Tuesday, February 7.
Ordered, That the petitions of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New Jersey, which was presented yesterday, be referred to Mr. Boudinot, Mr. White, Mr. Thatcher, Mr. Bourne, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Niles; that they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same, with their opinion thereupon, to the House.
Mr. Benson, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for an apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first enumeration, and making provision for another enumeration, and apportionment of Representatives thereon, to compose the House of Representatives after the third day of March, 1797; which was received and read the first time.
The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanying his report stating the amount of the subscriptions to the loans proposed by the act making provision for the public debt, as well in the debts of the respective States as in the domestic debt of the United States, and of the parts which remain unsubscribed, together with such measures as are, in his opinion, expedient to be taken on the subject, pursuant to an order of this House of the 1st of November last; which were read, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.
The Fishery Bill
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."
Mr. Page said no man in this House was more heartily disposed to encourage the fisheries of the United States than he was; nor could any one more sincerely wish to encourage the bold, active, and enterprising adventurers in that branch of our commerce to persevere in it, than he did; being sensible of the importance of their traffic in peace, and of their defence of their country and annoyance of their enemies in war. But, sir, (said Mr. P.,) I much doubt whether Congress can give that encouragement to the fisheries to which they are entitled, and which policy would lead the General Government to give, were it not restricted by the constitution. I consider, sir, the constitution as intended to remedy the defects of the Confederation to a certain degree; so far only as would secure the independence and general welfare of the Confederated States, without endangering the sovereignty and independence of the individual States. Congress, therefore, was authorized to pay the debts of the Union, and to regulate commerce, partly for that purpose, and partly to prevent improper and dangerous commercial combinations, jealousies, and altercations between the States. But Congress was not intrusted with any regulation of exports which could admit of an interposition which might be dictated by partiality; nor was Congress permitted to lay any tax which could by any possibility operate unequally on the States in general. It is said, indeed, that, if a drawback be not allowed on the salt used in salting fish, there will be, in fact, a duty on the exportation of the fish. But to this I think it may be replied, that the constitution guards the exports of each State against the possibility of a partial restriction by Congress, or even by the States themselves; that Congress cannot lay a duty on the exportation of rice, indigo, tobacco, &c., or any other article exported from any State, because this might be done to the injury of the State where such duty would operate, and to the advantage and aggrandizement of some particular States, its competitors more favored by the General Government, or possessing more influence in the debates of Congress; and that the States are also individually restrained from laying such duties without the consent of Congress, to prevent acts which might produce jealousies, commercial combinations, and, perhaps, at length, civil dissensions. That this restriction, if it be intended to prevent partiality, therefore, cannot extend to authorize drawbacks, which may be productive of partial preferences and their consequent jealousies; that if drawbacks be granted at all, they ought to be universally extended to every article which is or can be exported from any of the States, having in its composition a dutiable ingredient; that hence, ships and other vessels, &c., should have drawbacks on the sails, cordage, iron, &c.; but it may also be said that, as to the duty on salt, that is amply repaid to the merchant by the price annexed to his fish; the sums laid out in salt and fish together form a capital on which he takes care to have a sufficient profit. Those merchants employed in this traffic, if allowed a drawback, would have a preference to other merchants, who import largely, pay heavy duties, and have no other advantage than the usual advance on their goods. The exporter of any article, with a drawback, must have an advantage over his fellow-citizens, who purchase through necessity many dutiable articles, and are obliged to consume them, without any other benefit than the use of them. I mention this because it has been said (by Mr. Ames) that, having made the men of Marblehead pay for salt, they have a right to demand the money expended in that salt on the exportation of their fish; for it would be as reasonable for the man who had ate his fish on which his salt was expended, or who had used any other article for which he had paid a duty, to claim of Congress a return of his money expended therein, as the exporter of fish. The only difference is, that, if both were paid the exact sum so expended by them, the exporter of fish would get twice paid. The purchaser or consumer of his fish would pay him for his salt therein, as if it were substantial fish, and the State for it as mere salt. Here, then, is a field for partiality, discontent, and complaints, which the constitution wisely guards against. It cannot, therefore, be to any purpose to tell us that a bounty, or allowance, as it is now called, is preferable to a drawback, as there is not so great room for fraud in the one as in the other; nor can it be of importance to show that the fishermen have not the profits to which they are entitled. That their services in the last war deserve rewards, &c., their country shared with them the glory of their gallant behavior; but they alone received the rewards they aimed at. The twelve hundred ships they took were a compensation for services and a reward for those exploits. It is true, they annoyed the enemy; it is certain their prizes sometimes fed, armed, and clothed our armies; but it is not said that they did not receive payment for furnishing those things.
