Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Friday, February 22.

Alien and Sedition Laws.

Mr. Bard presented several petitions and remonstrances from 1,487 inhabitants of the county of Franklin, in Pennsylvania, praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws; which having been read,

Mr. Bard moved to have this petition referred as usual.

Mr. Harper inquired whether it would be in order to strike out a part of this petition. On being answered in the negative by the Speaker, Mr. H. said, he was always unwilling to object to the reference of petitions; but, on this occasion he could not help protesting against an atrocious libel contained in these petitions against the courts and juries of this country. Some time ago a great deal had been said on the subject of courts and juries in this House, and now we find the sentiments, as many others have been, reverberated in the form of petitions. It is here said, "that the sedition law had, in its execution, been used as a means of private vengeance, personal enmity, and party resentment." A charge so unjustifiable, and so untrue, upon the courts and juries of this country, he could not suffer to be referred without his protest.

Mr. Gallatin observed, that the reference of these petitions is objected to, on account of what the gentleman from South Carolina calls a libel, which makes a part of these petitions. This, said Mr. G., is going upon the ground, which the greatest enemies of these laws have barely suggested might be taken, but which they thought scarcely possible, viz: that the right of petitioning might next be restricted, since the liberty of writing and speaking on the measures of Government was by law restricted: and now, taking it for granted, that the allegation contained in these petitions is untrue, the gentleman from South Carolina wishes to refuse these petitions a reference, without examining whether it is true or not. The petitioners say that the sedition law has been carried into effect under the operation of party spirit and personal revenge. The gentleman says that this is not true; but he does not want to have the allegation examined, in order to discover whether it be true or not, but to dismiss the subject at once; to tell the people, "You shall not be permitted to lay your petitions before us, if you dare to say that laws are carried into operation to gratify party spirit or private revenge, (for nothing is said of courts and juries,) if they contain such allegations, we will reject your petitions." Mr. G. hoped, on examination of the fact, the House would be convinced that though the charge is not a libel, that it is at least a gross mistake; that no such personal enmity, party spirit, or private revenge, has taken place, either in the commencement of any prosecution under this law, or in any decision which has taken place. But thus to object to the reference of petitions, would be to say that we have the power of defining the nature of petitions; that they may apply to this and that object, but that there are certain points which the people may not touch. He wished to know whether the people have not a right to say, if they choose, that the administration of justice is corrupt? and whether, if they do say so, the fact ought not to be inquired into? It certainly ought, and he was surprised to hear such an objection made. It must have arisen, because these petitions are grating to the feelings of gentlemen who are favorable to these laws. He hoped, on recollection, that the reference of petitions does not imply an approbation of the sentiments contained in them, that the gentleman from South Carolina would permit these petitions to be referred.

Mr. Harper was not surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania should defend these petitions, for reasons which every man must know. What he has said upon the subject is no more than a repetition of some things which we have before heard. He agreed that, when grievances are complained of, they ought to be examined; and if the people were to complain of a maladministration of justice, the fact ought to be inquired into; but when the repeal of a law is prayed for, it certainly cannot be proper for petitioners to go into charges against the administration of courts and juries, by saying that prosecutions are carried on under party malice and party revenge. To do this is to strike at the vitals of our constitution. The gentleman from Pennsylvania likes this, perhaps, from party motives, but he ought to remember that it is an instrument which will cut both ways; and the use of which, if he has any respect for the laws and rights of his country, he may live to regret having countenanced. Mr. H. said, if in order, he would move to refer this part of the memorial to a select committee, with a view of inquiring into the subject-matter, and report their opinion thereon to the House.

The Speaker declared such a motion out of order; and, after some observations from Mr. Nicholas, in which he said the gentleman from South Carolina had answered himself, by allowing the propriety of a reference at all; and observed, if because these petitions complained of the administration of one part of our Government (which, however, he did not allow they do) they were to be rejected, it might be expected that, hereafter, no petition would be received that complained of the maladministration of any department of the Government.

The reference was carried, there being 55 votes for it.

Mr. Gallatin presented petitions from six hundred and seventy-eight inhabitants of Chester County, praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws, in the same words with those presented yesterday.

On expelling Matthew Lyon.

