Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

RECAPITULATION.

Yeas in the House,	57
Yeas absent,	6—63
Nays in the House,	35
Mr. Sitgreaves absent (probably
against the resolution)	1—36
	—
Majority for the resolutions,	27[75]
Absent on leave,	4
Mr. Duvall, resigned,	1
The Speaker,	1
	——
Whole number of members,	105

Friday, April 15.

The Treaty with Great Britain.

The House then resolved itself into a committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, when, having read the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect—

Mr. Buck rose, and wished the question to be taken upon Mr. Maclay's resolution.[76] This was opposed by Mr. Madison and Mr. Hillhouse, and then Mr. Madison addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. M. said, on a subject of such extent and importance, he should not attempt to go through all the observations that might be applicable to it. A general view of the subject was all that he meant at present. His omissions would be more than supplied by others who might enter into the discussion.

The proposition immediately before the committee was, that the Treaty with Great Britain ought to be carried into effect by such provisions as depended on the House of Representatives. This was the point immediately in question. But it would be proper in examining it to keep in view also the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Maclay) which had been referred to the committee, and which would be taken up, of course, if the immediate question should be decided in the negative.

If the proposition for carrying the Treaty into effect be agreed to, it must be from one of three considerations: either that the Legislature is bound by a constitutional necessity to pass the requisite laws without examining the merits of the Treaty, or that, on such examination, the Treaty is deemed in itself a good one, or that there are good extraneous reasons for putting it into force, although it be in itself a good one, or that there are good extraneous reasons for putting it into force, although it be in itself a bad Treaty.

The first consideration being excluded by the decision of the House, that they have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of passing laws relative to Treaties; the question first to be examined must relate to the merits of the Treaty. He then proceeded to consider the Treaty under three aspects: first, as it related to the execution of the Treaty of Peace in 1783; secondly, as it determines the several points in the law of nations; thirdly, as it respects the commerce between the two nations.

First. He would not inquire on which side the blame lay, of having first violated the Treaty of 1783, or of having most contributed to delay its execution, although he did not shrink from the task under any apprehension that the result could be disadvantageous to this country. The Treaty itself had waived this inquiry, and professed to adjust all controversies on this subject, without regard to the mutual complaints or pretensions of the parties. It was, therefore, justly and naturally to be expected, that the arrangements for carrying that Treaty into effect would have been founded in the most exact and scrupulous reciprocity. Was this the case? He was sorry, that on the contrary, the arrangements were founded on the grossest violation of that principle.

There were two articles which had not been executed by Great Britain; that which related to the negroes and other property carried away, and that which required a surrender of the posts. The article unexecuted by the United States was, that which required payment of all bona fide debts, according to the Treaty now in question: this article is now to be carried into the most complete effect by the United States, and damages to the last fraction are to be paid for the delay. Is there a reciprocal stipulation by Great Britain with respect to the articles unexecuted by her? Nothing like it. She is wholly absolved from the obligation to fulfil one of the articles, viz: that relating to the negroes, &c., and she is to make no compensation whatever for delaying to fulfil the other, viz: the surrender of the posts.

It has been urged in apology for those very unequal stipulations, that the injury resulting from a forbearance to surrender the posts, was not susceptible of any precise liquidation into pecuniary damages. However plausible this might appear, it was by no means satisfactory. Commissioners, such as were appointed, with full discretion for other purposes, might have been charged with this subject, and if they could not have done exact justice, might have mitigated the injustice of doing nothing.

Apologies have been attempted also for the very extraordinary abandonment of the compensation due for the negroes, &c. It was said to be at least doubtful whether this claim was authorized by the seventh article of the Treaty of Peace, and that Great Britain had uniformly denied the meaning put by the United States on that article. In reply he made two remarks. First, that it was not true that Great Britain had uniformly denied the American construction of that article; on the contrary, he believed, it could be proved, that till of late, Great Britain had uniformly admitted this construction, and had rejected the claim on no other ground than the alleged violation of the fourth article on the part of the United States.

But had it been true that Great Britain had uniformly asserted a different construction of the article, and refused to accede to ours, what ought to have been done? Ought we to have at once acceded to hers? By no means. Each party had an equal right to interpret the compact; and if they could not agree, they ought to have done in this what they did in other cases where they could not agree; that is, have referred the settlement of the meaning of the compact to an arbitration. To give up the claim altogether, was to admit, either that Great Britain had a better right than the United States to explain the controverted point, or that the United States had done something which in justice called for a sacrifice of their equal right.

It was evident, he thought, from this view of the subject, that the arrangements with respect to the Treaty of Peace were frequently wanting both in justice and reciprocity.

Besides the omissions in favor of Great Britain, already pointed out with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Peace, he observed, that conditions were annexed to the partial execution of it in the surrender of the Western posts, which increased the general inequality of this part of the Treaty, and essentially affected the value of those objects.

The value of the posts to the United States was to be estimated by their influence, 1st. on the Indian trade; 2d. on the conduct and temper of the Indians towards the United States.

Their influence on the Indian trade depended principally on the exclusive command they gave to the several carrying places connected with the posts. These places were understood to be of such importance in this respect, that those who possessed them exclusively would have a monopoly, or nearly a monopoly, of the lucrative intercourse with a great part of the savage nations. Great Britain having hitherto possessed these places exclusively, has possessed this advantage. It was expected that the exclusive transfer of them would transfer the advantage to the United States. By the Treaty now concluded, the carrying places are to be enjoyed in common, and it will be determined by the respective advantages under which British and American traders will engage in the trade, which of them is to share most in it. In this point of view he thought the regulation highly impolitic and injurious. He would say little of the advantage which the British would have in their superior capital: that must be encountered in all our commercial rivalships. But there was another consideration which ought to have great weight on this subject. The goods imported for the Indian trade through Canada pay no duties. Those imported through the United States for that trade, will have paid duties from seven to ten per cent., and every one must see that a drawback is impracticable, or would be attended with an expense which the business would not bear. So far, then, as the importance of the posts is to be considered in a commercial view, they are, in a very great measure, stripped of it by the condition annexed to the surrender of them. Instead of a monopoly in our favor, the carrying places are made common under circumstances which may leave a monopoly in the hands of Great Britain. And this is done, too, by an article which is to last for ever.

Second. The influence of the posts on the general conduct of the Indians, is well known to depend chiefly on their influence on the Indian trade. In proportion, therefore, as the condition annexed to the surrender of posts affects the one, it must affect the other. If the British should continue to enjoy the Indian trade, they would continue to influence the Indian conduct; if not in the same degree as heretofore, at least in so great a degree as to condemn the article in question.

He took notice also of the inequality of the stipulation which opened all the ports of the United States, as the condition of having those of an unimportant province of Great Britain opened in return.

With respect to the Mississippi he could not but consider the clause relating to it as being singularly reprehensible. Happily the adjustment of our claims with Spain had been brought about before any evil operation of the clause had been experienced. But the tendency of it, he thought, could not be doubted. It was the more remarkable, that this extension of the privileges of Great Britain on the Mississippi beyond those in the Treaty of Peace, should have been admitted into the new Treaty, because it is supposed by the Treaty itself, that Great Britain may be deprived, by her real boundary, of all pretensions to a share in the banks and waters of the Mississippi.

Secondly. With respect to the great points in the law of nations, comprehended in the stipulations of the Treaty, the same want of real reciprocity, and the same sacrifice of the interests of the United States, were conspicuous.

It was well known to have been a great and favorite object with the United States, "that free ships make free goods." They have established this principle in all their other Treaties. They have witnessed with anxiety the general effort, and the successful advances towards incorporating this principle into the law of nations; a principle friendly to all neutral nations, and particularly interesting to the United States. He knew that at a former period it had been conceded on the part of the United States that the law of nations stood as the present Treaty regulates it. But it did not follow that more than acquiescence in that doctrine was proper. There was an evident distinction between silently acquiescing in it, and giving it the support of a formal and positive stipulation. The former was all that could have been required, and the latter was more than ought to have been unnecessarily yielded.

The article prohibiting sequestration was next considered by Mr. M. He said he should probably be among the last who would be disposed to resort to such an expedient for redress. But he could not approve of a perpetual and irrecoverable abandonment of a defensive weapon, the existence of which might render the use of it unnecessary. The situation of this country in relation to Great Britain was a peculiar one. As we had not fleets and armies to command a respect for our rights, we ought to keep in our hands all such means as our situation gave us. This article was another instance in which no regard was paid to reciprocity. British subjects, it was well known, had and were likely to have in this country a great deal of the property of the King made sacred. American citizens, it was as well known, had little, and were likely to have little of the kind in Great Britain. If a real reciprocity had been intended, why were not other kinds of private property, as vessels and their cargoes, equally protected against violation? These, even within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, are left open to seizure and sequestration, if Great Britain finds it expedient. And why was not property on the high seas under the protection of the law of nations, which is said to be a part of the law of the land, made secure by a like stipulation? This would have given a face of equality and reciprocity to the bargain. But nothing of the sort makes a part of it; where Great Britain had a particular interest at stake, the Treaty watchfully provides for it; when the United States have an equal interest at stake and equally entitled to protection, it is abandoned to all the dangers which it has experienced.

After taking this brief notice of the positive evils in this part of the Treaty, he might, he said, add the various omissions which were chargeable on it. But as he should not pretend to exhaust the subject, he would mention one only: the not providing for the respect due to the exhibition of sea papers. He could not but regard this omission as truly extraordinary, when he observed that in almost every modern Treaty, and particularly all our other Treaties, an article on this subject was regularly inserted. Indeed, it had become almost an article of course in the Treaties of the present century.

Thirdly. The commercial articles of the Treaty presented the third aspect under which he was to consider it. In the free intercourse stipulated between the United States and Great Britain, it could not be pretended that any advantage was gained by the former. A Treaty was surely not necessary to induce Great Britain to receive our raw materials and to sell us her manufactures. On the other hand, consider what was given up by the United States.

When the Government came into operation, it is well known that the American tonnage employed in the British trade bore the most inconsiderable proportion to the British tonnage. There being nothing on our side to contract the influence of capital and other circumstances on the British side, that disproportion was the natural state of things. As some balance to the British advantages, and particularly that of her capital, our laws had made several regulations in favor of our shipping, among which was the important encouragement resulting from the difference of ten per cent. in the duties paid by American and foreign vessels. Under this encouragement the American tonnage has increased in a very respectable proportion to the British tonnage. Nor has Great Britain ever deemed it prudent to attempt any countervailing measures for her shipping, well knowing that we could easily keep up the differences by further measures on our side. But by the Treaty, she has reserved to herself the right to take such countervailing measures against our existing regulations; and we have surrendered our rights to pursue further defensive measures against the influence of her capital. It is justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such a restoration of the former state of things, the American tonnage will relapse to its former disproportion to the British tonnage.

When he turned his attention to the West India branch of the subject, there was still greater cause for wonder and dissatisfaction. As the Treaty now stood, Great Britain was left as free as she ever had been to continue the entire monopoly of the intercourse to British vessels. Recollecting, as he did, and as every member of the committee must do, the whole history of this subject from the peace of 1783, through every subsequent stage of our Independence down to the mission of the late Envoy, it was impossible for him to express his astonishment that any Treaty of Commerce should have ever been acceded to which abandoned the very object for which such a Treaty was ever contemplated. He never could have believed that the time was so near when all the principles, claims, and calculations, which have heretofore prevailed among all classes of people, in every part of the Union, on this interesting point, were to be so completely renounced. A Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, excluding a reciprocity for our vessels in the West India trade, is a phenomenon which had filled him with more surprise than he knew how to express.

He then pointed to the clause which restrains the United States from imposing prohibitions or duties in any case on Britain which did not extend to all other nations; observing that the clause made it impossible to operate on the unreasonable policy of that nation, without suspending our commerce at the same time with all other nations whose regulations with respect to us might be ever so favorable and satisfactory.

The fifteenth article had another extraordinary feature, which must strike every observer. In other Treaties, putting the parties on the footing of the most favored nation, it was stipulated that where new favors were granted to a particular nation in return for favors received, the party claiming the new favor should pay the price of it. This was just and proper where the footing of the most favored nation is established at all. But this article gives to Great Britain the full benefit of all privileges that may be granted to any other nation, without requiring from her the same or equivalent privileges with those granted by such nation. Hence it would happen that if Spain, Portugal, or France, should open their Colonial ports to the United States in consideration of certain privileges in our trade, the same privileges would result gratis, and ipso facto, to Great Britain. He considered this stipulation as peculiarly impolitic, and that it could not fail, in the view of the committee, to form a very solid and weighty objection to the Treaty.

He was not unaware of the stress that would be laid on the article relating to the East Indies. He should leave to others better acquainted than himself with this branch of the subject to explain it. He made two observations, however: one was, that judicious and well informed gentlemen, equally judicious and well informed with any who could be consulted, considered the article as offering not a shadow of advantage to the United States. The other was, that no privilege was stipulated which had not been uniformly heretofore granted without stipulation; and as the grant could have proceeded from no motive but a pure regard to the British interest in that country, there was every reasonable security that the trade would continue open as it had been, under the influence of the same consideration.

Such being the character of the Treaty, with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Peace, the great principles of the Law of Nations, and the regulations of commerce, it never could be viewed as having any claim to be carried into effect on its own account.

He should conclude, he said, with taking notice of two considerations which had been much used as inducements to carrying the Treaty into effect.

1. It was said that the greater part of the Treaty was to continue two years only after the present war in Europe; and that no very great evils could grow out of it within that period. To this he replied, in the first place, that ten of the articles containing many very objectionable stipulations were perpetual. In the next place, that it would be in the power of Great Britain, at the expiration of the other articles, to produce the same causes for a renewal of them, as are now urged in their favor. If we are now to enforce the Treaty, lest Great Britain should stir up the Indians, and refuse to pay the merchants for the property of which she has plundered them, can she not at the end of two or three years plunder them again to the same or a greater amount? cannot the same apprehensions also be then revived with respect to the Indians, and will not the arguments then be as strong as they are now, for renewing the same Treaty, or making any other equal sacrifice that her purposes may dictate?

2. It was asked, what would be the consequence of refusing to carry the Treaty into effect? He answered, that the only supposable consequence was, that the Executive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism which he did not doubt would govern that department, would, of course, pursue the measures most likely to obtain a reconsideration and remodification of the offensive parts of the Treaty. The idea of war, as a consequence of refusing to give effect to the Treaty, was too visionary and incredible to be admitted into the question. No man would say that the United States, if an independent people, had not a right to judge of their own interests, and to decline any Treaty that did not duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such cases, could give no cause, nor pretext, nor provocation, for war or for any just resentment. But apart from this, was it conceivable that Great Britain, with all the dangers and embarrassments which are thickening upon her, would wantonly make war on a country which was the best market she had in the world for her manufactures, which paid her an annual balance in specie of ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies were moreover essential to an important part of her dominions? Such a degree of infatuation ought not to be ascribed to any nation. And at the present crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war with Great Britain, on this country, would argue a degree of madness greater than under any other circumstances that could well be imagined.

With all the objections therefore to the Treaty which he had stated, he hoped that it would not now be carried into effect; and that an opportunity would take place for reconsidering the subject on principles more just and more favorable to the United States.

When Mr. Madison had concluded,

Mr. S. Lyman rose.—I do not rise, said Mr. L., with an intention to go into a detail upon this subject, or to exhibit a comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages which may attend the operation of this Treaty, but only to make a few remarks, which may be considered as preparatory to a more minute discussion.

Although I believe a discussion of this Treaty is not strictly in order, because it does not come before us immediately as a subject of debate and legislation, but as a piece of information from the Executive, yet I have no doubt but that a thorough discussion of its principles may produce a happy effect; for I believe the more it is understood, the less various will be Our sentiments, the greater the degree of unanimity among ourselves, so much the greater will be the unanimity among our constituents. This unanimity is an object of the greatest magnitude, not only as the source of national respectability and honor, but as the only true source of national happiness and prosperity; it is therefore the indispensable duty of Government to maintain internal peace and tranquillity, and upon this ground alone it is I am willing the Treaty should be thoroughly discussed. I am sensible this Treaty presents itself with an unfavorable aspect, and what is the reason? Is it not because we have entertained too exalted ideas of our own national importance? A generous and noble pride we ought to entertain as a nation, and without this pride we should be guilty of ingratitude to Heaven, for Providence has placed within our reach all the resources of national strength and greatness, but we are yet among the nations in a state of minority—a minor must solicit favors, he cannot challenge them. Did we go to the Emperor of Morocco, or to the Dey of Algiers, and challenge a passage for our ships up the Mediterranean? No; but we solicited, and pay dear for that passage; or did we go to the King of Spain, and demand a free navigation of the Mississippi? No; but we negotiated, and success has attended that negotiation; or could we have gone to the King of England, and challenged a participation with his subjects in the commerce of the East and West Indies? Certainly we could not. What then should we have done? Would it have been best to have traded with them upon sufferance, and so to have maintained a precarious kind of commerce? Certainly this would not have done, for in that case we should have been constantly dependent upon the caprice of a capricious Court; this would be extremely mortifying indeed. Commerce, like all other kind of business, ought to be carried on upon generous and open principles, otherwise we establish a system of deceit that would be favorable to pirates and freebooters.

Under those circumstances what could we have done? We could not have carved for ourselves, for our strength and greatness were not sufficient; we therefore had to go with the modesty of a minor, and to solicit; and what was the natural consequence of this solicitation? Why, at the first interview with the British Minister, he determined to exact of us at least a complete fulfilment of all that a former Treaty required; and what was that? It was a payment of our bona fide debts; what could we do? He produced our contract, and we said nothing; moral rectitude required a fulfilment of this: it was in vain to say, you have interrupted our commerce, you have carried off our negroes, you have retained the Western posts, and thereby occasioned an expensive and bloody war with the Indians. Some of this language, perhaps, would have had weight with the British Minister, if he had been acting in his private capacity, but he felt and acted like the Minister of a great and powerful nation; interest and glory are their objects, and moral considerations are too apt to vanish before these. It is true, by the law of nature, commerce ought to be free and uninterrupted, but by the law of nations it is otherwise; and what nation shall gainsay this law? We certainly cannot, our strength and greatness are not yet fully ripe; and if they were, we should, in practice, deny this law of nature, and should ratify and confirm this law of nations. Thus, Mr. Chairman, we see that interest and force govern among the nations. I have made these preliminary observations in order that we might contemplate the Treaty upon its true ground, for a want of reciprocity has been a heavy charge brought against it.

I have read this Treaty with care and attention, and I am free to own that upon the first perusal of it I had a prejudice against it; it appeared to me that some of its stipulations were too favorable for Britain, and too disadvantageous to ourselves; but we certainly had an able negotiator, and I verily believe he did his utmost to serve his country; the more I have attended to the subject, the more I am reconciled to it. I find the gentlemen who are interested in commerce are almost universally satisfied with the commercial regulations; but there is a more weighty charge brought against it than of a want of reciprocity; it is even said by some to be unconstitutional. This is a heavy charge indeed, and if it is well founded we ought to prevent its operation, for we are sent here as the guardians of the rights of our fellow-citizens, and for that purpose are sworn to support their constitution; if it is unconstitutional, it is a nullity; it is not binding upon the nation; we ought to reject it; but if it is constitutional, and not extremely pernicious, it becomes the supreme law of the land, and we are in that case bound to obey it.

When Mr. Lyman had taken his seat,

Mr. Swanwick addressed the Chair:—One of the most characteristic and strong points of difference that exists between republican and despotic forms of government, said Mr. S., consists in their greater or lesser degree of haste in making or adopting laws. Where the will of a despot is the only law, his simple volition is sufficient to call for the prompt obedience of the subject; but in our happy government, the numerous checks and balances it prescribes every where oppose themselves to haste, to error, or inadvertency, in the formation of laws. In acts of the smallest importance, we see daily that after they have undergone every possible chance of fair and impartial discussion in the House, they are transmitted to another, who equally proceed to revise, correct, and amend them; and even this not being deemed sufficient to secure, as it were, against all possibility of danger, they are sent to the President, who has ten days to consider, and who may return them with his objections. These we are bound respectfully to inscribe on our journals; and if we disagree in opinion with the President, the majority of two-thirds of both branches is requisite to give validity to the law. Do not we discover in all this infinite caution, and a wish rather not to act at all, by the difference of the branches among each other, than to act imprudently or precipitantly; and can we imagine that a constitution thus guarded with respect to laws of little consequence, hath left without a check the immense power of making Treaties, embracing, as in the instrument before us, all our greatest interests, whether they may be of territory, of agriculture, commerce, navigation, or manufacture, and this for an indefinite length of time? No. By one of the guards of that constitution relative to appropriations of money, this Treaty hath, in the last stage of its progress, come before us; we have resolved according to our best judgment of the constitution, and, as we have seen above, according to the meaning and spirit of it, that we have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of carrying it into effect. This will depend on its merits; and this is the discussion now before us. If, in the event, we shall be found to differ in opinion with the other branches as to this subject, it will involve no more animosity or crimination against them than if we differed as to an ordinary law. To what purpose then to sound the alarm, and to ring the tocsin from Georgia to New Hampshire? Do we impeach the Executive? Do we charge bribery or corruption? No, sir.

These preliminary remarks I have thought essential, previously to going into a consideration of the merits of the Treaty itself, which hath already been so ably considered by the gentleman last up from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) whose mildness of manner and suavity of address were certainly calculated to inspire any thing else than the angry passions so greatly deprecated by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. S. Lyman.) These, I hope, will be carefully avoided on all sides, and the debate be concluded with the same good temper and moderation in which it is begun.

I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that the first point of view in which this Treaty struck me with surprise was, the attitude Great Britain assumes in it of dictating laws and usages of reception and conduct different towards us, in every different parcel of her empire, while the surface of our country is entirely laid open to her in one general and advantageous point of admission. In Europe, we are told we may freely enter her ports. In the West Indies, we were to sail in canoes of seventy tons burden. In the East Indies we are not to settle or reside without leave of the local government. In the seaports of Canada and Nova Scotia, we are not to be admitted at all; while all our rivers and countries are opened without the least reserve; yet surely our all was as dear to us as the all of any other nation, and not to have been parted with but on equivalent terms.

But let us consider the articles distinctly:—first, as to the Mississippi; Great Britain is admitted as freely to navigate on this river, and to frequent the ports on its banks, as we are to go to those on the Thames; yet, it is strange to remark, that, at the time we made the stipulation, we had not ourselves obtained the right we gave. We have since obtained it by Treaty with Spain, and on terms absolutely contradictory to those contained in the British Treaty.

The next of the permanent articles I shall notice, is that which respects British debts. It is somewhat remarkable, that the commissioners, who are to judge of these, are permitted the power of adjournment from place to place—a very favorable stipulation for the creditors, whilst the Commissioners on Spoliations, by article 7, are to act only in London, whereby the American claimant must pass with his papers, or send them across the Atlantic, and engage lawyers in a country where law is unusually dear; a circumstance which will deter many from applying at all, and occasion great loss to the United States. I observe, too, that the awards of the Commissioners of British debts are to be paid out of the treasury as awarded by the commissioners. I am surprised not to find in the Report of the Secretary of State, on appropriations to carry this Treaty into effect, some calculation as to the probable amount of these debts, or some provision for lodging, for this purpose, money in the treasury. Gentlemen would then have known the extent to which they were going; but, at present, they can form no judgment on the subject of the money wanted, or of the funds from whence that money is to come.

Much hath been said about the tenth article, relative to the sequestration of debts. To be against the adoption of this article, hath been supposed to imply an unwillingness to pay debts lawfully contracted, and very copious abuse hath been thrown on the largest and most populous State in this Union, as having for motive of its opposition, this principle. To say nothing of the degrading nature of such an admission, with respect to the honor of our own country, which ought always to induce us to think the most favorably of it, is it true? Is it true, that an unwillingness to pay debts hath been the principal cause of opposition to this Treaty? Among the names opposed to it, are to be found some as respectable for independence and fortune as any on the Continent. To instance only one of a number, I may cite the celebrated Pennsylvania farmer, John Dickenson, Esq., one of the richest men in these parts of the country, attached to no party, living in great retirement, with a name honorable for the most virtuous efforts in the American Revolution. Can it be supposed that such a character as this is influenced by such a motive? Surely not. Whence arises, then, the opposition? It arises from a conviction that the admission of this article is degrading to the national character. During a late session of Congress an honorable member from New Jersey, (Mr. Dayton, the present Speaker) fired by a laudable indignation at the robberies committed on our commerce by the British, moved for a provisional sequestration of their property. No sooner was this done, than we saw a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 16th of January, 1795, recommending the United States to pass a permanent law against sequestration of property in the funds. Congress not having acted on this part of the report, though they adopted other parts, we now see the clause attempted to be brought into a law by way of a Treaty. And it is more singular, as, at the very time the article was agreed to in England, all the European nations were actually sequestering the property of each other.

After having thus reviewed the first ten or permanent articles, I think it must appear obvious that the result is, that we have ceded the right to navigate the Mississippi on terms different to those on which we received it from Spain; that we have consented to receive the Western posts on terms that afford too much danger of disturbances by a mixed intercourse of our people, British subjects and Indians; that we have provided, certainly, for an indefinite amount of British debts: whilst our claim for spoliations is left to be decided by commissioners at London, who meet without power of adjournment, and under very extensive latitude of judging according to what may appear to them to be the law of nations, in a country where that law his been twisted so as always to serve as a pretext for spoliations against us; and we have agreed never, in future, to consent to sequestrations, or confiscations, in case, by war or national difference, our property afloat should be confiscated or sequestered by Great Britain to any amount. Let any impartial mind, then, judge of the expediency, on our part, of voting efficacy to so ruinous a contract.

I come now to consider the remaining articles of a more temporary nature. The 12th article merits consideration, because, though not included in the general arrangement as ratified, being only suspended, its principles are not wholly abandoned, but left, like a cloud, still to hang over us. This 12th article was intended to regulate our intercourse with the British West Indies, and contemplated the singular provision that we should only navigate thither in vessels of seventy tons burden, whilst the British themselves might put in the employ vessels of any size. How degrading such a stipulation, it is not difficult to conceive! We supply these islands with what the inhabitants have always acknowledged they could get so well nowhere else, and yet our tonnage is to be thus restricted, while theirs is left open to employ vessels of any description. But this is not all: for the sake of getting admission into a few inconsiderable British ports in the West Indies, we are to give up the carriage in our own shipping of cotton, one of our own staple articles, and of sugar, coffee, and indigo, the produce of the French, Spanish, Danish, Swedish, or Dutch islands. How strange a mistake as to the geography of this Western Archipelago, in which the carriage of the produce of St. Domingo alone is worth more nearly than the entire admission to all the other islands put together! The principle contained in this 12th article, thus suspended, ought to have been utterly contradicted or annulled. While existing even in its suspended form, it will prevent my voting for this Treaty, of whose chains it is only an absent link.

But we are told whatever may be our fate in the West, all our losses are to be balanced in the East Indies; and we are carried from our own neighborhood, to be sure, to a great distance, in order to have repaid all our sacrifices. Let us examine this 13th article respecting the East India trade, and see if it does not bear a very strict analogy to the West India article that has been exploded.

We are to be admitted, it is true, in vessels of any size, but not suffered to settle or reside without leave of the local Government—that is, of the British East India Company. Of all the despotisms in the world that of a mercantile monopolizing company is the worst; yet into such hands we are to fall, and from them to solicit leave to reside or travel in the country. What security can there be for a commerce thus precariously conducted, in which your rivals are your judge?

The consumption of India goods being in a great degree out of the question in England, the Company, who have an annual revenue of a million and a half sterling to receive from their possessions in India, have hitherto sold them at vendue in Leadenhall street; and I believe, considering the credit our merchants usually obtained in London on those goods, and the low price the Company sold them at, they could afford to supply us cheaper in England than we could get them from India in time of peace. I find the East India Company themselves state, in 1788, that seventeen-twentieths of the calicoes imported by them were exported, and twelve-twentieths of the muslins also exported, thereby realizing, as they term it, the tribute which India pays to Great Britain through the medium of its commerce. In 1793 the Company state the internal consumption of India calicoes and muslins to be reduced in Britain to almost nothing. They add, every shop offers British muslins for sale, equal in appearance, and of more elegant patterns than those of India, for one-fourth, or perhaps more than one-third less in price. They say nine-tenths of all muslins and calicoes are sold for exportation.

The 15th article is one of the most objectionable of the whole Treaty, because it fundamentally contradicts all the provisions heretofore made by our Government for the encouragement and protection of the navigation of this country. By it it is settled that, so far as respects us, no tonnage duties shall be laid on British vessels but what shall be laid on those of all other nations; no duties on British articles but what shall be laid on those of every other nation; no embargo to affect Britain but what affects all other nations alike; American bottoms are left exposed to be charged, in the European British ports, tonnage duties equal to those laid on British bottoms here; countervailing duties may be laid in England to equalize the difference of duties on European or Asiatic goods imported here in British or American vessels; and no additional difference in tonnage or duties of this kind is to be made hereafter.

These principles deserve to be separately examined. They virtually repeal all the laws heretofore made as to navigation and impost, by indirectly equalizing the tonnage and duties on the British and American vessels; and they restrain, in future, the powers of Congress on some of the most important regulations of foreign commerce that could come before them.

On a review, then, of the commercial articles, they may be summed up as follows: West India trade left blank by the suspension of the 12th article. East India trade subjected to a condition of residence, rendering it precarious, and restricted to a landing of the goods exported in the United States, not known to have ever been imposed in any way similar, on any other nation trading to Bengal, while all nations are constantly allowed an equal liberty of trading there with ourselves. European, and both these trades, liable to an equalization of tonnage and duties, that cannot but operate unfavorably to the American navigation. Should the countervailing duties take place in the British ports in Europe on American vessels, they will probably be shut out of them altogether. In time of foreign war, our ships deprived of the neutral rights of carrying allowed them by Treaty with France and Spain, and exposed to be captured and detained on suspicion, as now daily happens. Naval stores exposed to confiscation by England, when shipped, at a time when she is at war, to the ports of her enemies.

In all these instances our navigation is materially endangered and exposed, without any equivalent advantages. May it not now well be asked, Whence it comes that this interest of navigation hath become less an object of care to us than at the time we passed the laws of duty and impost on foreign ships and goods imported into them? I stated the other day my ideas of the immense importance of navigation. Mr. Burke gave the following opinion of a branch of it in 1775:

"As to the wealth which the Colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet the spirit with which that enterprising employment has been exercised, ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits; whilst we are looking for them beneath the Arctic Circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of Polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen Serpent of South Falkland Island, which, seeming too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries, no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people—a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate those things, when I know that the Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious governments, but that through a wise and salutary neglect a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection—when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivance melt and die away within me."

Since then our navigation has had the growth of a man arrived at full age, (twenty-one,) and become extended to an immense size; yet was it so unprotected that, in this year, the United States wanting to remit, out of some cargoes of sugar and coffee shipped on private account, money to pay the interest of their debts in Holland, they were under the necessity of asking passports for these cargoes of the French and British Ministers, to let this property pass in safety over the Atlantic; and I have seen it boasted in some of our papers, that orders were issued by the British Government to their Port Admirals to respect these passports thus given by their minister or agent here; so the United States left their own merchants to carry their sugar and coffee as they might, but obtained passes for ships, in the proceeds of whose sales they were interested. What a strange circumstance, this! The American Government sailing secure under passes—the private merchant exposed!

But it is asked, if this Treaty be so unfavorable to commerce, why are the merchants so much in favor of it?

