Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Thursday, February 28.

Official conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The resolutions brought forward yesterday by Mr. Giles, were called for by that gentleman. The reading being finished, Mr. Ames moved that the resolutions should be taken up.

Mr. Murray suggested the necessity of giving a preference to the Judiciary Bill reported by him some days since. He was seconded by Mr. Key.

The motion for taking up the resolutions was carried, forty members rising in favor of it. The resolutions were accordingly read by the Clerk, and are as follow, viz:

1. Resolved, That it is essential to the due administration of the Government of the United States, that laws making specific appropriations of money should be strictly observed by the administrator of the finances thereof.

2. Resolved, That a violation of a law making appropriations of money, is a violation of that section of the Constitution of the United States which requires that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

3. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has violated the law passed the 4th of August, 1790, making appropriations of certain moneys authorized to be borrowed by the same law, in the following particulars, viz: First, By applying a certain portion of the principal borrowed to the payment of interest falling due upon that principal, which was not authorized by that or any other law. Secondly, By drawing part of the same moneys into the United States, without the instructions of the President of the United States.

4. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has deviated from the instructions given by the President of the United States, in exceeding the authorities for making loans under the acts of the 4th and 12th of August, 1790.

5. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has omitted to discharge an essential duty of his office, in failing to give Congress official information in due time, of the moneys drawn by him from Europe into the United States; which drawing commenced December, 1790, and continued till January, 1793; and of the causes of making such drafts.

6. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has without the instructions of the President of the United States, drawn more moneys borrowed in Holland into the United States than the President of the United States was authorized to draw, under the act of the 12th of August, 1790: which act appropriated two millions of dollars only, when borrowed, to the purchase of the Public Debt: And that he has omitted to discharge an essential duty of his office, in failing to give official information to the Commissioners for purchasing the Public Debt, of the various sums drawn from time to time, suggested by him to have been intended for the purchase of the Public Debt.

7. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury did not consult the public interest in negotiating a loan with the Bank of the United States, and drawing therefrom four hundred thousand dollars, at five per cent. per annum, when a greater sum of public money was deposited in various banks at the respective periods of making the respective drafts.

8. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has been guilty of an indecorum to this House, in undertaking to judge of its motives in calling for information which was demandable of him, from the constitution of his office; and in failing to give all the necessary information within his knowledge, relatively to the subjects of the reference made to him of the 19th January, 1792, and of the 22d November, 1792, during the present session.

9. Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the President of the United States.

Mr. Giles then moved that they should be referred to a Committee of the whole House.

Mr. W. Smith was decidedly opposed to referring those resolutions to the consideration of the Committee of the whole House, because he neither viewed a discussion of them as necessary on the present occasion nor warranted by the nature of the inquiry into the Secretary's conduct. It was trifling with the precious time of the House to lavish it on abstract propositions, when the object of the inquiry ought to be into the facts. He was satisfied that should the House once involve itself in an investigation of theoretic principles of government, the short residue of the session would be exhausted, and no opportunity remain for examining the charges themselves. Those charges being made, it became the House, from a sense of duty to the public and justice to the accused, to proceed immediately to consider them. If the mover intended to apply the principles of the two first resolutions to the facts contained in the subsequent ones, it was unquestionably proper first to substantiate the facts, and then establish the principles which were applicable to them; but it was surely a reversal of order to spend much time in establishing principles, when it might happen that the charges themselves would be totally unsupported. He did not like this mode of proceeding, because it might tend to mislead the House; it was sometimes a parliamentary practice to endeavor to lead the mind to vague and uncertain results, by first laying down theorems from which no one could dissent, and then proceeding by imperceptible shades to move unsettled positions, in order ultimately to entrap the House in a vote which in the first instance it would have rejected. This mode of conducting public business, he considered as inconsistent with fair inquiry. The question was, had the Secretary violated a law? If so, let it be shown; every member was competent to decide so plain a question. He could examine the proofs, read the law, and pronounce him guilty or innocent without the aid of these preliminary metaphysical discussions.

If it were urged that the propositions are so plain and obvious that no time would be lost in considering them, he then begged leave to observe that all antecedent discussions of constitutional questions had never failed to occupy a large portion of their time, and that however self-evident the resolutions might at the first glance appear, a more critical attention would satisfy a mind not much given to doubt that they were by no means so conclusive as to be free from objections.