Mr. Bayard called up for consideration the following resolution, which he had laid upon the table a day or two ago:

The resolution having been read, Mr. B. presented to the House a copy of the record of Mr. Lyon's trial, which was read by the Clerk, after which,

Mr. B. observed, it would not be necessary to trouble the House with many observations in support of this resolution. The facts upon which the resolution is founded, are proved to be incontrovertibly true, by the record which had just been read. The only question, therefore, before the House was, as to the consequence of the fact, or whether the crime of which the member in question had been convicted, is a sufficient cause for expulsion. Mr. B. referred the House to that clause of the constitution which gives the House the power of expulsion. The power, said he, is unlimited. The House has the power to expel a member for any crime, or for any cause, which, in their discretion, they conceive has rendered him unfit to remain a member of the body. Perhaps some gentlemen may think that it is improper for the House to take notice of acts done by its members out of the House, but he believed the fallacy of such a doctrine would be easily seen. It was certainly possible, and might, therefore, be imagined, that a member of this House, might be guilty of murder, treason, perjury, or other infamous crime, and would it be asserted that a man, defiled by crimes of this kind, ought to be suffered to represent a portion of the people of the United States in the National Legislature? He trusted that no gentleman, who valued reputation, would contend for such a point. The question, then is, said Mr. B., whether the act in question is an act of that description, the commission of which ought to induce the House to expel the convicted member? In his opinion, the crime was of the first political magnitude. A crime not only affecting the members of this House, but the whole community, as its consequences go to the subversion of the Government. This Government, said Mr. B., depends for its existence upon the good will of the people. That good will is maintained by their good opinion. But, how is that good opinion to be preserved, if wicked and unprincipled men, men of inordinate and desperate ambition, are allowed to state facts to the people which are not true, which they know at the time to be false, and which are stated with the criminal intention of bringing the Government into disrepute among the people. This was falsely and deceitfully stealing the public opinion; it was a felony of the worst and most dangerous nature. The member from Vermont has been convicted of doing this, with a view of exciting the hatred of the people against the President and Senate, and of stirring up sedition in the country. This, in his opinion, was a crime of the greatest magnitude, since it is all-important that the channel by which information is conveyed to the people should be preserved as pure as possible; for, if men are allowed to state things as facts, which they know to be false, what will be the consequence? However upright the Government, or however correct the First Magistrate may be, the hatred of the people may be excited against them by means of false information; and when a foreign foe, or domestic traitors, join the standard of rebellion, the best constitution and government may be subverted. Therefore, that falsehood which deprives men of the means of forming a true judgment of public affairs, in this country, where the Government is elective, is a crime of the first magnitude. The member from Vermont has been convicted, under aggravated circumstances. He was on this floor when the law, against which he has offended, was passed. He, therefore, was well acquainted with the law; yet, with this knowledge, he has falsely, scandalously and maliciously, defamed the President of the United States, with a view of exciting hatred, and stirring up sedition. These facts are recorded and incontrovertible; and he conceived it would be out of order to call them in question.

Mr. B. concluded with appealing to the candor and honor which he expected to find in the House, whether a member, the malice of whose heart, and the falsehood of whose pen, stood recorded; who had, from the worst and basest motives, violated a law which he had himself assisted to make, was fit to hold a seat in that House. Will any one say that a man who does not keep the laws ought to be allowed to make them? Certainly, nothing was more repugnant to principle and propriety; and, as he conceived the member from Vermont was notoriously and exemplarily guilty in this respect, an obligation rested on the House to expel him. Mr. B. said he brought forward this resolution from a sense only of public duty, from a strong feeling for national character. He knew but little, and should be happy if it were less, of the member who was the object of it. He could not be suspected of having been induced to the step he had taken by the miserable gratification of offering violence to the feelings of the member. He believed that nothing he had said, nor any thing which could be said, would awaken a single feeling. His sensations were of another sort, and excited in another manner. Mr. B. conceived he had done his duty, and if the House refused to purify itself by the expulsion of the member, it was a satisfaction to him to reflect that it would appear to the world that he had no share in the disgrace.

Mr. Nicholas had hoped that the gentleman from Delaware would have shown to the House something in this transaction which made the character of the member alluded to so infamous as to have rendered him unfit to hold a seat in this House. He should have thought that, after a member of this House had suffered so severely as the member from Vermont has suffered by fine and imprisonment, it would have been thought necessary to go into a consideration of the nature of the offence of which he is said to have been guilty, and to have shown that the guilt attaching to him was such as to defile the characters of the rest of the members to sit with him, before a vote of expulsion was taken. Indeed, Mr. N. had supposed that there had been but one opinion on this subject, and that no attempt would have been made to have inflicted a second punishment. The gentleman from Delaware, Mr. N. said, had confined himself in his declaration about this offence, to its being an offence against one of the laws of the United States, without showing the House what the offence was, or wishing them to form a judgment upon it.