They explain the reason themselves. They are influenced by the present rather than future interests. Five millions of spoliations they look to the Treaty to repay; their property afloat, they fear to be taken, and war they dread; but is there really weight in these arguments? I am as largely interested as any individual among them in shipping, and have suffered the loss of one of my cargoes at Bermuda, for which my underwriters have made me only a partial allowance; but I neither dread any war on the part of England, situated as she now is, nor expect any payment of my loss from the Treaty. To a nation to whom she offers bounties to carry her provisions, and who is so excellent a customer for her manufactures, she will not be easily induced to offer hostilities that shall go to the extent of war; and the Commissioners on Spoliations are to act in London merely as arbitrators of the law of nations, on whom our claim of spoliations is at best but a very uncertain dependence. The merchants in sundry parts of the United States having thought it so, have claimed the interference of Congress in advancing them the money, they rather doubted getting any where else.

Considering, then, this Treaty as merely a bargain exhibiting little or no profit and much to lose, I separate it from all considerations foreign to itself. I judge it on its own merits, and these must lead me to vote for the proposition to suspend appropriations, especially in a moment when our seamen continue to be impressed and our ships to be taken.

Saturday, April 16.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and took up the resolution for carrying into effect the Treaty with Great Britain.

Mr. Nicholas said, he was sorry to find gentlemen unwilling to go into a discussion of the merits of the Treaty, as he anticipated considerable benefits to the community from a fair investigation. He did not know, as had been said, that it could have no effect on the minds of members of the House, but he thought it necessary that the people should be enabled to form a just opinion of the merits of this compact, that neither opposition nor their attachment, should go beyond just bounds; that fair investigation was the most likely means of producing that calm in the public mind which he wished to see produced whenever Government had finally decided, and he would venture to say, there was no place which could be resorted to for more sound information.

In considering the merits of the Treaty itself, Mr. N. said, he would consider the subjects which pressed themselves on the negotiator and demanded provision. These were chiefly the disputes arising under the Treaty of 1783, late depredations on our trade, and the settlement of contested principles to guard us against future misunderstandings.

The cases arising under the Treaty of 1783, as heretofore contested, were negroes and other property carried away contrary to its stipulations; the territorial claim under it, and on the part of Great Britain, an interference in the recovery of private debts.

Of the negroes, nothing is said in the present Treaty. It is to be expected in negotiations, that some concessions are to be made for the sake of accommodation, and this sacrifice of private interests becomes sometimes unavoidable. This claim was of considerable importance to a class of the citizens of the United States, but it was of still greater importance, as it justified the United States from the charge of breaking the Treaty of Peace. In this respect it was highly incumbent on the negotiator to procure satisfaction. It will not be contended that it should have been a sine qua non in the negotiation, and it would not now be mentioned, if it was not necessary to a fair estimate of some of the stipulations of the Treaty, and if there had not been so uniform a surrender of the interests of the United States as to compel a calculation. It is now said, indeed, that the meaning of the Treaty of 1783 was mistaken, and that the engagement was only to refrain from carrying away negroes, &c., which should be found in possession of the inhabitants at the time peace should take place. It is not necessary now to go into a construction of the words of the article, as its meaning has certainly been fixed by the interpretation of the parties in the ten years which elapsed after it. In all that time the United States have asserted the claim, and it cannot be shown that Great Britain ever contested the construction of the article. It is said, that one of the Commissioners, (Mr. Adams,) who concluded the Treaty of 1783, in behalf of the United States, informed the Senate, in their deliberations on this Treaty, that it was the unquestionable meaning of the article, to save all negroes and other property then in the hands of the British; that the article was inserted after all other points had been settled at the instance of Mr. Laurens, who just then arrived from his confinement in London, and the reason assigned by him was, that many of the people of the United States would be disabled from complying with the part of the Treaty which respects debts unless this provision was made; that the same gentleman, who was afterwards Ambassador from the United States to the Court of London, also informed the Senate that, during his embassy, this construction of the article was never denied, and that it seemed to be understood by the Ministry, that, on a settlement with the United States, compensation must be made. This subject was fully investigated by the negotiator of the Treaty (Mr. Jay) while he was Secretary of Foreign Affairs; all the reasons which now arm the friends of the Treaty against this claim were examined by him, and then his decision was, that we were entitled to compensation. The reputed author of the best defence of the Treaty, (Mr. Hamilton,) in the year 1783, introduced a resolution into Congress, declaring that the negroes, &c., had been carried away by the British armies, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Treaty. Mr. N. thought it too late to extort a meaning from a contract after it had existed more than ten years; and he did not doubt every candid mind would be satisfied by the acquiescence of Britain, and the evidence which he had produced of a perfect understanding between the two countries on the subject. If the new construction of the article could not be established, the first infraction of the Treaty of 1783 remained indisputable. Before the Treaty became binding, Great Britain, by carrying away the negroes, put it out of her power to execute the contract which she had made, while, on the part of the United States, no act had been done which was inconsistent with the Treaty, provided the acts of the States did not continue to operate after the ratifications were exchanged.

Before he examined the cases provided for in this Treaty, it was necessary to remark, that the Treaty declares its intention to be to settle the disputes of the two countries without regard to former criminations, and all the writers in favor of the Treaty, declare that it was necessary to waive the first infraction of the former Treaty. This was a proper principle, and he only asked that it should have been pursued. This spirit of conciliation must have meant to put both parties on the same footing, either by agreeing that neither party had been the cause of the Treaty not being executed, or that both had been equally guilty. He would examine whether either of these concessions had been pursued.

To obtain a surrender of the posts, and the territory withheld from us, we have sanctioned the subsequent alienations of land by the King of Great Britain. We have confirmed the claims of the inhabitants and dispensed with their allegiance, by permitting them to remain subjects of Great Britain; we have opened our frontier to all their citizens, and permitted them to retain a share of the Indian trade. Mr. N. did not pretend to judge of the commercial effect of the intercourse between the frontiers, but he apprehended that, in another respect, this concession would destroy the whole value of the acquisition. The traders would be enabled to maintain their accustomed influence over the Indians, and would have more inducements than when they had a monopoly of the trade to embroil them with the United States. Formerly, they were interested in their continuing in peace, as war prevented the acquisition of skins and furs; but when American traders shall embark in the trade, they will have an obvious interest in war as the certain means of banishing their rivals. It appears, then, that the Treaty of 1783, in this respect, is not revived—that there is a new contract with respect to the posts, and much less will be obtained than if that Treaty had been executed.

When the claims of Great Britain, under the Treaty of 1783, became the subject of the present Treaty, the stipulations discover a different principle. The United States give up the claim for negroes, and agree to receive the posts on terms which greatly diminish their value; but, when the debts due from citizens of the United States to subjects of Great Britain are to be provided for, there is not a stipulation that they may now be pursued without hindrance, but there is an engagement, on the part of the United States, to pay all losses which have arisen from the infraction of the Treaty of Peace, so far as it respects them. On what ground could this assumption have been made? Why is this penalty imposed on the United States? There can be but one justification, and that is, that they had been guilty of the first infraction of the Treaty of Peace, and must make amends; but there was to be no concession of this kind, so that if damages were to be given at all, they should be given on both sides. It seems clear, then, whatever pretences are made by the Treaty or its advocates, that the first infraction of the Treaty of Peace is fixed on the United States, and that they are to make compensation for an injury. Where does the conciliating temper of Great Britain manifest itself? Had she a claim under the Treaty of 1783, which is forgotten? Does she not receive every thing which she could have demanded in relation to that Treaty? The United States are to indemnify her citizens completely for the non-execution at the time, and are to receive less than was promised them without the least compensation for the delay. But it is somewhere said, that the damages could not be demanded for withholding the posts, because they could not be computed. It will be agreed by those who press the acceptance of this Treaty in order to obtain the posts, that they are important to the United States. If of the consequence which they are represented to be, twelve years dispossession must have been a real injury, and the claim on Great Britain will be indisputable, although the amount may not be certain. This might be a good pretext for evading a payment to the United States, if this claim stood unconnected with any other; but it must be considered as a very shameless suggestion to enforce the payment of damages incurred by them. It is certainly a sufficient justification for retaining what is in their hands until Great Britain shall offer something on this account; otherwise she will be screened by her cunning in causing the subject of injury. Again, it has been said that this inequality in the Treaty was proper, because the right to recover debts returned with the peace, and did not depend merely on the Treaty. It is to be remembered, that the United States justify it as a retaliation for breach on the part of Great Britain, and that, in forming this Treaty, it was agreed to waive the right to retaliate: or, rather, the question, who first infringed the Treaty. It is only to be inquired, then, whether this was a proper subject of retaliation? and if it was, the United States ought to escape all penalty for using it, or Great Britain must be equally subject to compensation for her infractions. (For this, see Marten's Law of Nations, page 268, where it is said that it matters not, in this respect, whether rights are innate, or whether they have been acquired by express or tacit covenant, or otherwise.)

Another class of claims which may fall on the United States is still more alarming—those for war-interest. The Treaty has explicitly authorized the commissioners to judge of all claims of British subjects lost by legal impediments, whether of principal or interest, and they are to determine according to justice, equity, and the law of nations. In the correspondence on this subject between the two Governments, the right has been asserted and denied; and it will depend on the commissioners to say whether war-interest is due or not; and it being to be supposed that the commissioners will advocate the principles of their respective Governments, the United States are to depend on the chance election of the fifth commissioner for safety. If it shall be determined that it is due, the mischief will be insufferable. It will not merely be recovered in those cases where the principal is unpaid, nor will it be confined to those cases where it has been lost by actual judgment of a court, but will extend to all cases of private settlement, where the decision of the Judiciary of the State had previously settled the principle.

It appears, then, that on the subject of the disputes arising under the Treaty of 1783, there is no cause for congratulation. The claims for negroes carried off are abandoned; the posts are to be delivered up, on terms not unusual and dishonorable, but extremely dangerous to the future peace of the United States, and to obtain them in this manner we incur an obligation to pay a sum which probably will not fall short of five millions of dollars, and which may possibly amount to fifteen millions. When it is remembered that these claims commenced with our independence, and that they were the concessions to our infant struggles, what American is there who will not feel the disgrace to our manhood in abandoning them? All must blush at a comparison of the Treaty we obtained with our arms, with that which has been dictated by fear.

The next subject which claimed the attention of a negotiator was the injury recently sustained in the commerce of the United States; and on this subject it will be proper to review the circumstances in which the negotiator left this country. The losses sustained had been considered here as outrages of so serious a nature that all parties had concurred in demanding reparation; some had attempted at once to use coercion, and those who approved the mission declared that war must follow a failure. In this situation, where the sense of Government and people was decided, and where the injury was not only intolerable in itself but was likely to be repeated, it seems astonishing that a man could be found who would conclude a Treaty which gives to the United States no compensation, but more astonishing that partisans could be found here who approved his conduct. It may be asserted that no compensation is secured by the Treaty, and that under its operation it is equally probable that none will be received. See the article. It has been doubted, and is, perhaps, very doubtful, whether the Courts of Great Britain are not made the judges of irregular and illegal captures and condemnations, and whether the orders of the King are not admitted as good cause of seizure; but it never has been contended that compensation is promised in any particular case, or that any principles are established by the Treaty which are to govern the commissioners. In the construction of their powers, insisted on by the advocates of the Treaty, their guides are justice, equity, and the laws of nations. Nobody can complain of these principles, if their fair operation was secured; but a moment's attention will show that this was nothing but an evasion of the subject.

It will not be understood that I suppose it was in Mr. Jay's power to make his own terms, but I complain of his treating at all on the terms he did. It is said that it was not in his power to extort what he wished, but I complain that he yielded to the extortion of Great Britain. What has he left her to ask, what has he not surrendered? While professing, as the Treaty does, that there were important points of our commerce left for future negotiation, why bind us to continue to Great Britain the fullest share of our commercial privileges? If the Treaty had been the most complete and satisfactory, would it not be necessary to leave something to enforce its execution? What weapons have we which can reach her? The Treaty makes war indispensable, as the only redress of injuries, and how will war from the United States reach Great Britain? It was certainly improper to give up all power of restricting her commerce until the same instrument contained the fullest satisfaction as to our own. It was improper to give up all the power of seizing on the debts of her subjects, for this, when the power of restricting her commerce was bartered for equal privileges, would be the only means of maintaining respect. It is not necessary that weapons of any sort should be used, but it is more dangerous to surrender them. I am no friend to interference in private contracts, and I can truly say, I never was willing to resort to this remedy till all others had been tried; but if there was an impossibility of doing it, the want of the power would immediately be felt. The impolicy and immorality of sequestration have been dwelt on. Contrast it with war, for which it is a substitute, and it will be found in both respects unequal to it. All national remedies are attended with great mischiefs to those who use them, and they must be adopted only on comparison in this respect, and with regard to their effects on the enemy. In this last respect there seems to be no choice to the United States; they have no other weapon that can reach Great Britain, and I greatly fear that, when this is lost, we are completely disarmed.

Monday, April 18.

Treaty with Great Britain.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union; when the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect being under consideration—

Mr. Giles said it was much to be regretted that all the information which could throw light upon the subject of discussion should not be before the committee. A sense of responsibility arising from the peculiarly delicate nature of the question had induced the House to take every step with more than a common degree of caution. Before they proceeded to deliberate upon the expediency or inexpediency of providing for carrying the Treaty into effect, they made a request to the President for the papers which attended the negotiation. This request has been refused; not because the call itself contained any thing unconstitutional; not because the contents of the papers called for were of such a nature as to render the disclosure thereof at this time improper. Neither of these causes being intimated in the Message, but because principles were advocated by individual gentlemen in the course of the argument inducing the call which the President thought not warranted by the constitution. Mr. G. said, he did not propose to animadvert upon the conduct of the Executive in departing from the resolution itself, and in noticing the arguments of individual members, nor upon any other part of the proceedings of the Executive relative to the call of the House and his refusal. He only meant to remark, that being perfectly convinced of the propriety of the call itself, of the utility of the information embraced by it, and not being satisfied by the arguments of the President of the propriety of withholding the papers called for, he should have been willing to have suspended all further proceeding respecting the provision for the Treaty, until the papers should be laid before the House. He would have firmly placed himself on that ground, and in that position hazarded his responsibility. The extreme sensibility excited on the public mind by the agitation of the Treaty question, he had supposed, would have furnished an irresistible argument in favor of complying with the request of the House, provided no inconvenience would have attended the disclosure; and in his opinion, under all the circumstances of the case, the House would have been completely justified in suspending all further proceeding upon the question of providing for the Treaty, until they received that information which they deemed necessary to guide their deliberations. But as the House had thought proper to take a different course, and had proceeded to the consideration of the question, with such lights as they possessed, he would explain the motives which would probably finally influence his vote.

Mr. G. said he should discuss the subject in two points of view. He would first examine the contents of the Treaty itself, and then the probable consequences of refusing or of giving it efficacy.

In examining the contents of the instrument itself, he proposed to go through it article by article, unless the task prescribed to himself should exceed the bounds usually allowed to members for the delivery of their sentiments. He should do this, because he wished to treat the subject with the utmost candor, and to avoid any possible imputation of intending to exhibit the bad and avoid the good parts of the Treaty, if any such there were. He meant, however, to state merely the purport of many of the articles, without any animadversion, and to dwell only upon such as appeared to him the most material.

The first object of the negotiation respected the inexecution of the Treaty of Peace.

On the part of Great Britain, two articles had been unexecuted: The restoration of certain property in possession of the British at the close of the war, and the surrender of the Western posts. On the part of the United States, one article was suggested to remain unfulfilled; it respected the promise that no legal impediment should be thrown in the way to the recovery of debts due to British subjects.

The claim of compensation for the property carried away in contravention of the Treaty of Peace is wholly abandoned, and the value of the surrender of the posts very much lessened by the annexation of conditions which made no part of the stipulations of surrender in the Treaty of Peace. The United States are more than bound to fulfil the article heretofore unfulfilled by them; for instead of continuing the courts open for the recovery of debts in the usual way, as was the promise in the Treaty of Peace, they are made to assume the payment of all debts, interests, and damages in cases of insolvencies, and a mode of adjustment is proposed for ascertaining the amount which furnishes the greatest latitude for frauds against the United States which could be devised. This will appear in the future examination of the subject. Hence it is obvious that the stipulations of the Treaty abandoned the very principle of adjustment assumed by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Swift.)

Mr. G. would first premise, that if the article did not intend the restoration of property mentioned in it, the insertion of it in the Treaty was not only unnecessary, but mischievous, as it would necessarily produce embarrassment to the parties to the instrument.

The British army, at the termination of the war, was at New York; the negroes, which constituted the species of property in question, were in the Southern States; so that if the article did not include that species of property taken in the course of the war, and in the possession of the British at the end of it, it was worse than nonsense. It never could have been supposed that, upon the first dawn of peace, the British would have left New York and invaded the Southern country, for the purpose of plundering the inhabitants of their negroes. The peace article itself was a sufficient security against this conduct, and of course no specific provision could have been necessary for that purpose. This was not only the uniform construction of the article by the United States, but, as he always understood and believed, Great Britain had acquiesced in the construction until the negotiation of the present Treaty. As an evidence of these facts, Mr. G. observed, that American commissioners were permitted to make a list of the negroes in the possession of the British at the close of the war by the British commander; that the list was entered upon the files of Congress; that there were resolutions of Congress claiming compensation for the property carried away in contravention of that article in the Treaty of Peace, perhaps without even the intimation of a doubt as to the construction; that, during the administration of Lord Caermarthen, he had always understood that the claim of compensation for property carried away, was admitted, whenever British subjects were indemnified for the debts due to them from citizens of the United States. But here he had to regret the want of the papers called for by this House, as they contained all the evidence upon which this important fact depends. Hence it appears that Great Britain herself had yielded her assent to this construction, and ought not to have been permitted to have withdrawn it afterwards. These circumstances seemed to him to be conclusive, and ingenuity itself would pause for arguments against facts so stubborn and irresistible.

Mr. G. then proceeded to the examination of the articles of the Treaty. The first article, he said, was declaratory of peace, &c., between the two countries, which, he said, was a very desirable thing, provided it could be established upon principles compatible with the national honor and the national interests. The second and third articles contained the stipulations for the surrender of the Western posts, and the conditions accompanying the surrender.

The surrender of the Western posts, he said, would be an extremely desirable object, if conformable with the Treaty of Peace, and it were unattended with any conditions.

Here, he said, he was desirous of giving credit to every part of the instrument which would admit of it, and was not disposed to exaggerate its imperfections. He was willing to admit that the surrender of the posts, even with the conditions annexed, was of some importance; but he would assert that the surrender lost a great portion of its value to the United States, in consequence of the conditions attached to it. He observed, two objects of primary importance were to be effected by the unqualified surrender of the posts. The one was to obtain the influence over the Indians in their neighborhood, which the British now possessed. The other, the participation, at least, in the fur trade carried on with those Indians. The conditions accompanying the surrender, will, in his opinion, very much impede the one, and completely defeat the other object.

The stipulation in the second article, which authorizes British subjects who are now living within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, still to continue and to reside there, with the free use of their property; and to elect either to remain British subjects or to become American citizens at pleasure, will, in his opinion, very much impede, if not wholly obstruct, the salutary influence of the United States over the numerous tribes of Indians in that quarter; which is one great object hoped for from the possession of those posts. The effects of the stipulation will appear more obvious, when it is compared with the stipulations in the next article, by which the trade with the Indians is regulated. The second object, to wit, the participation in the fur trade, he believed, would be completely defeated by the regulation of that trade in the third article; that article stipulates an equality of duties between American citizens and British subjects, a free communication through that country, upon an equality of portages and ferriages. These conditions, in his opinion, would secure a complete monopoly of the fur trade to Great Britain; because the superiority of the British capital employed in that trade, and the inferiority of duties paid upon goods imported for that trade into Canada, would, in his judgment, wholly exclude American citizens from a participation in that trade, through any channel in the United States. The United States had no mode left to counteract this monopoly but by a system of drawbacks, which appeared to him, from the nature and trade of the country, to be almost impracticable; or if not absolutely impracticable, it would compel us to purchase the trade at a price greater than it was worth. It appeared to him that Great Britain had foreseen these consequences, and that these articles are as well calculated to produce them, and to obstruct the views of the United States, as sagacity itself could have devised. Hence it appears to him that the value of an unqualified surrender of the posts is very much lessened by the accompanying conditions. The gentleman from Connecticut observed, that the surrender of the posts was absolute, and that no conditions were annexed to it. It is a sufficient answer to say that his observation is a mere criticism upon terms. If they be not conditions of the surrender, they are accompanying engagements, and are to be executed with good faith by the United States.

The sixth article was, in his judgment, highly objectionable. This article assumes the payment of all debts, interests, and damages, due from American citizens to British subjects, previous to the Revolution, in all cases where insolvencies have ensued, and where legal impediments to the recovery of the debts have existed. He would remark, that this was an assumption of debt by the public, which they did not owe, and never promised to pay, and that it is bettering the condition of the British creditor under the Treaty of Peace, without any obligation on the United States to do so. He said that, as, amongst the fashionable calumnies of the day, this article had been a fertile source of misrepresentation against the State he had the honor to represent, he was anxious to place this subject in its true light; and, as he professed to be well acquainted with it, he hoped to be indulged with some minutiæ of explanation. He said, this subject presented two aspects to the public; the one, as it respected States, the other, as it respected individuals of the United States. As to the first, he admitted that if a greater proportion of debts of this description were due from Virginia than from other States, which had not, however, been ascertained, and which he doubted, in the same proportion, as a State, Virginia would receive an advantage over the rest of the States, by a common assumption of the debts; but as it respected the individuals in that State who were not debtors, they stood precisely on the same footing with individuals in other States, because they were, in common with others, to contribute to the payment of debts which they never owed. It is of very little consolation to them that they live in the neighborhood of those whose debts they are to contribute to pay; for propinquity or distance can make no difference in the state of interest between the individuals who do not owe, but who are to contribute to pay. As a very small proportion of the inhabitants of Virginia come under this description of debtors, the phenomenon of an opposition of that State, to this particular article, is thus explained.

It is to be remarked, that this article contains no limits as to the amount of debts assumed by it, nor are there any precise data furnished for calculation. But it has been said, that if the debts be due, they ought to be paid, be the amount what it may. He said, that gentlemen should reflect, that the amount would depend very much upon the mode of adjustment, and that the mode adopted by the Treaty was the most objectionable that could be devised.

He observed, that the principle established for the adjustment of the debts, instead of preserving the conflicting interests of debtor and creditor, would produce a complete union of interests; and of course would furnish the greatest temptations to frauds against the United States from both debtor and creditor. Hence the amount of debts assumed by the United States would probably be greatly increased beyond what would be the amount, if the debtor and creditor should be left to the ordinary course of judicial proceedings to adjust their own differences, under the principle of opposing interests. To entitle the creditor to a claim upon the United States, it is necessary for him first to establish his demand against his debtor, and then to show that his debtor was solvent at the commencement of the late war, and has since become insolvent; and that some legal impediment had intervened to prevent the recovery of the debt. Hence it becomes the interest of both debtor and creditor to establish these facts, because the debtor will be relieved from his debt, by the assumption of the United States, and the claim of the creditor will be transferred from the individual to the United States, which he would, in all cases, prefer, particularly as the assistance of the debtor will often become necessary to facilitate the establishment of the debt. This, he said, was the natural operation of the union of interest produced by the assumption of the debts by the United States, and there was more danger to be apprehended from it, from the impossibility of checking it, by any vigilance on the part of the United States, and from the peculiar circumstances attending those debts.

The greatest proportion of debts remaining unpaid, he believed, stood upon open accounts. In many cases, when the debts were evidenced by specialties, payments had been obtained, either by the usual course of judicial process, or by compromise between the parties. There were two circumstances attending the open accounts which would give great scope to the fraudulent combinations between the debtor and creditor. The one respected the evidence, the other the substantial causes of difference in the accounts of the creditor and debtor. In the reign of George II. an act was passed for the more easy recovery of debts due to His Majesty's subjects from His Majesty's plantations in America. This act authorized the merchant in Great Britain to establish his debt against a colonist by affidavits taken before the commencement of the suit, and authenticated in the usual mode. This deprived the defendant of all opportunity of cross-examination, so essential to the discovery of truth, and the jury of all knowledge of the character and credibility of the deponent.

In Virginia, the affidavits taken in pursuance of this act, have been deemed incompetent to the establishment of the debt, because the act itself destroys the very nature and properties of evidence. Hence, in all disputed claims founded upon this act, judgments have been rendered for the defendants. If this should be deemed a legal impediment to the recovery, this whole description of debts would probably come under the description of debts assumed. He observed, that the words used in the Treaty were calculated, in his opinion, with a view to this construction, and must have been dictated by persons better informed of the nature of this business than he presumed the Envoy Extraordinary of the United States could have been.

The other circumstances arose from the nature of the remittances. These were generally made in tobacco. The sales of this article were intrusted solely to the merchant residing in Great Britain, and the American shipper had no check whatever upon the merchant making the sale. Upon tendering these accounts, the tobacco is often set down at a price very inferior to the average price of that article in Europe, at the time of making the sale. A great number of controversies have taken place upon this ground, which remain unsettled; but, if the United States should assume the debts of the individuals thus circumstanced, they would have no inducement to contest these accounts in a course of judicial proceedings, and the promise of exoneration from the creditor, will often induce the debtor to facilitate the establishment of the claims against the United States. He said he had not overlooked the clause in this article of the Treaty, which compels an assignment of the claim from the creditor to the United States, but that would have little or no operation to check the practice invited by this article, because the debtor is presumed to be insolvent before the assignment is made, and he believed the United States would be but unsuccessful collectors from insolvent debtors.

From these circumstances, he concluded, that this assumption of debt, without any obligation for so doing, was extremely improper, particularly when it is recollected that this article sweeps away all acts of limitation, and relates to the whole extensive scene of business carried on in the United States, from the extremes of New Hampshire to the extremes of Georgia, for an unlimited time before the Revolution. He observed, if he were to make a conjecture as to the amount, it would be a loose one; but if he were to choose between indemnification to the American merchants for recent spoliations committed upon their commerce, or the payment of these debts, he should not hesitate to prefer the first alternative; because, to that there were known limits; to the other there were not, nor any data for calculation under the mode of adjustment prescribed by the Treaty. He, therefore, cautioned gentlemen against the assumption of this unascertained debt, for he believed it would be attended with a responsibility which they could not answer to their constituents, nor would the responsibility be alleviated by the recollection of the merits of the individuals for whose benefit it is made. The increase of the debt of the United States by these artificial means, without any obligation to do so, he thought highly objectionable.

The 10th article, he said, was of a very extraordinary complexion. It was remarkable, both as to the matter it contained, and the manner in which it was expressed. It is in the following words:

"Neither the debts due from individuals of the one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever in any event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated, it being unjust and impolitic that debts and engagements contracted and made by individuals having confidence in each other and in their respective Governments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by national authority on account of the national differences and discontents."

Mr. G. remarked, that this article also had assumed the resemblance of reciprocity; but no reciprocity in fact.

British subjects have great sums, both in public and private funds, in the United States. American citizens have little or no property in public or private funds in Great Britain. Hence the evident and substantial inequality of this reciprocal stipulation. On the other hand, American citizens have a great share of property on the water, with very little naval protection, and of course subject to the naval superiority of Great Britain.

If, therefore, Great Britain had stipulated, in case of war, that in consideration of a refusal on the part of the United States, to sequestrate property of British subjects upon land, she would not molest the property of American citizens upon water, there would then have been a substantial, instead of a nominal reciprocity; as the article now stands there is an important right conceded, and no compensation obtained.

This article, however, has been highly applauded by a particular description of persons interested in it, in consequence of the affectation of morality professed by it.

It has been said to be dishonest and immoral to take the property of individuals for the purpose of compensating national wrongs. He observed, that he could see no difference between the morality of taking the property of individuals upon water, and the property of individuals upon land. The difference of the element could make no difference in the morality of the act. However strongly, therefore, this moral impulse was operating upon the American Envoy whilst engaged in the construction of this article, it had entirely dissipated before he had arrived at the 25th article; for, in that article, the principle of privateering is not only admitted, but its operation facilitated; so that, unless the interest of Great Britain is to be the criterion of the Envoy's morality, what he has gained by the morality of the 10th article must be at least balanced by the immorality of the 25th. But, Mr. G. remarked, that sequestration was always admitted as part of the law of nations, and hence he presumed it was not immoral under certain circumstances. He said it appeared to be the opinion of some, that where the property of an individual was sequestered on account of the act of his nation, that the individual was to sustain the loss, but that was not the case. The sequestration itself imposes upon the government, to which the individual belongs, an obligation of reimbursement. Hence the sequestration does not ultimately rest upon the individual, but upon the Government, for whose wrong the property was taken. This is also conformable to the laws of nations. It was the course pursued by Great Britain for all sequestrations made during the American war, and is the course which would be pursued by all nations.

Mr. G. said, that war itself was immoral in most cases; and justified, in his opinion, only in the case of self-defence; but if a stipulation had been inserted in this Treaty, which prohibited the United States from declaring war, it would have been justly and universally reprobated. The present article prohibits the United States from resorting to the best means not only of preventing war, but the most efficacious means of supporting it. Hence, the surrender of the right was the most impolitic concession, and is infinitely aggravated by its being a voluntary concession; no equivalent being received in return. Mr. G. said, it was dishonorable to the United States because it evidenced a want of confidence in the discretion of the constituted authorities. The right of sequestration is admitted to be essential to national sovereignty; but, lest it should be indiscreetly used by the United States, its guardianship is transferred to Great Britain. Mr. G. said, he viewed sequestration as an extraordinary remedy, to be resorted to only on extraordinary occasions. And although he would admit that but few cases would justify a resort to it, yet it was one of our best instruments of defence, considering our relationship to Great Britain, and ought not therefore to have been surrendered. He said, too, that this restraint was imposed upon the United States for an unlimited time, and was the more objectionable, as it was a species of legislation against the discretion of legislation.

Upon the whole, he conscientiously believed the Treaty to be a bad one. He believed it contained the most complete evidence of British interference in our internal affairs, and had laid the foundation for the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has not afforded protection to our neutral rights, which was amongst its great objects; and in the adjustment of the differences resulting from the inexecution of the Treaty of Peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these important circumstances considered, and when it is also considered that the British persevere in impressing our seamen and seizing our vessels, in violation of the clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing of the Treaty, he could not consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. He believed that it was one of those extraordinary cases which justified strong and extraordinary resistance.

When Mr. Giles had concluded his speech,

Mr. Goodhue addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. Chairman: Much noise has been made, and every art has been practised to prejudice the people against the Treaty now under consideration. I mean to look at it and see if it be the horrid thing it is represented to be, and particularly to examine the commercial part, to know whether we have made a good bargain or not, I will take notice of some objections that have been made, and then touch on the great evils that may justly be apprehended, if we refuse to carry it into effect. And here let me observe, the subject is the most momentous that ever came before this House, and I mean to put no false colors on it, or to paint any evils that will follow a rejection, beyond what, in such an event, I most conscientiously believe will be realized. I will now state what new sources of commerce are opened to us by the Treaty that we had not before, and then see what we have given for them. 1st. We have got by the Treaty a perfectly free trade across the land, and by means of the lakes with Canada, that we had not before, and on the same terms with British subjects, which I estimate as a great advantage to this country; for it is evident, that we can introduce into Canada—up the North river and across the Lakes—almost any kind of goods, at less expense and on better terms than the British can up the river St. Lawrence, which is very lengthy, and frozen up six or seven months in the year. Having this advantage, can it be doubted that we have not industry and enterprise to improve it? No, sir, the enterprise of our people is such, that we shall unquestionably carry on almost all the trade of Upper Canada, and that great Western country which will be opened to us; by which means we shall have at least an equal share in their fur trade also with them, which we have so long wanted. But it is said, the portages or carrying places being common to both, they will run away with the greater part of the trade. Why so? I am not afraid but the citizens of the United States, if they are put on an equal footing with others, will make their way equal with any people on earth. But it is said, by way of lessening the advantages of this trade, that goods imported into Canada pay little or no duty, and the goods that we import are by our laws subject to high duty, and that no drawback of the duty can be established upon their being sent into Canada, and therefore, we cannot supply them on equal terms. To this, I reply, that I do not know what duty they impose on goods when imported into Canada, but I believe it is considerable; and I do not believe but it is possible to devise a plan for a drawback of the duty which may have been paid on our goods when they are sent into Canada, and that at any rate the ease by which we can send them there up the North river, compared with their being introduced by the St. Lawrence, will more than compensate for any difference of duty, in case a drawback should not be admitted.

