Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Tuesday, January 12

Judiciary System.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion made on the 6th instant, "That the act of Congress passed on the 13th day of February, 1801, entitled 'An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States,' ought to be repealed."

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia.—I rise with an impression of awe on the present question; for we must tread on constitutional ground, which should not be lightly touched on, nor too hastily decided. Every step we take ought to be well examined, and our minds convinced before we give that vote which cannot be recalled, and which will fix a principle on Legislative construction, which, perhaps, will prevail as long as we remain a nation.

In the early stage of this discussion, I had almost determined to say nothing, and am at present determined not to say much; but a justification of the vote I shall give, has impelled me to offer my reasons for it to the State I represent; and I have made up my mind, decidedly, to vote for the resolution before you, if I cannot be otherwise convinced.

We have been asked, if we are afraid of having an army of judges? For myself, I am more afraid of an army of judges, under the patronage of the President, than of an army of soldiers. The former can do us more harm. They may deprive us of our liberties, if attached to the Executive, from their decisions; and from the tenure of office contended for, we cannot remove them; while the soldier, however he may act, is enlisted, or if not enlisted, only subsisted for two years; whilst the judge is enlisted for life, for his salary cannot be taken from him. [See 12th division, 8th Section, 1st Art. Constitution.] Sir, it is said these evils will not happen. But what security have we for the truth of the declaration? Have we not seen sedition laws? Have we not heard judges crying out through the land sedition! and asking those whose duty it was to inquire, is there no sedition here? It is true, the sedition law had expired with the last Administration, and he trusted it would not exist, or at least be acted on, under the virtuous Jefferson. But hereafter, if it should exist, your judges, under the cry of sedition and political heresy, may place half your citizens in irons. I thank God, that no such law now exists, or is likely to exist. I thank God, that we are not now under the influence of an intolerant clergy, as is evident from their abuse of the President; and that we are not under dread of the patronage of judges, is manifest, from their attack on the Secretary of State. And I trust, that we shall long keep this patronage off, by not sanctioning the religious persecution of the clergy on the one hand, nor the political violence of the judges on the other.

But, upon the principles of gentlemen, the law which creates a judge cannot be touched. The moment it is passed, it exists to the end of time. What is the implication of this doctrine? To alter or amend what may greatly require alteration or amendment, it is necessary to return to the creator, and to inquire what this creator is. My principle is, that the creator is the people themselves; that very people of the United States whom the gentleman from New York had declared ourselves to be the guardians of, to save the people themselves from their greatest enemies; and to save whom from destroying themselves he had invoked this House. Good God! is it possible that I have heard such a sentiment in this body? Rather should I have expected to have heard it sounded from the despots of Turkey, or the deserts of Siberia, than to have heard it uttered by an enlightened legislator of a free country, and on this floor.

I am clearly, therefore, of opinion, that if the power to alter the Judiciary system vests not here, it vests nowhere. It follows, from the ideas of gentlemen, that we must submit to all the evils of the present system, though it should exhibit all the horrors of the Inquisition.

But, said Mr. J., gentlemen say the United States embrace a vast extent of territory, from fifteen to seventeen thousand miles in length. What is the inevitable deduction to be drawn from this fact? Why, that a system which is to apply to this extent of country, embracing different laws and different habits, will require frequent alterations: whereas, if we are tied down to a system of inferior tribunals once formed, we cannot even touch the plan of the Judicial system of the little District of Columbia. Nor can we touch the inferior jurisdictions in the North-western Territory, nor in the Mississippi Territory, in both of which the systems were acknowledged to be adapted only to present circumstances, and in the last of which the rights of Georgia were implicated. It follows, that whatever these rights may be, the system is sacred; and, as to the Mississippi Territory, if grounded on this doctrine, notwithstanding the claim of Georgia, her jurisdiction is totally lost. To revert to the sedition law. If the doctrine supported now were true, then, had the sedition law been incorporated as a system by itself, an inferior tribunal, and officers been attached to it, would it have been perpetually tacked to the constitution? That law under which so many of our citizens have been imprisoned for writings and speakings; and one, among others, for wishing that the wadding of a gun had been lodged in a certain Presidential part.

The gentleman had dwelt on the inconveniences and evils of the old system, and had particularly condemned that part of it, which, as he termed it, had converted the judges into post-boys. But I will appeal to the gentleman, if in England, where so much more business is done, there are more than twelve judges, and whether those judges do not ride the circuit? And why shall our judges not ride the circuits? Shall we have six judges sitting here to decide cases which require a knowledge of the laws, the morals, the habits, the state of the property of the several States? Would not this knowledge be much better obtained by their riding the circuits, and in the States themselves, making themselves acquainted with whatever relates to them, and the cases of appeals to come before them? It has been remarked by a celebrated writer on the English Constitution, that one of the greatest political evils that could befall a people, was the existence of large judiciary bodies. To illustrate his ideas, he had instanced the Parliaments of France. If the spirit which last session gave existence to sixteen new judges continued, who could say by what number they would be limited? They might indeed soon become, what they had been likened to, an army of judges.

