Wednesday, February 23.

Mississippi Question.

Mr. White, of Delaware, rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President, on this subject, which has on a former day been discussed with so much ability, and with so much eloquence, by my friend from Pennsylvania, the honorable mover of the resolutions, I shall submit the few observations that I may make, in as concise a manner as I am capable of; for it is very far from my wish to occupy the time or attention of the Senate unnecessarily. The resolutions on your table I approve of in their full extent; I believe they express the firm and manly tone that at this moment is especially becoming the dignity of the Government to assume; I believe they mark out a system of measures, which, if promptly pursued, will be honorable to the nation, and equal to the accomplishment of the important object which gentlemen on all sides seem to have in view. These alone, with me, would be sufficient inducements to yield them my feeble support; but in addition to these, and to the thorough conviction of my own mind as to the course I ought to pursue, I have the happiness of being supported in my opinions on this subject by the unequivocal expression of the sentiment of the State to which I have the honor to belong.

It was early seen, Mr. President, and required but little penetration to discover, that adventurers emigrating beyond the mountains, and settling on the Western waters, must possess the free navigation of the Mississippi, it being their only outlet to the ocean. This important privilege it became necessary on the part of the Government of the United States to secure by treaty, and not leave to the capricious will of whatever nation who might in future hold the territory at the mouth of the river. Accordingly, in the 4th and 23d articles of our Treaty with Spain, I find on this subject the following stipulation:

"Art. 4. It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of the United States, which separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is in the middle of the channel or bed of the river Mississippi, from the northern boundary of the said States to the completion of the 31st degree of latitude north of the equator. And His Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other powers by special convention."

"Art. 22. The two high contracting parties, hoping that the good correspondence and friendship which happily reigns between them will be further increased by this treaty, and that it will contribute to augment their prosperity and opulence, will in future give to their mutual commerce all the extension and favor which the advantages of both countries may require.

"And in consequence of the stipulations contained in the 4th article, His Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores; and His Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds, during that time, that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment."

This instrument, Mr. President, it is known, for a time, quieted the fears and jealousies of our Western brethren; they supposed it had removed for ever the possibility of any future embarrassment to their commerce on those waters. And after it had been proclaimed as the law of the land—after it had been ratified by both nations, and become obligatory upon the faith and honor of each, who could have thought otherwise? Yet, sir, it has happened otherwise. This place of deposit at New Orleans, secured to our citizens by the article last read, has been recently wrested from their hands by the authority of the Spanish Government, and no other equivalent one assigned, where, after more than two thousand miles of boat navigation, they may disembark their produce in order to be shipped for sea; and without this advantage the navigation of the river is to them but an empty name.

I have said, by the authority of the Spanish Government, it has indeed been given out to the world, for reasons that every man may conjecture, and are unnecessary to be mentioned, that this was not the act of the Government, but the rash measure of a single officer—the Intendant General of the Spanish provinces; that the Spanish Minister had issued orders for the speedy adjustment of these difficulties; had kindly offered to throw himself into the breach to prevent this Intendant General from going to extremities with the Government of the United States. Sir, gentlemen may find, when too late, that this is a mere piece of diplomatic policy, intended only to amuse them; and to say nothing of the humiliating idea of resorting to such a plaster for the wound that has been inflicted upon our national honor, if they had taken the trouble, they might have been informed that the Spanish Minister near this Government has no control at New Orleans; that the Intendant General is, like himself, an immediate officer of the Crown, and responsible only to the Crown for his conduct. If the Spanish Minister has interfered, which I am not disposed to question, to make the best of it, it could only have been by the entreaties of men in power, as a mere mediator, to beg of the Intendant General of New Orleans justice and peace on behalf of the people of the United States. Are honorable gentlemen prepared to accept peace on such terms? They might do, sir, for a tribe of starving Indians; but is this the rank that we are to hold among the nations of the world? And it seems that even these supplicating advances are likely to avail us nothing. By accounts very lately received from New Orleans, by a private letter which I have seen since these resolutions were submitted to the Senate, the Intendant General has expressed much displeasure at the interference of the Spanish Minister, stating that it was not within his duty or his province, and that he, the Intendant, acted not under Spanish but French orders.

As to the closing of the port of New Orleans against our citizens, the man who can now doubt, after viewing all the accompanying circumstances, that it was the deliberate act of the Spanish or French Government, must have locked up his mind against truth and conviction, and be determined to discredit even the evidence of his own senses. But, sir, it is not only the depriving us of our right of deposit by which we have been aggrieved, it is by a system of measures pursued antecedent and subsequent to that event, equally hostile and even more insulting. I have in my hand a paper, signed by a Spanish officer, which, with the indulgence of the Chair, I will read to the Senate:

Advertisement.—Under date of the 16th instant, (December,) the Intendant General of these provinces tells me that the citizens of the United States of America can have no commerce with His Majesty's subjects—they only having the free navigation of the river for the exportation of the fruits and produce of their establishments to foreign countries, and the importation of what they may want from them. As such I charge you, so far as respects you, to be zealous and vigilant, with particular care, that the inhabitants neither purchase nor sell any thing to the shipping, flat-bottomed boats, barges, or any other smaller vessels that may go along the river, destined for the American possessions, or proceeding from them, that they shall be informed of it, for their due compliance of the same.

CARLOS DE GRANDPRE.

Baton Rouge, Dec. 22, 1802.

These are the measures, Mr. President, that have been adopted; these are the orders that have been issued by the Intendant General to every district of the Spanish provinces, prohibiting the subjects of His Catholic Majesty from having any commerce, dealing, intercourse, or communion whatsoever with the citizens of the United States; excluding us from their shores for the distance of two hundred and seventy miles; treating us like a nation of pirates, or a banditti of robbers, who they feared to trust in their country. And this day, sir, if a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, engaged in a fair and legal trade, was upon the waters of the Mississippi, within the Spanish lines, and in a state of the most extreme distress, the Spaniard who should yield her aid or comfort would do it at the peril of his life.

If it should be said, sir, that this important question will not long be an affair of controversy between the United States and Spain; that Louisiana, New Orleans, and this usurped claim of the Spanish Government to the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, will soon be found in other hands; that whenever we may have to negotiate on this subject, either in the cabinet or the field, it will not be with His Catholic Majesty, but with the First Consul; not with a King, but with the King of Kings—I answer that in these insults to our national dignity, we at present know no power but Spain. Whatever agency Buonaparte may have had in this business, he has been concealed from our view. It is Spain that has violated her plighted faith; it is Spain that has trampled upon the dearest interests of the United States, and insulted our Government to our faces without the semblance of a cause, and she alone is responsible to us for these outrages. And, under such circumstances, is it becoming, politic, or honorable in us to treat her as a friend and as a neighbor; to remonstrate with her on her acts of injustice, and wait till she shall add insult to insult, and heap injury upon injury; or what is perhaps even worse, if any thing worse than national degradation can befall an independent people, till this golden opportunity shall have passed away, and the facility of redress be wrested from our hands? No, sir, we should now view her as our open enemy, as having declared war against us, and do justice to ourselves. We can never have permanent peace on our Western waters, till we possess ourselves of New Orleans, and such other positions as may be necessary to give us the complete and absolute command of the navigation of the Mississippi. We have now such an opportunity of accomplishing this important object as may not be presented again in centuries, and every justification that could be wished for availing ourselves of the opportunity. