Saturday, January 5.
A petition of the inhabitants of the city of Hudson, in the State of New York, was presented to the House and read, stating the inconveniences under which they labor, from being obliged to register, enter, and clear their vessels at the port of New York, and praying that the said city of Hudson may be made a port of entry. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, with instruction to examine the same, and report his opinion thereupon to the House.
An engrossed bill to make compensation to the widows and orphans of certain persons who were killed by Indians, under the sanction of flags of truce, was read the third time and passed.
The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, accompanying the copy of a message of Cornplanter and New Arrow to Major General Wayne, dated the 8th of December last, relative to the measures which they have taken to conclude a peace, on behalf of the United States, with certain tribes of hostile Indians; which were read and ordered to lie on the table.
Military Establishment.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the motion of the 28th ultimo, for reducing the military establishment of the United States.
Mr. Moore said, that there was not sufficient information before the House respecting the prospect of a peace, to warrant a sudden reduction of the army. He referred to the abuses which had been hinted at in some of the branches dependent on the War Establishment, but he did not believe there had been any worth much notice. He also mentioned the abstruseness of attempting an investigation into the origin of the war—whether the frontier settlers, or the Indians, were in fault, was a difficult thing to determine; but from many circumstances, it appeared to him, the white people were often guilty of committing depredations. This was, in his opinion, a good reason why the protection of those frontiers should not be intrusted to the militia that would be raised there. Shall we intrust the conduct of that matter to the very persons who it has been alleged are often the aggressors? Can the President, at the distance he is situated from the Western territory, check all the irregular proceedings that might happen amongst such a militia? There were two obvious reasons for passing the law of the 5th of March, 1792, for the protection of the frontiers by regular forces. First, it could not be expected that militia would always prove successful against the Indians, because the latter are gaining more experience every day in the mode of warfare, and there can be no dependence on a treaty between those militia and the Indians. The second reason was, that the President was strongly impressed with the necessity of establishing the greatest degree of harmony between the United States and the Indians, by encouraging and protecting a trade with them, and that this could be easiest and best effected by establishing a line of forts along the frontiers, to be garrisoned by regular troops. Mr. M. next mentioned something of the manners and customs of the Indians, whose practice it is to spend most of their time on their hunting grounds, leaving their old men, women, and children, in their towns. They have no regular plan of government, and can only be attached by influencing some of their chiefs. The system of harassing them by burning and destroying their towns at the time they are employed in hunting, has come recommended to us by experience, and regular troops are the best to be employed in this service. Their present inexperience will soon be done away by a proper mode of discipline, and why may not these troops be soon instructed? Are they not as capable of receiving instructions as militia, and may we not expect more subordination amongst them, than could possibly be established over militia? He concluded by declaring himself against the motion.
[Here the Speaker informed the Chair that lie had received a confidential message from the President. The committee then rose, and the galleries were closed for some time.]
The House having gone into Committee, the debate was renewed by Mr. Williamson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Steele.
Mr. Steele rose after Mr. Madison, and said he was perfectly in sentiment with that gentleman, in regard to the propriety of inserting an amendment to the motion, which might secure a sufficient appropriation to carry on offensive operations against the hostile Indians, by the militia of the frontiers; and if an alteration was proposed to that effect, he would second it. The attention of the House to this question speaks its importance; it is probable one more important will not occur during the present session. On its decision are suspended the hopes and fears of the people of this country, their hopes of a speedy and honorable peace, and their fears of a standing army, with its usual retinue of political evils.
The present is regarded as an interesting epoch in the affairs of the United States; and it has been perceived, with serious regret, that while our national character is forming, (he hoped it was not yet formed,) it seems to partake, in some respects, more of the unnatural spirit of monarchy, than of the mild and conciliatory temper of a republic. The principle of keeping up standing armies, though highly obnoxious to the great body of the people, has not been equally so to the Government; they have been maintained and increased without affording protection, or even defence to the frontiers. The supplies necessary to support the establishment begin to discover an alarming derangement of the public finances, and it is now incumbent on the House of Representatives to check this growing mischief.
