Thursday, November 10.
The Census.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.
Mr. Laurance had previously moved, that until the next enumeration the number of Representatives should be one for every thirty thousand persons.
Mr. Dayton moved to strike out "thirty," before "thousand." This amendment was under consideration.
Mr. Gerry observed, that in all the decisions of the Legislature, we ought to follow as far as possible the opinion of the great body of the people. If this opinion should be found to be against the ratio of thirty thousand, the amendment ought to be adopted; but if we refer to the amendments, proposed by the Conventions to the constitution, we shall find that five States are in favor of one Representative to every thirty thousand persons, till the number should amount to two hundred. None of the propositions now moved as amendments to the motion of the gentleman from New York, amount to that number. Several others of the Conventions were of opinion that the representation was too small to secure the liberties of this country. This Government, said he, is a Government of representation; the people may control their Representatives, but their influence is small in respect to the Senate and the Executive, and still less over the officers of Government. On what then do the people depend for checking encroachments, or preventing abuses? On their Representatives? If these should be too few, or if they should fail them, they never can redress their grievances without having recourse to violence. If the number is small, a majority may be the more easily corrupted. On the other hand, too large a number will be attended with difficulties; a medium then is most eligible. An adequate number is absolutely necessary; and to show that one to thirty thousand would not produce more than an adequate number, he referred to the ratio of representation in England and France, in which there was a greater proportion of Representatives than in the Legislature of the United States.
He then adverted to the objection arising from the additional expense; but, he observed, after Congress shall have passed a few more of the most important acts, it is not probable that the public business will in future require that the sessions should be for more than four months annually; this would reduce the expense greatly, in the first instance; and, agreeably to a calculation, an addition of forty-seven members to the present number, would make the aggregate expense but about one-eighteenth part more than at present, supposing the sessions to be four months long. But he considered the objection on account of the expense as merely speculative.
Although Congress is not positively bound by the constitution to give one member for every thirty thousand inhabitants, yet he would ask, whether the citizens of the United States did not expect that this ratio would be adopted? and whether they would not consider it as an abuse of power, if Congress, instead of one to thirty thousand, should settle the representation at one to forty thousand? Eight States have already adopted the first article of the proposed amendments to the constitution: and if the House should either settle the number of the Representative body, as it now stands, or reduce it, or establish it at one hundred, perhaps they might, before the end of the session, be obliged to repeal their act—as they would be bound by the amendment, as soon as it is ratified by a sufficient number of States. If gentlemen thought it probable that the proposed amendment would be ratified by the several States, they ought already to consider it as a rule for their conduct, and be restrained by it, from giving less than one Representative for thirty thousand inhabitants. After the representation amounts to one hundred, Congress will, no doubt, have a right to fix it there, until it is increased by the ratio of one to forty thousand: but that is a power which, he presumed, Congress will not exercise; but that they then will establish some ratio, by which the increase of representation shall keep pace with the increase of population, until the House consists of two hundred members.
Mr. Boudinot was convinced of the propriety of striking out the word "thirty." The House ought to consider what would be an adequate number for doing the business of the Union; and that number ought not to be exceeded, except to answer some very valuable purpose. Business would proceed with difficulty, if the representation was so numerous as it would become by the ratio of one to thirty thousand. The present representation of the United States is in a ratio very different from that of one to thirty thousand; and yet he thought it fully adequate. From a rough calculation, the ratio of thirty thousand would produce one hundred and thirteen members; thirty-five thousand would give ninety-seven; and forty thousand would produce eighty-one. If the number once settled was to rest there, he would not be over anxious to oppose the increase; but if gentlemen would take into view the increase consequent on the next enumeration, they would find that the number will by far exceed the due bounds.
He thought the people of the United States would be duly represented, and to their entire satisfaction, if the ratio was set higher than thirty thousand; nor could he imagine that such an exact proportion, between the Representatives and the represented, was at all requisite to secure their liberties, or to do the necessary business of Government. This indeed might be the case, if the power vested in Congress was proportionate to their number; but, since the House would possess the same powers, whether it consisted of a greater or a smaller number, he thought the people equally secure in either case. The ratio of thirty-five thousand, which would produce ninety-seven members, would, in his opinion, be a very proper one. If, however, the people should think otherwise, they had it in their power to correct the mistake, by ratifying the proposed amendment. Their not having as yet ratified it, was to him an argument that they thought the ratio too low; or, at least, that they considered the question as doubtful. Some of the States, he observed, have postponed the consideration of the amendment; and eight only have as yet agreed to it. On the whole, the House might safely adopt the ratio of one to thirty-five thousand; for that the increasing population of the United States would ever supply a representation sufficiently numerous to answer every good purpose.
