceived, to be in favor of the ratio he had mentioned.
The representation ought as nearly as possible to express not only the will, but to participate in the wishes and interests of the people. A large representation embraces these interests more fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as come home to the doors, to the feelings of every man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of the people by a large representation. The expense he considered as trifling compared to the benefits—and the people expect and are willing to pay for being well governed, and having their liberties secured. An increased representation is an additional security against corruption. As to delays occasioned by a numerous body, he observed that the Representatives were chosen to deliberate and to mature every subject before decision; he instanced the advantages derived from the numerous representations in France and in Ireland; the former had framed a constitution in two years for twenty-six millions of citizens, and provided for securing the liberties of their country—and the latter had proved a successful barrier against the encroachments of the arbitrary power of England. He concluded, by asserting that the voice of the people was in favor of the amendment proposed to the constitution, which would give one Representative to every thirty thousand persons.
Mr. Giles said this subject had struck him in two points of view: whether Congress are not precluded from exercising any discretion on the subject? and whether, if they are not, it is expedient for them to exercise this discretion at this time? The ratio of representation is a constitutional, and not a Legislative act. He referred to the constitution, in which it is said that there shall be one Representative to every State; and, secondly, that until the enumeration, the number should be as therein appointed to each State. After the enumeration, the number is mentioned below which it shall not be placed; but there is a negative power to increase the ratio, and from this negative power, a positive discretionary power is inferred. But, he observed that Congress had precluded itself from a right to exercise this discretionary power, by sending out to the several State Legislatures an amendment on this very subject. This amendment he considered in a serious point of view; and had this idea been attended to at the commencement of the discussion, he conceived that it would have prevented the opinion from being brought forward whether it was expedient that any change in the ratio of the representation should take place. The idea of one to thirty thousand, he considered as fully settled in the minds of the people; and a change on the part of the Government would indicate a changeable disposition, and a mutability of counsels, which is but another name for weakness.
Mr. G. then took a view of the objects of legislation to the State Assemblies, and of those of the General Government. In the former, above one thousand persons are employed, though their attention is confined to their internal police. Those of the General Government, on the other hand, are on the great objects of the whole finance of the Union, a sum of more than eighty millions of dollars, &c., &c.
It is said that we shall want abilities, but I should be sorry if a representation of ten times the present number of this House should comprise the abilities of a single State.
He assigned different causes than numbers, for the corruption in the British House of Commons; among these were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the Executive, the mode of their elections, &c. A large number is not so easily corrupted as a small body.
An inequality of circumstances, he then observed, produces revolutions in Government, from Democracy to Aristocracy and Monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions in property in this country have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality; the Bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this moneyed interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this House. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this moneyed interest. He next adverted to certain ideas which he said had been disseminated through the United States; and here he took occasion to observe, that the Legislature ought to express some public disapprobation of these opinions. The strong Executive of this Government ought to be balanced by a full representation in this House. He hoped the motion to strike out thirty thousand would not obtain.
Mr. Boudinot closed the debate of this day by a few remarks, reinforcing his former observations in favor of an increased ratio.
Tuesday, November 15.
Ratio of Representation.
The House again resolved itself into a committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.
Mr. Page addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I can no longer refrain from expressing my sentiments respecting the question before the committee; not only because I wish if possible to remove the error which I think several members, for whom I have the highest respect, have fallen into, but because I feel myself more interested in the question than I ever was in any one I have had to decide on.
Sir, it gave me pain to find those worthy members calculating and coldly applying the rules of arithmetic to a subject beyond the power of numbers to express the degree of its importance to their fellow-citizens. I was distressed, sir, to find that, in their honest zeal for securing order, despatch of business, and dignity in respectability of members in the General Legislature, they used arguments which have been applied in other countries to the establishment of insolent aristocracies—in some, tyrannical despotisms—and in others, kings; those countries which were most on their guard with a semblance of a free Government.
Sir, the errors I wish to correct are these. They think that because it is proposed, by a proposed amendment to the constitution, to authorize them to interfere in the business of ascertaining and fixing the ratio of representation to the population of the States, that Congress ought, without any hesitation, to enter on that business; but I humbly conceive that Congress, as this is a delicate question in which their own weight and importance must unite with the weight and substantial interest of their constituents, ought to listen to the suggestions of delicacy, and leave its discussion to a disinterested convention of the States. I say it appears to me no small error to quit the plain path of legislation, marked out for us by the constitution, needlessly to wander into the field of political speculation respecting its supposed defects.
