Thursday, January 26.
An engrossed bill to ascertain and regulate the claims to half-pay and to invalid pensions was read the third time and passed.
Protection of the Frontiers.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the Protection of the Frontiers of the United States.
A motion being made to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplates the raising of three additional regiments of infantry and a squadron of light dragoons, amounting in all to three thousand and forty men, exclusive of commissioned officers—
It was urged in favor of the motion, that the Indian war, in which the United States are at present involved, was, in its origin, as unjustly undertaken as it has since been unwisely and unsuccessfully conducted; that depredations had been committed by the whites as well as by the Indians; and the whites were most probably the aggressors, as they frequently made encroachments on the Indian lands, whereas the Indians showed no inclination to obtain possession of our territory, or even to make temporary invasions, until urged to it by a sense of their wrongs. A proof of this unencroaching disposition on their part plainly appeared in their conduct, after the victory they lately obtained over our troops; for, when flushed with success, they might have swept the country before them, and penetrated as far as Pittsburg, they contented themselves with the advantage they had gained over their invaders, and did not attempt to invade our territories in return, although there was nowhere at hand a sufficient force to check their career.
The mode of treating the Indians in general was reprobated as unwise and impolitic. The Indians are with difficulty to be reduced by the sword, but may easily be gained by justice and moderation;[41] and, although their cruelties are alleged as reasons for a different conduct, and the sufferings of the white people pathetically deplored, these narratives, it was said, are at best but ex parte evidence—we hear nothing of the sufferings of the Indians—but if Cornplanter's speech were read, it would set the matter in a very different point of view, and furnish a complete answer to all the charges of their accusers.
Peace, it was said, may be obtained from the Indian tribes at a much less expense than would be necessary for the support of the war. To persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad purpose indeed; for, supposing our arms crowned with victory, what are the advantages we may expect to reap from our success? We can only gain possession of their lands—a possession that must long continue unproductive of the smallest benefit, as we already possess land sufficient—more, in fact, than we will be able to cultivate for a century to come.
Instead of being ambitious to extend our boundaries, it would answer a much better national purpose to check the roving disposition of the frontier settlers, and prevent them from too suddenly extending themselves to the Western waters. If kept closer together, and more nearly connected with the old settlements, they would be more useful to the community at large, and would not so frequently involve us in unnecessary and expensive wars with the Indians; but if permitted to rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation embroiled in perpetual warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest upon.
If the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, there they might, for years to come, cultivate the soil in peace, neither invaded nor invading. As the country progresses in population, and our limits are found too narrow, it will then be soon enough to contemplate a gradual extension of our frontier; but, in the mean time, it is an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry war beyond our present line of forts. It is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within our territory.
As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts, we can never hope to succeed against the Indians; nor ought we to trace our late misfortune to any other source than her still holding them in her possession. Were they in our hands, the Indians could not carry on their operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for it is from those forts that they obtain their supplies of arms and ammunition, with which they can be at all times plentifully furnished, as long as things continue on their present footing.
Until those posts are in our possession, it will be in vain to send our armies into the wilderness. A body of five thousand men, sent out against the Indians, under the present circumstances, would be as effectually defeated as the smaller ones have already been. In those wilds, our troops have no friend at hand to furnish them with supplies, or to give them intelligence of the approach and operations of the enemy; whereas, the Indians, receiving both aid and information from their friendly neighbors, can preconcert their plans, and choose, according to their own convenience, the place and the hour of attack, as they did before.
It was here observed, by an honorable gentleman on the other side of the question, that we ought undoubtedly to get possession of those posts; and that we might have long since obtained it, if we had only laid a seasonable embargo on all the British shipping in our ports; though he doubted whether it would at present be worth while to take such a step, as the English have lost so great a portion of our carrying trade, in consequence of the additional tonnage laid on their vessels.
In favor of the motion, it was further urged, that, supposing even the war to have been originally undertaken with justice on our side—supposing, also, that the national honor and interest called for a continuance of hostilities—yet, as it was by no means either necessary or prudent to invade the Indian territory, as this had been attempted in two successive campaigns, and the event had, in both instances, been such as to afford no very flattering prospect from a third expedition of the same kind, it was thought much more advisable to content ourselves with defending the frontier; and this might be done without making so great an augmentation in the military establishment.