Mr. Clark observed, that his objection was not merely on account of the pay of the members, but an increase in the representation would bring an additional expense on the people, by increasing the number of public officers; as almost every man would wish to see his friend provided for. The liberties of America could be in no danger from the present ratio of representation. The doors of the House are open, and the people know what their Representatives are doing.
Mr. Steele was in favor of the motion for striking out thirty. In discussing the important subject before the committee, he observed that there were two inquiries to be attended to: What is the proper number to constitute a Representative body for the United States, and what ratio will leave the fewest fractions in the respective States? One member to thirty thousand, he conceived, would give too numerous a representation. According to the present number of inhabitants, it will almost double the present number; it will divide and diminish the responsibility, make the House too unwieldy, retard public business, and increase the public expenses unnecessarily. An adequate representation, he thought, would be comprised within a much smaller number.
Gentlemen have called our attention to the House of Commons of Great Britain, and the National Assembly of France; but God forbid that we should draw our precedents from such examples as may be cited from European representation.
He was opposed to thirty thousand as the ratio: it would, in fractions, throughout the United States, leave above three hundred and sixty-nine thousand citizens unrepresented. Thirty-five thousand he thought the most eligible number, as it would leave the fewest fractions.
Mr. Laurance agreed that an adequate number was the great object to be attended to; but he contended that the original motion would give this number more completely than a larger ratio: and it ought to be considered, that, before the next enumeration, it will not be probably more than one to fifty thousand. As to the increase of expense, he observed that the great objects being accomplished, the future sessions will be short; besides which, the compensation of the members may be diminished. But he considered a necessary increase in the expense to be fully counterbalanced by affording greater security to the liberties of the people. The firmness of a government depends on a strong Executive; but this Executive should be founded on a broad bottom; and the broader the basis, the more secure is the public freedom under a vigorous Executive.
The existence of the Union may depend on the fullness of the representation. The inequality in the proportional increase of the number of inhabitants in different States, ought also to be taken into consideration; for it is very probable that in a short time, while some of the smaller States had a Representative for every thirty thousand, others would not have one to forty thousand. He was governed by general principles, and not by any calculations of fractional numbers: the constitution contemplates the ratio he had proposed, and therefore he hoped the motion for striking out would not obtain.
Mr. Goodhue observed, that the situation and circumstances of the Government of the United States are so different from those of France or Great Britain, that no parallel could be drawn respecting them. Nor is there an absolute similarity between this Government and those of the State Governments. The objects of legislation which come under the cognizance of Congress, are but few compared with those which engage the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France. A much larger representation for them, and in our State Legislatures, is therefore more proper, than is necessary for us in the General Government. He doubted the opinion that a large representation was less liable to corruption than a small one: some facts appear to confirm the former sentiment. He did not consider the expense as a material objection, if an increase of the number be necessary to doing more ample justice, or for the greater security of the liberties of the people; but, as he thought this was by no means the case, he was in favor of striking out "thirty," in order to insert a larger number.