2. We have got established by the Treaty, a right to trade with all their settlements in India on the same terms with their own subjects, and thus we have laid open to us a free trade with those vast possessions of theirs in that quarter of the globe, which, it is said, contains twenty or thirty millions of inhabitants. Let me inform the committee, that our trade to India is already very great and profitable. In the town of Salem only, in which I live, we have thirty sail of Indiamen, and doubtless, in the United States, the whole amount must be nearly a hundred; and the number will increase in such a manner, as by our superior enterprise, industry and economy, that we shall not only supply our own wants, but those of the West Indies and Europe, in a great measure, with India articles; for though, by the Treaty which gives us this free trade, we are not permitted to carry India goods from their settlements directly to Europe, yet there is no doubt, in my mind, but we can export from hence thither cheaper than they can get them any other way, for this obvious reason, because their trade to India is carried on by their companies, in which despatch and economy is by no means so much attended to, as it is when managed by an individual. But it is said we had this trade before the Treaty. I answer, it is true we had, but it was only by way of indulgence, subject to be deprived of it whenever they thought fit; and let me ask, is it not vastly better to have it secured as a right, than to have it rest on the precarious tenure of indulgence? Here, Mr. Chairman, let me remark, that they have granted to us this free trade to India, which their own subjects (except the India Company) are entirely shut out from. What must be the feelings of British subjects when they see their Government has given to strangers a perfect freedom of trade to their India settlements, and shut them out from it altogether? And what must be their astonishment when they hear that some people amongst us think that Great Britain has conferred no favor upon us by doing it? Hear what the famous Mr. Grattan, the great Irish patriot, said in the Irish Parliament, on the subject:

"This very America, which the British Minister insulted and then crouched to, had, by the late Treaty of Commerce, been admitted to all the British settlements in the East and West Indies, to the latter of which Ireland was only conditionally admitted, and from the former unconditionally excluded; yet Ireland was a loyal, attached nation, and America an alien."

These are the commercial acquisitions we have obtained by the Treaty; and let me ask, what have we given to Britain in return for them? I answer, nothing more than they have all along enjoyed in our ports, by the laws of the United States, in common with other foreign nations. No new commercial advantages have we given them; they can come here now on no better terms than before. But, it is said, we have tied our hands by the Treaty, that we will not lay any greater duties on their commerce than we do on all other foreign nations. Pray, let me ask, if Great Britain have not equally tied their hands? And can we be so unreasonable as to suppose that they would ever consent to a Treaty that had not such terms of reciprocity?

It is again said, by way of objection, that they have reserved to themselves the right of countervailing the difference of duty, which we, by our laws, have established between our own citizens and foreigners, and that she will now exercise that right by imposing equal duties on our vessels in the ports of Great Britain. Let me answer this objection to the Treaty, by asking if she had not this same right, and even an unlimited one, of imposing what duties she saw proper on our vessels in her ports before the Treaty? She did not see fit to exercise it then, neither is it probable she will now. And, lest it should be said she will now do it, because we are restrained by the Treaty from increasing the duty on her ships beyond what it now is, and, therefore, she has not the same fear operating to prevent it that she had before, let me remark, that if she was restrained by any such considerations, this same restraint would be in force again in two years after the present war ceased, being the period of the existence of those articles of the Treaty—a time so short as to render it highly probable she will not think it worth while to make the experiment.

A great cry has been made against the commercial part of the Treaty, and I must confess I never could see on what ground, for it is a certain fact we have given Great Britain no new privileges in our Atlantic ports by the Treaty, and no other in their intercourse by the way of Canada, than they have given us; and, therefore, it may fairly be said that, by the Treaty, we have given them no new commercial privileges they were not before enjoying in our ports; and they, on their part, have given us considerable; and consequently, on our side, the bargain must be a good one.

Let me ask, why there is for ever so much complaint against Great Britain because she does not open all her colonies freely to us? Does Portugal open the Brazils? No; she shuts out all foreigners. Did Holland, before the present war, open to us all her rich possessions in the East Indies? No. Does Spain open her rich islands in the East and West Indies, and her immense possessions in South America? No. Does she, in the Treaty lately made, open even Florida, as Great Britain has Canada? No. Did France before this war give us free trade to her colonies? No. And do not all those nations, as well as every other, come into our ports on the same terms with the British? Why, then, make this rant about the British? Let them fare as well in our ports as other foreigners, inasmuch as they certainly grant as much to us as most others do, is all I contend for. I do not wish they should fare better.

The impressment of our seamen by the British is made use of as an objection to our carrying the Treaty into effect. It is, to be sure, a mortifying circumstance, and must excite our utmost detestation of such conduct. But let not our passions get the better of our judgment. We have no kind of evidence that such conduct is countenanced by their Admiralty, but the evidence we have is of a contrary nature, for, upon our Minister's remonstrating to the British Ministry on this point, they assured him that orders had been issued, and should be repeated to the commanders of their ships, not to commit such violences on our rights, at the same time observing, that, speaking the same language as we do, it was difficult in all cases to distinguish their seamen from ours. In this situation let us believe that a firm and spirited remonstrance will be made by our Executive against such outrages; and let us hope that it may have the desired effect. But, let me ask, if the Treaty should not be carried into effect, will that relieve that deserving class of our citizens? Will it not have probably a contrary effect, and be the means of increasing the evil tenfold more than it exists at present?

Tuesday, April 19.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, on the motion for making provision for carrying into effect the Treaty with Great Britain; when

Mr. Heath rose and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: In the discussion of this so momentous and important a subject, and so big at the same time with the dearest interests of our common country, I shall not attempt any critical analysis upon the good and bad parts of the instrument, as the gentlemen preceding me in this debate have already done, but only confine myself to a few remarks, to justify my conduct to God and my country for the vote I shall give in the ultimate decision of the question. Mr. Chairman, permit me here to remark, that during the recess of the last Congress, when the American mind was roused with so much irritation and sensibility through all parts of the Union against this paper, after its first appearance in public print, I was one of those who kept aloof from the storm, suspended my opinion, became of no party, considering myself hereafter bound to discharge the important duties of an American Representative on the occasion. And now since the commencement of the present session, though two-thirds of my time overwhelmed with disease, and daily languishing in the bed of pain, even under such a dreadful personal calamity, my reflections were not turned aside from the awfulness of the subject before us; which before and during this discussion, I confess, as often as I have revolved in my mind, with a review of the situation of my country, I have frequently paused, not knowing the best expedient to pursue to avoid impending evils.

Mr. Chairman, I have strange forebodings on this occasion. By the second and third articles of the instrument before you, in the surrender of the posts, British subjects have a right to reside with us; Indians have a right to pass and repass from post to post from our district to their portages and ferriages free, all in the vicinity within gun-shot. Will not their traders continue their old acquaintanceship with them in spite of us? Are not their capitals for trade larger than ours? Where, then, are the real profits anticipated? All visionary, like the beggar's dream, grasping mountains of gold, and when the morning sun shakes off his slumber, it dissipates the delusion. But time will make more converts than reason. Further, before I quit this subject of inequality, I wish to remark, by way of reply to my much respected friend from Connecticut, who was up a few days ago, in language nearly similar, and the same sort of ingenuity of a celebrated champion, who has dedicated much labor in favor of this instrument, under the signature of Camillus, that Great Britain had never violated the seventh article of the Treaty of Peace in not restoring the slaves and other property; that they were taken in war, and their freedom offered to them by the British commanders, and were not taken after a cessation of hostilities; and, therefore, were not proper objects of surrender. Oh, the deceit, the sophistry of this construction! I shall just answer it by reading from the Journals of the old Congress what the real Camillus, or, in other words, the learned Mr. Hamilton, thought of that article at that time. He read the Journals of 1783, where Mr. Hamilton moved in Congress for commissioners to be sent to New York to the British commander to request an explanation respecting an infraction of that article. So was Mr. Hamilton's opinion at that time, so was the prevalent opinion of all America at that time. My second point, the want of reciprocity in the instrument, has been so well explained by my worthy colleague from Virginia, that I confess I am curtailed in my sentiments a little here. But, suffice it to say, that the local circumstances of this country will make the suspension of the law of alienage more advantageous by tenfold, than could be reaped by American citizens over the other side of the water. Witness the great disproportion between American citizens holding lands in Britain and British subjects in this country. I wish it may not revive old proprietary rights, with its long train of tenure, fealty, and vassalage. Perhaps my fears may ensue from residing in that of Virginia, where this tenure once prevailed. I now come to the third objection, and the most important. Other objections, though they have their weight in my mind, yet perhaps they might yield their force, were it not for this the more insurmountable. This might be said with propriety to be the foundation of the call for papers from the Executive respecting the Treaty.

By the various articles embracing this subject, the House of Representatives of the United States, in the Treaty-making power, have lived to see the day, which I am sure no human sagacity could have ever divined, that they may be considered as a perfect collective cypherical body of men in legislation, reduced to a mere Committee of Ways and Means, subservient to Executive policy, just called together, for voting the necessary supplies of money for foreign negotiation, or for the current annual expenses of Government. America is here totally disarmed of every alternative to resort to in the hour of distress—to prevent the horrors of war, no sequestration, no embargo, no commercial restriction, can be the subject of future legislation against the tender and humane people of Britain.

Is this right, is this just, that all our rights should be thus bartered away under a Treaty-making power? If it is so, and it must be borne, dreadful, dreadful, indeed, must be the calamity of future generations of America, under the operation of this Government; for any one of them, or all together, I would resort to an awful national crisis, sooner than sound the trumpet of war, and let the banners of blood loose upon the earth.

Mr. Williams said, that various opinions had been delivered upon the various subjects involved in the Treaty. He should take the liberty of stating to the committee his sentiments on the occasion, and then inquire into the policy or impolicy of carrying the Treaty into effect. But, in the first place, he conceived it to be necessary to take a view of its origin, the division, and party dissensions which then prevailed—the critical posture of our affairs, the depredations committed on our commerce, and the probability of a war.

Let us, said Mr. W., take a view of the debates of that House in the year 1793 and 1794, and he believed it would be discovered that if the business of negotiation had not taken place, this country must have been involved in a war. It would be remembered, that a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) on the 3d of January, 1794, laid on the table of this House seven resolutions. The object of which was to compel Britain to come to some terms of accommodation, and to prevent further depredations on our commerce.

After a discussion of several weeks, the first resolution, which was for imposing an additional duty on the importation of a great variety of manufactures from nations having no Commercial Treaty with the United States was agreed to by a small majority. Britain had, said he, ever since the end of the war, declined entering into any Commercial Treaty with us. In the mean time, the danger from British depredations augmented with such rapidity that those resolutions became insufficient, by reason of the seizure of an immense number of our vessels, in consequence of instructions that had been given by the British Ministry on the 6th of November, 1793; and other resolutions were then moved for the sequestration of British property, but the result was an embargo and negotiation.

Was it not then urged by members of that House that the British nation refused to negotiate with them? It was, indeed, supposed it would be attended with considerable difficulties, and that a considerable class of citizens, let the consequences be what they might, would not be satisfied with the result. However, it was thought best to adopt the measure.

But, said Mr. W., let us waive this subject, and inquire if negotiation had failed, whether war would not have been the consequence? Can it be supposed that, after the British had committed certain spoliations on our commerce; after their Order of the 6th of November, 1793; after the declaration of Lord Dorchester to the Indians, that war would not have followed? The national pride of Great Britain could not have yielded to compulsion without self-degradation; and it would be remembered, too, that from the relation in which the two countries have stood to each other, it must have cost more to the pride of Britain to have received the law from us than from any other power. And if war had been the consequence, how were we to have recovered the amount of the spoliations committed on the property of our merchants? How were we to act? Were we to demand satisfaction? We have no protection to our commerce, and therefore the British can at any time arrest it without additional expense to themselves, having near 500 vessels of war at command.

What had been our situation ever since the negotiation? Have we not, said he, been one of the happiest nations upon earth? Yet we are about to oppose the necessary appropriations to carry into effect that Treaty which hath been the means of keeping us in a neutrality, and thereby hazard a war which may be our ruin.

But, if we arrest the Treaty by refusing to make the necessary appropriations, can we suppose Great Britain will carry the Treaty into effect on her part? It would be inconsistent to think so. Great Britain was certainly acquainted with what was going on within these walls, and would refuse to give up the posts at the time specified. Who had been the cause of the posts being so long kept from the United States? The State of New York had been too long kept from its just due; that State had not prevented the British from obtaining their debt, and the people now looked with anxious expectation to the time when the posts were to be given up. They were, at present, considerably alarmed, lest the British Treaty should not be carried into effect. He had received letters that morning, from some of his constituents, who were at New York, endeavoring to sell their produce (for a number of the farmers in that part of the country which he came from, did not sell their produce to the merchants, but attended the market with it themselves.) They write the price of flour had already fallen three dollars a barrel, and wheat four shillings per bushel. Who were to be the losers, under these circumstances? The farmers. Who had the most produce to sell? The farmers in the State of New York. The other day a resolution was laid upon our table, proposing to lay an embargo on the exportation of corn. This, if it had been agreed to, would have had an immediate effect on the State of New York.

What was the effect of the embargo in 1794? The farmers were obliged to sell their produce for what they could get. Whatever loss was experienced, fell upon the farmer; and so it will be with respect to their present proceedings. If merchants cannot get insurance, will they send their vessels out? No; and they will certainly give no more produce than they can sell their articles for, with a trade profit.

The great objection against the Treaty was, that payment for the negroes which were carried away by the British, at the close of the war, was not provided for. It appears that this, at best, was a doubtful point. General Carlton, previous to his leaving New York at the close of the war, and when the negroes were demanded of him, said, that many slaves had been declared free by his predecessors before his own arrival; over these, he said, he neither possessed nor could assume any control. He considered them as at liberty to go to any part of the world which they thought proper. He was unwilling to suppose that the British Ministry could stipulate, by any Treaty, to make themselves guilty of a notorious breach of public faith to people of any color. He considered restoration, where inseparable from a violation of that faith, as, in itself, utterly impracticable.

It was acknowledged by every gentleman that the Treaty of 1783 was broken by the United States; and, if so, what could their negotiator do? The British Government would not come into the same terms as the Treaty of 1783, in the sense and meaning of the gentleman from Virginia, nor would they admit that that Treaty compelled them to give up or make restitution for the negroes. Their negotiator, thus situated, no doubt concluded that the amount of the negroes was not an object which ought to prevent a negotiation so desirable at that time, and agreeable to the law of nations. The Treaty of 1783 had been violated. Here Mr. W. quoted several authorities, among which was Marten's Law of Nations: "The violation of one article only of a Treaty, by one party, may, at least successively, give the other a right to violate the whole Treaty, unless this right has been formally renounced."

The United States having violated that Treaty, there was no other way than commencing a negotiation. And would gentlemen say that the negotiation had not been attended with beneficial consequences to this country? Was not peace the most to be desired, especially in our present situation? Had not the managers of our Government kept a watchful eye on our affairs? Had not our neutrality been the occasion of our wealth and prosperity? And having now entered into a Treaty with Spain, Algiers, and Natives, let us carry that with Great Britain into effect, and secure to us peace with all the world.

When Mr. Williams had concluded—

Mr. Hillhouse rose and said, the subject now under consideration was one of the first in magnitude he had ever been called to deliberate upon, and that the circumstances under which it came up were peculiar, for previous to the Treaty's being either promulgated or known, a hue-and-cry had been raised, and the prejudices of the people as much as possible excited against it, and he confessed it had not been without its effect upon his own mind. When the Treaty came out, therefore, he was led to examine it with attention, compare it with our Treaties with other nations, and those between Great Britain and other nations; the result of this inquiry was, that he found that no privilege or advantage given by Great Britain to the other nations was withheld from us; that advantages were secured to us which were enjoyed by no other nation, nor even by her own subjects: that we gave her little that was not enjoyed by every other nation; and, on the whole, that it was as good a Treaty as we had a right to expect, and as he had ever expected to obtain. He was sensible that prejudice, which, like a sentinel at the door of the human mind to keep out truth and argument, had induced many good citizens of the United States at first to be opposed to the Treaty, who, upon being prevailed on to give it a more candid examination, had declared in favor of it; but he hoped the Representatives of the people, called to decide on a question which might affect the dearest interests of millions, would, as much as possible, divest themselves of prejudice and passion: to do it entirely, he believed, was impossible.

The first, and, if well-founded, the most important objection which he had heard made against the Treaty was, that a claim for negroes and other property carried away from New York had been wholly overlooked or given up by our Minister. Here, he said, he was sensible any argument he might adduce would be opposed by the party opinions formed at the time—when judging in our own case, and when we felt a great degree of sensibility for the losses and injuries we had recently experienced. He was not unapprised that Congress had claimed that the construction of the 7th article of the Treaty was such as to require the delivering up of the negroes, and had passed the resolution read by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Heath,) and that that opinion had, without examination, been implicitly followed by many respectable characters; but he hoped at this distance of time, he might expect a candid hearing, whilst he examined their arguments and the law of nations, to which alone resort can be had to decide differences between sovereign and independent nations. To his mind they were conclusive that we had not a well-founded claim; to every mind, he believed, they would render the claim at least doubtful.

His first inquiry, he said, should be, whether negroes were to be considered as property? This, he believed, must be admitted: they were thus recognized by the article itself, which says "negroes or other property." Negroes being mentioned amounts only to a specification of one kind of property; as, in the constitution, it says "capitation or other direct taxes," which is a conclusive recognition that a capitation tax is a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution. Upon no other ground than that of property could the United States claim them; as men, they had a right to go where they pleased. Our commissioners, at the time of the embarkation, had no hesitation in declaring that they considered "negroes, horses, and other property," as being precisely on the same footing, and selected a claim for a horse as one of the strongest that could be found to enforce a compliance with this construction of the article. The claim was in these words:

"Mr. Vanderburgh had a horse stolen from him, out of his stable in Beekman's Precinct, in Dutchess County, 26th February, 1780, and the horse was conveyed by the person who stole him to a then British post, in Westchester County, where he has since been detained; so that Mr. Vanderburgh could not recover him again. The horse is now in the possession of Col. James De Launcy, of this city, from whom Mr. Vanderburgh has demanded him, and who refuses to deliver him to Mr. Vanderburgh."

In the letter of the Commissioners to General Washington, on this subject, they say:

"In the interview between the 15th and 24th, numbers applied to us for a restitution of their negroes and other property in the possession of others, but we supposed it most eligible to defer a requisition till a clear unequivocal case, similar to that of Mr. Vanderburgh's, where the proofs were at hand and not embarrassed with the circumstances of a capture in war or other pretences under which property is withheld here, should present itself; sensible that if restitution was denied in such an instance, it would inevitably be in every other."

It therefore appears clear that negroes, horses, and other property, were, by this article, placed upon the same footing, and that it was as much a violation of the Treaty to carry away a horse as a negro.

He next proceeded to inquire what was the situation of this property, and in whom, according to the law of nations, it was vested at the time of executing the Treaty? This point, he said, Mr. Jefferson had fully settled to his hand, and read out of his collection the following extracts:

"We now come together (says Mr. Jefferson) to consider that instrument which was to heal our wounds, and begin a new chapter in our history. The state in which they found things is to be considered as rightful; so says the Law of Nations.—Vattel. The state in which things are found at the moment of the Treaty, should be considered as lawful, and if it is meant to make any change in it, the Treaty must expressly mention it. Consequently, all things about which the Treaty is silent, must remain in the state in which they are found at its conclusion.—Bynk. Since it is a condition of war that enemies may be deprived of all their rights, it is reasonable that every thing of an enemy's, found among his enemies, should change its owners, and go to the Treasury. It is moreover usually directed, in all declarations of war, that the goods of enemies, as well those found among us as those taken in war, shall be confiscated."

These authorities, he said, clearly proved that all negroes and other property which in the course of the war had been taken, or in any way had fallen into the hands of the British, had shifted their owner, and were no longer the property of the American inhabitants. In the case of negroes, the British Commander-in-Chief had exercised the highest act of ownership, by manumitting such of them as should conform to certain stipulations, pointed out in his proclamation. If any change was intended to have been made by the Treaty in the circumstances of these negroes, and it had been intended they should be again returned into bondage, there would have been some express stipulation to that effect in the Treaty. The words are, "and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies," &c. There is nothing that indicates the least intention that this article should have a retrospective operation. It can only relate to property then belonging to the American inhabitants. Wherever any article was intended to have a retrospective operation, some expression is used that clearly shows such intention. In this same article, speaking of delivering up records, deeds, &c., these words are added, "which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his officers," &c. In the 4th article, "debts heretofore contracted." Any other construction would have required the restoration of vessels which had been taken from the Americans, and were then in New York, under the term "other property," as well as negroes and horses. If any negroes or other property, in the possession of the American inhabitants at or after signing the preliminary articles, were carried off, it was no doubt a violation of the Treaty, but he had not understood that they refused to deliver up property of that description, or that such property was carried off to any great amount.

But this matter does not rest only on there being no words in the Treaty which can be construed to have a retrospective operation, but it is fairly to be inferred from the papers contained in this same collection of Mr. Jefferson, that it was so understood by the negotiators; for, in the course of that negotiation; it appears to have been a primary object with the British Minister to obtain restitution of the Tory estates, or compensation for them. They almost made a sine qua non, and a refusal to comply had well-nigh broken off the negotiation; and to induce the British Minister to relinquish that article, our commissioners brought in a claim for negroes and other property which had been taken, and towns and villages which had been destroyed during the war. He here read the following letter from Mr. Oswald, the British Minister, to our commissioners, viz:

"You may remember, that from the very beginning of our negotiation for settling a peace between Great Britain and America, I insisted that you should positively stipulate for the restoration of the property of all those under the denomination of Loyalists or Refugees, who have taken part with Great Britain in the present war; or if the property had been resold, and passed into such variety of hands as to render the restoration impracticable, (which you assert to be the case in many instances,) you should stipulate for a compensation or indemnification to those persons adequate to their losses. To those propositions, you said, you could not accede. Mr. Stachey, since his arrival at Paris, has most strenuously joined me in insisting upon the said restitution, compensation, or indemnification, and in laying before you every argument in favor of the demands, founded on national honor, and upon the true principles of justice. Those demands you must have understood to extend, not only to all persons of the above-mentioned description who have fled to Europe, but likewise to all those who may now be in any part of North America, dwelling under the protection of His Majesty's arm, or otherwise. We have also insisted on a mutual stipulation for a general amnesty on both sides, comprehending thereby an enlargement of all persons who, on account of offences committed, or supposed to be committed, since the commencement of hostilities, may now be in confinement, and for an immediate repossession of their properties and peaceable enjoyment thereof, under the Government of the United States. To this you have not given a particular and direct answer. It is, however, incumbent on me, as Commissioner of the King of Great Britain, to repeat the several demands, and without going over those arguments upon paper, which we have so often urged in conversation, to press your immediate attention to these subjects, and to urge you to enter into proper stipulations for their restitution, compensation, and amnesty, before we proceed further in this negotiation."

To which our commissioners returned the following answer:

"In answer to the letter you did us the honor to write on the 4th instant, we beg leave to repeat what we often said in conversation, viz: that the restoration of such of the estates of the refugees as have been confiscated, is impracticable, because they were confiscated by laws of particular States, and in many instances have passed by legal titles through several hands. Besides, sir, as this is a matter evidently appertaining to the internal policy of the separate States, the Congress, by the nature of our constitution, have no authority to interfere with it. As to your demand of compensation to those persons, we forbear enumerating our reasons for thinking it ill-founded. In the moment of conciliatory overtures, it would not be proper to call certain scenes into view, over which a variety of considerations should induce both parties at present to draw a veil. Permit us, therefore, only to repeat, that we cannot stipulate for such compensation, unless on your part it be agreed to make restitution to our citizens for the heavy losses they have sustained by the unnecessary destruction of private property. We have already agreed to an amnesty more extensive than justice required, and full as extensive as humanity would demand; we can therefore, only repeat, that it cannot be extended further. We should be sorry, if the absolute impossibility of our complying further with your propositions, should induce Great Britain to continue the war, for the sake of those who caused and prolonged it; but, if that should be the case, we hope that the utmost latitude will not be again given to its rigors. Whatever may be the issue of this negotiation, be assured, sir, that we shall always acknowledge the liberal, manly, and candid manner, in which you have conducted it."

In consequence of information from our commissioners that the claim was made and pertinaciously insisted on by the British Minister, Congress passed the following resolutions, viz:

"Resolved, That the Secretary for Foreign Affairs be, and he is hereby, directed to obtain, as speedily as possible, authentic returns of the slaves and other property which have been carried off or destroyed in the course of the war by the enemy, and to transmit the same to the Ministers Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace.

"Resolved, That, in the mean time, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs inform the said Minister, that many thousands of slaves, and other property to a very great amount, have been carried off or destroyed by the enemy, and that, in the opinion of Congress, the great loss of property which the citizens of the United States have sustained by the enemy, will be considered by the several States as an insuperable bar to their making restitution or indemnification to the former owners of property which has been or may be forfeited to, or confiscated by, any of the States."

Dr. Franklin, in a letter to the British Minister, says:

"I must repeat my opinion, that it is best for you to drop all mention of the refugees. We have proposed, indeed, nothing but what we think best for you as well as ourselves. But if you will have them mentioned, let it be in an article which may provide that they shall exhibit accounts of their losses to commissioners hereafter to be appointed, who shall examine the same, together with the accounts now preparing in America of the damages done by them, and state the account; and that if a balance appears in their favor, it shall be paid by us to you, and by you divided among them, as you shall think proper. And if the balance is found due to us, it shall be paid by you. Give me leave, however, to advise you to prevent so dreadful a discussion, by dropping the article, that we may write to America and stop the inquiry."

The following article was accordingly drawn up and proposed to be inserted in the Treaty, viz:

"It is agreed that His Britannic Majesty will earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to provide for and make compensation to the merchants and shopkeepers of Boston, whose goods and merchandise were seized and taken out of the stores, warehouses, and shops, by order of General Gage, and others of his commanders or officers there; and also the inhabitants of Philadelphia, for the goods taken away by his army there; and to make compensation also for the tobacco, rice, indigo, negroes, &c., seized and carried off by his armies under Generals Arnold, Cornwallis, and others, from the States of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia: And also for all vessels and cargoes belonging to the inhabitants of the said United States, which were stopped, seized, or taken, either in the ports or on the seas, by his Governors, or by his ships of war, before the declaration of war against the said States. And it is further agreed that His Britannic Majesty will also earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to make compensation for all the towns, villages, and farms, burnt and destroyed by his troops or adherents in the said United States."

After pressing the matter to the utmost extent, we find, by Mr. Adams's journal, that on the evening previous to signing the Treaty, Ministers on both sides came to the following result:

"Upon this I recounted the history of Gen. Gage's agreement with the inhabitants of Boston, that they should remove their effects, upon condition that they would surrender their arms; but as soon as the arms were secured, the goods were forbid to be carried out, and were finally carried off in large quantities to Halifax. Dr. Franklin mentioned the case of Philadelphia, and the carrying off effects there, even his own library. Mr. Jay mentioned several other things; and Mr. Laurens added the plunder in Carolina, of negroes, plate, &c. After hearing all this, Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Oswald, and Mr. Stachey, retired for some time, and returning Mr. Fitzherbert said, that upon consulting together, and weighing every thing as maturely as possible, Mr. Stachey and himself had determined to advise Mr. Oswald to strike with us according to the terms we had proposed, as to our ultimatum respecting the fishery, and the loyalists. Accordingly we all sat down, read over the whole Treaty and corrected it, and agreed to meet to-morrow at O.'s house, to sign and seal the Treaties."

Will any candid man say, after reviewing these circumstances, that the 7th article was meant to secure the restitution of negroes and other property taken in the course of the war? If that had been meant, would it not have been improper to have urged it as an argument against the introduction of an article which would have subjected this country to immense embarrassment and expense?

It is true that the United States did challenge negroes and other property, which had fallen into the hands of the British previous to signing the Treaty. This circumstance, for the reason he had mentioned, and others that might be suggested, ought to have very little weight, for it is well known that recrimination of a violation of the Treaty soon commenced on both sides, and each mustered up every tolerable claim; many of which have since been admitted on both sides to be groundless. A circumstance which strongly corroborated what he said was, Sir Guy Carlton's letter on that subject had also been so grossly misunderstood and misrepresented, from that time to this, and now advanced by a gentleman on this floor, (Mr. Giles,) and even by Mr. Jefferson—in this instance departing from that candor which is so conspicuous in almost every other part of this excellent performance—for, when speaking on this subject, he says, "here there was a direct, unequivocal, and avowed violation of this part of the 7th article, in the first moment of its being known." Mr. Jefferson has given us a copy of Sir Guy Carlton's letter to General Washington, which is relied on to support this assertion, which is so far from speaking such a language, that in his opinion, it was directly the reverse, and that in a very pointed manner. His words are:

"I must confess, that the mere supposition that the King's Minister could deliberately stipulate in a Treaty an engagement to be guilty of a notorious breach of the public faith towards people of any complexion, seems to denote a less friendly disposition than I could wish, and I think less friendly than we might expect. After all, I only give my own opinion. Every negro's name is registered, the master he formerly belonged to, with such other circumstances as serve to denote his value, that it may be adjusted by compensation, if that was really the intention and meaning of the Treaty. Restoration was inseparable from a breach of public faith, and is, as I think all the world must allow, utterly impracticable."

Gen. Washington, at that time, seemed disinclined to give an opinion on that subject, but intimated the propriety of leaving any doubtful clause of the Treaty to be settled by future negotiation; for in a letter from him to our commissioners in New York, dated June, 1783, who had written to him for particular and pointed instructions on this very subject, there is this passage:

"It is exceeding difficult for me, not being a witness to the particular cases, or acquainted with the particular circumstances which must fall under your view in the course of the evacuation, to give you a precise definition of the acts which you are to represent as infractions of the Treaty; nor can I undertake to give an official construction of any particular expression or terms of the Treaty, which must, in cases of ambiguity or different interpretations, be explained by the Sovereignties of the two nations, or their commissioners appointed for that purpose."

A letter drawn up with great caution and extremely characteristic of that great man, who has always been extremely careful never to commit himself, but upon mature deliberation and upon sure ground. Here, Sir Guy Carlton, as a public officer of Great Britain, had made an explicit declaration on the subject, and that was directly against our claims; for his directing an inventory of the negroes, was only an evidence of his being disposed to conduct candidly in the matter, and give us an opportunity to recover a compensation, if we could afterwards make out our construction of the Treaty to be right.

