Thursday, May 10.
Provisional Army.
GENERAL SUMTER'S VINDICATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA MILITIA.
This favorite scheme of raising a standing army must be pushed forward by every aid of fact and fiction, and that its success may be insured, the Southern members are to be terrified into its adoption, for we are told that the Southern States have much to fear, that there is every reason to believe the Southern States will be speedily invaded by a merciless and vindictive foe from the West Indies. That at this moment thousands may be disgorging on our shores; that they are prepared to strike. And the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Harper, one of his colleagues) has, in the height of his zeal for American defence, or his fears for the safety of the Southern States, or from some other cause, which he did not pretend to divine, by his nice and minute delineations of the condition of the Southern States, shown to the House a terrifying picture of Southern imbecility, and had also published to this cruel, malicious, and insidious enemy, (as he terms them,) an enemy sufficiently penetrating without his aid, every point, every avenue, every position, most advantageous for them to take in attack; he has exposed our most vulnerable parts to their inveteracy, and our wealthiest part to their rapacity. The policy or prudence which dictated the detail, he did not stop to examine, but went on to ask, supposing these marauders were disposed to invade the Southern States, whether it would not be allowed that they were too fully and completely occupied nearer home, to be at liberty to execute at this time their intentions of such an invasion? For his part he thought such was their condition, and expected it would continue to be so for some time to come; but, admitting that it is possible for the man who has been mentioned, to invade our coast with the three or four thousand men spoken of, the consequences predicted are not likely to follow. The reasoning of his colleague being admitted, perhaps his conclusions might also; but the former not being just, the latter could not result.
He was aware that the number of inhabitants of the lower country, of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, as stated by his colleague, was not very great; but he did not consent to the deduction which the gentleman had made, that, therefore, the lower country was very weak in point of force to oppose an invasion. And here he deemed it proper to notice the attempt which had been made to draw invidious distinctions between the militia force of our country and what are termed regulars—attempts constantly made by the advocates of standing armies, not only on this occasion, but on many others—not only on this floor, but in the other branch of the Legislature, and very lately, in a pointed manner, by his colleague, (Mr. Harper,) who pressed the establishment of a standing army by depressing the manly character of his fellow-citizens: he (Mr. Harper) had said he was well acquainted with the Southern States; that the inhabitants on the seaboard are few, that for fifty or sixty miles they are still fewer, that the strong population is quite remote, that the whole in general are badly armed, many altogether without arms; that they are not well organized, and even if they were, they are not to be depended upon, unless headed and aided by regular troops; in short, that no good can be expected from the militia, unless they are supported by regulars.
It is an unpleasant thing, said Mr. S., for me to have to make any remarks on a subject of this sort; but so frequently have gentlemen made invidious distinctions between the courage and efficacy of militia and regulars, and with so much injustice to the former, that I cannot permit their assertions any longer to pass without notice. For doing this, I do not mean to derogate from the merit of the late American regular army, nor more particularly from that part of it which served to the Southward, of whose condition I can better judge than of that which served in the Middle and Eastern districts; as to them I am bold to say, they were not inferior, under all circumstances, to any army of equal numbers and equal opportunities which I have heard or read of in any time or in any place; but, then, it must also be remembered, whatever gentlemen may here say to the contrary, that the militia were as serviceable and as successful as any regulars whatever.
He said he would take a cursory review of the services of the militia in one of the Southern States, which would tend to support his last declaration.
He would quote only a few cases out of a great number where the militia had acted alone, without any co-operation or support from the regulars, and that against the veteran and conquering cavalry and infantry of British corps, and in which actions they were distinguished for their bravery and success. It may be remembered that very partial, if any, impressions had ever been made by our regular troops on the British corps of cavalry during the early period of war; and it seemed to be reserved to the Southern militia to convince them that their equals existed in our country. It is not to be attributed to the want of courage or discipline in our regular corps that this had not been done before, but to imperious circumstances which no skill could overcome; but this did not change the fact.
After the fall of Charleston in 1780, the first action, and that fought by the militia, without any aid from our regulars, was the action of Fishing Creek, where, without entering into a minute description of all the circumstances attendant on such an occasion, it will be sufficient to say, that the gallant Captain Rooke, who commanded a squadron of Tarleton's legion, fell, and the whole force was beaten and dispersed.
A few days after—and here permit me, said Mr. S., to remark, that if my colleague does not remember, and our historians have neglected to record the achievements of the militia, yet justice is in some degree done them by a British historian, who was an officer in the British service in that part of our country, and at the very time I am speaking of, who corroborates my facts—a few days after an attack was made by the militia on Rocky Mount, and Colonel Turnbull, who commanded the enemy's force, and who is now in New York, I have no doubt has candor enough to acknowledge, that from the contest he had with them, (although strongly defended by well constructed works,) and which lasted ten hours, there is something due to their bravery and the effect of their arms.