Let me, therefore, advise to leave the restriction of the numbers of members of this House to the people, or to some future Congress, which can see more plainly than can now be descried, the evils of a too numerous representation. By so doing, we shall avoid, if not an improper measure, at least a rash step—at least we shall stand clear of a charge of indelicacy, and deprive our enemies of the triumph they expected in the completion of their predictions, that Congress would never propose any amendments to the constitution but such as would be subservient to their own views and aggrandizement. Let us not give the enemies of our new Government cause to exult, and its friends to sigh and mourn. Let us not give our friends occasion to repeat what many have said, that so many of our citizens have been led away by theoretical writers on government, as to render it problematical whether the American States are not at this time as much indebted to the National Assembly for its remains of Republican principles, as France was to Congress, in 1776, for their first ideas of that liberty which they now enjoy. Let us not, in this moment of general exultation of the friends to the rights of man, take a step which may damp their joy, and lead them to fear that Americans, who were foremost in the glorious career of liberty, have stopped short.
But, not to take up the precious time of this House with relations of facts to show what was and is the opinion of our fellow-citizens on this interesting subject, I will only state a few arguments which have weight with me as being in themselves evident truths, viz: Our constitution being framed by the people, and introduced to us in their name, and Congress being the creatures of their will, spoken into existence by the word of their power, for Congress to lessen their weight, to diminish their importance, and to exclude them from as full a share in their own Government as can be consistent with the nature of it, and indeed from that share which they claim, must be impolitic and dangerous.
But, granting that the people wished not a greater share in the General Government than is proposed by the amendment, as it is impossible, in a country like the United States, that one man can be sufficiently informed of the opinions, wishes, and real interests of thirty-five thousand of his fellow-citizens, and therefore laws might be enacted contrary to the opinions, wishes, and interests of the people, in which they might nevertheless acquiesce, sacrificing their interests for the sake of peace and quiet to the wills of their Representatives, one thirty-five-thousandth part of their own number, what friend to his country would wish to see such a dangerous influence on the one hand, and such a blind submission on the other? How long could an enlightened people remain in such a state of insensibility and torpor? And what might not be the consequence of their awakening from their lethargy? If not an expensive revolution, an expensive repeal of laws. And here I will remark, that the smallest number of Legislators, and they, too, well selected for their wisdom and respectability, if unacquainted with their constituents, might pass well-framed laws, founded on the wisdom of other countries, and yet find them disagreeable to their constituents, and be under a necessity of repealing them; but this could not be the case, if the people had in that Legislature a sufficient number of Representatives on whose fidelity, attachment, and disinterestedness they could rely. This, sir, is a truth worthy of our attention—an ignorance of which, or inattention thereto, I suspect has been the occasion of much political evil in the world. Happily for France, the people had such a number of Representatives in the National Assembly as could engage their feeling, inform their judgment, attach their interest, and establish their confidence in their fidelity and disinterestedness; had that number been much smaller, it is probable France would never have been delivered from oppression by their exertions.
I know, sir, that many friends of our constitution thought that the convention did not pay a sufficient attention to the interests of their constituents, when they restrained them from having more than one Representative for every thirty thousand citizens. I know that there is a report that the people are indebted to their President, even for this share in their Government; and I believe, sir, if this report be true, that whatever has been so justly said of him, as compared to Fabius, to Hannibal, to Alexander, may be forgotten, when this instance of his wisdom, disinterestedness, and attachment to the interests of his fellow-citizens, will be more and more known and applauded, and be for ever engraved on the hearts of their posterity. Shall we, then, Mr. Chairman, the direct Representatives of the people, be less attentive to their interest, and that too respecting their share in the deliberations of their own House of Representatives, than the President of their convention was? I trust not.
I will not pretend to say, however, whether in an Assembly where attempts are frequently made to carry into effect the projects of monarchical or aristocratical juntos, the virtuous struggles of patriotic members may not produce mob-like disorders; but in an Assembly like Congress, where I should suppose no such question can be agitated; none which may not be discussed with temper and decency, such disorder need not be apprehended. I should suppose there would be less clanger of animosities and disorderly debates in Congress, amongst twelve hundred members, than in the British Parliament, if it consisted but of one hundred. Where we have all but one and the same great object in view, the happiness of our country, (not the interests of a particular body of men born with privileges insulting to the feelings and rights of freemen, nor the whims of an individual, born to trample on his fellow-creatures,) we can have no cause to be dissatisfied with one another.