Both in the United States and Great Britain it is admitted, as a sound rule of construction, that where any law or instrument is doubtful, and the liberty of any one, even of a slave, to be affected by it, that construction was to be preferred which was favorable to liberty. Under this rule, ought this Treaty to be so construed as to reduce to slavery three thousand persons who had obtained their liberty, by putting themselves under the protection of the British arms, unless there was some positive unequivocal stipulation in the Treaty which could admit of no other construction, he hoped, for the honor of America, they would make no such challenge. There was another circumstance which he had never seen mentioned, which, in his opinion, greatly weakened our claims, which was the doubts he entertained of our right to demand of a foreign nation the restitution of a runaway slave. The United States are now at peace with all the world; suppose a slave should escape into the dominions of a foreign nation, and on demand they should refuse to deliver him up? he very much doubted whether we should have just ground of complaint. On the other hand, if any of our citizens may be so unfortunate as to be reduced to slavery by any of the Barbary powers in Africa, should make their escape into the dominions of any of the European nations, and upon being claimed by such powers, should be delivered up, he did believe we should have good ground of complaint against such nation, as being unjust and inhumane. And, so far as principle is concerned, what difference does it make whether the citizens of the United States are carried into slavery in Africa, or the inhabitants of Africa are brought into slavery in the United States? He knew of no principle that made a difference between the natural rights of a white or black man. The first principle that is laid down in the rights of man, is, that all men are born free and equal; it does not say all white men. He did not believe, he said, that the House would ever admit so absurd a doctrine, as that the different shades in a man's complexion would increase or diminish his natural rights. He hoped no gentleman would take any exception to what he had said on this point; he did not mean to give offence, or to throw any reflection on any part of the Union, on account of their having a larger proportion of slaves. It was an evil which existed at the commencement of our Revolution, and he trusted every part of the Union would get rid of the evil as soon as it should be practicable and safe. What he had said, was only what he felt himself bound to do in justification of our Minister for his having given up that claim.

Mr. Hillhouse requested gentlemen to pause a moment, and reflect what will be our situation if this Treaty is rejected. The peace of 1783 is agreed on both sides to have been infracted, since that Great Britain has committed depredations on our commerce to an immense amount. Is it supposed that all this matter can go off without any noise or combustion? As to treating again, no one can suppose that we could do it to any advantage, after such rejection. What may Great Britain expect, if we will not settle our differences by negotiation? Will she not expect that we shall resort to more violent measures—such as reprisal, sequestration, or stopping of intercourse? And to guard herself against such measures, may we not expect she will lay her hand upon all our property on the ocean? He said he looked upon such events as the natural consequences of our rejecting the Treaty. What may we expect will be the conduct of our own citizens? Will they tamely submit to be robbed of their property, when they lose all hope of aid or protection from the Government? They will not; they will defend it even to the shedding of blood; and not only so, but they will also take every opportunity they have to make reprisal for the property they have already lost upon those who did them the injury, whether they belong to one nation or another. What, he asked, could be the end of all these things but war?

Wednesday, April 20.

Treaty with Great Britain.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect, being under consideration,

Mr. Page said, that he had heard no arguments in favor of the resolution before the committee, but such as might be used to influence a vote at any other time, and upon almost any occasion; for we are told that war, or popular discontent, and great inconvenience and distress to merchants, underwriters, and others, will be the consequence of its rejection. If such threats can influence this House upon the present occasion, an unhappy and mortifying comparison may be made between the Congress of 1776, and that of the present day. They despised and encountered the dangers of war actually commenced. He wished, when members were disposed to mention their fears of such dangers, they would first clear the galleries; for such communications ought to be secret. Did members really believe that Great Britain will declare war against the United States, if this House should refuse to be accessary to the violation of the constitution, the destruction of their own rights, of the rights of neutral nations, and of the interests of their constituents? If they do believe this, is their belief founded on conjecture alone, or on the negotiator's declaration, that the British Ministers threatened him with war, declaring that war should be the consequence of a rejection of the Treaty? If the latter be the case, and nothing less can justify such repeated assertion that war will be the consequence of a refusal to carry the Treaty into effect, the Treaty ought to be deemed null and void on account of that threat; and if the former, they may be assured that they are mistaken, and that Britain is not so frantic as to engage in a war with the United States upon such slight grounds. The citizens of the United States wish not to be at war with the British nation; nor can the people of Britain desire a war with them. Both must wish for peace, and a full commercial intercourse upon liberal terms; and as the Executive authority of both countries are well disposed to each other, and have, as far as in their power, carried the Treaty into execution, what reason can be assigned why we should be involved in a war? It has been said that the United States will be obliged to declare war, on account of the British refusal (which may be expected) to deliver up the posts, and to make compensation for spoliations of our commerce; but I see no necessity for such conduct. For my part, should Britain never give up the posts, I would not vote for war, nor be at the expense of a single regiment to take them; nor would I go to war to recover losses sustained by spoliations. For, if we reject the resolution before you, sir, we may be at liberty to pass such a bill as we I passed in the year 1794, by a majority of twenty-four members, and for which thirteen Senators then voted; and should the Senate concur with us in passing it, we might use it more effectually than a declaration of war for the recovery of the posts, and reparation of wrongs. As to war, as my colleague yesterday said, I have reason to deprecate it, for the sake of my constituents, and for my own sake; for I have experienced enough of its evils; but I cannot think that I ought to sacrifice their dearest interests merely from an apprehension of the dangers of war. The arguments, therefore, which I have heard, cannot induce me to vote for the resolution before you. Indeed, sir, I must vote against it; because I think that the Treaty is unconstitutional and pernicious; and even if it were constitutional in every respect, and as advantageous to the United States as it has been represented, I should think it impolitic and dishonorable in this House to lend its aid to carry it into effect during the present war, and a continuance of the British depredations on our commerce, and impressment of our seamen. The Treaty appears to me unconstitutional, because it takes from Congress that very power with which it was invested by the constitution, and to invest them with which, the constitution itself was expressly formed; a power which I think should be held as precious and unalienable. I mean the power of regulating the commerce of the United States with Great Britain; so as to induce her to fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, and to put the trade of the United States with her upon a footing of reciprocity. It appears also unconstitutional, because it violates a solemn act of Congress passed in conformity to the express words, and I may say, in obedience to the injunction of the spirit of the constitution: I mean the act for establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, and this violation, too, operates partially, and in favor of British subjects alone. It is moreover unconstitutional, because it interferes with the authority of the Judiciary, by establishing a Court of Commissioners, a kind of supreme court of appeals, within the United States, with powers to proceed, unknown to our laws; with temptations to defendants to make no defence; with a right to bind the United States to pay debts which they owe not, and to any extent or amount which that court may think fit to decree; and it is unconstitutional, because it authorizes the President to create certain offices, and annex salaries thereto. In these instances, at least, I think the Treaty unconstitutional; for I think that Congress cannot authorize the President to do away the power of Congress or to establish a court of appeals superior to the Federal Supreme Court; that, whatever would be unconstitutional, if done by Congress, cannot be constitutional if done by the President and British King. But, sir, if the Treaty were not unconstitutional, that is, if the President and Senate had a right to deprive Congress of the power it claims, and to interfere with the Judiciary, yet the exercise of that right in the present case, ought to be viewed as so pernicious to the United States as to render the Treaty null and void; or, at least, it ought to be viewed as an argument of sufficient weight to induce this House to refuse their aid towards carrying this Treaty into operation. And were it even constitutional and advantageous to the United States in every article, yet, as it acquiesces in a violation of the rights of neutral nations in favor of Great Britain, and in some instances, to such a degree as to be thought even by the President himself, to afford just ground for discontent on the part of our allies, it will be dishonorable and highly impolitic in this House to be in any manner instrumental in carrying it into effect. As it has not been in the power of the United States to assist their Republican allies, when fighting in fact their battles, the least they can do, or the least that the world and those allies can expect from them, must be, that they will not put the enemies of those allies into a better condition than they were by making Treaties with them during the present war.

Mr. Findlay said he should not think it necessary to resume any of the arguments relative to a principle which had already been settled in that House; yet, he observed, that every gentleman who spoke on the subject seemed to argue what were the rights of that body upon the subject of Treaties, as if no question had already been had on the occasion.

It had been insisted upon, notwithstanding the decision which had been had, that a Treaty was a law when it came before that House, and they had no power but to appropriate to carry it into effect. He said this opinion was directly contrary to the opinion held on the constitution at the time it was accepted in Pennsylvania. Moral discretion, he said, was necessary to be exercised in every decision of that House, except the constitution had prescribed to them some positive rule of action. In ratifying the constitution in the State of Pennsylvania, this was the understanding of it. The minority in the convention did not wish so much power placed in the Executive, and he appealed to gentlemen in that convention, if this was not the doctrine asserted by the majority in answer to the objections of the minority. Indeed, if they were not to have exercised a moral obligation upon the Treaties, the constitution would have expressly said so, as in the case of the President's salary, the pay of the Judges, Army appropriations, &c. If they had not been limited in these articles by the constitution, they certainly would have had the power to have changed them if they had thought proper.

But, passing over this consideration, there had been pretty large views taken of the manner in which the Treaty came before them. The gentlemen from New York and Virginia had entered into the subject. He must beg leave to differ from the gentleman from New York as to the matter of fact relative to that House in the concerns of Government two years ago. He had no apprehensions at the time the Envoy was sent to Britain to negotiate a Treaty, that Britain would have commenced a war if that measure had not been adopted; so far from it, that a majority of that House thought differently. He had no doubt that war, and the destruction of liberty altogether, had been meditated by Great Britain; but before the negotiation was commenced, circumstances occurred which caused her to give up this extravagant design. Before the negotiator was appointed, it is well known that the plundering Order of the 6th November was revoked. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) had given a very good narrative of events in Europe, which fully showed the cause of this change of conduct. That gentleman had also gone through the Treaty, article by article, in a manner so much to his satisfaction, that he should not attempt to follow him. Before the negotiation took place, we had suffered considerably by British spoliations, and that House thought of various means to make it the interest of that power not to continue their depredations. First one plan was proposed and then another. It need not be mentioned that amongst these was the plan of sequestration, the future power of doing which this Treaty proposed to deprive them of. It was discussed in the House, but no question taken on it, to show that negotiation was not thought necessary. He mentioned a conversation which had taken place betwixt a gentleman then in the Cabinet (now no more) and himself, which confirmed his opinion of the propriety of the measures. A bill for regulating commerce in such a manner as to make it the interest of Britain to refrain from injuring us, and redress the wrongs we had suffered by spoliations, was agreed to by the House, but negatived in the Senate. So far from being then afraid of war, they were more and more convinced that it was in their power to make it the interest of Britain to refrain from their acts of violence towards us.

Mr. Moore.—Mr. Chairman, I rise with diffidence to give my sentiments on so important a question as that now before you, especially as I have been preceded by gentlemen whose superior abilities have enabled them to investigate the subject with more accuracy than I am capable of. I consider the object as important of itself. It is rendered more so by the warmth with which it has been discussed—the irritation it has produced, both in this House and on the public mind. I lament that improper motives should be imputed to gentlemen on either side. I am disposed to believe, that gentlemen aim at doing what will best promote the public interest. I entertain no suspicion of designs against the Government by any member of this House, or any branch of the Government. Gentlemen have predicted a war and dissolution of the Government, if provision is not made for carrying the Treaty into effect. I have no apprehensions of either. It is highly improper to attempt to influence the votes of members by such declarations. I hope gentlemen will believe that members who differ from them in opinion, are equally zealous with themselves in discharging their duty, and have firmness enough to repel every attempt to intimidate. For myself, I have equal confidence in every part of the Union, that they have no wish to dissolve it. The suggestion is unfounded, and ought not to be made.

Mr. Chairman, the vote which I shall give on the question before us, will, in some degree, be influenced by a constitutional principle, which I consider as involved in the decision. On the resolution calling for the instructions given to Mr. Jay, and other papers relative to the Treaty, it was insisted on by members of this House, that the Executive has a right, by Treaty, to supersede all Legislative powers vested in Congress by the constitution. The Executive gives the same construction to the constitution. If, under these circumstances, I vote for the resolution before you, I consider myself as admitting, as recognizing the principle contended for. This I cannot do. On the admission, or rejection of this principle, I am of opinion, the future course, the future operations of Government materially depend. By this it will be decided, whether it is wholly Executive or not: whether this House depends on the courtesy of the Executive for their right to interfere in legislation.

It has been argued, that this extensive, unlimited power, was necessarily vested in the Executive, subject only to the control of the Senate. In order to support the sovereignty and independence of the small States, I do conceive that a branch of the Legislature in which the States are equally represented, was all that could be claimed. Can it be conceived to be necessary, just, or proper, that the regulation of all the important interests of the Union should be at the disposal of the Executive? Can gentlemen seriously believe that the citizens of the United States, who opposed, at so great an expense of blood and treasure, the claim of Great Britain to tax us unrepresented, would admit all their interest to be represented by so unequal a representation as that contended for? It has been asked, Is not the Senate as worthy of the confidence of the citizens of the United States as this House? I will ask, are they more? This Legislative power is restrained and checked by the constitution; particular modes and restrictions are prescribed, but no checks are imposed on the Executive. Were the people jealous of this House, and not of the other branches? Did they suspect the Legislature of doing wrong? When this House was connected with the other branches, were they to regulate their interests; and have they reposed unlimited confidence in the other branches when acting without this? Did they consider this House as the only branch from which any danger was to be apprehended? It is impossible, yet this must have been the fact, if the construction given to the constitution is a just one.

A gentleman from Connecticut has said, that gentlemen had prejudged the Treaty; they come forward with prejudices against it, determined to vote against it. It is not so with me. I was strongly inclined to vote for it; to make some degree of sacrifice rather than defeat it.

Gentlemen, on reflection, must be convinced that the question has not been prejudged. The Envoy was appointed at the moment when this House was deliberating on means for preventing further spoliations on our commerce. Commercial regulations were proposed, and other means from which they might have been forced to abandon their unjust and oppressive system. I remember well the arguments then used were convincing to my mind; that those were the only weapons of defence within our power; that they would be effectual. But these were arrested by the despatch of an Envoy Extraordinary. Some of the leading features of the Treaty were then predicted; the event has corresponded with those predictions. Principles were then discussed, which the Treaty contains, before the negotiator was appointed.

This shows there was no prejudging in the manner gentlemen have stated. By this Treaty all the measures then contemplated by the Legislature are arrested; an eternal veto is imposed against our ever carrying the measures then contemplated into effect. This shows that the Executive claims not only the constitutional right of forcing this House to pass what laws they please, but also, by Treaty, to declare what they shall not do.

We have passed a resolution, which is now on your files, declarative of the sense of this House as to their constitutional rights. The question is, however, undecided. The Executive and Senate will proceed to act on their own construction. They may, on their own construction, make a Treaty, which will imply a still more imperious and commanding necessity to provide for its execution, than even the present case. This necessity may force a relinquishment of the right contended for by this House. It may force an acquiescence in the Executive regulating all the interests of the Union. I believe it was not the sense of the framers of the constitution. It is not the sense of the people who adopted it. It never can be mine.

The merits of the Treaty have been ably and accurately discussed. I will make but a few remarks on it. I must disagree with the gentleman from Connecticut, who mentioned, as a well-known principle in judging of Treaties, that all property, (by fair construction, and by the established law of nations,) if not excepted particularly in a Treaty, remains in the same state in which it was found when the Treaty was made. Those in possession retain the possession. From this he has concluded, that negroes, taken during the war, had become the property of the captors, or rather, were emancipated. The words of the Treaty of Peace are, "negroes and other property."

This plainly shows, in his opinion, that, by negroes, was not meant those taken during the war; they were not American property. The property was changed. It could only be intended, such negroes as were taken after the peace. I will ask, was it ever known in a Treaty, that a stipulation was made to give up property plundered after the peace? Is it not an established principle amongst all civilized nations, that plundered property shall be given up? Is it necessary, or was it ever thought so, to make it a stipulation by Treaty? I believe, if his construction is a just one, it is a new case, the provision was at least nugatory.

But if the principle he lays down is a just one, how does it happen that debts due to British subjects, paid by the debtors into the Treasury under the sanction of a law, and appropriated to the use of the State, are now recoverable by the British creditor? An important case of this kind has been decided in the Federal Court, and judgment given for the British creditor. Was the property less changed by the law of a sovereign and independent State, than by the proclamation of a British commander? This cannot be. The fact is, however, that in two cases, found in the same instrument, there are claims founded on the same principle; the one, a British claim, is established, the other, a claim of the United States, is rejected. This involves in it an absurdity. By those opposed modes of construction, an important claim of the citizens of the United States is given up by the Treaty, a claim against them to a great amount is established.

The claim as against us is admitted; our claim is rejected, in cases where the same principle fairly applies, and where, by gentlemen's own showing, there is no dissimilarity which can justify such opposite constructions. There is another provision of the Treaty, by which an important interest has been sacrificed. British subjects held lands within the United States before the war; many of those claims were barred; the claimant being an alien could not recover; his being an alien was the only bar. It was effectual—such has been the decision of the Courts. But by the Treaty, being aliens shall not bar the claim of British subjects—thus, many of the extensive claims are restored. In some of the States more than half their territory will be revested in proprietors. What could induce this grant? What equivalent do we receive for this sacrifice? Sir, I am constrained to think the Treaty a bad one, in those instances I have mentioned, more so than in any others. And when I connect with the Treaty itself the important constitutional question which has been discussed, I cannot vote for the resolution before you.

Mr. Kittera.—Since the 4th of July, 1776, the Councils of America have not been agitated by so momentous a question as that at present before the committee. At the period to which I allude, the question was, whether we should tamely submit to an abject and disgraceful slavery, with all its concomitant evils, or, by a Declaration of Independence, an exertion of our internal strength, with the advantages of foreign aid, make a bold and manly effort to obtain the blessings of freedom—the solid rewards of well-earned liberty. The present question is, whether we shall supply the means of carrying into execution a Treaty of Commerce and Amity with a powerful nation, entered into by a Minister of the United States, and solemnly ratified by the authorities constituted by the people for such purposes; or, by refusing, perhaps unconstitutionally refusing those means, hazard the peace, interrupt the prosperity, and tarnish the honor of the country? In a question of such magnitude, prudence calls me to pause, duty to reflect. My country's faith is plighted, a solemn contract is made; it would therefore be unwise and impolitic, as it concerns the interest, and dishonorable, as it regards the character, of this nation, in the infancy of its existence, to violate so solemn a contract.

Two causes have contributed much to prejudice the American mind against the Treaty. 1st. An enthusiasm for France, struggling in the cause of liberty, against the combined Monarchs of Europe, in which combination, the very power with whom the Treaty was made, formed a prominent part. 2dly. Strong resentment against Britain, for injuries received during a tedious and cruel war, and those injuries renewed by a detention of our Western posts, exciting and aiding the savage Indian tribes in the commission of hostilities on our frontiers, with strong indication of a design to contract our boundaries, and their lawless depredations on our commerce. I will not add, that there are amongst us some irreconcilable enemies to this Government, who opposed its adoption, predicted its downfall, and whose pride and political consequence are suspended on the fulfilment of this prediction. For the honor of human nature, and for the character of my country, I hope there are few to answer this description; if, however, there are any, the poet's execration is to them peculiarly applicable: "Cursed be the man who owes his greatness to his country's ruin?"

There are some things in which the candid part of those who hear me will not disagree. 1st. That our Envoy was a wise and honest man; he was a tried patriot, skilled in diplomatic life, and rendered to his country important services during the late war. The tale of his receiving British gold was made for children and fools, and need only to be told, to be disbelieved. 2dly. He made the best bargain he could. I will not mention, in proof of this, the ratification of the contract, eight months afterwards, by the President, (in whom this country has certainly an unbounded confidence,) with the advice of two-thirds of the Senate; but I have proof positive. The letter of Mr. Pinckney, our Minister resident at London, and conversant with every part of the negotiation, in strong and decided terms advises Mr. Jay to accept the contract as the best that could be procured, and as one that would promote the interests of this country. 3dly. If negotiations had been unsuccessful; if the Treaty, on the terms offered, had been rejected, war must have ensued. Our national honor would have forbidden a tame submission under so many insults and injuries; such submission would have invited new insults, and our own safety would have made resistance and retaliation necessary.

The Treaty naturally presents itself under two general heads: 1st. Such parts of it as are permanent, to wit, the first ten articles. 2dly. Such parts of it as are temporary, to continue for two years after the expiration of the war in which Great Britain is now engaged. Three great points are embraced under the first arrangement: a surrender of our Western posts, compensation for the spoliations committed on our commerce, and the payment of British debts. However lightly my colleague from the western part of Pennsylvania (Mr. Findlay) spoke yesterday of the Western posts, I consider the acquisition as an important treasure to this country. It will not only increase the value of our Western lands, and open to us a new source of commerce, but it will relieve us from the expense and horrors of an Indian war. Those were the sentiments of the gentleman himself, on this floor, two years ago. The spoliation on our commerce has generally been estimated at five millions of dollars. On a rejection of the Treaty, I wish the gentlemen in the opposition to point out how the American merchants are to be reimbursed for their loss. Nothing can be expected from new negotiations. It would be a solemn mockery of justice to the claim of those citizens. Payment out of the Treasury has been talked of, and a resolution to that effect is now on your table. This can never be done. It would be without a precedent, and Congress has heretofore refused the claim. And how can you discriminate such claims from those rising from savage depredations on your frontier settlers? The protection of the Government was, at least, as much due to the peaceable farmer as the speculating merchant; and if losses have arisen for want of such protection, compensation is as justly due in the one case as in the other. But why are we to subject the Government to this payment, or our citizens to this loss, when compensation is offered by the nation that has done the wrong? As to British debts, the committee have had various calculations of their amount.

I believe some of the estimates have been exceedingly exaggerated. If they are even half the enormous sum that has been stated on the other side, we have not much difficulty in accounting for the extraordinary opposition to the administration of this Government that has appeared in a certain quarter of the Union. Whatever may be the amount, the nation is bound by the strongest ties of justice and national honor to secure the payment.

Mr. Holland said, he would submit some considerations to the committee, that, together with those which had been given, would influence his vote upon the resolution on the table; a subject, as had been said by all who advocated the resolution, of the first importance—an issue on which depended peace or war. He said, he considered the question of some importance, particularly as it related to their constitutional powers; but the conceptions of gentlemen had exaggerated the result of the present question. It was nothing more or less than, would they or would they not now appropriate moneys to carry the British Treaty into effect? He said, he had ever felt a disposition to that purpose; not because the faith of the nation, as had often been said, was pledged; not because they were under moral obligations, as had been contended for—neither of which he could admit; but because a respect was due to the negotiator, to the Senate who advised, and to the President who ratified it; for, it was to be presumed, until the contrary appeared, that they exercised their judgments for the good of the nation. But it was possible the means they have adopted may not produce the end intended; they may have been mistaken.

When he first examined the instrument, he was in hopes that there was something extrinsic existing, which, when communicated to him, would do away the exceptions on the face of the instrument, and therefore he was silent and suspended his judgment. It was for that purpose he had voted for the papers relative to the negotiation to be laid on the table, in hopes of obtaining further information, previous to his being called upon to carry it into effect. But, unfortunately for him, no further information was to be obtained. The useful papers, an innocent and humble request, were not granted. He was not possessed of any other information than could be drawn from the instrument, from the writers on that subject, and the arguments that had been advanced by the gentlemen who had advocated the resolution; to the whole of which he had with candor attended, and with regret informed the committee, that nothing had been advanced, that had convinced him of the reason, propriety, necessity, or fitness, of the stipulations contained in the instrument.

Those gentlemen, instead of reasoning, have endeavored to alarm. They have said that, if we do not carry this Treaty into effect, that we shall be plunged in a war; that Britain is a proud and haughty nation; that they will lay their hands upon all our property, &c. This was an address to our fears and not our reason, and were our fears once on the wreck, there is no knowing the result, or where we should land. But, in this instance, we would not be governed by panic, or dread of the power of that haughty nation, as they had been called; but as the Representative of a free and independent nation, he felt himself perfectly at liberty to exercise his reason in the most cool and deliberate manner. Not apprehending any danger, the time has been, and now is, that we are perfectly secure in asserting our equal and reciprocal rights with that nation. We have done it in a state of infancy and inexperience, at a time much more unfavorable, taking each side of the question into view, than the present. And shall we now hesitate, and tamely suffer them to dictate to us? And are we bound to accept the Treaty, lest they should be offended and treat us with contempt for not accepting, as it is said, a more favorable offer than they have given to other nations? Are we not the sole judges; have we not a right to determine for ourselves? And as this is a mere naked stipulation, they can receive no damage, nor, on this early notice, can they charge with deception, or have any right to complain. One thing is certain; so long as Great Britain finds it for her interest to be pacific, she will adopt measures calculated to preserve peace; but when interest dictates the contrary, her invention will not seek a pretext for a different conduct. The history of that nation gives abundant proof of this.

Mr. Swanwick objected that his colleague (Mr. Kittera) had charged him with a want of candor. He was liable to mistake, he said, equally with any other man; but he trusted he should not be charged with knowingly misstating any thing with respect to the East India trade; he had reserved to himself a future opportunity of speaking on that subject, which, however, the length of debate seemed likely to prevent. He had said that the American vessels were permitted to trade to the East Indies as all other nations were, but that they were obliged to land their goods in the United States, whilst the Danes, Swedes, &c., could go there and carry the goods which they purchased from thence to any part of the world, except to the British dominions; and that was the situation of America antecedent to the present Treaty. A ship of his, some time ago, earned a good freight from Bengal to Ostend, and another he knew had lately made one to Hamburg; but, by the Treaty before the House, whatever advantages might be made by going to a foreign port their vessels were deprived of, and must return direct to the ports of the United States. These, he said, were stipulations which no other nation lay under; and though, perhaps, no nation had special leave stipulated by Treaty to go there, yet they all, nevertheless, did go, and never met with any opposition.

Friday, April 22.

Execution of British Treaty.

After the presentation of several petitions on this subject, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, when the resolution for carrying into effect the British Treaty being under consideration—

Mr. Coit said, that the importance of the resolution before the committee would preclude all necessity of analogy for any member's asking their attention to his observations. He should only add to it, that he should endeavor not to repeat what had been already said.

He observed, that the discussion of the merits of the Treaty came before the committee under peculiar disadvantages, for, besides the prejudices against it that might be supposed to have been caused by extraneous circumstances, the agitation of the important constitutional question relative to the right of the Legislature to concur in giving validity to this Treaty, which was claimed to be valid and complete without that concurrence, and the refusal of a call for papers had very naturally a tendency to give a bias to the minds of some gentlemen against the Treaty; for himself, he was fully satisfied the Legislature had no constitutional connection with the business of making Treaties.

Mr. C. said he should attempt to run through the objections which had been made to the Treaty, and consider its merits independently of the peculiar circumstances under which it was now presented to the committee, and then give his own view of it as relative to those peculiar circumstances.

The objects of the negotiation, he said, very naturally were divided into three parts—the inexecution of the Treaty of 1783; mutual complaints between the United States and Great Britain relative to transactions independent of the Treaty; and arrangements for the intercourse between the two nations, commercial and political. But as gentlemen had made their objections generally in the order in which the several articles of the Treaty had been arranged, he should follow the same order in his observations in answer to them.

The first objection which had been made was, that no compensation had been stipulated to the United States for the supposed breach of the Treaty of 1783, in carrying off the negroes. This objection, he had supposed, was so completely answered by his colleague, (Mr. Hillhouse,) who had been up the day before, that he should not have added on that head, but that he had since found gentlemen still insisting on that objection. He was particularly surprised to hear the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Findlay) stating that he conceived the negro article to have been put into the Treaty expressly as a compensation or set-off for the engagement to pay the British debts. This pretension, he thought, had been fully refuted by the extract from Mr. Adams's journal, quoted by Mr. Jefferson in his correspondence with Mr. Hamilton, and which had been read by his colleague. From that extract, it appeared that a claim for negroes and other property which had been plundered, carried off, and destroyed by the British, was made by our commissioners, as a set-off against a claim made by the British commissioners for restoration of confiscated estates; and that the one of those claims was abandoned with the other. Had the gentleman from Pennsylvania taken the pains to examine the journal of Mr. Adams, which might be seen by any member of the committee at the office of the Secretary of State, he would have found how the article came to be inserted.

Before the signing of the Treaties with which the extract made by Mr. Jefferson is closed, stands in the original the history of this article in these words:

"Mr. Laurens said, there ought to be a stipulation that the British troops should carry off no negroes or other property; we all agreed. Mr. Oswald consented, and then the Treaties were signed," &c.

This, Mr. Coit said, was all the mention he could find respecting this article, except in a subsequent part of the same letter, in which Mr. Adams observes:

"I was very happy that Mr. L. came in, although it was the last day of the conferences, and wish he could have been sooner. His apprehension, notwithstanding his deplorable affliction under the recent loss of so excellent a son, is as quick, his judgment as sound, and his heart as firm as ever. He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and judging and approving; and the article which he caused to be inserted at the very last, that no property should be carried off, which would most probably, in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs, have escaped us, was worth a longer journey, if that had been all, but his name and weight is added, which is of much greater consequence."

From these extracts, it appeared, the article was not a subject of negotiation, but inserted at the close of the transaction, without discussion, as a matter of course, and which Mr. Adams supposes might, in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs, have been omitted, if Mr. Laurens had not suggested it.

Mr. C. said, he would candidly acknowledge that it was very extraordinary to him, that the construction which had been generally put on the article in America, should have so universally prevailed, if it was not the true one, that Congress should have adopted it; and that such should have been the idea of the commissioners appointed to superintend the embarkation at New York, in the year 1783. Still more extraordinary was it to him, to find Mr. Jay himself, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the year 1786, in a report he then made to Congress on the subject, considering the carrying off of those negroes as a violation of the Treaty, and saying further, that he understood from Mr. Adams, then at the Court of London, that the British Minister had no objections to making compensation for them. Still he believed, the true construction of the article was, that it was designed only to prevent plunder by the British troops, and carrying off of American property, according to the ordinary agreements in Treaties, which stipulate for the giving up of conquered countries. True, it might be asked, why say negroes or other property? The expression, he agreed, was not correct, unless a doubt might have been entertained whether negroes were property; but the word negroes must be qualified by other property, with which it is connected, and could operate only as if it had said horses or other property, which no person would contend amounted to a stipulation not to carry off what had once been, but by the laws of war and nations, before the close of the war, had ceased to be the property of American inhabitants. Four gentlemen from Virginia had insisted on this objection, and not one of them had deigned to remark on the construction of the article itself. They had all relied upon the common understanding of it. That this understanding could not change the sense of the article, if it was not doubtful, could not be denied. Their leaving the article and resorting to the common understanding of it, he conceived to be a tacit acknowledgment of the gentlemen, that the instrument itself would not bear the construction they wished to give it.

Whether the negotiator had urged this construction of the article, and found he could not obtain its admission, or even an arbitration upon it, he did not know; from his opinion of the good sense and understanding of Mr. Jay, however, he was for himself satisfied that, whatever might have been his former opinions, on attending to the subject, he had found what had been called the American construction was not the just one, and had therefore abandoned it.

Mr. C. said, he was aware that the construction he contended for had been called the British construction, and Camillus's construction; that he had himself, however, adopted more than two years ago, the first time he had paid any attention to the article, upon no other impulse or authority than his own judgment, on the perusal of it, and even before he had ever heard of any other construction of it than that he contended against, he was aware that there was a kind of patriotism which claimed every thing for one's country, whether consistently with truth, justice, and candor, or not; for himself, he had no pretensions to such patriotism. He believed Mr. Jay had none, and if he was convinced that the American construction of this article was unfounded, he thought it for his honor, and the honor of this country, that he had abandoned it.