The only use of regular troops on the frontier is to garrison the forts, and to have a standing force in the neighborhood to form a station, to which the militia may resort either for protection or supplies; but as to active service, the frontier militia and rangers were pronounced to be by far preferable to the regular troops, as being more expert woodsmen, and better habituated to the Indian mode of fighting. To defend the forts, a small number of regulars would be sufficient. The present establishment of two regiments would, if completed, be amply adequate to the purpose, and, when assisted by such forces as might at all times be collected on the frontier, would be able to repel every inroad of the enemy.
Experience has proved that the sudden and desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers are ever attended with better success than the methodical operations of a regular force. The former are better calculated for expedition and surprise, making unexpected sallies, scouring the country in small bodies, harassing the Indians, and intercepting their straggling parties, by whom their motions are unobserved; whereas, when a body of regulars take the field, encumbered with baggage and heavy artillery, the unavoidable slowness of their movements affords the enemy an opportunity of watching all their operations, collecting their whole force, and skulking in the woods around them till they can seize the favorable moment to strike a sudden blow, which they generally do with success, but which they could never attempt if exposed every hour to the unforeseen attacks of our woodsmen, who would keep their attention constantly engaged in all quarters, and thus prevent them from uniting in large bodies.
It was further observed by some gentlemen, who even admitted the propriety of invading the Indian territory, that, to effect this with success, it was by no means necessary to make such an increase in the military establishment as that contemplated in the bill. The miscarriage of the former expeditions could not (they said) be alleged as a sufficient reason; for it is well known that the former establishment was far from being complete. The regulars intended for the service of the last campaign were to have been above two thousand two hundred; the President was, besides, empowered to raise two thousand five hundred levies, in addition to the regulars; and these would, together, have constituted an army of about four thousand seven hundred men. Had such a body been employed, we might reasonably have expected much better success against the Indians, whose numbers were so far inferior; the whole force of the Wabash tribes not amounting to above eleven or twelve hundred warriors, who never could keep the field for any length of time, but must be soon obliged to disperse, without venturing an attack upon an army of such superior strength.
Instead of this, our army consisted of only about twelve hundred men, and of these not above four or five hundred were regular troops; besides, had even this force been sufficient, if employed in season, the delays that had taken place in the execution of the plan would alone have been sufficient to defeat the intended purpose. During the winter, the law was passed for raising the additional troops for carrying on the war with greater vigor. The whole summer was spent in the business, and the few men that we did enlist were not raised till late in the fall. Collected at length at the head of the Ohio, they fruitlessly loitered away their time, till they finally erected a monument to our eternal disgrace and infamy.
Whatever troops are to be employed, ought to be raised with diligence and despatch, if we wish to avoid a similar miscarriage in our next attempt. The army ought not to enter the Indian country till their whole force is complete. Difficulties, however, and delay, equal to those of last year, may be expected in enlisting the men; and we shall have the officers in pay a considerable time without any soldiers. Perhaps the former pay of the troops was too low, and proper effective men were unwilling to accept of it; if so, let it be raised, let the men be well clothed and fed, and they will more readily engage in the service. Probably, also, the term of three years was an objection with many, who would otherwise have joined our standard. If enlisted only for six months, the ranks will be sooner filled; and this ought to have considerable weight with those who advocate the augmentation of the military establishment, as they cannot but know that, if we set about enlisting the number of men contemplated in the bill, and in the manner there prescribed, they cannot be raised time enough to render any service in the next campaign.
The information contained in the report on the table was not, it was said, to be implicitly relied on. That report was made by a man who had not personally visited the frontier. Others, who had been on the spot, were of opinion that, if two thousand levies had been raised last year, they would have been sufficient, not only for the defence of the frontier, but even for any offensive operations that might have been thought necessary. Such troops, collected in the vicinity, are more competent to the undertaking than the troops now in contemplation. No complaint had been made of their conduct. Whenever they were tried, they behaved as well as the regulars, and, in the action under General St. Clair, they gave equal proofs of their valor.