Mr. N. was surprised at this second prosecution, because, if gentlemen will speak candidly according to the opinions which they formerly delivered in justification of the law, they will acknowledge that the whole of the charges brought against the member from Vermont ought not to have been inquired into under the sedition law; since two of the counts contained in the indictment are mere matters of opinion, not containing the least suggestion of fact; and the third rests so much on matter of opinion, that it is impossible, according to a sound construction of the law, for any guilt to be incurred by the act.

Mr. N. wished the House to attend to the nature of the charges exhibited against the member from Vermont, and to say whether they were not of such a nature as to render it difficult to say whether they are well founded, and, if they are well founded, then they are innocent. In the record from which he had copied the charges, there are three counts; two of them are founded on extracts taken from a letter, called "Barlow's Letter;" the third is for sentiments contained in a letter of the member's own writing. The two first turn on mere matters of opinion. Mr. N. read the counts as follows:

"The misunderstanding between the two Governments has become extremely alarming, confidence is completely destroyed, mistrusts, jealousy, and a disposition to a wrong attribution of motives, are so apparent as to require the utmost caution in every word and action that are to come before your Executive—I mean if your object is to avoid hostilities. Had this truth been understood with you before the recall of Monroe, before the coming and second coming of Pinckney; had it guided the pens that wrote the bullying Speech of your President, and stupid answer of your Senate, at the opening of Congress in November last, I should probably have had no occasion to address you this letter. But we found him borrowing the language of Great Britain, and telling the world that, although he should succeed in treating with the French, there was no dependence to be placed on any of their engagements; that their religion and morality were at an end; that they had turned pirates and plunderers; and it would be necessary to be perpetually armed against them, though they are at peace. We wondered that the answer of both Houses had not been an order to send him to a mad-house. Instead of this, the Senate had echoed the Speech with more servility than ever George III. experienced from either House of Parliament.

"As to the Executive, when I shall see the efforts of that power bent on the promotion of the comfort, the happiness, and accommodation of the people, that Executive shall have my zealous and uniform support. But, when I see every consideration of the public welfare swallowed up in a continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, or selfish avarice; when I shall behold men of real merit daily turned out of office for no other cause but independence of sentiment; when I shall see men of firmness, merit, years, abilities, and experience, discarded on their application for office, for fear they possess that independence; and men of meanness preferred for the ease with which they take up and advocate opinions, the consequence of which they know but little of; when I shall see the sacred name of religion employed as a State engine to make mankind hate and persecute one another, I shall not be their humble advocate."

The two first counts contain the opinions of the writer on public and notorious acts. No act is charged upon the President and Senate which is not notorious. It is not an attempt to impose upon the world a belief of facts which do not exist. He called upon gentlemen of the law and others to say whether this law was ever intended to extend to matters of opinion. He was astonished that a record of this kind should ever come from a court of the United States. The law declares that the publications which it proposes to punish, shall be false and scandalous. Do gentlemen say opinions can be false which do not contain matter of fact? Another part of the law gives to the party accused the privilege of giving the truth of the fact charged in evidence; but it is impossible that this can be done, where the matter charged consists of mere opinion; and juries could not possibly say whether an opinion be true or false. They can only determine whether or not it is their own opinion.

If a man is to be subject to a prosecution for his opinions, what will be the consequence? We are, said Mr. N., sent here to form an opinion, and, when we return home, we are expected to deliver that opinion to our constituents: but, if the propriety of our opinions are not to be judged of by ourselves, but by others, what will become of us? No man will be safe; for, though he may have formed his opinion as correctly as possible, if twelve men are to sit upon it, and, if it should not happen to be their opinion, or if they should not believe it to be his upon whom it is charged, he will be liable to a severe fine and imprisonment. Is it proper, Mr. N. asked, for legislators to be placed on this ground? Or, will gentlemen say it was their intention to place themselves in this situation? They certainly will not; for who would consent to sit here, or of what use would it be, under such conditions?

The third count is somewhat of a different nature. Mr. N. said, in speaking on this subject, he was not giving his own opinion. If he were to give it, he should say he had no foundation for the fact here stated. There is no mode, however, of ascertaining whether or not it was the opinion of the member from Vermont, and if it were his opinion, there being no mode of determining whether the opinion is correct or otherwise, it was impossible to act upon it.

With respect to the first part of the third count, which speaks of "every consideration of the public welfare being swallowed up in a continual grasp of power, &c.," he supposed it would be agreed that it was an expression of the affection of the mind—an opinion upon the disposition discovered by actions. That part of it which relates to "men of real merit being turned out of office for no other cause but independence of sentiment, &c.," suggests a fact, but if this was his opinion, it is a matter so much connected with opinion, as to be scarcely distinguishable from it. And shall we be told, said Mr. N., that a member ought to be banished from his seat for uttering a sentiment of this kind, after having been told by the gentleman from Delaware, and others, that it was a complete disqualification for office for a man to hold a different political opinion from that of the Executive? He trusted gentlemen could not seriously think so. For, since if the fact were true, and the member from Vermont had adduced (as he believed he might have done) two or three instances of men being turned out of office merely on account of their political opinions, still the jury might have asked, "how do you know that the men displaced possessed superior talents to those who succeeded them?" This, though true, could not be proved, therefore the member from Vermont could not have availed himself of the advantage held out by the law. Gentlemen may say this is not necessary, as this law goes to many offences not capable of this proof; they may say that the British law on this subject goes to many others. But our law is not the same with the British law; there, though the libel be true, it is not less a libel, which is not the case under our law, which is an important distinction.

It was clear, Mr. N. said, that such parts of the counts as went to insinuate fact, were so connected with opinion, that it was impossible to separate them. It could not be said that the jury were competent to decide upon the truth of the case. The decision of twelve honest men on a point of fact, is, perhaps, the best security that can be devised for the security of justice; but if a man is to be convicted because his opinions and those of a jury are at variance, there is an end to all security. Men's opinions are as various as their faces, and the truth or falsehood of those opinions are not fit subjects for the decision of a jury.

Upon what ground does the member from Vermont stand? He is a representative of the people; and gentlemen could not shut their eyes against a notorious fact, viz: that the constituents of this member, with a full knowledge of this prosecution, have re-elected him; and if the people of Vermont choose to have a person possessing these opinions to represent them, who have a right to say they shall not? Indeed, if they are to be represented at all, they must be represented by the man whom they choose to elect.

The gentleman from Delaware had said, that all the offences of Mr. Lyon were greatly aggravated from his being a member of this House. Mr. N. was of a different opinion. He thought it incumbent on a Representative to disclose his opinions on public affairs to his constituents; and this disclosure will become more necessary, in proportion as such opinions may be offensive to the administrators of the Government; as, when all goes on smoothly and well, there will be no necessity for calling the attention of the people to public concerns.

The gentleman has also said, that it would be out of order to contest the truth of any thing contained in this record. He thought differently, and that if it was proper to act upon the subject at all, it would be proper to assign a day to have a fair hearing of the business, to enable the House to judge of the facts. For gentlemen will not say, that courts and juries are so infallible, that there is no case in which the decision of a court ought to be revised. If the member from Vermont should think it necessary to demand this investigation, the House ought to submit to it.

There was something in that record, Mr. N. said, which was very singular indeed; something which requires investigation; for unless the fact is different from what his information made it, a most extraordinary circumstance was connected with the third count. It will be seen, from the showing of the record, that the letter upon which the charge is founded, was written before the passage of the law on which the offence was tried. If he was not misinformed, no evidence was adduced in court to show that Mr. Lyon did any act subsequent to the writing of his letter in the publication, and that though the thing appeared in print after the law took its effect, all that was done by the writer was done before the law was passed. He thought, therefore, before the House acted upon this subject, an inquiry ought to be had upon it. He did not know what were the wishes of the member from Vermont himself on this subject; he had not put the question to him, because he thought there was no offence contained in the record of which the House ought to take notice. He would say farther, that believing most religiously that the law against which the member from Vermont is said to have offended, is a violation of the constitution of this country, he could not without a breach of his oath, do any act to punish a breach of that law.

Mr. Lyon said, he did expect that if he was to have had a second trial, he should have been at liberty to have adduced the evidence upon which a jury had already decided. Gentlemen who have been able to obtain a copy of the record, which he, notwithstanding all his earnest desires to obtain it, had not been able to procure, might also have obtained a copy of the testimony on which this judgment was founded.

Mr. L. thought he had received an unjust trial and a hard sentence. He said unjust, because he was frowned upon by the Judge in a very abrupt manner when he challenged two of the jury, which he had a right to do by a law of the State. The Judge answered me, said Mr. L., "You are unacquainted with the laws of the State." Mr. L. observed that there is a law in the State of Vermont for punishing persons who speak against the public authorities, which gives to the accused the privilege of challenging six of his jury. This privilege, said Mr. L., I was denied, exclusive of the political packing of the jury who tried me. This is the kind of treatment I have received: but I shall submit to the decision of the House without occupying their time on my account, further than my enemies are desirous of so occupying it.

Mr. Allen said, nothing but the respect which he entertained for the character who presided at the trial of the member from Vermont would have drawn him from his seat on that occasion. But if he understood the member from Vermont, he said he was frowned upon by the court when he challenged two of his jury, and having been present at the trial, he was able to speak to that fact. He understood the member to make a challenge, and the Judge told him he did not know the laws of Vermont; but so far from any harshness being used towards the member, he must say he never saw a trial more fairly conducted. He thought it did honor to Judge Paterson, who presided. When the member persisted in his opinion, that a law of the State gave him a right to challenge his jury, the Judge replied, "if that was the law, it would require consideration;" and he inquired of the district judge if that was the law, who said it was not. As to the member's being precipitately tried, [Mr. Lyon observed, he did say so,] if ever there was a case deliberately tried, or in which unexampled indulgence was shown to the accused, it was this.

The member from Vermont had spoken of the jury being packed. He had seen this asserted in the papers, and the public ought to be informed that the charge is wholly untrue. The member from Vermont must know it is untrue. The jury was drawn from the boxes as is usual, in consequence of an order made by the court in May, which pointed out the particular towns from whence the jury were to be drawn. Mr. A. concluded by saying, he was sorry to find any man base enough to attack the gentleman who presided on this trial, as he believed his conduct to be unimpeachable.

Mr. Bayard said, considering the lateness of the hour, he should limit his reply to a few observations. He did not know what would bind the gentleman from Virginia; he denies the obligation of the law, and the credibility of the record. He could not expect, therefore, that he would be bound by the obligation of reason.

The gentleman from Virginia, in his defence of the member from Vermont, has gone upon the ground that mere matter of opinion cannot be construed into a libel. He begged leave to differ from that opinion, for which there was not the least ground. Four things, Mr. B. said, are necessary to constitute a crime under the law in question: it is necessary that a publication should be seditious, false, scandalous, and malicious. When these four things appear, whether the publication consists in the assertion of matter of opinion, or matter of fact, it will be within the law, which makes no discrimination on the subject.

Mr. B. did not think it altogether in order to question in this place the regularity of the proceedings of a court of justice. According to the organization of this Government, the powers of it are distributed, and the Judiciary in its department is as sovereign as the Legislature; and it is as improper for the Legislature to question the proceedings of a court as it would be for a court in common cases, to question the obligation of a law. What has the fact been? The judgment of a court has decided, on the verdict of a jury given upon oath, that this case was within the law; and, after a judicial determination, is it for a member of this House to say that the case was not within the law?

But Mr. B. could conceive no idea more groundless than that of the gentleman from Virginia, that mere matters of opinion are not grounds of charges under this law. This the gentleman had made his alpha and omega. He wished to know how a distinction was to be made on this subject? If an opinion upon a fact be expressed, and that opinion is false, scandalous, and malicious, ought it not to be subject to prosecution? Does the gentleman say opinions cannot be false? Mr. B. said, he would put a case to the gentleman from Virginia, without any intention of personal reflection, but merely for the sake of the argument. Suppose any person were to say, that in his opinion, that gentleman was a rogue, or any other opinion casting a gross imputation, would the offence be less, because he had, instead of saying expressly he was a rogue, merely given it as his opinion? But if the gentleman insisted opinions could not be false, how would he get rid of the conclusion? This, Mr. B. conceived, might be sufficient to show that opinions may be false. Or, suppose a man were to say that, in his opinion, another was a traitor, ought he not to be punished as severely as if he had asserted the thing as a fact? The intention and wisdom of this law was, Mr. B. said, to caution men to be guarded in the publication of their opinions; since, by the expression of false opinions the minds of the people may be alienated from their Government. Suppose, for instance, that the gentleman from Virginia, or the member from Vermont, were to harangue the people, and say, in their opinion, this law is unconstitutional, and, therefore, not binding; that it ought not to be obeyed, but opposed by force; that it was made by men grasping after power, in defiance of the best interests of their country, in order to answer their own private views. Although this all might be mere matter of opinion, would it not come within the meaning of the law in question? No man on earth, Mr. B. said, would be more opposed to any measure for restraining the expression of honest and well-intentioned opinions, than himself. All that this law does, is to restrain false, malicious, and scandalous opinions. And will the gentleman from Virginia say, that the good of the country, or its liberty, will be promoted by indulging in an expression of what is false, scandalous, and malicious? Could this be liberty? He thought not. Every man, under this law, has the liberty of publishing what he pleases, taking the responsibility upon himself for the truth of what he writes. If he writes only what is true, he is not liable to punishment; if what is false, and that maliciously, it is only reasonable he should be punished for his falsehood and malice.

Suppose a common case, that a man were to say that, in his opinion, another was insolvent, a bankrupt, or a thief, would he not be answerable for this opinion? He certainly would. And ought a man to be permitted to slander the Government and not an individual? If the licentiousness of the press be allowed to go thus far, there will be nothing safe in character; it will always be in the power of a malicious person to rob the best men of their reputation with impunity. He presumed, therefore, that there was no ground for the distinction which the gentleman had attempted to draw.

The gentleman from Virginia had called upon the advocates of this resolution to show, that the member from Vermont could be punished a second time. Mr. B. did not know that the expulsion of a member from his seat could be considered in the light of a punishment. It was merely lopping off from the Legislative body a rotten member who contaminates the whole system. This was done without regard to the member himself, but with a view solely to the health and purity of the body of which he is a member. The constitution, however, left no doubt on the subject.

It is said that the member from Vermont has been re-elected, since his offences were known. He wished the gentleman from Virginia to say, how this fact was ascertained. At one moment he disputes the truth of the record, and says it cannot be considered as conclusive or creditable; yet, at another, he asserts a fact, upon the grounds of an extract of a letter, or a paragraph in a newspaper, of which this House could take no notice. The member was not re-elected to the present Congress, nor was any return made of his re-election to the next. Suppose he had a majority of votes at the late election, may it not hereafter appear that the election was carried by corruption or fraud, and that the member is not entitled to his seat?

It is suggested as a fact that the letter of the member from Vermont was written before the law passed; but the crime is not in the writing of the letter, but in the publication of it. There would have been no crime in scandalously writing, if he had not published the letter. The crime consisted not in the wickedness of his own heart, but the intention to corrupt others; the design to scatter firebrands through the community, with a view of exciting insurrections. If, therefore, he could have proved before the court and jury that he was not accessory to the publication after the passing of the law, he would doubtless have been acquitted; and though he did not think highly of the talents of that member, he supposed, if this had been the case, he would have had wit enough to have availed himself of it.

He would say a word with respect to the consequences of the crime upon a member. In England, a member of the House of Commons may be expelled for libellous matter. Such was the case with Mr. Wilkes; though in this case, the transaction was afterwards expunged from the journals, it was not done upon the principle that the original expulsion was not justifiable, but because he had been expelled for the same offence, after he had been re-elected to the same Parliament.

Believing, as he did, that the member in question disgraced the body to which at present he belonged, he hoped the resolution would be allowed to wash away the blot which marked and disfigured this branch of the Government.

Mr. Gallatin confessed that, though there were some reasons which diminished his surprise at seeing this resolution on the table, he did not expect to have heard it defended on the ground which the gentleman from Delaware had taken in his last speech. He did not expect that when a judgment, awarded under the sedition law, was under consideration, a gentleman should rise and tell the House that this law applies to the publication of opinions as well as to that of facts; and it was less to be expected from the very gentleman who introduced an amendment into that law, providing that the truth of a charge may be given in evidence. His present declaration amounted to this: that those words were introduced in order to deceive the public, since they could be of no real use.

The gentleman from Delaware had constantly confounded matter of fact expressed, not positively, but only as the belief of the writer, and opinions or deduction from facts. If a man, with a view of defaming the government, publishes that, in his opinion, according to his belief, a certain fact does exist, which is susceptible of proof, and is found to be false, the publication, by the law, is undoubtedly a libel. Thus, if a man says that, in his opinion, a man is a thief, a bankrupt, or insolvent, it is not less a libel, than if he said such a person was positively so, because these things are susceptible of proof. But, when we speak of opinion, as distinct from fact, we speak of opinions not susceptible of proof, because they depend upon reasoning, and different opinions may be deduced from the same facts; therefore, we say that such opinions are not matter for prosecution even under this law. But, the gentleman from Delaware says that all opinions are liable to be prosecuted, provided that they can be proved to be false, scandalous, and malicious. Proved false! And who are the judges? To be sure, twelve jurymen, who are sworn to give a verdict according to evidence. And how can the truth of things which cannot be proved by evidence, be determined by evidence? An opinion may be incorrect; and, if judged incorrect by the gentleman from Delaware, it is, according to his reasoning, to be deemed false, and liable to prosecution.

The House had been told by the gentleman from Delaware, that it has nothing to do with this trial, any further than the record; that it ought to be taken as complete evidence of the facts which it contains, which ought not to be disputed. He also tells the House that courts of justice are as independent of the Legislature, as the Legislature of them; that this House has nothing to do with the crime; that it is the conviction only which they ought to take cognizance of. If, said Mr. G., the gentleman from Delaware had not brought forward the resolution now under discussion, we would have had nothing to do with the business. We did not bring forward the subject; we have nothing to do with it. Mr. G. added, I believe I go too far when I say we have nothing to do with it; for I believe it was the duty of the House to have sent the Sergeant-at-Arms for the member from Vermont, and demanded him from confinement, that he might have attended to his duty in this House.

[The Speaker said this was not now the question.]

Mr. G. knew this was not the question; he mentioned this to show that the House might have had something to do with the business. But we did not, said he, bring the subject before the House; and, if we have nothing to do with the decision of a court, that decision has nothing to do with us. If the member from Vermont is to be expelled, he ought to be expelled, not because he has been convicted, but because he has committed a crime which renders him unfit to retain his seat. What is that crime? It is stated in the record: and, stated as it is, he did not believe it was sufficient to ground a motion of this kind upon. Whatever is contained in these charges, which is capable of proof, ought to be taken into consideration, but not what is mere matter of opinion. It was generally allowed, he believed, that the paragraphs from what is called Barlow's letter, are of this last description. With respect to the other part of the charge, viz: the extract from a letter said to be written by the member from Vermont himself, to which he meant to confine his observations, he would beg leave to state it. [Mr. G. read it.]

Mr. G. said, the whole of the paragraph was hypothetical; but, supposing that the member from Vermont had declared it as his opinion "that the efforts of the Executive power were not bent on the promotion of the comfort, the happiness, and the accommodation of the people," he wished to know whether this could be considered as a declaration of fact or opinion? There is, perhaps, no measure passed by Congress, which one or other may not think will be contrary to the happiness, comfort, and accommodation of the people of the United States. We had, said he, the other day, the question of a navy before us, the establishment of which many believe is necessary for the promotion of the comfort, happiness, and accommodation of the people; whereas, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many others, it will produce the very reverse. How is this question to be decided? And yet it is known that the President, in his writings and speaking, has recommended the establishment of a navy; and persons writing and speaking against this system, which they ought to do, if they believe the system inimical to the United States, might be charged with bringing the Congress and President into contempt. But, doubtless, this is a mere matter of opinion, and not susceptible of proof by evidence. In order to prove the truth of either assertion, you must bring forward a dissertation pro and con.

The next part of the paragraph, viz: "when I shall see every consideration of the public welfare swallowed up," &c. So far as relates to the first member of this sentence, he did not see how it could be proved. He was not of opinion that every consideration of the public welfare was swallowed up in a continual grasp for power; but he did believe that there was a constant disposition, not only in the Executive, but in many gentlemen on this floor, to increase the power of the Executive.

[The Speaker said, neither this remark, nor the observations on the Navy, were in order.]

Mr. G. said, that he always wished strictly to adhere to order, and in order to avoid committing any further mistake, he desired to be informed why it was out of order? Was the argument not in point; or was it the declaration of his own opinion, as he went along, that was out of order? He wished to know, as he meant to be guided by the rule adopted by the Chair.

[The Speaker repeated that the gentleman from Pennsylvania had been out of order.]

Mr. G. proceeded. With respect to that part of the paragraph which says, "when I shall see men of firmness, &c., discarded on their application for office," &c. This, said Mr. G., is, in some degree, matter of fact, and in some degree, matter of opinion. It is a matter of fact, so far as that men of firmness, experience, &c., have been turned out of office; and matter of opinion as to what is said of men of meanness being preferred in their place. I do believe, said Mr. G., that the first assertion is true; and what is here written is no more than an illustration of what has been declared upon this floor, that men of certain political opinions, however capable, experienced, firm, and virtuous they might be, were unfit to hold offices. This, Mr. G. said, was the only fact which could be brought under the law, and he thought it a fact capable of being proved to be true. Mr. G. adduced, as evidence of the fact, the cases of the late Commissioner of Revenue for the United States, and of the Commissioner of Loans for the State of New Hampshire, who, he said, it was evident, were turned out of office on account of their political opinions. And he read, in support of his assertion, the publication of the late Commissioner of Loans of New Hampshire.

Another part of this paragraph speaks of "an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp." This, said Mr. G., is mere matter of opinion. Take the member from Vermont to the house of the President, and he may call its furniture and appendages, ridiculous pomp; take a member from a different part of the country, and he may declare every thing decent and plain; but take an overgrown nobleman from Great Britain into the house of the President, and he would set down every thing he saw as mean and selfish.