When Mr. Coit had concluded—

Mr. S. Smith rose and said, the subject then before the committee appeared to him to be of an importance at least equal to the great constitutional question which agitated the House during the present session; it has had, and he trusted would continue to have, the same calm attention paid to its discussion. He hoped and expected that it would ultimately be determined with a view to the real interest of the nation, under the existing state of things.

When the Treaty was first published he had read it with attention, and although he had not seen all those faults with which it has since been charged, yet there was, to his view, so little good contained in it, and so much of evil to be apprehended from it, that he had felt a hope that the President would not have ratified it. He had been disappointed, yet he had not a doubt but the President, after the most mature consideration, had given his signature; being possessed, as he was, of every information relative to a subject so very important, he could better determine on the policy of its adoption than those who were less informed. Still there were many articles, particularly the commercial, which every man might judge of from the face of the instrument. On these he did not hesitate to give an opinion: which was, that they promise not one solitary advantage, and shackle our commerce in many important points. He would not trouble the committee with going deeply into a subject that has already been so ably discussed. He, however, could not refrain from a few remarks on the right to countervail our extra duties on tonnage of goods imported in foreign bottoms. He asked what would this countervail be? Could any man tell? It was not specified in the article; it was then discretionary with the British; discretionary with a nation whose rule of right has always been the measure of its power, whose conduct has invariably been to cramp and distress the commerce of all other nations. To such a nation was it proper to trust a latitude of that extent? Will she make her countervail oppressive and unjust? It is more than probable she will, and if she should, what remedy have we? None: for we are forbidden by the same article to legislate further on the subject.

He said he would take leave to explain the 13th article which relates to the East India trade, and which it has been said gives such solid advantage as to counterbalance all the evils arising out of the Treaty. He had taken some pains to inform himself on this subject, and he had found that the Americans, in common with all other nations, traded to the British and other ports of India, and were every where received with that sort of kindness which grows out of the interest that the vender has in selling his goods for ready money, and to a great profit; that our trade is so much the interest of the India Company, and of all its officers and factors, as well as of the private traders residing there; that it was ridiculous to suppose the India Company would prevent it; and, if they should, what would be the evil? Little or none; for there were other ports, belonging either to other European powers or to the natives, in the neighborhood of all the English ports, who would receive us with open arms, and supply us for our silver, on terms equal, or nearly so. He then stated that our ships could now carry from one port in India to another, to China, or to Europe; an employment that had been found very lucrative. Under the Treaty they must proceed with whatever they purchase in an English port direct to America. The article says, His Majesty consents to your trade to India, and this is called a boon. It appeared to him just as ridiculous as if his Majesty had said, he consented to our going to Great Britain to purchase its manufactures.

To enumerate the many faults he found with the Treaty, as well of omission as commission, would take up too much of their precious time; yet he trusted he should be excused for taking a short view of its leading features.

When the envoy was sent to Great Britain, he was principally to demand restitution for the cruel depredations committed on our commerce. We find that object attended to so vaguely that our best-informed men seem doubtful whether much will ever be recovered under the Treaty; they find that in every instance the loser must first pursue his remedy through their tedious and expensive Courts. We find, that by fair construction, we have acknowledged ourselves to have been the infractors of the Treaty of Peace; for what was the ground on which some of the States placed legal impediments to the recovery of British debts? Why, that Lord Dorchester had refused to deliver up or pay for the negroes which, by that Treaty, ought to have been restored, and which slaves would have assisted their masters by their labor to pay those debts; yet we see no mention of them in the Treaty; and we find, to our surprise, men, since this Treaty, defending the construction lately put on the Treaty of Peace by the British, and which had never before been heard of; thus acquiescing in the charge of our being the first aggressors. But this only relates to our honor, and of course can be of little consequence to a nation whose rule of conduct is to submit to every thing, provided, that on the whole account, there appears to be a balance of profit in its favor.

After having thus formed his opinion relative to the Treaty, his next inquiry was, is the Treaty constitutional? On that point he had held himself open to conviction, and waited its discussion. He had not heard any gentleman declare it unconstitutional, except one, (Mr. Page,) who seemed to give his opinion as if he still doubted; and having carefully considered the subject, he was now of opinion that there was nothing directly repugnant to the constitution in the instrument. He then inquired whether, under the existing state of things, the Treaty ought to be rejected? whether it contained stipulations so extremely injurious to the United States as ought to induce the House of Representatives to reject a compact made by the other branches of the Government? In the ten first articles, which are permanent, he found some objections. The third article, which, like many others, cannot be well understood, seems to say that goods imported in British bottoms to the ports of the Lakes, shall pay extra duty. If this be a true construction, it will then be necessary to repeal our restraining duties, to make the Treaty by law consistent with the constitution, which requires that all duties shall be equal. The tenth article ties our hands against sequestration, a power which ought not to be exercised, except on some very extraordinary occasions; yet it was a power which, considering our relative situation to Great Britain, it was imprudent to part with; still, on fair consideration, he did not find that there was sufficient cause, on the account, to reject the Treaty, in the situation we are now placed. The residue will expire in two or three years.

Tuesday, April 26.

Execution of British Treaty.

Mr. Dwight Foster observed, that as the subject before the committee had been minutely discussed, it was not to be expected any new arguments, either on the one side or the other, would be adduced. Hitherto, he had been silent—though silent, he had not been inattentive—he had listened with candor to every thing which had been offered; he had formed his opinion upon serious deliberation, and was ready to give it whenever the question should be taken.

When the resolution requesting the President to lay before the House a copy of the instructions, correspondence, and other documents relative to this Treaty, was under consideration, Mr. F. observed, that he had intended to have expressed his sentiments on the subject; but the great length of time which was spent in that discussion, and the extreme impatience discovered by many members to have the question taken, induced him, as it might several others, to be content with expressing a silent vote, as he did with the minority, on that occasion. This he was the more willing to do, as it was then well known that the Treaty itself would be before the House; that some appropriations would be requisite, on their part, to carry it into effect; and, it was not to be doubted but every gentleman who wished to express his opinion would have an opportunity. The time had now arrived, and several days had been spent already, he believed not unprofitably, in deliberating on an instrument which had been the cause of great agitation in the United States.

He was heretofore one of those who considered the negotiation as advisable; it appeared to him the only means by which the horrors of war were to be avoided. He therefore rejoiced when the President appointed an Envoy for the purpose of negotiation; nor did he yet find any reason to apprehend the measure was injudicious. Far otherwise. He believed it was right, proper, and advisable; and that the result would prove highly advantageous and fortunate for our country. He further said, that he had critically examined the various articles of the Treaty; that he had weighed the arguments for and against them, jointly and severally; that he had considered them all with the attention their importance required; and though, in some instances, we might have wished an extension of advantages on our side, he was bound, in conscience, to declare that he thought the Treaty as beneficial to us as we had a right to expect.

The right of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, is a principle clearly defined by the constitution. Not a single power delegated by the constitution to any one branch of the Government is defined in terms more explicit, or less liable to be misunderstood, than those which define the Treaty-making power of the United States; and, during the whole course of the former and present debates, Mr. F. observed, he had not been able to raise a doubt in his own mind on the subject. The Treaty under consideration had been duly made and ratified by the proper authority, constituted for this purpose by the people of the United States; as such it was now before the committee and demanded their serious attention and respect. The subject was allowed by all to be of importance. To him it appeared more momentous than any other which, at any time since the establishment of the Government, had engrossed the attention of Congress. He viewed it not as a question of peace or war only, but as involving questions of far greater magnitude. He meant the present unexampled prosperity of this country, our political happiness, our excellent constitution, and probably, in its consequences, the existence of the national Government.

Mr. Kitchell said, he could throw no new light upon the subject under discussion; he wished only to express a few ideas which would lead him to support the resolution in its present form. He did not believe the Treaty to be that box of Pandora, which was to scatter evils of every kind upon the land. He believed there were stipulations in favor of the United States, as well as in favor of Great Britain; and when the Ministers of the two nations enter into contract, it must be expected that stipulations will be agreed to on each side which will not appear perfectly satisfactory to either, as certain concessions must be made on both sides.

He would mention only the probable consequences of rejecting the Treaty. The disposition of the two nations towards each other at the time of entering into negotiation was well known. The spoliations and injuries done to the American vessels had wound up American resentment to the highest pitch. Happily for America, Britain saw cause to change her system of aggression. He believed, with some other gentlemen, that Britain had not only formed the plan of crushing the rising liberties of France, but also of extending her views to America; but, from a reverse of fortune, she found it necessary to employ all her resources against France. There was another thing, the people of England were clamorous on account of the injuries done to the vessels of America; they were seen to be unjust, and were publicly reprobated. These circumstances were favorable to our negotiation, and he believed they could at no time have got a better Treaty, than at the time the present was agreed upon.

He said, they had only three alternatives. Either to give aid to the Treaty, continue to bear the insults of Great Britain, or else to determine resolutely on the dernier resort, war.

Mr. Griswold said, that in his opinion, the extensive view which the committee were taking of the merits of the Treaty with Great Britain was unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States; that he did not believe any part of the Treaty-making power had been delegated to the House of Representatives; and that the committee might with as much propriety examine the merits of the constitution itself, for the purpose of deciding whether they would execute it or not, as to examine the Treaty in the manner which had been adopted in the committee. He had, on a former occasion, delivered his opinions on that subject, and he would not attempt to repeat them; but since the committee had thought proper to take an extensive view of the merits of the Treaty, he would follow the example which had been set him, and submit a few observations upon that subject—more particularly as he believed that no discussion would prove injurious to that instrument. He should not, however, attempt to take a very extensive view of the subject, as gentlemen who had preceded him had exhausted almost every part of the subject and left little to be said at that period of the debate.

Mr. G. said the Treaty embraced three great objects:

1. The execution of those parts of the Treaty of 1783, which remained unexecuted.

2. The settlement of disputes.

3. Stipulations for regulating the commercial and other intercourse between the two nations.

He said that it would be agreed on every side of the House that these objects were important; and if they had been justly and fairly secured by the stipulations of the Treaty, it would not be said that the committee ought to feel dissatisfied with that instrument. He believed that this was really the case, and that the United States had no just cause to complain of the terms therein contained.

Several objections, however, had been made to that part of the Treaty which provided for the execution of the Treaty of 1783. It had been said that this Treaty did not provide for every part of the Treaty of Peace which remained unexecuted; and that conditions were annexed to the execution of those parts of that Treaty which had been provided for highly injurious to the interest of the United States. He said, if those objections were well founded, they formed a very serious objection to the present Treaty: but he could not find them by comparing or examining the two Treaties. The only article of the Treaty of Peace which it was said had been violated by the British Government, and was not provided for by the present Treaty, was that which respected the negroes and other property of the American inhabitants. He said he would not detain the committee with many remarks on this part of the subject, as it had been very fully and ably explained by gentlemen who had gone before him: he only mentioned it for the purpose of reading that part of the journal of Mr. Adams, one of the American negotiators of the peace, which immediately related to this subject. The same journal had been already read by different gentlemen, in detached parts, but he wished to bring the whole journal at one view before the committee. He said, however, that he ought to repeat what had been already said on the floor, that the article in question did not want any exterior aid to assist the committee with an explanation. The words of the article were certain and explicit; they declared that the evacuation should be made "without carrying away any negroes or other property belonging to the American inhabitants;" and as it was universally agreed that the negroes who had been carried away consisted either of those who had fled from their masters during the war, on a promise of emancipation, or of those who had been taken as plunder in the period of hostility, no doubt could exist but that in all those cases the property in the negroes was changed; that they were no longer the property of American inhabitants, and of course it was no violation of the Treaty to carry them away. And whatever might have since been said on that subject, he was convinced that the American Commissioners, at the close of the negotiation, had no idea of including in the Treaty of Peace a stipulation to secure a restoration of negroes then in the possession of the British army. To evince this fact, he said he would now read the journal he had before alluded to. [He read some paragraphs from that journal.]

Mr. G. said that it appeared, from the journal he had read, on what ground the negotiation respecting the negroes stood. The British agent claimed a restitution of confiscated estates. To rebut this demand, the American Commissioners, among other things, claimed compensation for negroes and other property which had been taken as plunder in different periods of the war. Finding, however, that no agreement could be obtained on these contested points, they were all relinquished as impracticable; and the claim for negroes, which had been made for no other purpose than to rebut the claim for confiscated estates, was given up of course, and, at the moment of signing the Treaty, the article in question was inserted—not to secure a restitution of property which had been changed by the events of the war, but to secure by stipulation, that the evacuations should be made without any destruction, or carrying away property really belonging to the American inhabitants. He said that it had always been a matter of surprise to him that any gentleman had put a different construction on this article; and he thought the parties had done wisely in excluding from the present Treaty a claim which did not possess even the shadow of justice.

Mr. Gallatin said he would not follow some of the gentlemen who had preceded him, by dwelling upon the discretion of the Legislature—a question which had already been the subject of their deliberation, and been decided by a solemn vote. Gentlemen who had been in the minority on that question might give any construction they pleased to the declaratory resolution of the House; they might again repeat that, to refuse to carry the Treaty into effect, was a breach of the public faith, which they conceived as being pledged by the President and Senate. This had been the ground on which a difference of opinion had existed since the beginning of the discussion. It was because the House thought the faith of the nation could not, on those subjects submitted to the power of Congress, be pledged by any constituted authority other than the Legislature, that they had resolved that, in all such cases, it was their right and duty to consider the expediency of carrying a Treaty into effect. If the House thought the faith of the nation already pledged, they could not claim any discretion; there would be no room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing. The resolution now under consideration was merely "that it was expedient to carry the British Treaty into effect," and not whether they were bound by national faith to do it. He would, therefore, consider the question of expediency alone; and, thinking as he did, that the House had full discretion on the subject, he conceived that there was as much responsibility in deciding in the affirmative as in rejecting the resolution; that they would be equally answerable for the consequences that might follow from either.

It was, however, true that there was a great difference between the situation of this country in the year 1794, when a negotiator was appointed, and that in which we were at present; and that consequences would follow the refusal to carry into effect the Treaty in its present stage, which would not have attended a refusal to negotiate, and enter into such a Treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumed before them a different and more complex shape than when before the negotiator, the Senate, or the President. The Treaty, in itself, and abstractedly considered, might be injurious; it might be such an instrument as, in the opinion of the House, ought not to have been adopted by the Executive; and yet, such as it was, they might think it expedient, under the present circumstances, to carry it into effect. He would, therefore, first take a view of the provisions of the Treaty itself, and in the next place, supposing it injurious, consider, in case it was not carried into effect, what would be the natural consequences of such refusal.

The provisions of the Treaty relate either to the adjustment of past differences or to the future intercourse of the two nations. The differences now existing between Great Britain and this country arose either from the non-execution of some articles of the Treaty of Peace, or from the effects of the present European war. The complaints of Britain in relation to the Treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal impediments thrown by the several States in the way of the recovery of British debts. The late Treaty had provided adequate remedy on that subject; the United States were bound to make full and complete compensation for any losses arising from that source, and every ground of complaint on the part of Great Britain was removed.

Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America had a right to expect that equal attention should be paid to her claims arising from infractions of the Treaty of Peace, viz: compensation for the negroes carried away by the British; restoration of the Western posts, and indemnification for their detention.

On the subject of the first claim, which had been objected to as groundless, he would observe, that he was not satisfied that the construction given by the British Government to that article of the Treaty was justified even by the letter of the article. That construction rested on the supposition that slaves came under the general denomination of booty, and were alienated the moment they fell in the possession of an enemy, so that all those who were in the hands of the British when the Treaty of Peace was signed, must be considered as British, and not American property, and were not included in the article. It would however appear by recurring to Vattel, when speaking of the right of postliminium, that slaves were not considered as part of the booty which was alienated by the act of capture, and that they were ranked rather with real property, to the profits of which only the captors were entitled. Be that as it may, there was no doubt that the construction given by America was that which had been understood by the parties at the time of making the Treaty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Coit) proved this fully; for when he says that the insertion of this article was alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens from London, can it be supposed that he would have laid so much stress on a clause which, according to the new construction now attempted to be given, meant only that the British would commit no new act of hostility? would not carry away slaves at that time in possession of Americans? Congress had recognized that construction by adopting the resolution which had been already quoted, and which was introduced upon the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it had not been denied that the British Ministry, during Mr. Adams's embassy, had also agreed to it.

But when our negotiator had, for the sake of peace, waived that claim; when he had also abandoned the right which America had to demand an indemnification for the detention of the posts, although he had conceded the right of a similar nature, which Great Britain had for the detention of debt; when he had thus given up every thing which might be supposed to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that our last claim—a claim on which there was not and there never had been any dispute—the Western posts should have been restored according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace. Upon what ground the British had insisted, and our negotiator conceded, that this late restitution should be saddled with new conditions, which made no part of the original contract, Mr. G. was at a loss to know. British traders were all allowed, by the new Treaty, to remain within the posts without becoming citizens of the United States, and to carry on trade and commerce with the Indians living within our boundaries, without being subject to any control from our Government. In vain was it said, that if that clause had not been inserted we would have found it our interest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we were alone competent judges; if that condition was harmless at present, it was not possible to foresee whether, under future circumstances, it would not prove highly injurious; and, whether harmless or not, it was not less a permanent and new condition imposed upon us. But the fact was, that by the introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our jurisdiction, as British subjects, the very men who had been the instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our frontiers,—by obliging us to suffer those men to continue their commerce with Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those regulations, which we had thought necessary, in order to restrain our own citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain had preserved her full influence with the Indian nations; by a restoration of the posts under that condition, we had lost the greatest advantage that was expected from their possession, viz: future security against the Indians. In the same manner had the British preserved the commercial advantages which resulted from the occupancy of these posts, by stipulating as a permanent condition a free passage for their goods across our portages, without paying any duty.

The remaining provisions of the Treaty had no connection with past differences; they made no part of the Convention which had been the avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission; they applied solely to the future intercourse of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation; and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been nevertheless adjusted. It was agreed on all hands, that so far as related to our commerce with Great Britain, we wanted no Treaty. The intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, was more immediately necessary to England, and her own interest was a sufficient pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her European ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in our navigation.

The twelfth and thirteenth articles had been obtained by our negotiator with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which related to our intercourse with the West Indies, was found, upon examination, to be accompanied by a restriction of such a nature, that what had been granted by Great Britain as a favor, was rejected by the Senate as highly injurious. The thirteenth article, which related to the East Indies, and remained part of the Treaty, was, like the twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and so far as he could depend upon the opinion of the best-informed judges on that subject, those restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was before the Treaty. As the West India article had declared that we should not re-export any produce of those islands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same time it granted us the privilege, which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the interest of the East India Company to grant it to us, that of being admitted in the British seaports there, had forbidden our carrying any articles from thence to any place except to America; which regulation amounted to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China, or to obtain freights back to Europe; and, upon the whole, he could not help thinking, from what had fallen on that floor, and what he had heard elsewhere from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same fate in the Senate with the twelfth article.

During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the neutral nations of the necessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottom making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portugal, who was in a state of vassalage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, had united in order to establish the principle, and had formed for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the Armed Neutrality. All the belligerent powers, except England, had recognized and agreed to the doctrine. England itself had been obliged, in some measure, to give for a while a tacit acquiescence. America had completely, at the time, admitted the principle, although they were then at war, [Mr. G. quoted on this subject the Journals of Congress of the year 1780, page 210, and of the year 1781, page 80,] and it had been introduced in every other Treaty we had concluded since our existence as a nation. Since the year 1780, every nation, so far as his knowledge went, had refused to enter into a Treaty of Commerce with England, unless that provision was inserted. Russia, for that reason, would not renew their Treaty, which had expired in 1786, although he believed that, during the present war, and in order to answer the ends of the war, they had formed a temporary convention, which he had not seen, but which, perhaps, did not include that provision. England had consented to it in their Treaty with France in 1788, and we were the first neutral nation who abandoned the common cause, gave up the claim, and, by a positive declaration inserted in our Treaty, had recognized the contrary doctrine. It had been said, that under the present circumstances, it could not be expected that Great Britain would give up the point: perhaps so; but the objection was not, that our negotiator had not been able to obtain that doctrine, but that he had consented to enter into a Treaty of Commerce (which we did not want, and which had no connection with an adjustment of our differences with Great Britain) without the principle contended for making part of that Treaty. Unless we could obtain security for our navigation, we wanted no Treaty; and the only provision which could give us that security, should have been the sine qua non of a Treaty. On the contrary, we had disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe, without whose concert and assistance there was but little hope that we should ever obtain that point, and we had taught Great Britain that we were disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at the expense of recognizing the principle the most fatal to the liberty of commerce, and to the security of our navigation.

Mr. G. was not going to enter into a discussion of the immorality of sequestering private property. What could be more immoral than war? or the plundering of the high seas legalized under the name of privateering? Yet self-defence justified the first, and the necessity of the case might, at least in some instances, and where it was the only practicable mode of warfare left to a nation, apologize even for the last. In the same manner the power of sequestration might be resorted to, as the last weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by an appeal to arms. It was the last peace-measure that could be taken by a nation; but the Treaty, by declaring that in case of national differences it should not be resorted to, had deprived us of the power of judging of its propriety, had rendered it an act of hostility, and had effectually taken off that restraint which a fear of its exercise laid upon Great Britain.

Thus it appeared that, by the Treaty, we had promised full compensation to England for every possible claim they might have against us, that we had abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we had consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated. That, after having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment of past differences, we had entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which had heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that, by that Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, we had obtained no commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before; we had obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we had parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of self-defence, which was calculated to give us any security.

From the review he had taken of the Treaty, and the opinions he had expressed, Mr. G. said, it was hardly necessary for him to add that he looked upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and that he earnestly wished it never had been made; but whether, in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to carry it into effect, and what would be the probable consequences of a refusal, was a question which required the most serious attention, and which he would now attempt to investigate.

Should the Treaty be finally defeated, either new negotiations would be more successful, or Great Britain would refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they were, or war would be the consequence. Mr. G. said that he would, in the course of his observations, make some remarks on the last supposition; he did not think that the first would be very probable at present, and he was of opinion that, under the present circumstances, and until some change took place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it was to be apprehended that, in such a case, new negotiations would either be rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an event would have perhaps followed a rejection of the Treaty even by the Senate or by the President. After the negotiator employed by the United States had once affixed his signature, it must have become very problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new Treaty. He conceived that the hopes of obtaining better conditions, by a new negotiation, were much less in the present stage of the business than they had been when the Treaty was in its inchoate form before the Executive; and in order to have a just idea of the consequences of a rejection at present, he would contemplate them upon that supposition which appeared to him most probable, viz: that no new Treaty would take place for a certain period of time.

As he was not sensible that a single commercial advantage had been obtained by the Treaty, he could not mention the loss of any, as a mischief that would attend its rejection. If, however, the East India article was supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other hand, be conceded that we had enjoyed every benefit arising from it for a number of years, without Treaty, and consequently, because it was the interest of the East India Company that we should enjoy them; and that it was not probable that circumstances would so far change there, during the short period to which that article was limited, as to induce that Company to adopt a different policy towards us.

But it was said that war must be the consequence of our delaying to carry the Treaty into effect. Did the gentlemen mean that, if we rejected the Treaty, if we did not accept the reparation there given to us, in order to obtain redress, we had no alternative left but war? If we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present Treaty into effect; for the Treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions committed since it was ratified, has not produced a discontinuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that they shall be discontinued. But the argument of those gentlemen, who supposed that America must go to war, applied to a final rejection of the Treaty, and not to a delay. He did not propose to refuse the reparation offered by the Treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; he had agreed that that reparation, such as it was, was a valuable article of the Treaty; he had agreed that, under the present circumstances, a greater evil would follow a total rejection than an acquiescence to the Treaty. The only measure which had been mentioned in preference to the one now under discussion, was a suspension, a postponement whilst the present spoliations continued, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they would cease.

But, was it meant to insinuate that it was the final intention of those who pretended to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country in a war? There was no period of the present European war at which it would not have been weak and wicked to adopt such measures as must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it, would fall but little short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to the idea; and it might, at least, have been recollected that war could not be declared except by Congress, and that two of the branches of Government were sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of that kind.

But to the cry of war, the alarmists did not fail to add that of confusion; and they had declared, even on this floor, that if the resolution was not adopted, Government would be dissolved. Government dissolved in case a postponement took place! This idea was too absurd to deserve a direct answer. But he would ask those gentlemen, by whom the Government was to be dissolved? Certainly not by those who would vote against the resolution; for, although they were not, perhaps, fortunate enough to have obtained the confidence of the gentleman who voted against them, still, it must be agreed, that those who succeeded in their wishes, who defeated a measure they disliked, would not wish to destroy that Government, which they held, so far, in their hands, as to be able to carry their own measures. For them to dissolve the Government would be to dissolve their own power. By whom, then, he would ask again, was the Government to be dissolved? The gentlemen must answer, by themselves, or they must declare that they meant nothing but to alarm. Was it really the language of those men, who professed to be, who distinguished themselves by the self-assumed appellation of friends to order, that if they did not succeed in all their measures, they would overset the Government? And had all their professions been only a veil to hide their love of power? a pretence to cover their ambition? Did they mean, that the first event which would put an end to their own authority should be the last act of Government? As to himself, he did not believe that they had such an intention; he had too good an opinion of their patriotism to permit himself to admit such an idea for a single moment; but he thought himself justifiable in entertaining a belief, that some amongst them, in order to carry a favorite, and what they thought to be an advantageous measure, meant to spread an alarm, which they did not feel; and he had no doubt that many had contracted such a habit of carrying every measure of Government as they pleased, that they really thought that every thing must be thrown into confusion the moment they were thwarted in a matter of importance. He hoped that experience would, in future, cure their fears. But, at all events, be the wishes and intentions of the members of this House what they may, it was not in their power to dissolve the Government. The people of the United States, from one end of the continent to the other, were strongly attached to their constitution; they would restrain and punish the excesses of any party, of any set of men in the Government, who would be guilty of the attempt; and on them he would rest as a full security against every endeavor to destroy our Union, our constitution, or our Government.

But, although he was not afraid of a dissolution, he felt how highly desirable a more general union of sentiment would be; he felt the importance of an agreement of opinion between the different branches of Government, and even between the members of the same branch. He would sacrifice much to obtain that object; it had been one of the most urging motives with him to be in favor, not of a rejection, but only of a suspension, of a delay. But even as a matter of opinion, it was difficult to say which mode of proceeding, in this House, would best accord with the general sentiments of the people. So far as related to the petitions before them, the number of signatures against the Treaty exceeded, at the moment he was speaking, the number of those in favor of the Treaty.

True it was, that an alarm which had produced a combination, had lately taken place amongst the merchants of this and some other seaports. What effect it would have, and how successful they would eventually be, in spreading this alarm amongst the people at large, he could not tell; but there were circumstances accompanying their petition, which, in his opinion, much diminished the weight they otherwise might have had. They had, undoubtedly, a right to petition upon every public measure, where they thought themselves interested, and their petitions would deserve equal regard, with those of their fellow-citizens throughout the United States. But on this occasion, in order to create an alarm, in order to induce the people to join them, in order to force the House to pass the laws relative to the Treaty, they had formed a dangerous combination, and affected to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, and transacting any business. A gentleman from New York (Mr. Williams) had been so much alarmed himself, that he had predicted a fall in the price of every kind of produce, and seems, indeed, to have supposed, that the clamors of a few individuals here would either put an end to, or satisfy the wants of those nations which depended on us for supplies of provisions. Yet, it had so happened, and it was a complete proof that the whole was only an alarm, that whilst they were debating, the price of flour, which was of very dull sale two weeks ago, had risen in equal proportion with the supposed fears of the purchasers.

He could not help considering the cry of war, the threats of a dissolution of Government, and the present alarm, as designed for the same purpose, that of making an impression on the fears of this House. It was through the fear of being involved in a war, that the negotiation with Great Britain had originated; under the impression of fear, the Treaty had been negotiated and signed; a fear of the same danger, that of war, had promoted its ratification; and now, every imaginary mischief which could alarm our fears, was conjured up, in order to deprive us of that discretion, which this House thought they had a right to exercise, and in order to force us to carry the Treaty into effect.

The Son of the Marquis Lafayette.

Mr. Livingston, Chairman of the committee for carrying into effect a resolution respecting the son of the Marquis Lafayette, reported that he had arrived in this country; that he had received the patronage of the President of the United States; that he was in New Jersey for education, and to show that he had no occasion for pecuniary assistance, the committee subjoin a well-written, affecting letter to the Chairman of the committee, in answer to one from him, expressive of his gratitude for the kind attention shown to him by the Legislature of the United States, by the President, and to every person to whom he was made known; that he had no wants; that he was as happy as he could be; that if he should in future have occasion for assistance, he would apply to Congress, who had been so kind and attentive to his welfare.[77]

Thursday, April 28.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union; when, the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect being under consideration——

Mr. Preston rose and spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman, I voted for the question yesterday, for the first time since this discussion began. I was then prepared to give my opinion, but, since the House has thought proper to devote another day to this important subject, I will take the liberty to offer my sentiments, and claim the indulgence of the committee for this purpose. I make this claim for their indulgence with the more confidence, as I have heretofore occupied but little of the time of the House on any occasion, and as I mean to be short on the present—not intending to take that comprehensive view of the subject which many gentlemen have done who have preceded me. With this apology I will proceed, conceiving, however that no apology is necessary on this or any other occasion where our duty impels us to come forward. But I must confess it has been painful to me to hear the recriminations that have taken place on this occasion. I had hoped, on a subject so important, on which it is said the peace and happiness of this our common country rests—whose welfare must be equally dear to all—that temperance and calmness would have marked our deliberations; that all our efforts would have been made to enlighten the minds and convince the judgments of each other, instead of lessening one another in our estimation, and that of our constituents, by dishonorable imputations, and which, I trust, every member would spurn. As to myself, Mr. Chairman, I stand here regardless of any imputations that ill-nature may cast upon me in this House, or abuse which may be conferred without doors. I shall not be deterred from pronouncing that opinion which my best reflections have enabled me to form.

Sir, in considering this subject, I had hoped every information possessed by any of the departments of Government would have been freely afforded us; and I cannot but lament that the President, by a too strict adherence to what he has supposed to be his constitutional duty, refused the request of this House for certain papers, which request seemed to me not only proper, but innocent—proper, because they might have afforded information that would reconcile many of the objections entertained of the Treaty, and finally produce its adoption; it was innocent, because, if there was no unfair procedure respecting this business, why not publish the transaction to the world—at all events to the Representatives of the people, who, it is acknowledged by all, were not only to act on the Treaty in some way, but were intrusted with the management of some of the dearest rights of their fellow-countrymen? If, then, the people confide in us such important concerns, might not the Executive have reposed some degree of confidence, and complied with a request so decorously and respectfully made? But he has told us his duty forbids it. We are then reduced to the necessity to judge of the thing from the face of it, without the wished-for information. And I must confess it has always presented such a hideous and deformed aspect to my mind, that I have ever disliked it—which, together with the unfriendly sentiments of my constituents to it, has produced my prejudices. But I had determined, as the President and Senate had ratified it, and many approved it, to keep my mind open for every information the subject was capable of. As, then, none has been offered to operate a change of my opinion, and as the most likely source is shut against us, my prejudices, instead of being lessened, have become firmly fixed in the opposition.