Mr. Barnwell agreed with the gentleman last up. He should vote for striking out "thirty," in order to substitute the largest number that had been mentioned. Mr. B. entered into an abstract and philosophical discussion of the principle of representation in Government. The leading sentiment was, that a large proportion of Representatives is not necessary to obtain the best objects of legislation, in expressing the will of the people, or to secure the liberties of the constituent body. The great point, he observed, was, to combine the greatest portion of honesty with a due degree of activity. That number which would comprise a due proportion of these, would be competent to all the purposes of legislation, whether the number for which it legislates is ten thousand, or five hundred thousand. On this principle, he was decidedly against a large number, and in favor of a small one. Adverting to the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France, with respect to the former, he said, their corruption is, in a great degree, owing to their numbers: as to the latter, he observed, that the National Assembly had acted, in his opinion, politically and wisely. They set out with a large representation, in conformity to the sentiments of the people at the moment; but, on experience, finding the number too great, they have reduced it from twelve hundred to about two hundred and fifty. He believed that the general sense of the people was against a large representation in Congress; the inconveniences experienced from numerous bodies in the State Legislatures have led several of the States to lessen the number. He instanced Georgia, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
Mr. Baldwin was opposed to the motion. One Representative for thirty thousand appeared to him by no means a great representation. The opinion that, of late, had been so often advanced from the press, and in public discussion, for reducing the Representative branch in Government to a small number, he held to be full of dangerous error. He was sensible that the terms great and small were so merely relative in their signification, that it was difficult precisely to understand each other in the use of them. Perhaps they may most properly, both of them, be considered as extremes. No doubt representation, which of late seems to be used as the character of Republican Government, is a great improvement upon Democracy, or legislation by the whole body of the people. He could conceive that a representation might be so large as to partake of the evils of assembling the whole body of the people; but it was a very improbable and not a dangerous extreme: the other extreme was full of danger. These observations acquire much force, when applied particularly to the Governments of this country: enfeeble the representative part of them, and you sap the very principles of life. They stand on a different basis from the Governments which have gone before them, and may justly be said to be new experiments in government; time, as yet, has scarcely given room to judge of the probable issue; but this we may pronounce with much certainty—Let the principles of representation languish, and they have no chance of success.
It had not been found practicable to ground representation in the Federal Constitution upon any other principle than that of numbers; but extent of territory is unquestionably one of the natural principles on which it rests, and should if possible be regarded. One for thirty-four or thirty-five thousand may be deemed a proper representation in the Kingdom of France, or of Great Britain. The four millions which compose the United States, compactly settled where there was great sameness in the country, and pretty equally distant from a common centre, would be properly represented by a smaller number than in their present sparse settlement. But still further: the settlement of the United States is a fillet stretched along the sea-coast for seventeen hundred miles, comprehending as great a variety of climate and interests as one of the other quarters of the globe. It is difficult to conceive of a situation which calls for a greater extension of the principle of representation.
It has been said, that one for thirty thousand will make too large and unwieldy a body. He was sensible that was a point that did not admit of being determined by any conclusive reasoning; it was a mere matter of opinion; sound judgment only is to be used, time and experience will come on and confirm or correct the opinion. In such a case, it is wise to inquire how this has been judged of by others who have had a Representative body. In France, one thousand two hundred was not thought too great a representation in forming their National Assembly; and the number established by their new constitution for their stated Legislature was not two hundred and fifty, as the member last up had stated, but, if he had not been misinformed by the publications in this country, it was nearly seven hundred and fifty.
In the Kingdom of Great Britain, five hundred is not thought too great a representation: and can one hundred and thirteen, which is the greatest number contended for, be considered in this country as a huge and impracticable mass of representation?
It had ever appeared to him to be among the strongest marks of our youth and inexperience, that we grow wise too suddenly. He was afraid this instantaneous wisdom which sprung up so at once, and set at nought, or removed to the extreme of absurdity and folly, the deliberate and tried opinions of the most profound and enlightened among men, in circumstances peculiarly favorable to honest decision, will itself be left by time on that extreme.
The Federal Government, it must be admitted, is in fact pretty highly seasoned with prerogative; practice has already evinced the necessity, in many instances, of increasing it, by devolving much of the Legislative power upon the Executive Department, arising from the difficulty of making particular provisions and details in our laws, and accommodating them to the various interests of so extensive a country.
The other branch of the Legislature has many traits of a perpetual—at least of a very solid constituent part of the Government. He did not mention these as imperfections in the Government; they are perfections, if the other parts can be in due proportion: but it is surely a sound reason against taking positive measures at this time to diminish the Representative branch. For his own part, he was not well satisfied as to the intention. If there is any reason to apprehend that the Government will depart from the point on which it was first placed, he could scarcely suppose that any one could be honestly alarmed with the fear that the departure would be towards Democracy. He concluded, by expressing his hopes that the representation to the next Congress would be fixed at one for thirty thousand, as it had hitherto been, and that the motion for striking out would not prevail.