But, I insist upon it, said Mr. G., that matter of opinion ought not to be subject to cognizance by this law. What, said he, is the nature of the crime now proposed to be punished by the expulsion of the member from Vermont? We are told that he has published and uttered false, seditious, and malicious writings; that though these writings may be only matter of opinion, yet if those opinions are false, they come under this law; and, also, that such writings have a tendency to stir up sedition and insurrection.

Mr. G. would not repeat what had been said as to the unconstitutionality of the law under which the member from Vermont had been convicted; but this alone would be a sufficient reason for him to vote against the present motion. But, supposing the law constitutional, is the crime an infamous one? Certainly not. It is a political crime, and will always be determined according to the situation of the parties at the time. For, said he, we may say as much as we please about the purity of our courts and juries, and of our own purity; decisions upon political questions will always be influenced by party spirit. It is we, said Mr. G., that have introduced this spirit into the courts; and having given them political questions to decide, it need not be expected that courts will be free from party prejudice any more than others. Therefore, the falsehood or maliciousness of a publication will be determined by the political opinion of the jury.

As to the manner in which the trial of the member from Vermont had been conducted, he knew nothing of it. He wished the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Allen,) who, it seems, was present at the trial, would inform the House what proof was adduced to the court to show that the letter of Mr. Lyon was published by him after the sedition law passed. The letter is dated the 20th of June, the law was passed on the 6th of July, and the letter was published in Vermont on the 30th of July. He should be glad to know whether any evidence was adduced to show that Mr. Lyon did any thing relative to that publication, after writing the letter from Philadelphia on the 20th of June? If not, it will appear strange, indeed, that he should have been punished for an act done prior to the passage of the law under which he was convicted.

As to the manner in which the jury had been summoned, he supposed it had been done in the usual way. Without saying, however, that the jury was packed, which he did not believe, yet, if the towns out of which the jury was selected, were the towns which had never given Mr. Lyon but one or two votes at his election, it necessarily results that the jury were his political enemies; and being called upon to try him for a political offence, they would, of course, convict him.

Mr. G. said, the lateness of the hour would prevent him from detaining the House longer. He would only observe that, considering that the member from Vermont had been tried for a political offence, by a jury opposed to him in opinion, and upon a law passed on political ground at the last session; that he had been punished by an imprisonment of four months, and by a fine of one thousand dollars; that he had been deprived of his seat in the Legislature for three months: he thought it would have been better not to have proposed this resolution.

If this resolution should be adopted, it would follow, Mr. G. said, that every member who shall write any thing which is contrary to the opinion of a majority of this House, whether what he writes be founded in truth or not, will be liable to be expelled, in order to purify the House. Mr. G. thought persecution had followed the member from Vermont long enough. Every candid man must acknowledge that, if he has committed an offence, he has already been sufficiently punished by fine and imprisonment; to expel him from his seat, would carry with it an idea of persecution to the public, and to his constituents, that they would not be permitted to have a representative on this floor. He knew the circumstance of the member from Vermont's having been re-elected could not be introduced as an argument in his favor, but it might serve to show that what he had suffered for was no offence in the eyes of his constituents.

The question was put; when there appeared 49 yeas and 45 nays, as follows:

Yeas.—John Allen, Bailey Bartlett, James A. Bayard, Jonathan Brace, David Brooks, Christopher G. Champlin, John Chapman, James Cochran, William Craik, Samuel W. Dana, John Dennis, William Edmond, Thomas Evans, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Jonathan Freeman, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, William Gordon, Roger Griswold, William B. Grove, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, William Hindman, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, James H. Imlay, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, James Machir, William Matthews, Lewis R. Morris, Harrison G. Otis, Isaac Parker, Josiah Parker, Thomas Pinckney, John Rutledge, jr., James Schureman, Samuel Sewall, William Shepard, Thomas Sinnickson, Nathaniel Smith, Peleg Sprague, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Thomas Tillinghast, John E. Van Allen, Robert Waln, and John Williams.

Nays.—George Baer, jr., Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Robert Brown, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, William Charles Cole Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, George Dent, Joseph Eggleston, Lucas Elmendorph, William Findlay, John Fowler, Nathaniel Freeman, jr., Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Joseph Heister, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, Blair McClenachan, Joseph McDowell, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Thompson J. Skinner, Samuel Smith, William Smith, Richard Sprigg, Richard Stanford, Thomas Sumter, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Robert Williams.

The Speaker, declaring the state of the vote, said, the constitution requiring two-thirds of the members present to expel a member, the resolution is not carried.