Surely, sir, unless these gentlemen suppose the members of Congress void of sense, or of every idea of decency and propriety, they cannot suppose that even five hundred members would not be easily restrained within the bounds of order.
Mr. Clark said, he did not rise to trouble the House with a lengthy discourse, for he had always believed that long speeches answer no valuable purpose. He meant only to offer a few remarks on what had been said in opposition to his former observations, and he hoped that, although the gentlemen contend for the ratio of 30,000 as the only basis whereon to found the liberties of the people, he should not be stigmatized with the name of an aristocrat for voting in favor of a large ratio. Hitherto he had not borne that character, and he could not suppose himself yet infected, unless he had caught the disorder since he became a member of the present House. Much has been said about the influence of the bank, and that bank directors are members of the House of Representatives. The bank (said he) is public property, and therefore he could not see the force of the gentleman's arguments respecting the dangerous influence of that institution, unless it was that he was displeased at the distribution of the shares, so much of the stock being held at New York and to the eastward, and so little at Conococheague. In the same predicament he viewed the other objections respecting the influence of speculators; for he did not know that any members of the House were speculators, neither could he see any danger from bribery.
In reply to Mr. Findlay's observation, that more wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the ratio, he asked whether this would not also bring in more folly? For the probability is, that the ratio of both wisdom and folly will increase with the increase of numbers, and likewise of honesty and dishonesty; and with respect to the smallness of the district, or that it was safer for a small number to send a member than a greater, he was of a different opinion, as he believed that if ever the practice of bribery should come into play in America, it would be easier for a Representative to purchase a small district than a large one. If ever the liberties of the people are endangered, it will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is the door which Congress should guard in the strictest manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.
A gentleman from Georgia has observed, that the disposition of a great many millions of dollars has been in the hands of a quorum of this House, of whom it requires only seventeen to form a majority. On this Mr. C. observed, that the old Congress, which was composed of a much smaller number, were intrusted with the disposal of larger sums, although there were sometimes only two members from the largest State, Virginia, and no complaints were heard of their conduct.
But there is an argument which ought to have weight in the present question. The Senate, although a much smaller body than this House, are fully competent to judge of our proceedings, and of the safety of the country. Indeed, (said Mr. C.,) it appears very evident to me that we are not in want of a larger number in the House of Representatives to debate any question, if it be considered how much has already been said on the subject now before us.
Mr. Vining expressed much surprise that the subject, which to him appeared perfectly definable, should have occasioned the debate to travel so widely from the line marked out by the constitution. The pendulum seems to vibrate between the numbers 81, 96, and 113; and should that pendulum rest on any one of them in preference to the others, he could not suppose that it would affect the liberties of America. Why, therefore, all this extraneous argument about a point of so easy decision? We are sent here to administer the Government, the first principles of which are already fixed, so that neither branch can encroach on the other. The Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, have each defined powers; and whilst those remain, I shall always believe the liberties of America are invulnerable.
Under this impression, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for striking out 30,000, in order to accommodate the question to a medium. But I shall do this on different principles from some other gentlemen; notwithstanding, I at the same time confess that the ratification of the first amendment to the constitution ought to govern us in deciding this question. The spirit of the amendment appears to me clearly to imply that we should not suffer the number of Representatives to exceed one for 30,000. I am here, not as a person who shall exercise discretionary opinions, but judge by the letter of the constitution. And in this case we may increase the number, but we cannot make it less after the enumeration. In the mean time, until that enumeration is complete, the representation remains as it has been hitherto, which I believe may be about one member to every 40,000 or 41,000.
If we go upon theory only, I would enlarge the representation to its greatest extent, and hand down the principle to futurity, in letters of gold, that a very great representation—that Democracy is the very best Government that can possibly be devised, provided it were practicable to give it stability. Next to a government as free as theory could extend, we have the freest in the world—a Government of representation, which will increase with the population of the country, and the ten new States will always preserve an equilibrium; but if you increase it to an extreme, you may render it tumultuous, although it may be safe.
I cannot, however, see the propriety of comparing this to the Government of Great Britain, although that is called a Government of Representation, consisting of two Houses of Parliament, one of which is elective, the Lords are hereditary, and the King can do no wrong; and it has hitherto been, I believe, the next best Government, after our own, in the world. And yet we know with how much reluctance Ireland obtained a participation of the trade and commerce of Great Britain; although a Flood bellowed forth with the voice of liberty like a Demosthenes, still nothing could induce the British Ministry to give way, until the volunteers effected it. And have we not the volunteers, sir, in this country to protect our rights? Yes, sir, the American volunteers are perfectly competent to this service.