Though the position contained in the first resolution, as a general rule, was not to be denied; yet it must be admitted, that there may be cases of a sufficient urgency to justify a departure from it, and to make it the duty of the Legislature to indemnify an officer; as if an adherence would in particular cases and under particular circumstances, prove ruinous to the public credit, or prevent the taking measures essential to the public safety, against invasion or insurrection. In cases of that nature, and which cannot be foreseen by the Legislature nor guarded against, a discretionary authority must be deemed to reside in the President, or some other Executive officer, to be exercised for the public good; such exercise, instead of being construed into a crime, would always meet the approbation of the National Legislature. If there be any weight in these remarks, it does not then follow, as a general rule, that it is essential to the due administration of the Government, that laws making specific appropriations should in all cases whatsoever, and under every public circumstance, be strictly observed. Before the committee could come to a vote on such a proposition, it would be proper to examine into the exceptions out of the rule, to state all the circumstances which would warrant any departure from it, to whom the exercise of the discretion should be intrusted, and to what extent. Did any member wish at this period to attempt this inquiry? He supposed not. Let every deviation from law be tested by its own merits or demerits.

The second resolution was liable to stronger objections. It might with propriety be questioned whether, as a general rule, the position was well founded. A law making appropriations may be violated in various particulars without infringing on the constitution, which only enjoins that no moneys shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of the appropriations made by law. This is only to say, that every disbursement must be authorized by some appropriation. Where a sum of money is paid out of the Treasury, the payment of which is authorized by law, the constitution is not violated, yet there may have been a violation of the law in some collateral particulars. There may even have been a shifting of funds, and however exceptionable this may be on other accounts, it would not amount to that species of offence which is created by the constitution. The Comptroller of the Treasury must countersign every warrant, and is responsible that it be authorized by a legal appropriation; yet it cannot be supposed that he is to investigate the source of the fund.

One of the alleged infractions stated in the subsequent resolution, namely, the drawing part of the loans into the United States without the instructions of the President, evinces that the opposite construction is not a sound one. For suppose the fact proved, and suppose it a violation of the law, it certainly would be a very different thing from drawing money out of the Treasury without an appropriation by law; for in this case, there would be no drawing money from the Treasury at all, the money never having been in the Treasury.

Mr. S. then, said, he should also object to referring the last resolution, which is in these words,

"Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the President."

The object of this resolution went clearly to direct the President to remove the Secretary from office; the foregoing were to determine the guilt, the last to inflict the punishment, and both the one and other without the accused being heard in his defence. When the violation of the constitution was so uppermost in our minds, it would be indeed astonishing that we should be so hoodwinked as to commit such a palpable violation of it in this instance. The principles of that constitution, careful of the lives and liberties of the citizens, and what is dearer to every man of honor, his reputation, secure to every individual in every class of society, the precious advantage of being heard before he is condemned.

That constitution, peculiarly careful of the reputation of great public functionaries, directs that when accused of a breach of duty, the impeachment must be voted by a majority of the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate, who are to be on oath, and two-thirds of whom must concur before a sentence can pass, by which the officer is to be deemed guilty. The officer is to be furnished with a copy of the charge, and is heard by himself or his counsel in vindication of his conduct. Such are the solemnities and guards by which they are protected, and which precede a sentence, the only effect of which is a removal from office. But if the House proceed in the manner contemplated by this resolution; if they first vote the charges, and send a copy of them to the President, as an instruction to him to remove the officer, they will violate the sacred and fundamental principles of this, and every free Government. They will condemn a man unheard, nay, without his having even been furnished with the charges against him; they will condemn to infamy a high and responsible officer convicted by the Representatives of the people, of a violation of the important trusts committed to him, without affording him one opportunity of vindicating his character and justifying his conduct.