But we are told the British committed no infraction of the Treaty of 1783, by withholding the posts; for we, having thrown legal impediments in the way of the recovery of their debts, became the first infractors thereof, whereby they were left free to comply or not. Let us, for a moment, inquire into this fact. By the 4th article of that Treaty, creditors on either side were to meet with no legal impediment to the recovery of their debts. By the 7th article of the same Treaty, His Majesty was, with all convenient speed, to withdraw his armies and garrisons from every post and place. Now, sir, on comparing these articles, can it be presumed by any one that the latter stipulation was to remain unexecuted until the creditors recovered their debts? Was it to remain as a pledge for the performance of the other? No one can entertain the idea for a moment. Suppose the creditors had gone on in the collection of their debts without interruption, would it be said that the stipulations of the 7th article would be suspended until all the creditors were wholly satisfied? It is absurd, particularly when we reflect that the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty must have contemplated the recovery of those debts by lawsuits; therefore, if the latter clause was intended to coerce the former, we would certainly not have had the insertion of the words "with all convenient speed," which implies an early compliance. If the opposite construction was just, I would venture to say, the British Government would never have agreed to surrender the posts, but in consequence of such concessions as it now gets; for it would have the advantages of the fur trade, and the faith of this country pledged for the payment of the debts, which were accumulating by interest. This was a pleasing situation; but what was the situation of the British debtors? Deprived of their negroes, which were to be returned by the Treaty; deprived of the advantages of the trade with the Indians, whereby they might be enabling themselves to discharge those debts; harassed and worn down with taxation, to support the Indian wars excited by their creditors. In this situation of things, was it not natural for them to look around for security or indemnity against these evils; and would any thing more naturally present itself, than withholding the payment of the money to the very cause of these evils? None, sir; and I cannot conceive it so dishonorable as some gentlemen pretend to view it.

But, sir, I will endeavor to show that the laws which were enacted by States for prohibiting the recovery of the British debts, were not an infraction of the Treaty of 1783. By the little book, which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) says is so precious, and which he hopes will be preserved for some time to come, we find that Mr. Jefferson has, in consequence of complaints from the British Minister, respecting the impediments to the recovery of British debts, inquired into the facts, in those States where the complaints originated; the result of these inquiries was, that though there were State laws prohibiting, yet a number of gentlemen, of the first abilities and great integrity,—generally professional characters, and who have been engaged in proceedings of this kind,—certify, that wherever attempts were made to recover these debts, they have met with no more obstruction than other creditors. Besides, those gentlemen were generally of opinion that, on the final ratification of the Treaty of 1783, it repealed all laws at variance with it. If, then, it had such a powerful attribute as to repeal former laws, it follows as a consequence, that subsequent laws opposing it were mere nullities. These opinions were cited the other day by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick,) and relied on. I hope they will have their due weight on the application now to be made of them. So that, on the whole, it does appear to me the British creditor had nothing more to struggle with than other creditors had, except the well-founded prejudices imbibed by our countrymen against that nation, which, though the laws might in some measure correct, they could never eradicate. That these prejudices have produced irregularities in many instances and delay of collections, I have no doubt; but from the nature of things it is well known no foresight or protection could guard against it. Indeed, they might have been expected, for can it be supposed that men would stand calmly and see their families reduced to penury and want by an unrelenting British creditor, who had aided to impair the very means of his debtor to pay, and whose Government was by their acts daily increasing the evils, by exciting the Indians to war against us, whereby our citizens were borne down with burdens to defend themselves? I say, would not such reflections, with ruin before our eyes, produce a degree of irritation in the most calm amongst us? I owe none of these debts, I never did, and I never will, if I can help it. I spurn the idea of involving my country in a debt of an incalculable amount, when millions of them never received any benefit thereby. It is wrong, it is unjust. I again repeat, that it does appear to me, on an impartial view of this subject, that the United States are not chargeable with the first infraction of the Treaty of 1783, and that therefore, we are not bound now to enter into a compact which appears to me to be warranted neither by the principles of reciprocity nor justice.

But I undertake to say, and with some confidence too, that Great Britain committed the first infraction of that Treaty, by withholding the posts, and also carrying away the negroes, which she had expressly stipulated to give up; and, to my astonishment, it is now contended that the taking away the negroes was not a violation of the Treaty, as they came into their possession by the rights of war, and being deemed property were vested in the captors. Admit, for a moment, they were that kind of property, and they became as much the property of their captors as any they had possessed themselves of in the same way, what then? Certainly, that it followed of course, they had a right to dispose of them in any way they chose, either to emancipate them, retain them in slavery for their own use, or return them to their original owners. Which of these alternatives have they elected to do? [Here he read the following sentence from the Treaty of 1783.] "And His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies," &c., &c. Now, sir, was not the carrying away the negroes a violation of this article? All America once thought so. No other construction ever entered the head of man till this Treaty appeared; owners so construed it, and in virtue thereof made demands. Congress, and even "Camillus," once thought so, and so they declared it in the most solemn manner. And so it would be construed by all descriptions of people, from the schoolboy to the Senator, to use the expression of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Cooper,) had our minds remained in the same state they were in a dozen years ago. Sir, if there be modern constructions of the constitution, I will venture to say there is the same of Treaties. But another clause of the same article justifies my construction, to wit: the leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein. Gentlemen will hardly say this means fortifications garrisoned by American soldiery; this would be absurd, for it is pretty well known that American artillery guarded itself better than British Treaties did. Was not this artillery, which had fallen into the hands of the enemy, a vested property, till the chances of war or the Treaty had made a disposal thereof? Unquestionably it was. Were not the archives, records, deeds, &c., which had also fallen into the hands of the enemy, their property? There can be no doubt of it. Yet we find these things stipulated to be given up.

If, then, they chose to yield one species of property, might they not another? But, it is said, the negroes were not our property at the time of signing the Treaty; so neither did the archives, records, &c., belong to the States—they were the property of the enemy; but certainly the British Minister had as much right to stipulate for the return of the one as for the other, and he has in as explicit terms. This must have been the understanding of the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty, although one of them has been traced to his slumbers, the evening before the sealing the Treaty, for a different construction. So that, in this instance, the British have certainly committed the first infraction, by carrying off the negroes. And is it not extraordinary that, notwithstanding this, no claim is made for them, and yet we are bound to pay the British debts, when the very means of doing it are taken from the debtor by the creditor? Sir, this is a serious oppression, and though not of a very great magnitude, will nevertheless be felt in an interesting manner, and if submitted to will be so under much disquietude.

But the rejection of the Treaty is tremendously alarming, indeed. War, and war's alarms, are echoed on all sides. We shall be attacked on one side by savage barbarity; up the Mediterranean by Algerine cruelty; our commerce prostrated, and our cities laid under contribution by the British. In short, the dogs of war let loose on us, and America, once happy America, will become the scene of bloodshed and desolation. Great God! What man is there here that can be wicked enough to involve his country in such incalculable miseries? Who has firmness enough to meet so foul a deed? Particularly when we reflect on the dreadful act we are about to do, that will produce such scenes of horror and devastation! namely, refuse to accept a bargain derogatory to our national honor! This, sir, is to produce the dreadful catastrophe. But the measure of woe is not yet filled. There will be disunion; and American citizens will become American enemies, imbruing their hands in each other's blood. Civil wars will rend our happy country. Heavens! What a shock to suffering humanity here will be! And all about some commercial regulations and political differences with a foreign nation, who, I believe, in principle, is our inveterate enemy.

Mr. Chairman, I am one who, though I have but little confidence in the British Government, yet I cannot believe that she, or any other nation on earth, is so arrogant, and lost to every principle of humanity, as to go into such dreadful excesses, because we will not enter into a contract that will suit her interest. I fear war as much as any man, when a pretext is given; but can it be seriously said a rejection of this Treaty is a cause of war? I cannot believe that such can possibly be the event.

As to disunion, it is idle to talk of it; for I do believe if, instead of a minority of this House, every man in it were to return home full of spleen and disappointment, and were to use every exertion, every artifice in their power, to bring about a disunion, they would fail in so traitorous an attempt. The people, sir, would scoff them, would turn them out of office, and place therein more deserving characters.

As then, Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that war or disunion will be the result of a rejection of the Treaty, and as I think it is one from which we ought to withhold our assent, I must give it my negative. And if, in this, time shall prove me wrong, I shall lament the error with the greatest sincerity, but I shall have the pleasing consolation to know it was an error of the head, and not of the heart.

When Mr. Preston had taken his seat—

Mr. Ames rose, and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I entertain the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes.

In my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and manner with which we may prevail on ourselves to contemplate the subject, than upon the development of any profound political principles, or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If we should succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less difficulty than we have to apprehend in surmounting all our objections.

The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to ourselves, and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we ought to anticipate the circumstance as a probability, and when we are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact.

How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the House, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears.

Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left unexplored? It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling have been summoned to listen to some particular style of address; and yet we seem to believe, and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that of unbiased reason.

It would be strange that a subject which has roused in turn all the passions of the country, should be discussed without the interference of any of our own. We are men, and, therefore, not exempt from those passions; as citizens and Representatives, we feel the interest that must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions: we are not disinterested, it is impossible we should be dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the understanding; but the public sensibility and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation to the debate. The public attention has been quickened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impressions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and more mature, as well as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents in political affairs are the passions of men—shall we complain of our nature? Shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise? It is right already, because He, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so; and because thus made, and thus acting, the cause of truth and the public good is the more surely promoted.

But an attempt has been made to produce an influence of a nature more stubborn and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly pretended that the constitutional right of this House is at stake, and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the design to nullify this assembly, and to make it a cypher in the Government. That the President and Senate, the numerous meetings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terror, to force the Treaty down our throats, though we loathe it, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

It is necessary to pause here and inquire, whether suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and pernicious in all their influences? They oppose an obstacle in the path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are indestructible. While this remains, it is in vain to argue; it is in vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea. For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead that should hope to prevail in an argument whose scope and object it is to mortify the self-love of the expected proselyte? I ask, further, when such attempts have been made, have they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction that is believed to debase it.

The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, or more constant in its action, than what is called in French, l'esprit de corps, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its own prerogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be abandoned, because men in a public assembly are still men, and feel that spirit of corps which is one of the laws of their nature? Still less should we despond or complain, if we reflect that this very spirit is a guardian instinct that watches over the life of this assembly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation; and, without its existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the Representatives of the people, and immediately the liberties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage.

If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal to assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and, whenever they shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof that there will be no want of advocates and champions.

Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when once roused, so difficult to pacify, that, if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure which was lately believed by ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of the House. Principles that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a post where it is possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault.

While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless; it may be heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience it wearies, to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass to the understanding guarded.

Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing.

I cannot press this topic too far—I cannot address myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here, to suspect their own feelings, and while they do, to examine the grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion, that this body has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from inclination than evidence.

Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House; that the addresses which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity.

It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortation to reject the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surrender them for ever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the House will not concur in the measure to execute the Treaty, what other course shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us?

In the nature of things there are but three—we are either to make the Treaty—to observe it—or break it. It would be absurd to say we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase, already so much abused, we are under coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the consequences of a choice.

By refusing to act, we choose. The Treaty will be broken, and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness, then, of replying to those who urge upon this House the topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to force the Treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce its discretion, and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the Treaty-making power? In case we reject the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we gain no safer shelter than before, from the consequences of the decision. Indeed, they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain that the Treaty-making power has produced this coercion to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that power, it is the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty word, coercion, has given scope to an eloquence that, one would imagine, could not be tired, and did not choose to be quieted.

Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before us, and we shall scarcely fail to see, in still stronger lights, the futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the House.

If, as some have suggested, the thing called a Treaty is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obligation, the first question is, Will this House complete the instrument, and by concurring, impart to it that force which it wants?

The doctrine has been avowed, that the Treaty, though formally ratified by the Executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own, by the President's Proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly no way distinguishable in point of authority or obligation from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many, precisely for the reason that, in the contention of power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms, as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolutions, (Mr. Blount's.) We declare that the Treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the President and Senate, and not in this House. Need I say that we fly in the face of that resolution when we pretend that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in them? It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction and to claim a share in a power which we, at the same time, disclaim as exclusively vested in other departments.

What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the President and Senate with foreign nations are Treaties, without our agency, and yet those compacts want all power and obligation until they are sanctioned by our concurrence? It is not my design in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.

But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous phrases, have we no discretion? And, if we have, are we not to make use of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the Treaty? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty.

If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making appropriations for the Treaty, but in the resolution itself, (Mr. Blount's.) Let us examine it more nearly. A Treaty is a bargain between nations binding in good faith; and what makes a bargain? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the Treaty power is not in this House; this House has no share in contracting, and is not a party; of consequence, the President and Senate alone may make a Treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, however, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expediency of Treaties—that is the constitutional province of our discretion. Be it so—what follows? Treaties when adjudged by us to be inexpedient, fall to the ground, and the public faith is not hurt. This, incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount of it, in plainer language, is this—the President and Senate are to make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making them. But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a Treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend upon the making, but upon our opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our Legislative capacity, the Treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in suspense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratification by the Treaty-making power, but from our approbation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend that we may have no share, according to the argument, in the Treaty-making power? These opinions, nevertheless, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perseverance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them, and their ridiculous consequences?

Let me hasten to suppose the Treaty is considered as already made, and then the alternative is fairly presented to the mind, whether we will observe the Treaty, or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question.

If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the Legislature as for the Courts of Law.

I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, appears at length to be no more than the authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen complain that we are forced to act in this way, we are forced to swallow the Treaty. It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not. There is but one way open for us, the laws of morality and good faith have fenced up every other. What sort of liberty is that which we presume to exercise against the authority of those laws! It is for tyrants to complain that principles are restraints, and that they have no liberty so long as their despotism has limits.

The consequences of refusing to make provision for the Treaty are not all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast interests are committed to the sport of the winds, chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is forbidden to human foresight to count their number, or measure their extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss, so dark and so profound, it becomes us to pause and reflect upon such of the dangers as are obvious and inevitable. If this assembly should be wrought into a temper to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is deceptive, to pretend that we can escape them. It is worse than weakness to say, that as to public faith our vote has already settled the question. Another tribunal than our own is already erected. The public opinion, not merely of our own country, but of the enlightened world, will pronounce judgment that we cannot resist, that we dare not even affect to despise.

Well may I urge it to men who know the worth of character, that it is no trivial calamity to have it contested. Refusing to do what the Treaty stipulates shall be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should stand justified at last, a character that is vindicated is something worse than it stood before, unquestioned and unquestionable. Like the plaintiff in an action of slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by invective, and even tarnished by too much handling. In the combat for the honor of the nation, it may receive some wounds, which, though they should heal, will leave some scars. I need not say, for surely the feelings of every bosom have anticipated, that we cannot guard this sense of national honor, this ever-living fire, which alone keeps patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too vigilant and jealous. If, by executing the Treaty, there is no possibility of dishonor, and if by rejecting there is some foundation for doubt and for reproach, it is not for me to measure, it is for your own feelings to estimate the vast distance that divides the one side of the alternative from the other. If, therefore, we should enter on the examination of the question of duty and obligation with some feelings of prepossession, I do not hesitate to say, they are such as we ought to have; it is an after inquiry to determine whether they are such as ought finally to be resisted.

To expatiate on the value of public faith, may pass with some men for declamation; to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge, can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement? Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue and their standard of action? It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame and disgust.

What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference because they are greener? No, sir; this is not the character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defence, and is conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a State renounces the principles that constitute their security? Or, if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious to the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent? The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a banished man in his native land.

I see no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politics—the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians that a whiff of tobacco-smoke or a string of beads gives not merely binding force, but sanctity, to Treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise or too just to disown and annul its obligation. Thus, we see neither the ignorance of savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows; if the victims of justice could live again, collect together, and form a society, they would, however loth, soon find themselves obliged to make justice—that justice under which they fell—the fundamental law of their State. They would perceive it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good faith.

The refusal of the posts (inevitable, if we reject the Treaty) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. A plain and obvious one will be, the price of the Western lands will fall. Settlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so much of the interests of the United States, should calculate how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the Treaty—how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the National Debt. What then are we called upon to do? However the form of the vote and the protestations of many may disguise the proceeding, our resolution is in substance (and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution) to prevent the sale of the Western lands and the discharge of the public debt.

Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contrasted by any one? Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war till the negotiation with Britain was far advanced, and then the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not, however, to expect that neighboring nations, highly irritated against each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages. The traders will gain an influence, and will abuse it; and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised, and hardly restrained from violence. Their situation will oblige them to choose between this country and Great Britain, in case the Treaty should be rejected. They will not be our friends, and at the same time the friends of our enemies.

But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point? Certainly the very men who charged the Indian war on the detention of the posts will call for no other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It is remembered with what emphasis—with what acrimony—they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and treasure into the Western country, in consequence of Britain's holding the posts. "Until the posts are restored," they exclaimed, "the Treasury and the frontiers must bleed."

If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that the peace with the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will urge another reply. From arguments calculated to produce conviction, I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask whether it is not already planted there? I resort especially to the convictions of the Western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no Treaty, the settlers will remain in security? Can they take it upon them to say that an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove firm. No, sir; it will not be peace, but a sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the tomahawk.

On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for them—if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal—I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, Wake from your false security! Your cruel dangers—your more cruel apprehensions—are soon to be renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are to be torn open again. In the day-time, your path through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father: the blood of your sons shall fatten your corn-field! You are a mother: the war-whoop shall wake the sleep of the cradle!

On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror which cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, it will speak a language compared with which all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid.

Will it be whispered that the Treaty has made me a new champion for the protection of the frontiers? It is known that my voice, as well as my vote, have been uniformly given in conformity with the ideas I have expressed. Protection is the right of the frontier: it is our duty to give it.

Who will accuse me of wandering out of the subject? Who will say that I exaggerate the tendencies of our measures? Will any one answer by a sneer, that all this is idle preaching? Will any one deny that we are bound—and I would hope to good purpose—by the most solemn sanctions of duty for the vote we give? Are despots alone to be reproached for unfeeling indifference to the tears and blood of their subjects? Are Republicans irresponsible? Have the principles on which you ground the reproach upon Cabinets and Kings no practical influence—no binding force? Are they merely themes of idle declamation, introduced to decorate the morality of a newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topics of harangue from the windows of that State-house? I trust it is neither too presumptuous, nor too late to ask, can you put the dearest interest of society at risk without guilt, and without remorse?

It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are not to be reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their measures. This is very true, where they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have depicted are not unforeseen; they are so far from inevitable, we are going to bring them into being by our vote. We choose the consequences, and become as justly answerable for them as for the measure that we know will produce them.

By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires—we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom our decision will make; to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake; to our country; and I do not deem it too serious to say, to conscience, and to God—we are answerable; and if duty be any thing more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country.

There is no mistake in this case; there can be none. Experience has already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future victims have already reached us. The Western inhabitants are not a silent and uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of their wilderness. It exclaims that while one hand is held up to reject this Treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of the imagination to conceive, that events so near are already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage vengeance, and the shrieks of torture. Already they seem to sigh in the west wind; already they mingle with every echo from the mountains.

Are the posts to remain for ever in the possession of Great Britain? Let those who reject them, when the Treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they choose, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take them by force? The argument I am urging would then come to a point. To use force, is war. To talk of Treaty again, is too absurd. Posts and redress must come from voluntary good will, Treaty, or war.

Such a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will be worse than war. Peace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, contempt for ourselves, intestine discord and anarchy. Worse than this need not be apprehended, for if worse could happen, anarchy would bring it. Is this the peace gentlemen undertake, with such fearless confidence, to maintain? Is this the station of American dignity, which the high-spirited champions of our national independence and honor could endure; nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the country? What is there in the Treaty that could humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choking with them? If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do not hesitate to declare it ought not to be peace.

Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to respond on this prospect, by presenting another, which it is yet in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread that a change of system will reverse the scene? The well-grounded fears of our citizens in 1794 were removed by the Treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been considered at that day as a happy escape from the calamity? The great interest, and the general desire of our people, was, to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negotiation, after the end of the European war. This was gaining every thing, because it confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing. This alone would justify the engagements of the Government. For, when the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentered in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This Treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded at the same time the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colors will grow pale; it will be a baleful meteor, portending tempest and war.

Let us not hesitate, then, to agree to the appropriation to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and, some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast, and, if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed wheat, and is sown again to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity: and in this progress, what seems to be fiction, is found to fall short of experience.

Friday, April 29.

Execution of British Treaty.

Mr. Dayton (the Speaker) declared that he did by no means intend to follow the gentlemen who had conceived it advisable to enter into a discussion of the merits of the Treaty, article by article.

To those, he said, who regarded this second Treaty with Great Britain with disagreeable sensations—to those who believed that it did not contain in it such terms as the United States had reason to expect, and even a right to demand—to all those whose indignation had been excited at the unwarrantable outrages committed by that nation upon the rights of our neutral powers, who had seen their high-handed acts with astonishment, and the whole conduct of their administration towards this country with abhorrence—to those whose attachment for the French, nobly struggling for their liberties, was sincere, and who ardently wished that their revolution might terminate in the establishment of a good and stable government:—to all of this description, he could, with propriety, address himself, and say, that he harmonized with them in opinion, and that his feelings were in perfect unison with theirs. But if, he said, there should be found in that assembly one member, whose affection for any other nation exceeded that which he entertained for this, whose Representative he was—if there could even be found a single man whose hatred to any other country was greater than his love for America—him, he should consider as his enemy, hostile to the interests of the people who sent him there, utterly unqualified to judge rightly of their concerns, and a betrayer of the trust reposed in him. But, Mr. D. said, he could not believe it possible, that there were any such amongst them, and he was convinced that every one must see and feel the necessity of divesting himself of all his hatred, all his prejudices, and even all attachments that were in the least degree inconsistent with an unbiased deliberation and decision. The good and the prosperity of the people of the United States ought to be the primary object. It was that alone which their Representatives were delegated and commissioned more immediately to promote, and who would deny that it was intimately connected with, and involved in the vote they were about to give?

That the defects of this instrument of compact with Britain greatly exceeded its merits, was a truth which was strongly impressed upon his mind, long before he had heard the reasoning of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) who had opened the debate. Although that gentleman had sketched its deformities in strong colors, and had in some instances, perhaps, exaggerated them; yet, Mr. D. said, he should not have contested the justice of the picture he had exhibited, if he had, at the same time, presented to their view, in true and faithful coloring, the other side of it also. Yet, this was surely necessary in order to enable them to form a right judgment. That member had declared that the House were now called upon to approve the Treaty, but Mr. D. was far from believing such a declaration warranted by the language or nature of the propositions on the table, to which all might assent, without pledging themselves to be the approvers of the instrument itself.

So firmly convinced was he of this, that, if he could subscribe to the truth and force of every objection that had been urged by that gentleman, he should, nevertheless, by no means conclude with him, that the House ought to withhold the appropriations, but, on the contrary, they ought to grant them. This would be his course of conduct, because difficulties and inconveniences alone presented themselves to their view and choice, and he thought he should act unfaithfully, if he endeavored to shun those on the one side only, without regarding the wide scene of dangers into which he might plunge his country on the other. What would be thought of that man, who, because the road he was travelling proved to be an uneven and rough one, should considerately betake himself to an opposite path without exploring the precipice that awaited him there? In the individual it would be deemed an evidence of madness, and such heedless conduct in that House could not escape the imputation of blindness. Under impressions of this sort, as to the importance of the vote he was about to give, he conceived himself bound to extend his views beyond the mere intrinsic merits of the Treaty, and to estimate the evils which must flow from a rejection of it. What, he asked, were these? Would a foreign war, and the dissolution of the Government be the certain fruits of a rejection, as had been represented by some gentlemen whose opinions he respected? These would certainly be amongst the most dreadful calamities which could befall a country, and, especially, one made up of Confederacies like this; and although he did not think them probable, yet, they must be admitted to be possible, and as such, justify those who allow them to influence their minds. But he appealed to those gentlemen who seemed to treat such apprehensions as perfectly chimerical, whether there might not be others, which, though less alarming than a foreign war and dissolution of the Union, would yet exceed—nay, very far exceed, those which are to follow the operation of the Treaty. The first fruit of a rejection would be, Mr. D. said, a claim from the merchants who had suffered by spoliations, to be fully indemnified from the Treasury. He called upon the members who, like himself, represented agricultural States; and he called, also, upon those who represented the landed and agricultural interests in the commercial States, to declare, whether they were prepared to burden their constituents with a tax of five millions of dollars to be thus applied?

He did not fear that he should be charged, as others had been, with sounding a false alarm. A proposition to that effect had already been laid on the table, and, what was not a little singular, it was founded on a presumption that the Treaty was to be annulled by a vote of the House, and was to derive its support from that very circumstance. Mr. D. thought it his duty to remind gentlemen of the doctrine uttered by the member from New York, (Mr. Livingston,) when he moved it, as well as of the extent of the principle contained in it. It is an established principle, said the mover, that protection is equally due to the person and property of all citizens, and that where the Government fails to protect, it is bound to indemnify for all the losses that may be sustained by every individual in consequence of such failure. They were, therefore, Mr. D. said, if they rejected the Treaty, to be immediately called upon to recognize a principle which would not only pledge them to tax their fellow-citizens for the five millions, at which the British spoliations were estimated, but, also, to make compensation for every depredation that might hereafter be made upon their trade; nay, more, for every injury that any American citizen might suffer through want of protection. He was aware that he might be told that the resolution embraced only merchants who had suffered, but he contended that the principle, when established, must extend to all; for he challenged any gentleman to show what better title they who inhabited the frontier next the sea, had to claim Governmental protection and indemnification, than they who inhabited a frontier on the land side? If, therefore, they were determined to compensate from the Treasury the merchant for his plundered cargo, they were equally bound to pay the frontier settler for his stolen horse; and there would be no bounds to such claims, or means to satisfy them.

It had been asked what would be the conduct of Britain, when they should learn that the House of Representatives had refused to make appropriations for the Treaty. He was disposed to think that they would not consider it a cause, or make it a pretext, for the war. Having in their hands the fur trade, the Western posts, and about five millions of dollars, of which they had despoiled the people of these States, they might probably sit down contented with the spoils they had made, after this Government had, by its own act, dissolved the stipulations they had entered into to make restitution and compensation. But what, in this state of things, would restrain their piratical cruisers in the West Indies? They, whether hoping that a war would be the consequence of annulling the Treaty, or that, as the two nations were no longer under that tie, they might again rob with impunity; and would probably seize on American vessels wherever they could meet them, and carry them into those ports in which corrupt Judges stood ready to condemn them.

So far as this question respected a dissolution of the present Government, it was certainly a very delicate one. Important as the subject under debate unquestionably was, he was free to declare it to be his opinion that no decision, however unfavorable it might seem, could justify, or would produce a separation of the States. He lamented that it had been conceived or mentioned by any one, for he should, whilst he had strength, resist such an event as the most fatal that could befall his country, and would cling to the Union as the rock of their political salvation. But he would not say, nor would any one else seriously say, that there was no room to apprehend that a rejection might produce suspicions, jealousies, distrusts, and discord between the one part of the Union and the other, and such a general fermentation in the public mind as never before prevailed.

He could not here refrain from making a serious appeal to the candor and good sense of the gentleman from Virginia. Having served with him many years in public life—in the old Congress, under the Confederation, in the Federal Convention, and for nearly six years under the present form of Government, he had, upon many and various occasions, witnessed the display of his superior talents, and the efforts of his patriotism, and derived from thence a conviction that, as at no former moment, so neither at the present, could he appeal to those qualities in that gentleman in vain. Mr. D. requested him to turn his attention to the last article of the British Treaty, and particularly that part of it which is in the words following, viz:

"This Treaty, when the same shall have been ratified by His Majesty and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of their Senate, and the respective ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding and obligatory on His Majesty and on the said States, and shall be by them respectively executed and observed with punctuality and the most sincere regard to good faith," &c.

He called upon the gentleman from Virginia to show in what line or word of it the President had exceeded his authority, or, if that was not pretended, and he believed it was not by any one, he wished that gentleman to reflect for a moment how it was possible to refuse appropriations, and yet preserve inviolate the faith of this country, so solemnly pledged in that article.

Mr. D. concluded with observing that, although he was not pleased with many parts of the Treaty—although he had never felt any strong predilection for an intimate connection with Britain—although he had never seen their encroachments on the rights, nor their depredations upon the property of American citizens with an indulgent eye, or in the temper of tame submission, and although he had long ceased to entertain any respect for the negotiator, yet he should vote for the resolution, because he loved his country, and to that love, would sacrifice every resentment, every prejudice, every personal consideration. He should vote to carry the Treaty into effect with good faith, because he sincerely believed that the interests of his fellow-citizens would be much more promoted by that, than by the opposite line of conduct.

The question was then put on the resolution, which is in substance as follows:

Resolved, That it is expedient to make the necessary appropriations for carrying the Treaty with Great Britain into effect.

The House divided, forty-nine for the resolution, forty-nine against it.

It remained for the Chairman, Mr. Muhlenberg, to decide.

He said, he did not feel satisfied with the resolution as it now stood; he should, however, vote for it, that it might go to the House, and there be modified.

The resolution was consequently agreed to, and reported to the House.

[The following statement will show the true sense of the House as to the expediency of carrying the British Treaty into effect:

Forty-nine voted for this expediency.

Forty-nine against it.

The Chairman, Mr. Muhlenberg, to give an opportunity further to consider the resolution, voted for it.

Mr. Patton from Delaware was ill, and was necessarily absent. It is, however, well understood, that he is opposed to the Treaty.

Mr. Varnum was accidentally absent. He is no friend to the Treaty.

Messrs. Freeman, Sherburne, and Van Cortlandt are absent on leave.

Mr. Duvall has resigned, and his successor has not yet taken his seat.

From which it is evident that there is an actual majority of the House against the expediency of carrying the Treaty into execution.]

Saturday, April 30.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then took up the resolution yesterday passed in a Committee of the Whole, for carrying into effect the Treaty lately negotiated with Great Britain: when

Mr. Dearborn said, as it appeared that a majority of that House was in favor of carrying into effect the British Treaty, notwithstanding several of those gentlemen who had declared their intention of voting for it, had declared they thought it a bad Treaty, and as he wished to see the opinion the House entertained of the Treaty entered upon their journals, he took the liberty of proposing an amendment to the resolution in the following words:

"Resolved, That, although in the opinion of this House the Treaty is highly objectionable, and may prove injurious to the United States, yet, considering all the circumstances relating thereto, and particularly, that the last eighteen articles are to continue in force only during the present war, and two years thereafter, and confiding also in the efficacy of measures that may be taken for bringing about a discontinuance of the violations committed on our neutral rights, in regard to our vessels and seamen, therefore, &c."

Mr. Coit hoped the yeas and nays would be taken upon the question; which was agreed to.

Mr. Goodhue hoped the House would not agree to the resolution; he, for one, would never agree to it.

Mr. Swanwick hoped the amendment would be agreed to; for whatever some gentlemen's opinion might be with respect to the propriety of carrying the Treaty into effect, very few thought it a good Treaty. An amendment, therefore, declaring the motives which actuated that House in passing the resolution for carrying the Treaty into effect was very desirable; it would induce some gentlemen to vote for it, who would otherwise vote against it, and it ought not to excite objection. He appealed to the recollection of gentlemen, the arguments which had been used to enforce the necessity of the appropriations, which laid great stress upon the shortness of time which the most objectionable part of the Treaty was to be in force. He hoped, therefore, these arguments would not be objected to in the form of a resolution.