Mr. S. then adverted to the effects of standing armies on the morals and political sentiments of the people, wherever they had been employed; of the expensiveness of all such establishments, and of the wicked purposes to which they had been, and might be subservient. He said he had prepared himself to have spoken largely to this point, and to have quoted the pernicious effects of such a policy in other nations; but the debate having been already lengthy, and the committee probably fatigued, it would be sufficient for his present purpose, for the members to make their own reflections, and to mark the rapid progress of the army from 1789 to 1792, both in numbers and expenses. Instances from foreign history are superfluous, when our own affords such ample testimony. The establishment began with one regiment: it is now five. The House was called on in 1789 to appropriate a little more than $100,000 for that Department; in the present year, above $1,000,000 is demanded. The reason of this extraordinary additional expenditure, this unexpected increase of the army, if not enveloped in darkness, has been founded on policy hitherto not satisfactorily explained. He said, however lightly he was disposed to touch this part of the subject, he could not avoid reminding the committee of the memorable sentiments of 1776, in regard to standing armies; of the universal abhorrence of the Americans to them at that time; and, to illustrate it more clearly, he read the expressions of some of the States in their Bills of Right. These were the sentiments of the Whigs of 1776, and to such Whigs he wished to appeal on this occasion. He also reminded the committee of the recent debates of 1788, of the amendments proposed in several of the State Conventions; of the unanimity which prevailed among all ranks of people on this particular point; and it is now to be lamented, said he, that while the ink which recorded these objections to the constitution is yet drying, the evil then predicted has taken place.
If there is a subject on which much deliberation is unnecessary, in order to form a right opinion, it would be in regard to military establishments. The feelings of a free people revolt at their continuance, and every man who reads or thinks, can point out their dangers. He said he felt more anxiety for the fate of this motion, than commonly marks his conduct, because this is the last session that will ever afford him an opportunity to trouble the House with his sentiments on this or any other subject. The motion was brought forward to discharge a duty which he owed to his constituents, to satisfy his own conscience, and to afford that protection to the frontiers which they deserved, and to save the public money. If an uncommon degree of zeal was discovered in supporting the motion, it ought to be attributed to these, and no other motives.
The question will now soon be taken; if adopted, I shall be among those who rejoice; if rejected, among those who have always submitted with a proper degree of decency to the decision of the majority. But in any event, the public will know that we have asserted the sense of the people against standing armies; that we are anxious to defend the frontiers against their enemies; that we have recommended a system of economy and efficiency, instead of profusion and delay; that we have recommended a system calculated to produce victory and peace, instead of disgrace and war; and that we wish to rescue the Government from the intoxication of the times, and all the apery of military establishments.
He said he had been attentive to the arguments of the opposition, and they led principally to four points. If neither of these positions be found tenable, the motion will certainly succeed; and that they are not tenable, is believed and will be shown.
1st. It has been boldly asserted that the President is the author of the existing system.
2dly. They call in question the sincerity of our declarations in wishing to afford effectual protection to the frontiers.
3dly. They deny the competency of the militia.
4thly. The impolicy of reducing the establishment, when a treaty is expected.
In regard to the first, we deny that the President is the author of this plan of prosecuting the war. Not having avowed explicitly himself that he is so, no document appearing to confirm that opinion, we are justified in attributing a system which appears to us ineffectual to his Secretary, and not to him.
It is true, that the Secretary is only a finger of his hand, and the intimate connection which must of necessity subsist between them, perhaps, is the ground upon which the assertion has been made. The Secretaries are all equally near to the President, and if it be admitted that he is the author of this, he may, with equal propriety, be said to have been the author of every system on general subjects which either of them have recommended.
Was he the author of the report on the fisheries? Was he the author of the plan for establishing the National Bank? It is known that he was not, and circumstances might be mentioned (which are withheld from delicacy) to confirm this opinion.