It was further urged, that the frontier militia are not only equal, but infinitely superior to any regular troops whatever, for the defence of the borders, and that they are, in fact, the only force that can be effectually employed in expeditions against the hostile Indians, whose mode of fighting is familiar to them, and does not strike them with that degree of terror with which it inspires those men who enlist on the regular establishment. These latter being collected in the heart of populous cities, where the face of an Indian is seldom seen, hardly know whether the Indian and his horse are not the same animal. And when they approach the enemy, at the very first shout, even before he is in view, they are terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever been taught to reflect on with horror, and, being incapable of resistance, they commit their safety to flight. To prove the superiority of the militia, gentlemen need only contrast the despatch and success of the expedition conducted by General Scott, with the delays, disgrace, and mortification, which attended that under General St. Clair, and consider the difference of the expense on those two occasions.
The expense of such an army as the bill contemplates is an object well worthy of serious consideration, especially at the present moment, when there is scarcely a dollar in the Treasury. Gentlemen would also do well to advert to the progress of this business, and consider where they were likely to stop, if they went on at the present rate. At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about $100,000; a second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense to about $300,000; and now a standing force of 5,168 men is contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter of dollars. Can this be justified in the present state of our finances, when it is well known that the Secretary of the Treasury, having been requested by the members from a particular State to build a light-house on a part of their coast, declined the undertaking, and alleged the want of funds as the reason?
Our resources, however, might be made to answer for the support of such a force as that which was intended for the service of the preceding year, and there would be little complaint or dissatisfaction among the people. Very few murmurings were heard against the former establishment; but such a one as is now contemplated will be thought extravagant, will breed discontent among the citizens of the United States, and perhaps afford our neighbors in Canada an opportunity to take advantage of our divided situation, and involve us in a war more dangerous than the former which separated us from Great Britain.
Apprehensions, it is said, are entertained that the object contemplated in raising these additional troops is not so much to punish and coerce the Indians, as to have a standing regular force equal to what the British have on this continent. This is said to amount to about six thousand men, including those in Canada. But it is to be remarked, that the British nation has not above one thousand men within the limits of the United States; and yet, with this handful of troops, they not only keep the Indians in awe, but even, in opposition to the wishes of the United States, retain possession of those posts which should have been ceded to us pursuant to the terms of the treaty. Why, then, is it necessary, for the purpose of establishing posts and garrisoning them, to increase the standing force to so large a number as that contemplated in the clause under consideration? During our late arduous struggle for liberty, when we had to cope with the most powerful nation under heaven, the commander-in-chief had never at any one time above ten thousand men under his own immediate command; and if, with so small a force, we were able to effect so glorious a revolution, there can be no necessity of going such lengths at present, for the sake of establishing a military character. It is strange policy, indeed, to raise five or six thousand men to oppose a handful of Indian banditti, whose utmost amount does not, from the documents on the table, appear to exceed twelve hundred.
We are preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one, except those who are in the secrets of the Cabinet, knows for what reason the war has been thus carried on for three years. But what funds are to defray the increased expense of maintaining such a force as is now contemplated? The excise is both unpopular and unproductive. The impost duties have been raised as high as is consistent with prudence. To increase them, would be but to open a door for smuggling, and thus diminish their productiveness. And if those sources of revenue fail—if our finances be thus exhausted in unnecessary wars—we shall be unable to satisfy, the public creditors, unless recourse be had to new taxes, the consequence of which may, with just reason, be deplored; whereas, if we but keep our expenses within bounds—if we nurse our finances—we shall be respectable among the nations of the earth, nor will any nation dare to insult us, or be able to do it with impunity.
During the course of these observations, an honorable gentleman asked, whether this was a day set apart for rhetorical flourishes, as the galleries were open, and he saw the short-hand writers stationed at their different posts?
At an early stage of the debate, an honorable gentleman had suggested, that, instead of passing a law for raising at all events the additional regiments, which, for his part, he did not think necessary, the House, if they finally determined the present establishment to be insufficient, would perhaps do better to appropriate a certain sum of money, to enable the Executive to call in such additional aid as circumstances may require.
To this it was objected, that it is the duty of the Representatives of the people, in all appropriations of the public money, to make them for certain specific purposes. To act otherwise on the present occasion would be setting a precedent that might, in its consequences, prove highly injurious; for, although the greatest confidence may safely be reposed in the virtue and integrity of him who now fills the Presidential chair, it is impossible to foresee what use may hereafter be made of the precedent by his successors, or how far it may be carried.