But here we are asked, Is it not of great consequence to the United States to employ those bold, skilful seamen in our service, that we may enjoy the commercial advantage they give us in peace, and their powerful assistance in war? To this I reply, that it ought first to be proved that Congress has the power and authority to give them the encouragement demanded; and even if Congress have that power, it ought to be shown that it can be extended to the benefit of the sailors of some of the States, and not to those of every State. It may be said that Congress may with as much propriety give bounties to our hunters in the Western country, to raise up a nursery of soldiers as a barrier against the Indians, and to promote the fur trade, as to give drawbacks and bounties to the fishermen of the Eastern States, with a view to encourage fisheries, and to raise a nursery of seamen for their defence against enemies who may invade our Eastern frontiers. Indeed, if defence be the object in view, we might as well give bounties to sturdy landsmen to be in readiness and constant training for war.
Indeed, sir, I confess I am not altogether convinced, that, if Congress have this power, it ought to be thus exerted; because it is not clear to me that those fishermen would not be more profitable to the United States, if they were cultivating the lands which now lie waste, and raising families, which would be of ten times more value than their fisheries. A nursery of virtuous families, which will produce soldiers, sailors, husbandmen, and statesmen, must be preferable to a mere nursery of sailors, who generally live single, and often perish at sea. I always look upon the loss of a crew to an infant Republic as the loss almost of a new State.
I speak of this question, however, as a citizen of the United States, as a member of this House. Were I to discuss it as a citizen of Massachusetts, and in their Legislature, I should say, as the State is nearly filled with inhabitants, and our fishermen increase our commerce in peace, protect us in war, and, indeed, even enrich us by their prizes, it is our interest to encourage them to the utmost, and to prevent their going into the service of other countries. I might, therefore, as a member of the Legislature of that State, do all in my power to procure bounties for them, and indeed for all the sailors belonging to that State; but I should not think of applying to Congress for their assistance; not only because I doubt their right to afford it, but because I should look upon it as in some degree derogatory to the sovereignty and independence of the State. I should look upon such an interference of Congress as a step towards swallowing up the powers of the State Governments, and as consolidating the different States into one Government, which the wise and virtuous in every State always protested against as dangerous to their liberties; the fear of which consolidation prevented many good men from voting for the adoption of the new Government.
The framers of the constitution guarded so much against a possibility of such partial preferences as might be given, if Congress had the right to grant them, that, even to encourage learning and useful arts, the granting of patents is the extent of their power. And surely nothing could be less dangerous to the sovereignty or interests of the individual States than the encouragement which might be given to ingenious inventors or promoters of valuable inventions in the arts and sciences. The encouragement which the General Government might give to the fine arts, to commerce, to manufactures, and agriculture, might, if judiciously applied, redound to the honor of Congress, and the splendor, magnificence, and real advantage of the United States; but the wise framers of our constitution saw that, if Congress had the power of exerting what has been called a royal munificence for these purposes, Congress might, like many royal benefactors, misplace their munificence; might elevate sycophants, and be inattentive to men unfriendly to the views of Government; might reward the ingenuity of the citizens of one State, and neglect a much greater genius of another. A citizen of a powerful State, it might be said, was attended to, whilst that of one of less weight in the Federal scale was totally neglected. It is not sufficient to remove these objections, to say, as some gentlemen have said, that Congress is incapable of partiality or absurdities, and that they are as far from committing them as my colleagues or myself. I tell them the constitution was formed on a supposition of human frailty, and to restrain abuses of mistaken powers. The constitution has been said by some one to be, like answers of the oracles of old, capable of various and opposite constructions; that it has been ingeniously contrived, like some of them, to suit two events—a republican or a monarchical issue. I will not pretend to say that this is not, in some instances, too just an observation; nor will I undertake to deny that it was not the intention of some of the Convention that such ambiguities might be in their constitution, to correspond with the critical and ambiguous state of the American mind respecting government; but I will boldly affirm, that, whatever the theories of that day might lead some to think respecting the application of monarchical principles to the Government of the United States, no one can, at this day, pretend that they are applicable to their circumstances, their dispositions, or interests, or even are agreeable to the wishes of the people. Even before the adoption of the constitution, when the rights of men had not been so thoroughly investigated as they since have been, it must be remembered that whole States, and large and respectable minorities in other States complained of and objected to the aristocratical and monarchical features of the new Government. In vain did the friends of the new Government—friends of order, of union, or of liberty—contend that the powers granted by the constitution which appeared so alarming were such as would never be exerted but when all good men would acknowledge the necessity of exercising them, and that, indeed, they would be explained or restrained by some future amendments. The sagacious and eloquent Henry shook his head at such promises, sighed and submitted to the will of the majority—a small one indeed—but foretold, from his knowledge of the human heart, what would be done and said in justification of every measure which might extend the power of Congress.