I am under no apprehensions from the stockholders of the bank, or the speculators in the funds; for it is their interest to have a wise and good representation. The people who are employed in the more simple path of agriculture, removed at a great distance, are not more interested in the security of the Government than the more informed stockholder. As an example of the discernment of the great commercial people of London and Bristol, I need only mention their choice of a Fox and a Burke, for until a late day Mr. Burke was the champion of the people and the friend of liberty.
If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.
Mr. Hillhouse said he had ever been a friend to a Republican form of Government, and God forbid, that he should ever give his vote for any measure that should endanger the liberties of his country. He was in favor of an energetic government, as that alone can secure the blessings of liberty. As to the dread of corruption in this House, which some gentlemen appeared to entertain, he thought there was no foundation for such an apprehension; at least as the idea refers to one or two hundred Representatives—two hundred he contended, were as easily corrupted as one. But the corruption contemplated was a mere matter of opinion; no facts, he presumed, existed in this country to justify a positive assertion; and as to foreign countries, it seems to be conceded that a larger number than any that has been mentioned is susceptible of undue influence. He then adverted to the restrictions on the President of the United States, and the Senate, in respect to the means of corrupting the Legislature. The constitution has also made provision to secure the independence of the members, &c. He then urged some difficulties which would be occasioned by a small ratio. He observed that the population of some of the States is nearly stationary: if a small ratio is now established, the consequence will be, when it is augmented, that the representation of those States must be diminished. This would be a measure that would be greatly disliked. With respect to the proposed amendment, he thought it was entirely out of the question, till it was ratified by three-fourths of the States. A very numerous representation would tend to weaken, if not destroy the State Governments, and, in the issue, would destroy the General Government. For, said he, they mutually depend on each other for support.
Mr. Kitchell was in favor of a numerous representation. He thought the amendment proposed to the constitution ought to be the guide to the House on this occasion. He did not draw his ideas of what should constitute a proper representation, from the examples cited from foreign countries; nor was he actuated by an apprehension of corruption, as more applicable to a small number than to a large one; but when he considered the various objects, views, denominations, professions, callings and interests of the citizens of the United States, he was fully convinced that a large representation was necessary to embrace the wishes and answer the expectations of the people. He should, therefore, vote against the motion for striking out thirty thousand.
Mr. Gerry took a general survey of the arguments against the proposed ratio of one to thirty thousand. In noticing the objection from the instability of the State Legislatures, he said it was not owing to their numbers, but to the mode in which they are elected. Were the Senates and Executives of the several States chosen as those of the General Government, there would have been as much stability and consistency in their transactions, as in those of the Government of the Union. A gentleman had said that the proposed amendments to the constitution had been adopted with reluctance by some of the States which had accepted them. He called on the gentleman to produce his authorities for this assertion. A relative proportion between the members of the House and the Senate had been suggested; this idea had no foundation in the constitution. And he further observed, that the constitution has so completely guarded and secured the rights and independence of the Senate, that he could not conceive of the apprehensions of gentlemen, who appear to think that an increase of the members of this House will overwhelm that branch of the Legislature. In all events, the privileges of that body will remain the same. The States, it is said, have reduced their Representative Assemblies. This, so far from being an argument against the proposed ratio, was directly in favor of it. The diminution of the State Legislatures has been occasioned by the idea which the people entertain of the increasing importance of the General Government. The objects of legislation to both Governments are nearly similar; they relate to those important concerns which interest the feelings of every citizen of the United States; all the difference lies in the magnitude of their respective spheres of action. Hence, it must evidently be the wish and expectation of the people, that their interests in every point of view, should be fully and adequately represented in this House.
The resolution being again read, in the following words:
"Resolved, That the number of Representatives shall, until the next enumeration, be one for thirty thousand."
The question was taken thereupon and agreed to by the House; yeas 35, nays 23, as follows:
Yeas.—Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, John Brown, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Daniel Heister, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, and Francis Willis.
Nays.—Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Robert Barnwell, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, James Hillhouse, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, George Thatcher, John Vining, and Artemas Ward.
Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Page, Mr. Murray, and Mr. Macon do prepare and bring in the same.