I do not wish to be severe in my remarks on the conduct of the late Administration. I admire the private character of Mr. Adams. But I do believe the succession of his political acts tended ultimately to accumulate in, and attach all powers to, a particular person or favorite family.

If I wished to bestow on Mr. Jefferson this mass of patronage, which I contend this horde of officers bestows, I should be in favor of the bill that it is now moved to repeal; but, as a political person, I am no more for Thomas Jefferson than for John Adams. When he acts, according to my opinion, right, I will support him; when wrong, oppose him; and I trust a majority on this floor will act in the same way.

Mr. Tracy, of Connecticut.—Feeble as I am, I have thought it my duty to offer my sentiments on this subject. Owing to severity of indisposition, I have not been in my place, nor have I heard any of the discussion. This circumstance will be my apology, if, in the remarks I shall make, repetitions shall occur on the one hand, and apparent inattention to arguments on the other.

Having been a member of this Government during several years, and being impressed with the difficulties attending the formation of a judiciary system, I have thought proper to give a concise history of Legislative proceedings on this important subject. Permit me to say, sir, that the first institution of such a system must be an experiment. It is impossible to ascertain, until tried, the effects of a system co-extensive with the vast territory of the United States, and which ought to be adapted to the different laws and habits of the different States.

Soon after the first law was enacted, as early as the year 1793, and I believe sooner, complaints were made of the system of circuit courts. The Union then being divided into three circuits, and two of the six judges were obliged to attend each court, if one judge failed, all the business of course was continued to the next term. Judges complained of the distance they had to travel, and suitors and lawyers complained of delays. In 1793, if my memory is correct, the law passed allowing one judge to attend with the district judge in each district, with some other modifications not important in the present view of the subject. If, by reason of distance, badness of roads, sickness, or any other accident, this one judge failed of attendance, or if he and the district judge differed on any point, a delay was occasioned. If the same judge attended the same circuit at the next term, another delay, and so on, till experience taught us, that some alteration in the system was requisite. It will be recollected, that the judges had to travel over this extensive country twice in each year, and to encounter the extremes of both heat and cold. Of this they complained; but this was not all; the business was not done.

Although this subject had been recommended before, and committees had contemplated a revision and alteration of the system, I do not remember that a bill had ever been presented to either House of Congress until 1799. In that session, a bill was reported similar in its features to the act which passed last session. It might have been acted upon in the House of Representatives; of this, however, I am not confident; but I recollect it was printed, and the members of both Houses had it before them; and at the last session, with some alterations and amendments, it was enacted into a law. I believe all parties wished for a revision and amendment of the system, in respect to circuit courts; the difference of opinion was principally this: some supposed an increase of the Judges of the Supreme Court to such a number as would render the duties of the circuit practicable for them, and provide for the completion of business, would be the best amendment; the others thought the law, as it passed, was preferable.

I acknowledge, that in deliberating upon this subject, we always assumed the principle, that the establishment of courts was important to protect the rights of the people; we did not fear an army of judges, as has been hinted by the gentleman last up, (Mr. Jackson.) In this opinion we might be mistaken, but we were honest in our professions. Although some believed, that more of the business of the United States might be confided to the State courts; yet it is not within my recollection, that the question was considered, in any measure; a party question. I am confident, that at the session of 1799, and for a long time before that, the friends of this law, which eventually passed last winter, could not, nor did not, contemplate any change of administration. A revision of the system was long a subject of deliberation; we believed an increase of circuit judges, to the number requisite to perform the duties, would be an inconvenient increase of the Supreme Court; and though it was desirable for the Judges of the Supreme Court to see the people and be seen of them, yet the preference was given to the system now proposed to be repealed. We supposed it would be an evil to increase the number of Judges of the Supreme Court to thirteen, fifteen, or seventeen. A court which is to act together, should not be numerous; on this subject, all men have agreed; here may be danger of an "army of judges," as the gentleman says; for although in Great Britain the twelve judges are sometimes called to give an opinion, yet no man will feel equal confidence in a tribunal of judges for the business of a court, consisting of many as of few; from three to five, the good sense and experience of all nations, has declared to be about the proper number; and we thought it conducive to the general good, to establish tribunals in such manner as to carry justice to the door of every man.