Mr. Murray said he was opposed to the reference of the resolutions to the Committee of the Whole. He had, as far as the time permitted, examined the several reports on which the examination depended, and was then ready to vote on them, though he confessed, from the intricacy which was inherent in such a subject, as well as from the vast variety of the detail involved, he had not had sufficient time for a complete investigation. Nor did he imagine that any man who had not previously meditated on the subject for a length of time, and made choice of his ground of attack, could say he was completely master of the subject. Some vote, however, was now rendered essential to the character, not only of Government, but of the gentleman who presided over the finances of the country. But three days were left for this inquiry, and to finish a great deal of other business; and he thought that despatch which was usual in the House ought to be used in preference to the indulgence which a committee afforded. As to the abstract propositions, if it were necessary now to go into them, he thought it would be proper to decide on them first. He thought it most logical to lay down principles of reasoning before facts were developed. Were they agreed to by the House, it would be under provisions and restrictions. They could not have the implicit force of axioms, but at most must be yielded to as wholesome maxims, the application of which must be frequently modified by a certain degree of discretion. With respect to all the other resolutions, he imagined they would, on examination, be found to be unwarranted by facts. He hoped the movers and supporters of the resolutions would not be gratified at so late a season by the House in resolving itself into a Committee of the Whole. The mode in which they were brought forward did not entitle them to much confidence. He said, a more unhandsome proceeding he had never seen in Congress. It had been a practice, derived from the lights of common liberty, common right, and the first principles of justice, that whoever was charged with a violation of law on which a punishment ensued, should have some mode of answering to the charge. It had, in a recent instance, been the practice of Congress, when an officer's conduct was even in the first instance inquired into, to afford the officer an opportunity of attending upon the examination on which his offence or his freedom from blame was to appear. He alluded to the conduct of the House when an examination took place relatively to the failure of General St. Clair's expedition. Suspicions were entertained that blame lay somewhere. A committee was appointed to examine. The three officers particularly concerned were, he understood, invited, as it were, to come before the committee, to explain, to interrogate, and to give information. Though the Secretary of War was not permitted to explain on this floor, justice and delicacy, and the most common principles of jurisprudence, to which we attempted to hold some analogy, demanded that he should be heard somewhere, and the committee was renewed for this purpose. The Quartermaster General asked to be heard on this floor. Though refused, he was permitted to attend that committee on whose examination his character as a Quartermaster depended. Were any man responsible as an officer to this House to fall under the suspicion of its members, a regard to decency and to the established rights of citizenship, would teach gentlemen to inquire formally before they hastily laid a charge on the table, to which they might move the assent of the House. But in this proceeding a Legislative charge was gone into before inquiry had been instituted. Every rule of justice, and all that delicacy which ought ever to attend her progress, had been disregarded, and in the very first instance, a number of charges are brought forward, not for inquiry, but conviction, which, if sanctioned by a majority of the House, are to be followed by the dismission of one of the highest officers in the Government. This mode was as tyrannical as it was new, and if any thing could throw a bias against the resolutions, independent of inquiry, it was the partial and unjust form in which the proceeding had commenced. Resolutions of conviction might rise out of the report of a committee of inquiry, who would act as a Grand Jury to the House, but could never precede it. He hoped the House would not refer to a Committee of the Whole what might be decided in the House with more despatch.

Mr. Page in reply to Mr. Smith, spoke, in substance, as follows:

Mr. Chairman: The more precious our time, the more readily shall I vote for a consideration of the first resolution; for I think it of more consequence that we should decide on it, than on any other before us. We find, from the inquiry which has been set on foot into the conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury, that he differs from the mover of the resolution in opinion respecting his powers, and the constitutional obligation he may be under of regarding acts of appropriation; it therefore must be the wish of the Secretary himself, whether we agree with him or not; and it is our duty, as soon as possible, I conceive, to let our constituents know whether we approve, or not, of his opinion. The Secretary himself, I think, confesses "that a strict adherence to appropriations, in certain cases, would be pusillanimity." He preferred, no doubt, the public good, which he thought he had in view, to a strict compliance with an act of appropriation. It becomes us, then, to determine whether we wish that the Secretary shall hereafter be bound by our acts of appropriation or not.

I cannot conceive that the rejection of the first resolution can alter the nature of the case before us, or in any manner confirm or invalidate the truth of facts which some gentlemen seem so apprehensive may lead to an impeachment. For my part, I keep in view the first resolution, without thinking a moment of the last, or the intermediate propositions. When they shall come under consideration, I shall be ready to show a proper attention to them. How the first resolution can be called an abstract proposition, I know not, when the nature of the last before us requires a decision on it. The Secretary himself should desire it, and our constituents must expect it. If the Committee of the Whole shall be of opinion that appropriations ought to be sacredly regarded, they will agree to the resolution; if they think they may be dispensed with "in certain cases," they may amend the resolution, and qualify it so as to justify the conduct of the Secretary. To call the resolution a preamble, and to object to it as such, appears to me as extraordinary as to call it an abstract proposition; for I have always thought it inconsistent with Republican principles to object to preambles. I have remarked, sir, when they have been objected to, it became the Representatives of a free people to show on what principles and with what views their laws are enacted, and, not in a dictatorial manner enact that it shall be so and so. The framers of our constitution have set us an example of an excellent preamble; and, as it has been remarked by several members, this House has occasionally used them; I think, therefore, that none of the objections to the commitment of the first resolution are of sufficient weight to induce the House to agree to the motion for striking out the two first resolutions.

The question was now taken on committing the first two resolutions, and negatived—25 to 32. On the question of referring the last, only fourteen members voted in the affirmative.

Ordered, That the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth resolutions contained in the said motion be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the said committee; and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.