Against the motion for striking out, and in favor of the proposed augmentation of the military establishment, it was urged: That, as to the justice of the war carried on against the Indian tribes, that was a question which could not admit of a doubt in the mind of any man who would allow that self-preservation and indispensable necessity are sufficient causes to justify a nation in taking up arms. If the present war be not in every respect justifiable, then there never was, nor ever will be, a just war. It was originally undertaken, and since carried on, not for the sake of conquest, but to defend our fellow-citizens, our friends, our dearest connections, who are daily exposed, in the frontier settlements, to all the rage of savage barbarity, to which they, with their wives and children, must soon fall victims, unless we speedily fly to their assistance; and, although there are some people who utterly deny the justice of any war whatever, this doctrine, however fine in theory, will hardly ever obtain in practice; for, is it to be imagined, that any set of men are of such a passive disposition as calmly to look on whilst their friends and relations are butchered before their eyes, and to refuse giving them every assistance in their power?
The murders and depredations which have for years past been repeatedly committed by the savages, loudly call for redress. From various documents of unquestionable authority, now in the hands of the Secretary of War, signed and attested by the Executive and Legislature of Kentucky, by the District Judge, and the Captains of the militia, it appears, that, from the year 1783 to 1790, there have been, of the inhabitants of that District, or of emigrants on their way thither, no less than fifteen hundred persons either massacred by the savages, or dragged into captivity, two thousand horses taken away, and other property plundered or destroyed to the amount of fifty thousand dollars. And there is good reason to suppose that on the other frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania the number of persons murdered or taken prisoners during the above-mentioned period would furnish a list of one thousand or fifteen hundred more.
The white people, it is true, have sometimes committed depredations on the Indians; but the instances have been rare (the honorable gentleman who spoke did not recollect above one or two) of their making unjust attacks upon the savages; nor did they, on those occasions, commence hostilities against them till exasperated by the strongest provocations that could possibly stimulate the human heart. This circumstance may be justly allowed as some palliation of the offence. Even in these instances, however, a few individuals only were concerned; and, when the affair came to the knowledge of the State, ample reparation was made to the injured party. The General Government, too, had shown an equal disposition to do justice to the Indian tribes. Witness the affair of the Cherokees; for, as soon as Congress had heard their complaints of an encroachment made on them by some of the people from the frontier of the Carolinas, immediate orders were issued for obliging the intruders to evacuate the Indian territory.
But, notwithstanding the disposition that prevails, as well in the Legislatures of those States whose frontiers are most exposed, as in the General Government, to cultivate peace and amity with the neighboring Indians, that desirable object is become utterly unattainable in the present posture of affairs. The frontier Indians have killed a number of whites; the whites, in their turn, have made retaliation. Both parties are in the highest degree exasperated against each other, and likely to continue so, in spite of every endeavor that can be made to effect a reconciliation. With minds thus irritated, it is vain to hope for peace, as long as they continue in each other's neighborhood. It is therefore necessary to form a strong barrier, to keep them asunder, unless, indeed, the advocates for a cessation of hostilities would oblige the frontier settlers to abandon their lands. But by what new-invented rule of right should the inhabitants of Kentucky, and the other frontier settlers, be laid under a greater obligation than any other citizens of the United States to relinquish a property legally acquired by their purchase? Were it even proposed to pacify the savages, by purchasing the lands anew, such a measure would answer no other purpose than that of procuring a temporary peace, which would soon again be interrupted by a war that would reproduce the necessity of again having recourse to the same expedient. We should have to purchase the lands again and again, without end. By thus squandering the public money, year after year, we should swell the national debt to an amount that we cannot possibly foresee. Better at once to make a vigorous effort, to act in a manner becoming the national dignity, and to maintain our ground by war, since we cannot obtain a durable or an honorable peace.
Attempts have, at various times, been made to effect treaties of peace with the Indian tribes with whom we are now at war; and, although these efforts have constantly proved ineffectual, they yet show, that neither the United States nor the State of Virginia were backward on their part to adopt conciliatory measures, and to do away that animosity which had commenced on the part of the savages at an early period of the late war with Great Britain, and had continued to break out at intervals ever since. In the years, 1783, '84, '85, '87, '88, and '90, offers of peace were made to them. On the last-mentioned occasion, when a treaty was proposed at the Miami village, the Indians at first refused to treat. They next required thirty days to deliberate; and, in the interim, the inhabitants of Kentucky were expressly prohibited by the President of the United States from carrying on any offensive operations against them; yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the whites, no less than one hundred and twenty persons were killed or captured by the savages, and several prisoners roasted alive, during that short period, at the expiration of which, the Indians refused to give any answer at all.
On another occasion, the Indians, not content with rejecting our offers of peace, proceeded even so far as to insult us, by telling us we have lands within the British posts, and asking us why we did not go and take possession of them? Will it be said that we are unable to do it? Is this language to be used within the United States? No! We are able, abundantly able to do it, whenever we please; and if we would but retrench our expenses in some instances, which might well admit of a reduction, our ability would still increase; our finances are not quite so insufficient as some gentlemen seem to imagine, nor so easily deranged. We are still able to prove that the boasted efficiency of the General Government is something more than an empty name—we can yet raise both men and money sufficient to defend the nation from either injury or insult.
It is now too late to inquire whether the war was originally undertaken on the principles of justice or not. We are actually involved in it, and cannot recede, without exposing numbers of innocent persons to be butchered by the enemy; for, though we should determine to discontinue the war, can it he said that the savages will also agree to a cessation of hostilities? It is well known that they are averse to peace; and even the warmest advocate of pacific measures must therefore allow that the war is a war of necessity, and must be supported. We cannot, without impeachment both to our justice and our humanity, abandon our fellow-citizens on the frontier to the rage of their savage enemies. And although the excise may be somewhat unpopular, although money may still be wanted; what is the excise? what is money, when put in competition with the lives of our friends and brethren?
A sufficient force must be raised for their defence; and the only question now to be considered is, what that force shall be? Experience has proved, that the force employed in the last campaign was inadequate. It is true the establishment was not complete; but who will venture to assert that, if it had been complete, it would have been sufficient for the intended purpose? Are gentlemen who assert this so well acquainted with the circumstances of the enemy, as to be able to give an accurate statement of the amount of their forces on the frontier? There are stronger opinions in favor of an augmentation of the army than can be adduced against it—opinions given by men of judgment and experience, who have themselves been on the spot, and are well acquainted with the situation of affairs in that quarter. These gentlemen, who must be allowed to be competent judges, are decidedly of opinion that the present establishment, though completed to the last man, will not furnish an adequate force to carry on the war with effect; and that it will be a hopeless attempt to open another campaign, with less than about five thousand regular troops, the number contemplated in the bill.
Nor ought that number to be deemed extravagant, under an idea that we have only a contemptible handful of banditti to contend with. Their numbers were, last year, from authentic documents, stated at about twelve hundred warriors, from twenty-three different tribes: such was the opposition then contemplated; but it is impossible to ascertain what accessions of strength they have since received, or even what force they had engaged in the late unfortunate action, as the very men who were in the engagement do not pretend to form any just or accurate estimate of the number of their assailants; but there is good reason to suppose that they had previously entered into an association with various tribes, that have not as yet come within our knowledge. The bows and arrows used against our troops on that occasion, afford a convincing proof that they had foes to encounter from distant nations, as yet unacquainted with the use of fire-arms. Nor does the account of the bows and arrows depend, for its authenticity, on newspaper evidence alone; gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, who were personally engaged in the action, have declared that they had themselves noticed the arrows flying.
When we consider the warlike disposition of the Indians in general, and the alacrity with which the victors are ever sure to be joined by numerous allies, we have every reason to expect a much more formidable opposition in the next campaign. It is well known that the savages place all their glory in deeds of war; and that, among them, a young man cannot make his appearance in company till he has signalized his valor by some martial achievement. When, to this powerful incentive, a new stimulus is added by the trophies obtained in the late action, it is presumable that numbers will crowd to their standard; and it strongly behooves us to prepare in time for a much more vigorous effort than any we have yet made against them.
The objections drawn from the increased expense, must entirely vanish from before the eyes of any man who looks forward to the consequences of one more unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster would eventually involve the nation in much greater expense than that which is now made the ground of opposition. Better, therefore, at once to make a vigorous and effectual exertion to bring the matter to a final issue, than to continue gradually draining the Treasury, by dragging on the war, and renewing hostilities from year to year.
If we wish to bring the war to a speedy and a happy conclusion, and to secure a permanent peace to the inhabitants on the frontier, we must employ such troops and adopt such measures as appear best calculated to ensure success. If we delay our determination until the force of the enemy be ascertained, we can make no provision at all; for the nature and circumstances of the case preclude us from the very possibility of obtaining a knowledge of their strength and numbers. And are we, meanwhile, to remain inactive and irresolute, and make no efforts to repel their intended attacks? No! Whatever their numbers may be, prudence calls aloud for provision of some kind. And if experience is to have any weight with us, the example of the French and of the British points out the true mode of securing our frontier, and rendering it invulnerable to an Indian foe. Let us occupy posts in the vicinity of the enemy, let them be properly garrisoned and well provided, and the business is done.
These will afford an opportunity of trading with the friendly tribes, and will prevent all intercourse between the whites and the Indians, except under proper regulations. Should hostilities be meditated by any tribes who are not in amity with us, early intelligence of their movements can be obtained; their marauding parties may either be beaten off on their approach, or intercepted on their return; opportunities may be taken of separately attacking the hostile tribes; their old men, their squaws, their children, will be exposed a great part of the year, whilst the others are out hunting. In short, if fear, hope, interest, can be supposed to have any influence on the Indians, this mode of defence must be allowed to be preferable to any other, as giving the fullest scope to the operation of all those motives.
A different mode has long been pursued in Virginia, and adopted by the inhabitants of Kentucky, but its success has not been such as to offer any inducement to the General Government to follow the same plan. Rangers have there been employed for a number of years to scour the frontiers; and those rangers, too, were expert woodsmen, perfectly inured to the Indian mode of warfare; yet, notwithstanding their utmost vigilance, these savages still found means to commit all the murders and depredations already enumerated. It is true, however, that a frontier militia man, trained up in the woods, may be, in many respects, preferable to a regular soldier, who has not the same knowledge of the country, and of the mode of fighting; but with equal experience, (and proper men possessed of that experience, may be enlisted on the establishment,) regular troops will be found infinitely superior to any militia upon earth.
Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband, and forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, are much more to be depended on, especially when the object of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be undergone. The militia, in whatever mode they may be called out, will hardly furnish men of the proper description; if large pay be offered, the temptation will equally prevail upon those who are unfit for the service as it will upon good, effective men; besides, some of the States have no militia laws; and, even in those States which have such laws, they are gone into disuse; no dependence can therefore be placed on militia under any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia law now before the House: but if it ever passes, it certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the purpose of providing for the immediate defence of the frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render ourselves responsible for the consequences of this parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.
The Cornplanter's speech was again mentioned and called for; but, as it had been confidentially communicated by the President, an objection was made to having it read, without clearing the galleries. Whereupon,
An honorable member rose, and mentioned his having read it in one of the public newspapers in the State of New Jersey.
To this it was answered, that if any gentleman had the newspaper to produce, the speech might be publicly read from that; otherwise, although it might be very proper that the speech itself should be read, yet, as it had been confidentially received from the Executive, there would be a manifest trespass on propriety and decorum in having it read with open galleries; it was therefore wished that the galleries might be cleared.
The Parliamentary etiquette requiring that this should be done by the House, and not by a committee, the committee rose for the purpose; and,
The Speaker having resumed the chair, the motion for clearing the galleries was renewed.
An objection was here started by an honorable gentleman in favor of the augmentation, who said that, as some gentlemen had spoken on the popular side of the question, whilst the galleries had been open, it was unfair to preclude those of opposite sentiments from an opportunity of answering their arguments in the same public manner, and proving to the people the justice and necessity of the war.
The motion, however, was persisted in, and the galleries were cleared.[42]
[The speakers in this day's debate were Messrs. Wayne, Goodhue, Boudinot, Livermore, Steele, Parker, Bourne, (Rhode Island,) White, and Moore. Mr. White and Mr. Moore opposed the motion; they were in favor of the augmentation proposed in the bill. The other gentlemen were in favor of striking out the clause.]
Friday, January 27.
Protection of the Frontiers.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States.
Mr. Mercer rose and addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I originally opposed the reference of this subject to the Secretary of the Treasury, on principles supported by the constitution, by the theory of free government, and from practical observation on the progress of our own, and I believe the result now before us will fully exemplify every evil predicted.