Was he the author of the Funding System? Some gentlemen in the opposition to this motion, would not be willing to give the President that credit if he claimed it, and some who support this motion would not only be sorry that the President had even claimed such a credit, but believe that it was in no respect attributable to him. The same gentleman (Mr. Wadsworth) who first asserted that the President was the author of this military plan, in the same speech admitted it to be the war, as well as the plan of the House, and then argued on the necessity of stability in our measures. It is not very material to the present question whose plan it is; being a public measure, we are justified in offering our objections to it; and this is the first time that I have heard it publicly asserted that a Government should persevere in an error, because they had undertaken it. If the plan be a good one, it may be supported by reason; if a bad one, no name ought to be called in to prop it up.
The inconsistency of that gentleman's (Mr. Wadsworth's) arguments not only supports the motion before the committee, but shows the wretched shifts which have been used to defeat it.
It has been said, in the course of the debate, that individual members, and even this House, are incompetent to decide upon the efficacy or inefficacy of military plans. In answer to this it may be said, that if we are not all Generals, we are all members, and that we have the privilege of thinking for ourselves and for our constituents. To admit this doctrine in the latitude which has been expressed, would be to introduce military ideas indeed; it would be to make soldiers of us, instead of Legislators: nay, worse than that, it would be to revive the exploded doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance.
In regard to the sincerity of his intentions to afford effectual protection to the frontiers, Mr. S. said that he had been sufficiently explicit; that a feeling for the sufferers had dictated this motion; that he was sorry that it had been whispered in the ears of some of the members that it was intended to withhold the necessary appropriations, and divert them to other purposes.
If two regiments were insufficient to garrison all the posts necessary for defence, he would even, under certain restrictions, consent to continue the three sub-legions, thereby enabling the President to establish double the number of posts now erected, if he should deem it advisable. Regular troops being incapable of active expeditions against Indians in the wilderness, his wish was to abandon that system and confine them entirely to the garrison.
The next objection to the motion is the incompetency of the militia; and to support this opinion the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Wadsworth) has made this expression, "that as to the expedition under General St. Clair, the regulars were few, and not to be named when compared with the number of the militia." The truth is, there was not a man engaged that day as a militia man, except the advance guard commanded by Colonel Oldham, which consisted of about three hundred, perhaps a few more. The field return of the day preceding the action being in the War Office, this can be ascertained with precision. The balance of the army on that unfortunate day, had been enlisted as regulars, were fought as regulars, even clothed as regulars, and, poor fellows, died like regulars. They suffered the fate which awaits every regular army destined for similar expeditions. Even the handful of militia employed that day, did not deserve that name; they were chiefly substitutes for drafted men from the ceded territory. This draft became unavoidable, from a misfortune to General Sevier, which Mr. Steele related.
The attack on Major Adair has also been mentioned as a proof of the incompetency of militia, and Mr. S. insisted that the only inference which could be drawn from thence was, that one hundred militia were able to repel, but not destroy, near two hundred Indians. This event he conceived was in favor of and not against his motion.
He next adverted to the arguments of Mr. Wadsworth, in regard to the war of 1762; of the establishment of posts in Pennsylvania and Virginia, and of the success of Colonel Boquet's expedition. If two worn-out regiments at that time were sufficient to defend the frontiers, and, with the aid of the militia, to terminate the war, two new regiments, with all the vigor which the gentleman described them to possess, with the aid of established posts, and a much more effective militia, can certainly be equal to the same end. After examining Mr. W.'s arguments for some time, Mr. S. said, that when analyzed, it would be found that they proved more than they were intended to prove; but the merits of this motion did not require that he should take advantage of these indiscretions.
He showed from the history of 1762, that though posts were established, with a handful of regular troops in each, they never answered the purpose of effectual protection; but the frontier people were always obliged, in a great degree, to defend themselves; that they were best calculated for that service, and that they would perform it now with alacrity and success, if well rewarded.
Mr. S. then refuted the objection against the militia on account of their waste and expense which Mr. W. had alluded to. The law allows a mounted volunteer, furnishing himself with a good horse, good arms, provisions, and every other necessary, except ammunition, at his own risk and expense, one dollar per day. The exact expense of such an expedition can be calculated. Whether successful or not, the charge to the public cannot be increased. The contractors, quartermasters, and hospital departments, are all avoided, with the abuses, expenses, and frauds, attending such establishments. Mr. S. enlarged upon this point, and said that these were always found to be the most expensive departments in any army, and that the Federal Treasury had felt their effects already. In favor of the militia, it may be asked, who fought the battle of Bunker's Hill? Who fought the battles of New Jersey? Who have fought the Indians so often with success, under Generals Wilkinson, Scott, Sevier, and others? Who marched in 1776 under General Rutherford, through the Cherokee nation, laid waste their country, and forced them to peace? Who fought the battles of Georgia, under Clark and Twiggs? Who fought the battles of South Carolina, under the command of an honorable member now present? Delicacy forbids me to enlarge upon his successes in his presence.
Who fought the ever-memorable battles of Cowpens, King's Mountain, Hanging Rock, Blackstocks, the pivots on which the Revolution turned in the Southern States? In short, who fought all the battles of the Southern States, while we had a mere handful of regular troops, scarcely the shadow, much less the reality of an army?
They were all fought by freemen, the substantial freeholders of the country—the men attached to the Revolution from principle, men who were sensible of their rights and fought for them.
Such men will not enlist in regular armies, nor will any one who has the disposition or the constitution of a freeman. It would give me pain to describe the trash which composes all regular armies: they enlist for three dollars a month; which, in a country like the United States, is a sufficient description of their bodies as well as their minds. Such men are not fit to combat the most active enemy in the world. Here Mr. S. read Major Gaither's and Major Trueman's depositions, respecting the defeat of the 4th November, 1791, stating that they could not see the Indians, because they were behind trees, &c.; that the regular troops tried, but could not fight that way; that they seemed to be stupid, and incapable of resistance; and that if any General in the world had commanded such men that day, he must have been defeated as they were.
An additional argument, and one of the most weighty, too, against regular expeditions, in this species of warfare, is, that, by the slowness of their movements, the force of the enemy may be concentrated; time is afforded them to form alliances, and to confederate against those whom they consider a common enemy. It is otherwise with militia incursions. He offered a number of reasons to show that it was so, and how essential for the interest of the United States to adopt a policy calculated to detach the tribes from each other as much as possible.
But it has been said, these men were not regular troops. Mr. S. asked, what, then, were they? They surely were not militia. The last objection, and the least serious of all, to this motion, is the expectations of a treaty in the spring. Mr. S. said, if he thought the gentleman who threw this difficulty in the way believed himself that we have any reason to expect a permanent peace from the treaty now proposed, it might deserve an answer. Facts are more to be relied upon than words. From the channel through which these propositions have come—from the whole complexion of their talks, and from the late attack on Major Adair, it may safely be asserted that no peace can be effected in the spring. He recapitulated some of the difficulties which this motion had to conflict with, and said that he could mention others, if he was at liberty to do so. Under such circumstances, success is hardly to be expected; but he knew the merits of the motion deserved it.
Mr. Hillhouse, who had hitherto sat silent, observed that nothing new had been advanced in the whole course of this long debate, but what he had heard mentioned last winter in that House. He was then opposed in principle to a war establishment, and he still retained the same opinion; but, from the complexion of affairs, it appeared to him that he ought to submit, and give up his own opinion to the general sense of the Legislature, which at present seemed to be for persevering in the system already adopted, and which, as it had scarcely had time for a fair trial, he thought, therefore, ought not to be arrested, perhaps in the very instant when its efficacy was to be expected. If peace should not be established during the next summer, he would then join with such members as would propose a better system; but as the law provides for the discretionary powers of the Executive, it would be best to rely on them. A standing army, he said, was a thing impossible to be accomplished in the United States whilst the House of Representatives have the power of granting money only for two years at any time; he therefore had no fears on that score. An army existing in time of peace was the idea he had of a standing army, and not an army embodied for only a year or two. Upon the whole, it would be as expensive to disband the present force, and to institute another of militia, &c., as it will be to keep up the existing establishment for a little longer time; it was therefore his advice to let the matter rest where it is, with the Executive, for the present. But, in case of a peace not being accomplished within a reasonable period, he would join those who would be for a change in the system; and he was clearly of opinion that a system might easily be adopted, not only to protect our frontiers by repelling the savages, but to exterminate them altogether.
Mr. Findlay felt himself inclined to say a word or two more in reply to Mr. Steele. He thought it would be unjust to lay so much of the weight of protecting the frontiers on the militia only. He expatiated on the meaning of the word militia as defined by law, &c. He also remarked that, however it might be fashionable to despise the levies, yet amongst them there were examples of great bravery to be found, and particularly in one battalion of the unfortunate army on the 4th of November, 1791. He noticed the well-conducted retreat of Major Clark, and the success of General Broadhead up the Alleghany. It was unjust to expect to raise enough of militia in the back parts of Pennsylvania; and the inhabitants of Virginia are so dispersed near the frontiers that they cannot be expected from that State. With respect to the men who went out with General Harmar, and whose time of enlistment expired soon after they reached the scene of operations, many of them remained and settled in that country. He again repeated the injustice of calling out heads of families from one part of the frontier; and above all, he lamented the risk and loss of lives. But, if it should be determined to carry on the war with militia, let them be called from all parts of the United States. The burden already laid on a part of the inhabitants is extremely unequal, and must not lie longer on them. Let the troops now raising be disciplined. I am informed that many of them are considerably advanced in point of discipline, and may before spring become expert soldiers. Let these go on in the present system, and let the militia also be kept up or increased, until the object shall be attained for which the law was intended, and then, and not before, it may be proper to talk of reducing the present establishment. We are now in a situation that it would be extremely imprudent to retreat from.
Mr. Murray delivered some opinions on the preceding arguments of all the members, and remarked that the army, under the present establishment, had no right to be compared to or called a standing army; it bore no more comparison to a standing army than a chameleon to an owl.
Mr. Wadsworth closed this tedious debate with a few further explanations. He accounted for the difference between his calculations and those of the gentleman from North Carolina by observing that he got some of his statements from the War Office. Mr. Steele's were taken from the appropriation laws, and in one instance he had underrated the appropriations. With regard to the opinions he had delivered on the militia, he had never meant to traduce the character of militia, because he had often experienced their brilliant actions; his arguments went no further than to show that the operations of regular troops were in general more effectual. He never wished to detract from the honor of militia, but only to remark that they were not so efficient as regular troops.
The question on the original motion being now put, was negatived.
Mr. Williamson did not entirely approve of the motion in its present form; the blanks might be so filled, he thought, as to import a thing opposite to his wishes—they might import a discharge of the regular troops already raised. He believed his colleague had no such desire; he thought the measure would be improper; but he wished not to have a regiment of officers without soldiers; he wished to fix a time at which the recruiting service should cease and the supernumerary officers should be discharged. As he intended to move that the proposition might be so amended, he should consider it in that light, and he believed the measure would not be imprudent nor inconsistent with the most vigorous measures of defence or offence.
It should be remembered that the House of Representatives, when they had the bill before them, which last winter passed into a law, for defending the frontiers, sent it to the Senate, with a clause importing that officers below the rank of field-officers should not be put into commission any faster than troops could be enlisted. The Senate, adhering to their privilege, refused to agree to that clause in the bill, and it became necessary immediately to commission the officers for five thousand men, some of whom, if report speaks truth, not covetous of honor, are content with their pay, without having raised three men. By the proposed amendment the officers only would be dismissed, whom most of us wished never to have seen in commission.
The proposed regulation has been censured as implicating some kind of censure on the Executive. He viewed it in a different light. The Executive had done what was proper and necessary at the time. But if it should appear that other measures would fit the change of circumstances, he did not see why those measures should not be adopted. It should be recollected that, during the last winter, when the estimate of five thousand men as necessary for the defence of our frontiers was handed to Congress, there was no militia law. A well-armed effective militia, that palladium of liberty, had once and again been recommended by the President to the attention of Congress; but Congress, from year to year, as if they wished for a standing army, had neglected the militia. Towards the close of the last session, indeed, they passed a law. He hoped he might, without offence, call it the shadow of a law. It was saying, in a few words, that the several States might have a good militia if they pleased; and, if they pleased, they might have none at all. Was the Executive to trust the defence of a country to a militia formed under such a law? He thought not. But he observed that, since the last winter, it had come to be generally known that a class of our fellow-citizens exist on the frontiers who are at all times ready to serve, not as drafted militia, but as volunteers. These are the men by whom the Indians must be chastised, or we shall never have peace. They are the best woodsmen and marksmen, and they have no professional interest in spinning out the war. He must repeat the observation that volunteers of the militia are the only troops for vigorous offensive operations. Figure to yourselves an army of regulars creeping through the wilderness, with all its cannon and other military apparatus, in chase of a naked savage, who sees it without being seen. It is an elephant in chase of a wolf. The troops already raised may be pretty well disciplined before the season for action; they are sufficient, with the co-operation of the militia, to take a post, and build forts where they please; every thing else is beyond their power, if they were not five but fifteen thousand. They will never see an Indian unless he chooses to be seen. He wished to be indulged in a single observation respecting a case in which it was said the other day, the militia had been surprised. He was sorry that his naming Major Adair had produced the remark. He would nevertheless venture to repeat the case as an instance of vigilance and bravery. The Major, believing there was an enemy at hand, had visited all his posts at midnight in person; his Lieutenant, Madison, before the dawn of day, roused all the men, telling them that the Indians were coming. The Major, wishing to leave the ground before daylight, called in the sentinels; but the Indians, rushing in with them, gave a heavy fire before there was light by which they could be seen. The Major had not the merit, as he believed, of having been a continental officer, but he had the merit, not less honorable, of having served bravely in the militia. He questioned whether any of the green troops to be recruited next spring or summer will make so good a defence as Major Adair's militia had made. They had taken scalp for scalp, though they fought against the odds of three to one. He prayed it might be remembered that his ideas were not founded on any hopes of sudden peace with the Indians; on the contrary, every motion of the Indians, and every measure taken by those who had most influence over the Indians, induced him to regard an Indian war as the perpetual tax of at least one million per annum. It is fortunate, as he conceived, that the United States know the source of their misfortunes; and if they are compelled to spend one million per annum in opposing a savage enemy, who seems to be hunted upon them, perhaps they may be taught to indemnify themselves by refusing to expend several millions which they can easily save. If a perpetual tax on this head must be raised, sound policy will readily point to the proper object of taxation; but this must remain over for our successors. In the mean time, believing that the troops already raised are sufficient to maintain every fort that is or may be erected, and being confident that volunteers may be found at any time sufficient, if it shall be necessary, to extirpate every hostile tribe of Indians, he should vote for the proposition with the proposed amendment.
The question being taken on Mr. W.'s amendment, viz:
"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill to reduce the military establishment of the United States to —— regiments, to consist of the men who are now in service, or who may be recruited before the —— day of —— next," &c.—
was negatived—32 to 24. The question then was on the original resolution, as moved by Mr. Steele; which, being put, it was negatived—21 members only rising in favor of it. The committee then rose, and the Chairman reported accordingly. The report was laid on the table, and the House adjourned.