Mr. Hillhouse said, when he prepared the resolution on the table, he thought he had done it in such general terms that every gentleman might vote for it, without expressing a sentiment contrary to what he entertained respecting the Treaty. The amendment proposed, he thought very objectionable. It appeared as if it was intended to force gentlemen to vote against carrying the Treaty into effect rather than vote for the Treaty. For his own part, he could not vote for it, as it would be in direct contradiction to the sentiments which he had before expressed. He thought candor itself could not expect gentlemen who approved of the Treaty to vote for the amendment. It was also a rule to avoid expressing particular sentiments in resolutions of this kind. One part of the proposition, if it was brought forward separately, would be assented to generally, respecting the confidence placed in the President, with respect to future spoliations and impressments of men. In this proposition, it was said, the Treaty was injurious; he did not believe it was so. He believed it would be beneficial to the United States. It would not only be agreeing to an opinion which was contrary to the sentiments of gentlemen, but it would be passing a censure on the other branches of Government. Gentlemen were not required to say it was a good Treaty, and he hoped no one would be forced to say it was a bad one.

[The Speaker informed the House that it was then twelve o'clock, and as they had yesterday ordered that there should be a call of the House to-day at that hour, he should direct the Clerk to make the call. It was accordingly done. Messrs. Brent, Harper, and Patton were absent. The two former came to the House soon after the call, and, on making apologies, were excused. Mr. Patton was indisposed.]

Mr. Gregg said he should vote for the resolution in its present state. He did so, not because he thought the Treaty a good one, but because he believed the interest of the United States would be promoted by making the necessary appropriations, and because he was apprehensive worse consequences might arise from defeating it than from carrying it into effect.

Mr. Moore considered himself as called upon to choose between two evils. He considered the Treaty to be bad. On the other hand, he was apprehensive that evils might arise, if it was not carried into effect, out of the control of that House. He had resolved not to vote for the resolution on the table; but he felt unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of rejecting the Treaty, which had been sanctioned by the President and Senate. In deciding upon the amendment proposed, he wished the sense of the House to be taken; and if he considered that a single individual would be influenced to vote against the resolution who would otherwise have voted for it, he should wish them to be separated. It was his opinion the Treaty was a bad one, and he believed it was the opinion of a decided majority of that House. He wished the resolution to be so amended that the Treaty might go into effect by a considerable majority, as it would tend to lessen the irritation which had been raised respecting it.

Mr. Dearborn said, in offering the amendment which he had proposed, he had no intention of taking any thing like an unfair advantage, or of producing what might be thought uncandid or unfair. His own sentiments relative to the Treaty were such as would prevent his consenting to do any thing to carry it into effect, unless with such a provision as he had brought forward. It appeared to him of such a nature, that he was not sure that he could bring his mind to vote to carry it into effect at all. He had supposed there could be nothing improper in taking the opinion of the House relative to the thing itself. If it might be presumed that there were but few gentlemen in that House who thought the Treaty a good one, he, indeed, thought there were none of that opinion, until then, though some gentlemen had praised it in their speeches, but which he had merely considered as adding weight to their arguments, he believed such an amendment was desirable.

As he, therefore, took it for granted that a considerable majority of the House were of the same opinion with himself, he saw no impropriety in having that opinion expressed. The propositions would not interfere with any bill which might be brought in, and gentlemen would have the discretion to vote for it or not. If a majority of the House thought differently from him, and chose to negative the amendment, he should be satisfied. Until he heard something further on the business, to convince him of the impropriety of doing so, he should wish to see a decision of the House upon the proposition as he had offered it.

Mr. Harper said he was of the number who thought the measure of passing the resolution on the table a very expedient one; but whilst this was his opinion, he knew there were many, both within and without their walls, of a different opinion. He had no objection to gentlemen's expressing their opinions, but he wished also to be at liberty to express his. He should, therefore, propose that the mover should form his resolution as a preamble. This would answer the purpose of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Moore.)

He said, when it was so formed, every one would have an opportunity of voting for it, and, if negatived, the resolution would stand as before. He hoped, therefore, the proposal would be agreed to.

Mr. Dearborn said he considered his motion in the nature of a preamble; and he had no objection to any alteration that would make it more properly so.

Mr. Kittera appealed to the candor of the gentleman who brought forward the amendment, with respect to the propriety of making his proposition a distinct one. He thought it would be extremely improper to pass a resolution which would say, "We pass this law, though we believe it to be a very bad one." He thought it also directly charging another branch of the Government with improper conduct.

Mr. Nicholas had no objection to the amendment being inserted by way of preamble. He urged the propriety of the opinions of members being fairly taken on this important business.

Mr. Gregg wished to offer an amendment, as a substitute to that before the committee. It was, in substance, as follows: "Resolved, That under a consideration of existing circumstances, without reference to the merits or demerits of the Treaty, and in confidence that measures will be taken by the Executive to maintain our neutral rights, it is expedient," &c.

This was declared out of order until the amendment was decided on.

Mr. Venable had no objection to the propositions being taken separately, as gentlemen would be then left at liberty to vote as they pleased. He conceived there were gentlemen who would vote for the proposition with the amendment, who would not vote for it without it. He did not know that any amendment would reconcile the resolution to him; for, though he should vote for the amendment, he would not bind himself to vote for carrying into effect the Treaty.

Mr. Murray said he had not spoken on the subject before. He was stating that the President was armed only with reason; he was stripped of all the symbols of power, and if the Treaty before them was carried into effect, with such a clog as the amendment proposed, he would be debilitated indeed. Their Executive had, in his opinion, done great things, and what would have covered any European Minister with untarnished laurels, by means of reason and policy; for, however wickedly courts act, they calculate upon the force of the powers with whom they treat. When a Minister goes to negotiate, they inquire into the naval and military force of his country, their appropriations for the army and navy, &c., &c. The Envoy of the United States would be a blank upon such an occasion. What was their interest, then? It was to give energy to their Government. Should they then pass the law in such a manner as almost to warrant the people in resisting it? The only thing which remained for them to do, was, not only to carry the Treaty into effect, but to carry it into effect with good faith. The object was not merely the posts—it was a conciliation of the differences long existing between the two nations; and it was their duty to execute it so as to produce the greatest advantage; whereas, if they were to agree to the amendment proposed, so covered with odium, it would weaken the power of the Executive, already too feeble.

Mr. S. Smith said he had never seen any cause of gloom. He never doubted that the members of that House would come to right conclusions. They did right yesterday, and he was not afraid of their doing wrong to-day. In their decision yesterday, the Chairman had doubts. He decided in favor of the resolution, in hopes of its undergoing some modification—that modification was now brought forward. It did not entirely please him; but he thought it might be so amended as to please every one. He moved that the words "and may prove injurious to the United States," be struck out. Consented to.

Mr. Muhlenberg said, when he gave his vote yesterday, he did it in the hope of a modification of the resolution taking place in the House. A modification was now brought forward, and he was ready to vote for some such modification. Whilst he made this declaration, he must add, that he was willing also to vote for the original resolution. He wished the sense of the House to be taken upon the two propositions separately.

Mr. Dearborn consented to the propositions being taken separately.

Mr. S. Smith moved to strike out the word "highly," so as to read objectionable, instead of "highly objectionable."

The sense of the House was taken, when there were 48 for the striking out, and 48 against it. The Speaker gave his vote in the affirmative.

Mr. Kitchell said, he should vote against the proposition now brought forward, because he thought it wrong to hold up an idea which would have a tendency to weaken the Government. He looked upon it as injurious. The people would judge upon the Treaty from the instrument itself, and what had been said of it. They ought never to alarm the people unnecessarily. It was not from any fear of going to war, or any other apprehension but what he had mentioned, which caused this opposition in him.

Mr. Gallatin said, if the propositions could be divided, no gentleman could reasonably object to the sense of the House being taken upon them.

Mr. Parker said, he had not yet spoken upon this business. He would now say, he disapproved of the amendment, and should not vote for it. He thought the Treaty a bad one, and would not agree to vote for it by means of any modification.

Mr. Heister said, he should vote for the amendment, because, if the Treaty went into operation, he should wish the reasons which induced the House to agree to it to appear, on the Journals. When, however, the resolution for carrying the Treaty into effect was put, he should vote against it.

The motion was then put on the preamble, and decided in the negative, as follows: yeas, 49, nays 50:

Yeas.—Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Dempsey Burges, Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, John Clopton, Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, Samuel Earle, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Christopher Greenup, Andrew Gregg, William Barry Grove, Wade Hampton, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, Daniel Heister, James Holland, George Jackson, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Francis Preston, Robert Rutherford, Israel Smith, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Richard Winn.

Nays.—Fisher Ames, Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Nathan Bryan, Daniel Buck, Thomas Claiborne, Joshua Coit, Wm. Cooper, Jeremiah Crabb, George Dent, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, George Hancock, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, John Heath, Thomas Henderson, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Aaron Kitchell, John Wilkes Kittera, George Leonard, Samuel Lyman, Francis Malbone, William Vans Murray, Josiah Parker, John Read, John Richards, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Thomas Sprigg, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, and John Williams.

From this list it appears that the question was lost by one vote. The clerk, however, through mistake, reported the votes to be equal, viz: 49 for and 49 against the question, and the Speaker gave his vote in the negative, but the above was afterwards found to be the true statement.

Mr. W. Smith was glad the motion was negatived. He did not wish either blame or praise to be cast upon the Treaty by the resolution passed to carry it into effect. He would, therefore, move to add the following words to the original resolution: "Without reference to the merits of the Treaty."

Mr. Giles opposed this amendment. He said, it would be an indirect mode of passing a censure upon the House for having undertaken to judge of the merits of the Treaty. He did not know whether it struck the gentleman in the same way, but he would agree it was improper to pass a censure upon the House. He hoped, therefore, the motion would either be withdrawn or voted against.

The motion was withdrawn.

Mr. Winn said, as it was his opinion, and the opinion of the generality of his constituents, that the Treaty was a bad one, he should vote against it.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays, and determined in the affirmative—yeas 51, nays 48, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Theodorus Bailey, Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Daniel Buck, Gabriel Christie, Joshua Coit, William Cooper, Jeremiah Crabb, George Dent, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Andrew Gregg, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, George Hancock, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, Thomas Henderson, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Aaron Kitchell, John Wilkes Kittera, George Leonard, Samuel Lyman, Francis Malbone, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Wm. Vans Murray, John Read, John Richards, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Philip Van Cortlandt, Peleg Wadsworth, and John Williams.

Nays.—Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, Samuel Earle, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Christopher Greenup, Wade Hampton, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, Daniel Heister, James Holland, George Jackson, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Josiah Parker, Francis Preston, Robert Rutherford, Israel Smith, Thomas Sprigg, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Richard Winn.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution, and that Mr. Hillhouse, Mr. Sedgwick, and Mr. Gallatin, do prepare and bring in the same.

[Recapitulation.

For declaring the Treaty highly objectionable 48

Against this declaration 48

The Speaker decided in the negative.

For declaring the Treaty objectionable 49

Against the declaration; some because they did not consider it objectionable; others because they feared making the declaration would be injurious, and others because, so opposed to the Treaty, as to object to all compromise 49

The Speaker decided in the negative.

For carrying into effect the Treaty; some because a good one, others because best to execute it under existing circumstances 51

Against carrying it into effect, because bad in itself, and notwithstanding existing circumstances 48

Absent on this question—Messrs. Sherburne and Freeman, on leave; Mr. Duvall, resigned; Mr. Patton, by illness; Mr. Findlay, accidentally.][78]

Friday, May 6.

Admission of Tennessee.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the report of the committee to whom was referred the Message of the President, relative to the Territory of the United States south of the river Ohio.

Mr. Rutherford hoped the committee would concur in the report. He had no idea of confining that Territory to the strict legal line. He did not wish to cavil with this brave, generous people. He would have them taken out of leading-strings, as they were now able to stand alone; it was time to take them by the hand, and to say, we are glad to see you, stand on your own feet. We should not, he said, be too nice about their turning out their toes, or other trifles; they will soon march lustily along. They had complied with every requisite for becoming a State of the Union—they wished to form an additional star in the political hemisphere of the United States—they have erected a State Government, and wish to come into the Union, and to resist their claim would be out of character. He hoped it would be agreed to.

Mr. Dayton said, he disapproved of the report of the committee, and of the terms in which the resolution they had recommended for the adoption of the House was expressed. He could never give his assent to any proposition which expressly or even impliedly admitted that the people inhabiting either of the Territories of the United States could, at their own mere will and pleasure, and without the declared consent of Congress, erect themselves into a separate and independent State. Yet this seemed to be the spirit of the report under consideration, and what was still worse, it went, as he understood, to renounce any right in Congress even to deliberate whether they should become a member of the Union. He was by no means desirous of opposing the wishes of this valuable and enterprising people who inhabit the South-western Territory, nor of unnecessarily impeding the efforts they were making to throw off the Territorial jurisdiction, and establish a system of Government for themselves; but being aware that the steps now about to be taken would be regarded and pursued hereafter as a precedent, he conceived it important that they should, in this first instance of the sort that had presented itself, proceed circumspectly and rightly. He was willing to pass a law in the present session which should at the same time provide for erecting and forming them into a State, and for admitting them as such into the Union. They should thereby effectually promote the views of the people of Tennessee, in a mode which, by avoiding the violation of any just political principle, would entirely reconciled and render consistent the interest of that district of country and of the several United States.

Mr. D. acknowledged that he should have been much better satisfied if he had found all the people comprehended within the Territorial line petitioning for this measure, and if he had seen ingrafted in their constitution the conditions and restrictions contained in the ordinance upon which they found the right they were claiming; but he knew that unanimity was in no instance to be expected amongst a people so numerous and scattered; and he was convinced that they were bound by the conditions and limitations he alluded to, without an acknowledgment and repetition of them in their new charter.

Mr. Dearborn said, as to the census relative to representation, it appeared doubtful, that, because that Territory had now 66,000 inhabitants, they were entitled to two Representatives, as the other States of the Union were represented according to the number of inhabitants they contained in the year 1790. It might be doubtful whether they should be entitled to an advantage which was not allowed to other States. It had been his opinion (and he saw no reasons to change) that if this Territory was admitted into the Union, it was not entitled to more than one Representative; and therefore it was not necessary to make another census. As to passing a previous law recognizing the Territory as a State before it was admitted into the Union, he did not think it necessary. They say they are now a State, and surely Congress would not say to them, You shall not be a State, or dictate to them what sort of a constitution they shall have, provided it be a Republican. The method taken for ascertaining their number of inhabitants, he thought, could not be objected to. He saw no reason to prevent them from accepting the Territory as a State of the Union: what number of Representatives they were entitled to, would turn upon another point.

Mr. Blount said the House should have determined upon this question long since, as the government of Tennessee had a month ago gone into operation. The people there had chosen not only their State officers, but their Senators, and perhaps their Representatives, to come to Congress. The Governor had, from time to time, informed the President of the United States of every step taken towards the proposed change of government. In July, he sent him a copy of the law directing the census to be taken; in November, when the census was completed, he sent him a copy of it, and a copy of his Proclamation requiring the people to elect members of Convention for the purpose of forming a constitution and State Government; and on the 19th of February he sent him a copy of the constitution, with notice that on the 28th of March, when the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee would meet to act on the constitution, the temporary government would cease; and this last information was, to his knowledge, received on the 28th of February—forty days before it was communicated by the President to Congress, and eleven days after it must have been known to the Secretary of State, if not to the President, that the State Government had gone into operation.

What would be the consequence, said Mr. B., of refusing at this time, and under these circumstances, to receive this State into the Union? Did gentlemen wish to re-establish a temporary Territorial Government there? If they did, he believed their wish would not easily be accomplished; for the people there believed, that in changing their government, they only exercised a right which had been secured to them by a sacred compact; and under that belief, they will be disposed to defend it. That right was, in his opinion, recognized by the Government of the United States, when Mr. White was permitted to take his seat in that House as the Representative of the Territory; and from that circumstance they had reason to expect that 67,000 inhabitants would have entitled them, without scruple, to be a member of the Union. If the census was not a just one, or if there had been any fraud used in taking it, an impeachment would lie against the Governor, who, upon his responsibility as an officer of the United States, sanctioned the law for taking it, and acted under it after it was taken.

Mr. W. Lyman said the subject presented itself in two points of view—as it related to the Territory being admitted as a State into the Union, or as giving them a right to send members to Congress. In his opinion, according to the ordinance of Congress, they had a clear right to be admitted as a State into the Union; for it was there said, that when they had 60,000 inhabitants, they should be entitled. No mode is pointed out how it shall be ascertained; but the Governor being expressly mentioned in the case where 5,000 inhabitants were to entitle them to a temporary Government, he thought there could be no doubt but the same way was to be observed with respect to their qualification for becoming one of the States of the Union. This fact, he said, came fully ascertained, and being so, there could be no doubt the right was clear. It was a right, indeed, which they could not deny, and, as a matter of expediency, it was not worth while to oppose it. He saw no reason why they should call in question the proceedings or the purity of the government of that Territory, so as to doubt their return.

Mr. Dayton said that he preferred the formation of the South-western Territory into one State, to a division of it into two, and he therefore did not agree with those gentlemen who had advocated the latter idea. The people had requested to be united into one State, and he was for complying with their request, and for taking them at their word, rather than by subdividing to give them a double representation in the Senate.

Mr. Sedgwick concurred in opinion with the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton); and if any gentleman understood him to say that he did not wish the State of Tennessee to be admitted into the Union, it must have been an error, for he had no such desire. But he was still persuaded that it was never intended that that Territory should have the power of settling the way by which they were to become one of the independent States.

What had been said by a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) of their being in a degraded situation, because controlled by laws which were made by persons independent of them, would not only apply to 60,000, but to six persons. The question was whether they were in a situation in which they could claim to be a State? If they were, they ought to be admitted; if not, they ought not to be admitted. If the idea of the gentleman from New Jersey was adopted, they might be admitted at an early period. He had no idea of charging Governor Blount with improper conduct: he was entitled to his respect. If it was intended that these people should decide upon their own situation, they ought to do it in the way observed in cases directed by the constitution. Mr. S. proposed two resolutions—one for laying out territory into a State or States, and another for directing a census of the inhabitants to be taken.

It appeared to him that this was the way in which the subject should be considered: they should determine whether the Territory should be in one or two States, and before Representatives were sent to Congress, a census would be taken by authority of Congress. Words could not, he thought, have rendered more explicit the intention of the contracting parties than the words of the compact; and all this might be done in time for Representatives to be sent to the next session of Congress.

Mr. Macon said the chief differences in the opinions of gentlemen arose upon a subject which was not before the committee, viz: the number of Representatives to which this new State was entitled in that House. The question before the committee was on admitting the Territory to be a State of the Union. There appeared to him only two things as necessary to be inquired into: First, Was the new Government Republican? It appeared to him to be so. And, secondly, Were there 60,000 inhabitants in the Territory? It appeared to him there were; and, if so, their admission as a State should not be considered as a gift, but as a right. Their temporary government (by whose authority the late census was taken) had not only a Governor appointed by the Executive of the General Government, but also a Legislative Council. To admit this Territory as a member of the Union, appeared to him as a matter of course. It also seemed as if the Executive was of that opinion. The President, having been duly informed from time to time with the proceedings of that Territory towards being admitted into the Union, if he had thought they had been doing wrong, he would have set them right. It was also his opinion, that if they had passed a law directing a census to be taken, it would have been done exactly in the way the present had been taken. He thought the subject of navigation was settled by the Constitution of the United States; the waters in that country would be under the same regulations with all other waters in the Union, nor did he think there was any thing in the Constitution of Tennessee which had a contrary tendency. It appeared clearly to him that every thing had been fairly done, and that they had a right to claim an admission as a member of the Union.

Mr. Baldwin said, had he belonged to the Territory south of the Ohio, he should probably have been for pursuing a different mode of conducting this business, from that which it seems they have thought proper to adopt. He should have thought it desirable, a year or two ago, to have obtained from Congress an act pointing out the mode of taking the census, and ascertaining the events on which they were entitled to become a State. He said Congress ought also, of their own accord, to have taken up that subject, and made those provisions, though not requested by the Territory; and it had always been with surprise he had observed that the first act for forming that Territory did not contain those provisions. He thought, as to the principle in this case there could be no doubt. Whenever the event happened of their having 60,000 inhabitants, as pointed out by law, their right to be a State took place. It was to depend entirely on that contingency; when that was proved to have taken place, they could not be debarred. There having been no mode previously pointed out for ascertaining this fact, only makes it more difficult for the Territory and for Congress to be satisfied of the fact of their actually having so many inhabitants, but does not affect their right. He thought it best for the House to proceed to examine their census and the evidence which they had thought proper to collect and bring forward in their own way. He was ready to allow that, for himself, he should examine it more scrupulously than he should have done, had it been taken under a law of Congress. But he had not understood many objections had yet been made to it. Perhaps, on further examination, it will be found fully satisfactory; if so, they must be admitted to be a State as a matter of right. They might have waited longer, and attempted to have formed two States; they have made their election of the other alternative. He thought it wise for Congress to avail itself of this opportunity of holding them to what they have chosen, and thus prevent future difficulties and misunderstandings.

Mr. W. Smith said he was glad to find the observations which he made yesterday in some measure sanctioned to-day. He then recapitulated his leading arguments. It was said yesterday by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) that whilst the people of the Territory remained in their colonial situation, they were in a state of degradation; but, he would ask, at whose request they became so? Look at their request in the year 1790, as expressed in the cession act. And yet, in the course of a few years, without consulting Congress, in consequence of a census taken by their own authority, they proceed to erect themselves into a State, create a new government, and claim to be admitted into the Union as matter of right. Under their former government their member was admitted to that House; yet, whilst he holds his seat under that government, they have appointed other members to represent them under their new Government. The most regular way would certainly have been to have transmitted their request to Congress to be formed into a State. Congress would then have passed a law for taking a census, have fixed when the Territorial system should cease and the State Government commence.

He thought the business was of considerable consequence, and he was sorry it was taken up in so thin a House. There would certainly arise in a few years other new States in the Western country yet uninhabited, which might occasion considerable difficulties. They might make a census and say they had 60,000 inhabitants, when they had not half that number. He did not wish to keep the inhabitants of the South-western Territory out of the Union, but he wished them to be admitted in a constitutional mode.

Mr. Gallatin was of opinion that the people of the South-western Territory became ipso facto a State the moment they amounted to 60,000 free inhabitants, and that it became the duty of Congress, as part of the original compact, to recognize them as such, and to admit them into the Union, whenever they had satisfactory proof of the fact.

It was objected that, previous to the proof of that fact being given, it was necessary that Congress should have laid out and formed that Territory into one or more States, and that the proof of their number should have been given under direction and by order of Congress, the people not being competent to give the proof themselves.

Both those objections suppose a construction of the original compact between the people of that Territory and the United States, (of the act of cession of North Carolina, and of the ordinance of Congress of 1787,) which was inadmissible; for it rendered that compact binding upon one party and not upon the other. It is supposed that that ordinance, whose object it was to establish the principles of a free government, and to ascertain a certainty of admission into the Union, had declared that the time when those people were to enjoy that government, and were to be admitted as a member of the Union, depended not on the contingency of their having 60,000 free inhabitants, but on certain previous acts of Congress—in other words, on the sole will of Congress. Either you must acknowledge that their admission depends solely on the condition of the compact being fulfilled, to wit: their having the number required; or you declare that it rests upon another act, which may be done or refused by the other party; that Congress have the power, by neglecting to lay them out into one or more States, or by refusing to pass a law to take a census, to keep them for ever in their colonial state. Nor did the strictest interpretation of that contract justify the construction given by the gentleman from South Carolina; for the only meaning that could consistently be given to the words, "lay out and form into one or more States," was, that Congress had power to fix the boundaries of the Territory or Territories that were to become a State or States. They could have declared that that Territory should be one or two States; but if they had neglected to do it, their omission could not be plead against the inhabitants of Tennessee. The power given by that clause to Congress was merely to fix boundaries, and to choose whether there should be more than one State; but if they had not made use of that power, there must be one State, and its boundaries were fixed by the act of cession, so that nothing remained now for Congress to operate upon.

Mr. Blount said, there was an absolute necessity for the clause which the gentleman last up objected to. Persons were daily coming to that Territory in great numbers. If the census had been required to be taken in one day all the people who had come into the Territory, with the intention to reside permanently there, could by no means have been numbered. It was not intended to give the officers power to take persons in more places than one, nor did he believe it had been done. He undertook to explain yesterday the reason why so long a time was given, but he seemed not to have been understood, which was, the difficulties attending the passage of the wilderness.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) had said, that his arguments of yesterday had been to-day admitted. If the gentleman had supposed that he had admitted them, he was mistaken. That he might not continue under the mistake, he would inform him, that what he had called arguments, were, in his opinion, mere quibbles, such as could only have been expected from a County Court lawyer, at the bar of a County Court.

Mr. Coit said, that as he had not heard it suggested from any quarter that it would be expedient to divide the Territory into two States, he did not think it important to inquire into the powers of Congress in that respect. It is declared by the ordinance for the government of the Territory, that when there should be sixty thousand inhabitants in any one of the States there they should be admitted into the Union. If, then, it is not in contemplation to divide the Territory into two States, he considered that the right to be admitted was complete as soon as there was the requisite number within the whole Territory. But it appeared to him, that on examining the census and the law under which it was taken, they could not be considered as furnishing proof that there was that number there. He did not pretend to say that any fraud had been committed in the execution of the law, but the law itself was wholly defective. The same man might have been counted in several counties, nay, in every county in the Territory, and that without any fraud, but in strict compliance with the law; two months having been allowed for taking the enumeration, and it being enjoined on the sheriffs of the several counties to include in their enumeration all persons within their respective districts within that period.

The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Blount) seemed to imagine that it would have been impracticable to have followed a mode similar to the one pointed out in the enumeration law of the United States, but he could not see the reason. [He read the law.]

Mr. Sitgreaves said, he felt every disposition favorable to meet the wishes of the people of the South-western Territory, and for a reason which had been given, viz: that, as they were our fellow-citizens, it was desirable they should equally participate with us in all the advantages of the General Government, and suffer no longer than was necessary the comparative humiliation of a Colonial or Territorial administration; but, from obvious considerations, he thought it highly important that they should be admitted to the enjoyment of these advantages only in conformity with the promise made to them, and on the terms of the compact entered into jointly by the United States and by them. Two constructions of this compact had been contended for; one, that so soon as sixty thousand free inhabitants should be collected within the Territory, they should be entitled to a place in the Union, as an independent State; the other, that Congress should first lay off the Territory into one or more States, according to a just discretion, defining the same by bounds and limits; and that the admission of such States thus defined, should take place as their population respectively amounted to the number of free inhabitants mentioned; that is, that the sixty thousand inhabitants could not claim admission into the Union, unless their number was comprised within a State whose Territorial limits had been previously ascertained by an act of the United States. He inclined to this latter construction, because it was conformable to the letter, and, as he understood it, to the spirit of the instrument. By the act of cession of the State of North Carolina, accepted by Congress, it is provided that the ceded territory should be laid off into one or more States, and that the people of the Territory should be entitled to all the privileges secured to the inhabitants of the Territory north-west of the Ohio, by the ordinance of 1787. The extent of their privileges, therefore, is to be determined by this ordinance, which may be called their charter. They have no other or greater privileges than the inhabitants of the North-western Territory; and it cannot be pretended that these would be entitled to admission into the Union as one State, so soon as their whole number shall amount to sixty thousand, because the ordinance itself divides that country into three separate and distinct States, each of which must contain sixty thousand free inhabitants before it can claim to be received. The actual circumstances and situation of the South-western Territory evinced the reasonableness and propriety of the construction; it is composed of two settlements, the Hoston and the Mero districts, separated from each other by the Cumberland Mountains and a wilderness of two hundred miles in width, which has always been inhabited by the Indians, and the soil and jurisdiction of which have been actually ceded to them by the United States, by late Treaties; and by an examination of the documents on the table it would appear, that when, agreeably to the act of the Territorial Legislature, the officers who took the census put to the people of the Territory the question whether they were desirous of admission into the Union; the inhabitants of the Western or Mero district almost universally answered in the negative. He would not undertake positively to pronounce on the inexpediency of forming the whole country into one State; but under the circumstances which he had stated, and until they should be satisfactorily explained to his mind, it did appear to him that the interest and the wishes of that people required a division of the Territory. It looked somewhat absurd to connect under one permanent Government, people separated from each other by natural barriers, by a distance of two hundred miles, and by a foreign jurisdiction. They had been told, by gentlemen who knew the fact, that during the period of Indian hostility, the people emigrating to the Mero district were obliged to stop five or six weeks at the eastern boundary of the wilderness, until they could collect in companies or caravans of sufficient number and force to pass in safety; the time of hostility may again return, and even a state of peace with Indians is not a state of such tranquillity or security as to preclude the necessity of caution and vigilance on the frontiers. The people of the Western district seem sensible of the inconvenience of an arrangement so unnatural as the one proposed, and so far as their wishes can be collected from the documents before the committee, they desire as yet to preserve their connection with us in its present mode, and to remain under the Territorial Government.

Mr. Macon said, he should be as unwilling to agree to the doctrine of the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. Dayton,) as he was unwilling to agree to his. As to the people of this Territory attaching themselves to any other nation, he should not have thought it could have been suggested. There was no more likelihood of their going over to any other government than there was of any other State doing the same thing.

Mr. Gallatin said, how the resolution on the table, or the doctrine he had asserted, supported the idea that that Territory would have a right to separate from the Union, he could not see, and he should be glad to be informed. So far from it, his opinion was that if they were a State, they were at the same time a member of the Union; that they could not exist as a State without being one of the United States. The only difference of opinion was whether an act of Congress was necessary previous to their being recognized as such; and if any doctrine could lead to the conclusion of the Speaker, it was that of those gentlemen who thought that Congress must form them into a State, several months before they were admitted into the Union. In that intermediary situation, whilst declared a State and not one of the United States, they might, perhaps, claim, as an independent State, a right to reject an admission in the Union. But those consequences could only flow from the doctrine he was combating; the principle he was supporting was that no previous act was necessary, that there could not be two acts upon the subject; but that one and the same act must recognize them as a State and admit them in the Union.

Mr. Blount hoped the original resolution would not be rejected for the sake of the gentleman from New Jersey. He did not wish to give up the right to which these people were entitled; though perhaps the law might not pass the Senate.

Mr. Harper objected to the mention of the Senate, as to what was likely to be done there. He hoped they should adopt the resolution of the gentleman from New Jersey.

The question was then taken on the original resolution reported by the select committee, and carried by 41 to 35.

The committee rose and the House took up the consideration, when Mr. Kitchell proposed a resolution in the place of that which had been agreed to in a Committee of the Whole, as he thought some law should be passed by Congress recognizing the Territory as a State, before they were admitted into the Union. It was negatived; and the original resolution was agreed to by 43 to 30, as follows:

Yeas.—Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, Jeremiah Crabb, William Findlay, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Wade Hampton, Robert Goodloe Harper, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Daniel Heister, James Holland, George Jackson, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Francis Preston, John Read, Robert Rutherford, Israel Smith, Richard Sprigg, jr., Thomas Sprigg, Absalom Tatom, Philip Van Cortlandt, and Abraham Venable.

Nays.—Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Gabriel Christie, Joshua Coit, George Dent, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, Thomas Hartley, Thomas Henderson, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Aaron Kitchell, George Leonard, Samuel Lyman, Francis Malbone, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, William Smith, George Thatcher, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, and John Williams.

Saturday, May 21.

Military Establishment.

The amendments of the Senate to the bill fixing the Military Establishment were read. They went to the retaining the whole number of light dragoons and the Major General, and directing that men should be enlisted for five instead of three years. The amendment respecting the dragoons being under consideration——

Mr. Baldwin informed the House that the amount of the amendments of the Senate was this, to keep up 320 dragoons instead of 52, and to retain the Major General. It appeared to him that the House, having determined upon these subjects already, would be at no loss to form an opinion upon these amendments.