Eight days after the affair on Rocky Mount, an attack was made on the British at their posts of the Hanging Rock. The force on this occasion consisted of the same corps of South Carolina militia who had enterprised on the other occasion; they were in number about 600; they had been joined by a few of the militia from North Carolina, and it is a pleasure to reflect on the cordiality and bravery displayed by them on this occasion.
The enemy's force at this post was 1,200 effectives; yet the result was, after an action which lasted through the greatest part of the day, that Major Bryan's corps was totally defeated, the Prince of Wales' regiment exterminated, even its name has never since been recorded. Other detachments from the 63d and 71st, under the command of Major Camden, were also cut up, driven from their encampment with the entire loss of baggage, &c.; and, in the course of this action, Captain Kinlaw, with a squadron of Tarleton's legion, arrived from Rocky Mount, made a desperate charge on the militia, was repulsed by them, and fled to Camden, without attempting to renew the combat. In this, as well as other actions, it ought to be remembered how many field officers, brave captains, and other officers, as well as valuable citizens, fell, or were wounded, while another nation had to regret in this action alone the loss of upwards of 800 men.
Passing by a number of important and considerable conflicts which took place between the British regulars and the Southern militia, still unsupported by regulars of our own army, said Mr. S., I come now to mention the attack which was made in the neighborhood of Winnesborough, while Lord Cornwallis laid in that town, upon the South Carolina militia, by a British regular force under Majors Wymes and McCarthy, supported by two troops of cavalry, the whole corps drawn together and formed for the purpose; after various charges made by the infantry and cavalry, and after repeated repulses, the enemy was totally repelled, their commanding officer wounded and taken, together with a number of his corps, and the rest were dispersed.
On the return of Colonel Tarleton to Winnesborough another effort was made, and from the number as well as the nature of the troops employed, it was certainly intended to be effectual in driving the South Carolina militia from that part of the country; for it was Tarleton's legion, McCarthy's corps, and that part of the 63d, under Major Money, which troops were led to the attack of the militia on the 20th of November; the result of this action is known to those who do not wish to detract from the merit of the militia. The enemy's detachment consisted of 270 legionary horse, and upwards of 400 regular infantry, with two field-pieces; the militia were between five and six hundred, without (as indeed they were through all the actions I have described) a single piece of artillery. In the number of militia are included some Georgians, who not only acquired honor to themselves from their exertions on that day, but did honor to their country. The fate of the British cavalry was then decided; they had been formerly unconquerable, but after that day they were never known to be brought to act with either energy or effect.
Knowing the ardor and firmness of the Southern militia, and not doubting but the militia of the several States in the Union possess equal motives for their exertions, equal spirit and activity, I cannot, said Mr. S., but rely on them as the natural and main support of our national independence—a support fully effectual without a recurrence to a standing army. These few cases, and it is stopping very short indeed of what the merits of the Southern militia deserve, tend to show that the charges brought against the militia generally are as unfounded as they are cruel to their feelings; while, at the same time, they demonstrate, that if an invasion (which is a contingency by no means likely to happen) should actually take place, we may rely with confidence on the manly exertions of the militia to meet the attack, and to resist every effort, at least for such a period as until more effective aid shall be drawn down to their support, and more permanent measures adopted.
The question for striking out twenty thousand to insert five thousand, was put and negatived—47 to 41.
The question now returned upon striking out twenty thousand to insert ten thousand.
Mr. N. Smith hoped this amendment would not be agreed to. It was contemplated, when this reduction was proposed, that the power should be given to the President for three years; but it was now restricted to the recess of Congress. He did not himself think that at present there was any danger of an invasion, nor did he believe that imminent danger of an invasion would exist, whilst the war continued between France and England; but, whenever a peace shall take place between those two powers, the question ought then to be taken whether this country ought not immediately to go into preparations for war; and if Congress were not in session at the time, the President ought to have the power of determining this question. It will depend on several circumstances; on what kind of peace was made; upon what ground parties stood when peace was made; on the situation of France at the time; on what kind of men are in power; on the situation of this country; on what is the state of parties here at the time; what is the number of those who are opposed to the Government; how many there are of those who wish to lull the rest to sleep; and what is the amount of spies in the country. All these will be important considerations to be decided at the time, and if it shall then appear that imminent danger does exist, will twenty thousand men be too large a number to raise? He believed not.
The question for striking out twenty thousand, and inserting ten thousand, was put and carried, 54 votes being in favor of it.
The question next came up on agreeing to the section proposed by the select committee, for authorizing the President, from time to time, as he shall deem it necessary, to call forth in rotation such portion, not exceeding at any one time the number of twenty thousand men, of the detachments of the United States, authorized by the act of the 24th of June last, as may be conveniently mustered together, and cause them to be trained and disciplined by their proper officers, either in their respective States, or in one corps, to be drawn from two or more adjoining States, for a term not exceeding ——; for which time the officers and men shall be considered as in actual service and be paid and governed accordingly.
After some discussion, in which constitutional objections were urged against this provision, the committee rose without taking a question upon it, and the House adjourned till Monday.