Is this system so very vicious, that it deserves nothing but abhorrence and destruction? It costs us a little more than thirty thousand dollars, and by it the number of circuit judges is increased to sixteen; and by it likewise is contemplated reducing the number of supreme judges to five, when it can constitutionally be done. Is the expense an object, when by that expense, we extend the jurisdiction of a court over this vastly extensive, growing country, and carry law and protection to every man? This country is in a singular condition; a great tract of unsettled lands is peopling with rapidity, and numerous emigrations increase our population far beyond its natural increase; is it not of importance that courts should be located among them, early, to correct the restless spirit which is frequent in new and scattered settlements? And are not the emigrations composed of such as require the prompt assistance of the law, to preserve among them regularity? Punishment, to us, and to all good men, should be a strange work; but to prevent crimes, is the work of a God. I speak to gentlemen, who have many of them graced the judge's bench, and adorned the professional robe they have worn, and am therefore not obliged to be particular that I may be understood; a word to the wise will be sufficient. A judiciary, in a national point of view, is absolutely necessary, and an extension of it to every national purpose, is equally necessary. To depend upon State courts, not under obligations, nor amenable to you, besides having as much business allotted to them by the respective States as they can accomplish, and depending, upon them, and not on us, for existence—will require only to be mentioned, to be exploded. Locating your judges in various parts of the country, by them promulgating the national laws, which it is well known has been a subject of great difficulty, and giving them daily opportunity of mixing with people, not well disposed to order and law; may prevent disorders and insurrections, and save millions of expense, which pecuniary saving will be the least of the important events arising from such a system.

But there is another objection to the repeal of the judiciary law, which in my mind is conclusive: I mean the letter and spirit of the constitution.

In the formation of every Government, in which the people have a share in its administration, some established and indisputable principles must be adopted. In our Government, the formation of a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary power, is one of the incontrovertible principles; and that each should be independent of the other, so far as human frailty will permit, is equally incontrovertible. Will it be expected, that I should quote Sidney, De Lolme, Montesquieu, and a host of elementary writers, to prove this assertion? There is, probably, no conflict of opinion upon this subject. When we look into our constitution of Government, we shall find, in every part of it, a close and undeviating attention to this principle. Our particular form is singular in its requirements; that full force and operation be given to this all-important principle. Our powers are limited, many acts of sovereignty are prohibited to the National Government, and retained by the States; and many restraints are imposed upon State sovereignty. If either, by accident or design, should exceed its powers, there is the utmost necessity that some timely checks, equal to every exigency, should be interposed. The Judiciary is established by the constitution for that valuable purpose.

In the British Government, the Legislature is omnipotent to every legislative effect, and is a perpetual convention for almost every constitutional purpose. Hence it is easy to discern the different parts which must be assigned to the Judiciary in the two kinds of government. In England, the Executive has the most extensive powers; the sword or the military force; the right of making war, and in effect the command of all the wealth of the nation, with an unqualified veto to every legislative act. It is, therefore, rational for that nation to preserve their judiciary completely independent of their Sovereign. In the United States, the caution must be applied to the existing danger; the Judiciary are to be a check on the Executive, but most emphatically to the Legislature of the Union, and those of the several States. What security is there to an individual, if the Legislature of the Union, or any particular State, should pass a law, making any of his transactions criminal which took place anterior to the date of the law? None in the world, but by an appeal to the Judiciary of the United States, where he will obtain a decision that the law itself is unconstitutional and void, or by a resort to revolutionary principles, and exciting a civil war. With a view to those principles, and knowing that the framers of our constitution were fully possessed of them, let us examine the instrument itself. Article third, section first: "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Are there words in the English language more explicit? Is there any condition annexed to the judge's tenure of office, other than good behavior? Of whom shall your judges be independent? We are led to an erroneous decision on this, as well as many other governmental subjects, by constantly recurring to Great Britain. That their courts should be independent of their Sovereign, is an important object; he is the fountain of honor and power, and can do no wrong; our President, at least for several years past, has been considered as the fountain of dishonor and weakness, and if there was any maxim upon the subject, it was that he could do no right. Of course the great object of the independence of the Judiciary must here have reference not only to our Executive, but our Legislature. The Legislature with us is the fountain of power. No person will say that the Judges of the Supreme Court can be removed, unless by impeachment and conviction of misbehavior; but the judges of the inferior courts, as soon as ordained and established, are placed upon precisely the same grounds of independence with the Judges of the Supreme Court. Congress may take their own time to ordain and establish, but the instant that is done, all the rights of independence attach to them.

If this reasoning is correct, can you repeal a law establishing an inferior court, under the constitution? Will it be said, that although you cannot remove the judge from office, yet you can remove his office from him? Is murder prohibited, and may you shut a man up, and deprive him of sustenance, till he dies, and this not be denominated murder? The danger in our Government is, and always will be, that the Legislative body will become restive, and, perhaps, unintentionally break down the barriers of our constitution. It is incidental to man, and a part of our imperfections, to believe that power may be safely lodged in our hands. We have the wealth of the nation at command, and are invested with almost irresistible strength; the Judiciary has neither force nor wealth to protect itself. That we can, with propriety, modify our judiciary system, so that we always leave the Judges independent, is a correct and reasonable position; but if we can, by repealing a law, remove them, they are in the worst state of dependence.