Is it politic and wise, then, Mr. Chairman, to exert the power contended for, even if it be authorized by the constitution? May not the interferences of Congress in the business of regulating the trade of the Eastern States, excite, if not envy on account of a supposed partiality, a jealousy lest Congress undertake to intermeddle in the commercial regulations of other States? May not Congress with equal propriety, undertake to regulate the tobacco, the rice, and indigo trade, as well as that of the fisheries? If they intermeddle in the business of sailors, why not in that of manufacturers and farmers? Where, I may ask with my colleague, may they not go on in their zeal, and, I may add, in their laudable pursuit, of promoting the general welfare—and how totally may they be mistaken? If jealousy of rival States, instead of mutual satisfaction and pleasure—if distrust and suspicion of Congress, instead of confidence in their measures, be the consequence—how will the Union be promoted, or the General Government secured? However virtuously disposed the present members may be, (and I am ready to applaud their honest intentions,) let them consider, sir, that they had better suppress their patriotic emotions, than give a pretext for their successors to abuse the powers which they now wish to exert for the public good. I know they will quote the opinion of as wise and virtuous a citizen as is in the United States. I know his patriotism, and know well his true Republican principles; but, sir, with the freedom of a fellow-citizen, I take the liberty of saying, that his honest zeal, like that of the friends of the bill, has led him into a mistake.[43] That able statesman and virtuous citizen, like the eloquent advocates of the bill, has considered the acts now quoted as a full sanction for the one before the committee. But I am of opinion, that those acts had better be repealed than give a sanction to the enacting of a law which goes to the establishing of bounties, or drawbacks, or by whatever other name they are called, which may be used to the partial encouragement of any branch of trade or employment whatsoever. I shall therefore vote against the bill before us, and, to get rid of it shall vote for striking out of it the first section, according to the motion now before the committee. As a member of this House, I shall think it my duty to protect the fisheries, and every other branch of our commerce, the fisherman as well as every other citizen, as far as may be within my ability; but I am not permitted, as a member of Congress, I humbly conceive, to select the fisheries and fishermen as objects of more consequence than any other branches of trade, or persons employed in them, lest Congress should not only show a mistaken attachment, or, even if judiciously placed, excite jealousies and discontents between the States, and distrust, destructive of their weight and influence. My constant wish has been to see Congress confined to such acts as would form a more perfect union, promote the general welfare, ensure domestic tranquillity, and engage the confidence of our fellow-citizens.
My wish is, that the members of Congress would leave their respective States in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege they held before their adoption of the new constitution, which can be exercised without prejudice to the General Government. Let the Legislatures of the different States encourage, as far as in their power, the commerce, agriculture, or manufactures of their respective States? and let Congress, as far as can be consistent with the most steady impartiality, patronize their patriotic exertions, by wise regulations of their commerce with foreign nations, such as may open as full an intercourse with those nations as the States may desire. The emulation of the sister States in commerce, manufactures, or agriculture, would lead to the early establishment of that branch of either to which each State might be best adapted. This rivalship could produce no jealousy, no general national discontent in the States, no localities in Congress. Virginia would not attempt to rival Massachusetts in her fisheries or carrying business, nor will South Carolina and Georgia rival the manufactories of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Each State may rejoice to see its sister States enjoying the advantages with which Heaven has blessed them; and Congress, if confined to subjects which admit not of local considerations, may debate with temper and decide with unbiased judgment. I confess I have wished that Congress possessed the power that the friends of the bill tell us we do possess, and tell us we have exerted; but, on examining the constitution with a view to my wish, I found reason to think, not only that Congress has not that power, but that it ought not to possess it, unless the constitution was intended to establish a consolidated Government on the ruin of the State Legislatures; but this, I conceive, cannot be the case, because the constitution guarantees to the States their respective Republican Governments. The general powers of Congress, no doubt, ought to be (as they are) adequate to the purpose of forming a more perfect union than subsisted under the Confederation, to establish justice, &c.; but, as they are bound to guarantee to the States their respective Republican forms of Government, I cannot conceive how any of these powers can be employed, consistently with the ends for which they were given, in diminishing the power and sovereignty of the State Legislatures. How Congress can interfere in the regulations respecting the merchants and their sailors at Marblehead with more propriety than with those at Philadelphia, Norfolk, or Charleston, I cannot conceive; nor how this interference could take place without alarming those States, I know not. Viewing the bill before us in this light, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against it, and, as I said before, to get rid of it, shall vote to strike out the first section, according to the motion now before the committee.
The question on striking out the first section was taken, and negatived—32 to 26.