Let any man examine this bill, and compare it with the terms of the original reference. Let it then be asked, whether the submission to devise ways and means to provide for the defence of the Western frontier, authorized the plans proposed by the Treasury Department, that we are now giving sanction to? Did it authorize a perpetual tax, irrepealable by the whole Legislature, without a breach of faith, according to received doctrine? At least, so far placing the purse-strings in the hands of the Executive, who may refuse an assent to the repeal; in the power of the Senate also, and consequently beyond the reach of the Representatives of the people, who alone are deputized by, and may be recalled by the great mass of society, and to whom the constitution expressly confines the power of originating money bills. Have we, in truth, originated this money bill? Do we ever originate any money bill? If a reference, such as made to the Secretary, was proposed to the Senate, who are a branch of the Legislature, nearly of equal importance with ourselves, would it not be held a breach of the constitution? Were they to propose such a plan as this to us, would it not be received with indignation? Why so little jealousy of the Executive Department, separated by the constitution with so much care from us? Of the Treasury Department, too, which is considered in other countries as possessing and exercising the means of corruption? It is in my judgment a direct infraction of the letter and spirit of the constitution, of the principles of free government, and I have heard no attempt to defend it, but on the ground of pitiful evasion, more dishonorable to ourselves and dangerous to the public, than an open violation, that would rouse their resentment and ensure opposition.
But did the submission of a provision to defend the frontier authorize a system for the encouragement of manufactures, thereby placing the occupations and productive labor of our citizens under the direction of Government, and rendering the living of the artist and subsistence of the farmer, so far equally dependent on and subservient to the views of Administration? Did it authorize an entire provision for the public debt, past, present, and to come? Did it authorize a plan for supplying former deficiencies, which it is admitted do not exist? Lastly, did it authorize an extensive increase of the Sinking Fund, which we are informed is one of the principal objects? It would be an affront to common sense to answer one of these queries in the affirmative—it authorized none of them. And yet these are all its offspring; these are the great objects it produced. It is true there are in the bill two or three little clauses that were authorized, and which relate to the submission, and which might well have escaped my attention, and would probably never attract the observation of the public, but for the title—a bill for the protection of the frontiers. By these clauses five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars of the whole moneys to be for ever raised from its perpetual revenue, are appropriated for this year's campaign. After that sum is expended, we must, even the next year, look out for new taxes, and upon the same principles, as long as the Indian war continues (and by the enlistments it is not contemplated to be of very short duration) new taxes must be provided, for the residue of these taxes are by this bill appropriated to other purposes, for ever, after five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars are paid. This appropriation is unalterable even by the whole Legislature, unless by a breach of public faith, or providing other equal revenue. Should every year's Indian war, and every national disaster excuse Government for laying a perpetual tax, equal to the increased annual demand, it will be selling us defeats at a very high price; and if Government are paid so well, they may be tempted to repeat the tragical representation.
But what is the reflection that naturally arises from a contemplation of this bill. That Administration will not even permit us to defend the helpless women and children of the frontier from the brutal ferocity of a savage foe, but on condition that the Representatives surrender up for ever the sacred trust of the constitution, and place in the power and under the control of the Executive and Senate, a perpetual tax. Unless they throw the power of regulating the labor and industry of their fellow-citizens into the hands of Government, and into a mean dependence on Administration; and unless they furnish a large sum of money, under the denomination of a Sinking Fund, for the purposes of speculation, in order to raise and lower the price of stocks at pleasure, or as may suit the views and interest of the band of favorites that are in the secret.
Hard and oppressive conditions! Was this the object of the reference to the Secretary? It was not the avowed one, nor could it have been suspected, from a simple proposition to devise ways and means to defend the frontier. A mighty fabric has been erected on this slight foundation, to hurry us into its adoption. We have been officially, I suppose, informed that the money for the War Department is almost expended; that the preparations for the Western expedition must stop, unless we pass the bill immediately; and thus, with the tomahawk suspended over our heads, we must give up to Administration the dearest interests of the people, and sacrifice the most sacred rights of the constitution.
Monday, January 30.
Protection of the Frontiers.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States; and, after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; when the same being read, some were agreed to, and others disagreed to.
And then the said bill being before the House, a motion was made, and the question being put to amend the same, by striking out the second section thereof, in the words following:
"And be it further enacted, That there shall be raised three additional regiments of infantry, each of which, exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall consist of nine hundred and twelve non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians:"
It passed in the negative—yeas 18, nays 34, as follows:
Yeas.—John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Josiah Parker, Israel Smith, John Steele, Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Artemas Ward, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.
Nays.—Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, John Brown, Jonathan Dayton, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Joshua Seney, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, and Alexander White.
The farther consideration of the said bill was then postponed until to-morrow.