Mr. Williams hoped that the amendment from the Senate would not be agreed to. This House had taken great pains to mature the bill, and he was of opinion that the number of troops agreed to was sufficient for a peace establishment. No gentleman had observed to the contrary; any addition would not only be an augmentation to the great expenses already accrued by the late war, but be a mean of retaining in the army useful citizens, who would be otherwise employed in pursuits of much more benefit to the United States.

Mr. W. Lyman hoped the amendment would be disagreed to.

Mr. S. Smith said, the Senate seemed to contemplate these light dragoons, on account of the officers, who were to do duty on horse or foot, as necessity required. From this idea, he would suggest the propriety of agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. Kittera said, the army would be placed so widely from each other, that the horse would prove very useful.

Mr. Giles had no idea of keeping up the horse for the sake of the officers.

Mr. Gilbert was in favor of retaining the whole number of horses.

On motion of Mr. Williams, the yeas and nays were taken, and the amendment was negatived, 58 to 22.

The consideration of the propriety of retaining the Major General was next taken up.

Mr. Nicholas could not conceive any use for generals. He believed if the Senate had struck out the General they sent them, the amendment would have been a good one.

Mr. Giles hoped they should not agree to the amendment. It would be a commencement of sinecures in the Military Department. There would be generals without men to command. He believed the bill, as sent from that House, contained its full proportion of officers.

Mr. S. Smith was in favor of the amendment. He said the expense would be no great things, and the present Major General would be very necessary in taking possession of the posts. Perhaps, at this time, it was essential to keep this man in command, as, if he were discharged, it might create a derangement in our Army which might be fatal. The command of three thousand men, it was true, was too trifling for a Major General. But, perhaps, as this General had been the victorious means of procuring us peace with the Indians, immediately to discharge him would appear like ingratitude, if not injustice.

Mr. Rutherford concurred in opinion with the gentleman last up.

Mr. W. Lyman said, they were not now called upon to reward the services of Major General Wayne, but to provide proper officers for their Army. If the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. S. Smith) were to bring forward a measure of that kind, they should know how to decide upon it. Nor did he think the argument for making the office of a Major General, because the posts were to be received, had much weight. Any other officer would receive them as well as a Major General.

Mr. Giles said, he had no personal objections to the present commander of our Army; but he considered the present proposition such a breach of principle as he could not agree to. It was the making of an office for a man; as the gentleman from Maryland seemed to think the taking possession of the posts the principal business to be performed by him. If the services of this gentleman were necessary on that occasion, he would much rather pass a bill to make him a commissioner for that purpose. All the arguments in favor of a Major General were in favor of the man, and not of the propriety of the office.

Mr. Murray said, the gentleman last up must know that the gentleman who had so successfully commanded our Western Army, was now in the service of the United States, yet he would insinuate that there was an intention of creating a new office. There was no disposition in those who wished to retain this meritorious man in service to create new offices. They were now about to make a regular Military Establishment; heretofore it had rather been a nominal one. There had been hitherto a Major General at the head of our corps, and he thought it would be proper to continue the command. There appeared to him a great deal of danger from the instability of their proceedings, an instability often charged upon a Government like ours. He would not attribute this to any other motive than such as were too apt to enter into large deliberative bodies. Was it right that when a man had led our armies to victory, and returned, that he should be immediately stripped of his commission? He thought not. It was said that this was done, because the Army was reduced; but he believed it was now as large as when General Wayne obtained his victory by it, for it was not then more than three thousand men; and yet, because they wished to retain this man in the service of the United States, they were told that they were creating new offices for which there was no necessity.

Mr. Nicholas said, with respect to the instability of their measures, he was ready to take his own share of it as well as that of the gentleman last up, for he never found him vary from one point; he was always desirous to keep up every office which had been once established. Mr. N. thought the conduct of gentlemen extraordinary. At one time they were to make our Establishment as large as possible, and when more favorable circumstances appeared, they were not to reduce it. Where were the benefits of peace, if they were still to keep up our War Establishments? Gentlemen tell you that the Army would be as large now as before the reduction, yet the same gentlemen were opposed to its being reduced to the number now contemplated. This appeared something like inconsistency. Mr. N. said, if they did not seize every favorable opportunity of lessening the expenses of Government, he believed their constituents would have good reason to complain of their want of attention to their duty.

Mr. Macon said, they ought to legislate on this subject as if there were no Army in existence. They had no permanent Establishment, as their men were discharged at the end of every three years. He believed our present commander was a very respectable officer, but he could not vote for a Major General in the Establishment, which he thought unnecessary, because he thought him a deserving man.

Mr. Bourne believed it was not necessary to have any appropriate number of men for a Major General to command. It had often been thought that a Major General was necessary. He believed they had thought so on former occasions. If any necessity should arise for the militia to be called out to aid the Army, such an officer would be highly necessary. He did not think it would be true economy to reject him.

Mr. Gallatin said it was not pleasing to give a vote which was in some degree of a personal nature like the present. He was unacquainted with the gentleman who now held the office of Major General in our Army, and, therefore, was under no personal influence, and his opinion on the subject was formed upon the information of those in whose judgment on military affairs, he must necessarily confide, as it was a subject he did not understand. It was supposed that a Major General was necessary for a War Establishment, but not for a Peace Establishment. He drew this conclusion from that grade ceasing with the war in 1783, and being again introduced in 1791, when the Indian war had commenced, and he understood it was more connected with the nature of the service than the number of men. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) said that the nature of the service of this summer, required the service of General Wayne; but as the act they were about to pass would not take place till the 31st of October, as it was the opinion of all gentlemen of military knowledge, that there was no necessity for retaining a Major General in our reduced Army Establishment after the posts had been taken possession of, and as the whole summer appeared sufficient for that service, he would vote against the amendment.

Mr. Hartley thought it best to have a Major General. The expense was but small, and in case of the militia being called out (as was mentioned by the gentleman from Rhode Island) a Major General would be necessary; besides, to reject him, would have the appearance of forcing this man out of office in an ungenerous manner.

On motion of Mr. Bailey, the yeas and nays were then taken, and the Senate's amendment was lost, 49 to 34.

Monday, May 23.

Widow of General Greene.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the petition of Catharine Greene, widow of the late General Greene, for indemnity against the demands of Harris and Blachford, of London, merchants, on account of a certain bond which had been given to them by General Greene, as was said on account of the United States. The following was the report of the Committee of Claims:

"That this petitioner prays for indemnity against the demands of Messrs. Harris and Blachford, merchants, who have obtained a judgment against the estate of the late General Greene, for a large sum, in consequence of his being security to the said Harris and Blachford, for the debt of John Banks & Co., which debt, she states, was incurred for, and in behalf of the United States; and that General Greene gave security for no other purpose than to forward the interests of the public.

"On a strict investigation of this claim, the committee find, that in the fall of 1782, General Greene was authorized by the Department of War to obtain supplies of clothing for the Southern Army, then under his command; and, not long after, he contracted with John Banks, a partner in the house of Hunter, Banks & Co., for such supplies.

"In February, 1783, General Greene, under authority of the Superintendent of Finance, contracted with the same John Banks, to furnish such provisions as the same army were in want of; both of which contracts met the approbation of his employers.

"Both these contracts required greater funds than the contractors could command, and the last, which was to supply rations for the army, was near being defeated, because the creditors—for supplies on the former contract—were about to deprive the contractors of their means to fulfil the last. In this situation, Gen. Greene had before him the alternative of turning the army loose upon the inhabitants, to plunder for their necessary food, or support, by his own credit, that of the contractors. He preferred the latter, and gave, in addition to the security of John Banks & Co., his own bond to Harris and Blachford, to secure an eventual payment for articles which had gone to the use of the United States in clothing the army.

"John Banks received of the United States the whole sum of the contract, but diverted the money from its proper channel, and left General Greene liable to pay the sum secured by the bond mentioned above, and another to Messrs. Newcomen and Collet. Banks & Co. became bankrupts, and, soon after, Banks died.

"The committee find that General Greene, as soon as he was apprised of any possible danger which might accrue to him, took measures to procure some security; but his attempts were ineffectual as to a complete indemnity. It appears he effected some payments, and obtained partial indemnity, but was left finally exposed to a large claim of Messrs. Newcomen and Collet, and this bond about which the present petition is conversant.

"Against the claim of Newcomen and Collet, Congress have indemnified the estate of General Greene, by an act passed April 27th, 1792.

"This act has served as a precedent to the committee, in deciding on the present petition, as there are the same reasons existing for the interference of Government now as then; to which may now be added the weight of precedent.

"For further particulars as to the merits of the claim, the committee ask leave to refer the House to a report of the Secretary of the Treasury, made to Congress on this subject, the 26th December, 1791, and which is herewith laid before them. The bond given by Gen. Greene to Harris and Blachford for J. Banks & Co., is dated 8th April, 1783, for the sum of £18,473, 13s. 7d. South Carolina currency. This sum, by a variety of negotiations and payments, has been considerably reduced; the committee have not been able to ascertain with precision the sum now due, but suppose it to be between eleven and twelve thousand pounds.

"The committee are of opinion that General Greene gave this bond with the sole and honorable motive of serving, to his utmost ability, the then pressing interest of the United States: and that the salvation of the Southern Army, and success of our arms in that part of the Union, in a great measure depended upon this timely interference of his private credit.

"They think the honor and justice of Government is pledged to indemnify the estate of General Greene, and by paying the sum due to Harris and Blachford, save a deserving family from indigence and ruin. They therefore report, for the consideration of the House, the following resolution, viz:

"Resolved, That the United States ought to indemnify the estate of the late General Greene, for the sum due on a bond, given by the said General Greene to Harris and Blachford, bearing date April 8, 1783, for the sum of £18,473, 13s. 7d., South Carolina currency, as surety for John Banks & Co.: Provided, That it shall appear, upon due investigation, by the officers of the Treasury, that the said General Greene, in his lifetime, or his executors since his decease, have not already been indemnified, for the contents of the said bond: And provided, That the said executors shall make over to the Comptroller of the Treasury, and his successors, for the United States, all mortgages, bonds, covenants, or other counter securities whatsoever, if such there are, which were obtained by General Greene in his lifetime, from the said Banks & Co., or either of them, on account of his being surety for them, as aforesaid; to be sued for in the name of the said executors, for the use of the United States: And the officers of the Treasury are hereby authorized to liquidate and settle the sum due to the estate of the said General Greene, to indemnify the same as aforesaid, according to the true intent and meaning of this resolution; and to pay such sum as may be found due on the said bond, out of the Treasury of the United States, to the said executors, to be accounted for by them, as part of the said estate."

After some debate on this subject, in the course of which the Speaker read, in his place, a letter he had received from the Secretary of the War Department, in consequence of a resolution passed on Saturday, calling for a letter which had been written by the late Colonel Burnett to the late Secretary of War, declaring that no such letter could be found in the War Office; and Mr. Coit spoke at considerable length against the claim—at length the question was put and carried in favor of the report, there being 51 members in the affirmative. The committee then rose, and the House took up the consideration, when, on motion of Mr. Blount, who said he had intended to have made some observations on this subject, but finding the majority so large in favor of the report, he could not believe what he should say would have any effect, the yeas and nays were taken and stood, yeas 56, nays 26, as follows:

Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Lemuel Benton, Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Richard Brent, Dempsey Burges, Thomas Claiborne, William Cooper, Jeremiah Crabb, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, Christopher Greenup, Robert Goodloe Harper, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, Daniel Heister, William Hindman, George Jackson, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, William Lyman, Francis Malbone, John Milledge, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, Anthony New, John Nicholas, John Read, Robert Rutherford, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, Isaac Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Richard Sprigg, jr., John Swanwick, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Philip Van Cortlandt, Abraham Venable, Peleg Wadsworth, and John Williams.

Nays.—Thomas Blount, Nathan Bryan, Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, Joshua Coit, Isaac Coles, George Dent, Samuel Earle, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Roger Griswold, William B. Grove, Wade Hampton, George Hancock, Thomas Henderson, James Holland, Aaron Kitchell, Matthew Locke, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, Andrew Moore, Nathaniel Smith, Thomas Sprigg, Absalom Tatom, and Richard Winn.

The resolution was referred to the Committee of Claims, to report a bill.

[The facts, as stated in the course of debate, were as follows:

A little time before the evacuation of Charleston by the English, in the fall of the year 1782, a number of merchants who had settled there, under British authority, were under the necessity of leaving the city. Thus situated, these merchants were willing to dispose of their goods in a way that would secure their money, and enable them to leave the country immediately. John Banks knowing of this, and being, it is said, a man of a speculative disposition, determined to avail himself of this offer. He therefore went into Charleston, at a time when General Greene was lying not far from its walls, and there made a contract with Messrs. Harris & Blachford for goods to the amount of £50,000, which were delivered to him under the firm of Hunter, Banks & Co. After Banks had made this purchase, he entered into contract with General Greene to supply the Army with clothes. Some time after that contract had taken place, the Army was in want of provisions, and the supplies were cut off, and about to fail, when Banks came forward and made a contract to supply the Army with provisions; but the funds which were to enable him to fulfil this contract, were in the goods he had lately bought, and an interference of his partners and creditors took place. The creditors were afraid if these goods were disposed of for that purpose, their security would be lessened, and his partners were not willing that he should convert their joint property to his own particular benefit—for they, it seems, were to have nothing to do with the provision contract. To surmount these difficulties, security was required. The creditors of Banks would be satisfied, if security was given. In this state of things, General Greene became security for Banks, in his first purchase. Banks afterwards received the whole sum of the contract, but diverted the money from its proper channel, and left General Greene liable to pay the sum secured by the bond to Harris & Blachford.

The question in the committee was, whether General Greene entered into this security with the sole view of obtaining provisions for his Army in a time of distress, or whether he had some concern or partnership in the transaction. The following particulars were mentioned, to prove that the security was given for no other purpose than that of obtaining food for his men. The first purchase of Banks was made in September, 1782; the evacuation of Charleston took place in December following. Banks's clothing contract was made a few days previous to the evacuation; his proposal for the provision contract was made about the same time, but not actually entered into till the 18th of February, 1783, and not completed till General Greene's security was given on the 8th of April. On the 7th of May, General Greene got a counter security. It could not be seen, as was observed, for what purpose General Greene entered into this contract, if it were not for the relief of his army. Had General Greene been a partner, would he have required security of Banks six months after the contract, when business was going on extremely well—when Banks was in good credit, and making money, and when no doubt could be entertained of him? It was insisted he would not: but, having no connection with him, he thought it prudent to obtain a counter security.

On the other hand, various suggestions were thrown out which had somewhat of a suspicious appearance—such as General Greene's forcing his men to buy clothing, &c., of Banks, at an exorbitant price, reports in the Army, a letter said to be written by the late Colonel Burnett, who, it appears, was a partner of John Banks, intimating that General Greene was a partner in the concern, though his name was never mentioned in it; but nothing like proof appeared to the committee upon which to ground any reliance. Indeed, if General Greene had any concern with Banks, it seemed to be a matter which could not be proved, as, in General Greene's lifetime, he brought an action against Mr. Ferry, one of the partners with Banks, which was tried at Charleston, when every thing in Mr. Ferry's cause depended on proving General Greene a partner; but he failed in doing it, and having failed, it was said to be pretty strong presumptive evidence that it could not be proved; because Mr. Ferry might have brought a cross bill against General Greene, and oblige him to declare on oath that he was in no way interested in the suit, which he did not think it proper to do.

The report of the committee was at length agreed to, as before stated, and a bill ordered to be brought in, which subsequently passed. By this decision, between £11,000 and £12,000 sterling will be paid out of the Treasury of the United States to the executors of General Greene. The yeas and nays, on the passing of the bill, stood, 55 to 24.]

Friday, May 27.

Amy Dardin's Horse.[79]

On motion of Mr. Claiborne, the House formed itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims on the petition of Amy Dardin, who prayed for compensation for a very valuable horse which had been impressed during the war. The report was against the petitioner, on the ground of the act of limitation barring the claim. The case appeared a hard one, as a widow and orphans were in want of the money; and several members having suggested that application had been made before the act of limitation took place, proof of which could be substantiated, the committee rose, and the papers were recommitted to the Committee of Claims.

Monday, May 30.

Military and Naval Appropriations.[80]

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill providing appropriations for the Military and Naval Establishments; when,

On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for the sum for the payment of the Army was filled with $273,666.

Mr. W. Smith proposed to fill up the next blank, for the subsistence of the officers of the Army, with $68,480.

Mr. Gallatin said, he was not ready to vote for this object. It had been usual to appropriate the subsistence of the officers and non-commissioned officers and privates all in one sum. He did not know what were the separate calculations.

Mr. W. Smith believed that it had been usual to put the two subjects together heretofore, but the Secretary of War had suggested the propriety of placing them under different heads. It was therefore done.

Mr. Gallatin said, when he objected to this plan of putting the two objects together, it was not merely on account of the arrangement, but because he did not know the amount calculated for the different descriptions. He knew, however, the rations were calculated at 30 cents. He would move to fill the blank with 20 cents, which would be two-thirds of the amount proposed. He would give his reasons for thus filling the blank. It would be found, by a communication from the Secretary of the Treasury at the commencement of the session, that, in the estimate for the Military Department, rations were charged 15 cents each, making the whole subsistence for 6,000 men $367,061; notwithstanding the nominal Army Establishment had been reduced one-half, the total amount of expense was estimated as high as before. The items upon which an increase had been made, were subsistence, hospital, ordnance, and quartermaster's departments, and protection of frontiers. It would be found that, in the second estimate of the Secretary, lately made, rations were estimated at 30 cents each, which made the whole amount of subsistence $437,762.

This difference in the estimate led the Committee of Ways and Means to an inquiry into the business, because, as the nominal establishment was decreased from 6,000 to 3,000 men, they had hoped there would have been some decrease of expense also. They received for answer, that rations could not be contracted at Detroit for less than 30 cents each; but though this, by the contract, was the price of rations at that post, they could not suppose they would cost the same at the other posts. It also appeared, from the information received from the Secretary of the Treasury, that the contract which had been made, was upon these terms—to furnish rations either at Detroit at 30 cents, or at Pittsburg at 11 cents, the place of delivery being at the option of Government. It would be seen that there was a difference betwixt those two prices of 19 cents; and he would ask whether any gentleman in that House believed that it would cost 19 cents per ration to transport them from Pittsburg to Detroit? He did not think that transportation would, on an average, cost 9 cents. The distance by land was not 200 miles; and water carriage would reduce it to 20.

Mr. W. Smith said, if agreeing to this motion would save the money, it would deserve attention; but, if they were to make the appropriation so small as to embarrass Government, it would be much worse than if they were to vote for a little too much. There would be a certain number of men who must be fed, and he thought they might rely upon the Administration's not giving more for rations than was necessary. But, if the sum voted was too small, what would be the consequence? The rations must be got, be the prices what they may; the men must be fed. Difficulties would arise if the fund appropriated should prove inadequate. He did not see that there would be any real saving by reducing the sum appropriated.

Mr. Bourne hoped the blank would be filled up with the sum proposed by the gentleman from South Carolina. It had been stated that rations might be purchased at Pittsburg for 11 cents, but they could not be bought for less than 30 at Detroit, and he thought they could not calculate upon any other price than that, as it was uncertain whether or not the contract would be fulfilled; and if it failed, and the Secretary of the Treasury was obliged to purchase at Detroit, if they calculated the rations at 20 cents only, he would not be able to purchase the necessary provisions for their men; but if, on the contrary, 30 cents were agreed to, there would be enough in any case, and if the ration could be bought for 20 cents, he did not fear that the money would be expended unnecessarily.

Mr. Venable said he should not feel himself justified in appropriating more than was necessary for the object before them; for, if they were not to be guided by a proper estimate, they might as well at once give an unlimited power on the Treasury. All the expenses could not be estimated to be made at Detroit. If one-third of our men were kept at Detroit, he should think it a large number. Why, then fix the price as if the whole Army was to be kept there? And, even in that case, 20 cents would be a large appropriation. Why, then, embarrass themselves by making a larger appropriation than was necessary? The Army would be extended on the whole frontier, and at some places rations would be bought cheaper than at Pittsburg.

Mr. Dayton (the Speaker) observed, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin) assumed as undeniable, and established as the foundation of his arguments and objections, what he did not only not admit, but absolutely denied, viz: that the rations of provisions would cost the United States more when delivered at Detroit, than at any other post. He believed there were two or three others at which the price would be higher than at Detroit, and mentioned Michilimacinac in particular. The gentlemen who were for reducing this item of appropriation, had referred to the contract which had been made some time since, and had, at the same time, acknowledged the extraordinary advance in the price of the necessaries of life, even in the interior of the country. The latter event, said Mr. D., was of a nature to excite much fear that the contract would be thrown back upon the United States, owing to the inability it would create in the individuals to fulfil it, and ought, therefore, to prompt Congress to guard against such an exigency, by a more ample provision than would otherwise have been requisite.

Mr. W. Smith said there was one fact which he forgot to mention. The Secretary of the Treasury informed the Committee of Ways and Means that the contractor would lose money by the contract to deliver the rations at 11 cents at Pittsburg, and it was possible, therefore, that it might not be fulfilled. Gentlemen say—why provide the money if it be not wanted? They seemed to mistake the business; the money was to be borrowed, and if not wanted, it would not be taken. No more would be expended because there was more than sufficient appropriated. There would be no money lying unemployed in the Treasury.

Mr. Gallatin believed the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) would not deny that his information was correct. The contract was made to deliver the rations either at Pittsburg or Detroit, at the option of Government. To calculate the whole number of rations at 30 cents, was considering the whole Army at Detroit; and, though it be true, that there be one post more distant than Detroit, yet, the greater number were far nearer, and consequently, where provisions would be got cheaper. Therefore, considering the price at Detroit to be the general price, was allowing too much. This, he believed, would not be controverted.

Mr. Nicholas said, he should be glad to know what was the price of rations in the Atlantic States. One half of the Establishment would be upon the Eastern waters, and, therefore, the money necessary to be appropriated would depend, in some degree, upon the price of rations there. He thought 20 cents would be a full average price for the whole.

Mr. Havens said, that if they were to fix the price too high, it might produce a combination amongst the contractors to advance the price—as he believed there was a greater likelihood of combination than competition amongst them. He knew this was no reason why they should fix the price too low, but he thought it was a consideration which should lead them to vote for the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The original motion was put, and negatived, 34 to 31; and then Mr. Gallatin's, to fill the blank with $45,606, was put, and carried.

Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the next blank, for the subsistence of non-commissioned officers and privates, with $369,282, which was calculating the rations at 30 cents each.

The question was put, and negatived, 33 to 30.

Mr. Gallatin then moved to have the blank filled with $246,188, which was calculating the rations at 20 cents each.

Mr. Dayton hoped that the sum named would not be agreed to; if it were, he believed that the soldiers of the Army would not be subsisted. He was satisfied that gentlemen who proposed and advocated so scanty and inadequate sums had the same views as he had; but he was, nevertheless, convinced, that so far from promoting economy, they would eventually produce profusion.

Mr. Dayton concluded with saying, that he did not wish to appropriate lavishly, but his sole aim was to avoid any of those serious consequences which would inevitably flow from an ill-judged parsimony; and he should sit down and console himself under any event, with the reflection, that he had discharged his duty.

Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank with $360,000, which was carried, 34 to 31.

On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for forage was filled with $16,592, and that for clothing was filled with $70,000, without debate. He proposed to fill the blank for providing horses for cavalry, with $7,500; when

Mr. Blount observed, that he thought it unnecessary to provide for the purchase of horses, when they had resolved upon reducing the number of troops.

Mr. Gallatin said he would just notice, that when the full number of horses was kept up, the appropriations for clothing were the same as now, and those for horses were less. The former estimate was $6,000 for horses; now, $7,500; so that the more they reduce the Army, the greater was the expense.

Mr. Macon believed, there were as many horses now in the service as would complete two companies, and they could not, with any propriety, calculate upon one-half dying. He moved to strike out the item altogether.

The motion was put and negatived, 33 to 26.

Mr. Havens said, he did not vote for striking out the item altogether, as he supposed some money would be wanted, but could not think so much as had been mentioned was necessary.

The motion for $7,509 was put and carried, 34 to 31.

On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for bounty was filled with $10,000, and that for Hospital Department with $30,000, without objection. He also proposed to fill the blank for the Ordnance Department with $48,907, when

Mr. Gallatin said, that this sum was $11,000 more than the former estimate; $1,000 of which was owing to an increase of rent. The other additional item of $10,000 was for contingent expenses; but, as they had a distinct head for contingent expenses he thought that the contingencies would be best, all of them, placed under that head. He therefore moved to have the blank filled with $38,907.

Mr. Williams proposed $40,000, which was carried.

Mr. W. Smith proposed to fill the blank for the Indian Department with $70,000.

Mr. Gallatin said, it would be recollected that they had already made two appropriations under this head; the one for establishing trading-houses with the Indian tribes, the other for carrying into effect several treaties. On inquiry what reason there was for this appropriation, he could only find one, viz: that a treaty was expected to be held in Georgia, at which 3,000 Indians were to be present. He had supposed this expense was to have been borne by Georgia, but it was alleged that a part of it would fall on the United States.

The motion was put and negatived, 33 to 26; when

Mr. W. Smith proposed $60,000. He would mention, that the Secretary of War had been called upon to give a reason why so large a sum should be appropriated; when they were told of the treaty which the gentleman from Pennsylvania had mentioned, and that it would be necessary to have a large store for the purpose of feeding and clothing the Indians who attended it. The motion was then put and carried, 31 to 28.

Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank for the Quartermaster's Department with $250,000.

Mr. Gallatin said, it would be remembered that in the estimate at the opening of the session, this item was calculated at $200,000. The reason given for this advance, was, that the expense of removing stores, ordnance, &c., to new posts, would be very considerable; but, it would be recollected, that $200,000 only were appropriated for that purpose in the time of war, when the Army was liable to be removed very often. The present estimate was for a Peace Establishment, when their men, once removed to the new posts, would be stationed; and the appropriation, instead of for 6,000 men, was now only for 3,000. He moved to insert $200,000, instead of $250,000.

Mr. Blount said, he supposed the taking possession of the posts was contemplated when the first estimate was made. It was then known the British had stipulated to surrender them on the 1st of June.

Mr. W. Smith said, it was not certain when the first estimate was made, whether that House would have ratified the treaty; and, if not ratified, the posts would not have been got. The increased calculation was owing to the expense in transporting ordnance, stores, &c., to the posts.

Mr. Isaac Smith said, it would require more cannon for one of those posts, than were required by all the Army.

Mr. Blount said, they had had sufficient proof to lead them to believe, that the President did not think that House had the power mentioned by the gentleman from South Carolina, and, therefore, he doubted not but the first estimate was made with reference to the expense of taking possession of the posts.

The motion for $250,000 was put and negatived, 31 to 26; when $200,000 was put and carried.

Mr. W. Smith, moved to fill the blank for contingencies of the War Department with $30,000; which was carried without opposition. He then proposed to fill the blank for the defence and protection of the frontiers with $150,000.

Mr. Gallatin said, he certainly wished the frontier to be protected, but he could not think so large a sum necessary for that purpose. The sum last year appropriated was $130,000; and now we had peace with the Indians, which was secured not only by a treaty with them, but by treaties with Great Britain and Spain, he could not account for an increased expense.

The motion for $150,000 was put and negatived; $130,000 was then proposed and carried, 34 to 33.

Mr. W. Smith proposed to fill the next blank, for the completion of the fortifications, &c., at West Point, with $20,000.

Mr. Nicholas inquired if there was any law on this head?

Mr. W. Smith said, there was an act to authorize a provision for this purpose, but that act had expired. He believed, however, it might properly come in there. This expense, he was told, was necessary to make the posts tenable, and that if no money was expended, the fortifications would be lost. He believed this item might properly be considered as a part of the Military Establishment.

Mr. Nicholas said, he did not object to the propriety of the expense, but to the manner of introducing it. It would apply to New York as well as West Point. He considered the admission of West Point as the admission of a principle to which all the surplus appropriations might be applied. All the fortifications, he said, were in the power of the Executive; but, as they had had a committee appointed on the business, whose report they had considered, he thought they should act consistently. He therefore moved to strike out the clause.

Mr. Williams hoped this item would not be struck out, and that the President would be enabled to extend aid to the fortifications at New York; if not, the works would go to decay.

Mr. Van Cortlandt said, that fortifications ought to be attended to, and that he should vote for them.

Mr. Giles hoped the motion would prevail. There had been a committee most of the session, to consider the subject of fortifications. If these fortifications stood in need of repair, the President should have given the information to that committee. He thought the item improper in the present bill.

Mr. Gallatin believed the gentlemen from Virginia were mistaken. The committee which had been appointed was to consider the fortifications of our harbors only. The works at West Point were of a different description, and the estimate included not only the completing of the fortifications, but the building and repairs of barracks and stores which had been destroyed. The present item could not extend to fortifications in general, as had been apprehended; for, though the Secretary of the department does not confine the money appropriated to one object, to that particular purpose, yet, he cannot expend it on any object which was not contained in the act of appropriation. He moved to add, "magazines, store-houses, and barracks." Agreed to, and also the sum.

Mr. W. Smith then moved to fill the blank for the fortification of forts and harbors with $50,000.

Mr. Gallatin said, this item he should move to strike out. A committee had been appointed, and had reported on this subject, and that it was not necessary to attend to it at present, as there was a surplus of $23,000 unexpended. If they were to agree to the present sum, it would be appropriating an additional sum of $50,000 for the same object; he hoped, therefore, that it would be struck out.

Mr. W. Lyman was in favor of striking it out.

Mr. Williams hoped it would be agreed to, on the ground of the necessity of some attention being paid to the works at New York.

Mr. Dayton was in favor of striking out this item altogether, as there really was not money to spare for objects not essential. If any particular harbor had been, or could be mentioned, the committee might better be enabled to judge whether it would be fit, at this time, pressed as they were for resources, to make an appropriation for fortifying it, and how much. But, as he knew of none, and believed there were no such, he should certainly be opposed to appropriating a single shilling for this purpose. He meant not to say, that there were not ports in the United States which might be advantageously fortified, but only, that this country was not yet in a situation to justify their encountering such an expense, especially as it did not appear to be immediately necessary.

The motion for striking out was put, and carried.

Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank for the pay of officers, seamen, and marines, with $113,025.

Mr. Nicholas hoped this item would be struck out. It was certainly an expense for which there was no occasion. He did not wish to see men raised when they could be of no service. The frigates, he said, could not be fit for service before the next session. He hoped, therefore, no opposition would be made to the striking out of the clause.

Mr. W. Smith said, they had authorized by law the building of three frigates, and it was wished that they should go into service the present year. If the whole sum was not appropriated, there would certainly be a necessity for a part of it.

Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out the item as it stood, and insert, "the pay of the captains of three frigates."

Mr. Macon believed these were the only officers at present appointed.

Mr. Havens wished gentlemen to say why these captains should be paid at all. He believed that building of ships was not their business, and that these places were at present mere sinecures. He should therefore vote against the amendment.

Mr. W. Smith said, it would be necessary to add subsistence as well as pay of three captains, and moved to fill the blank with five thousand dollars; which, after a few observations, was agreed to.

On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for military pensions was filled, without opposition, with $114,259.

The committee then rose and the House entered upon the consideration of the amendments which had been made, when all were agree to, except that relative to the subsistence of the non-commissioned officers and privates.[81]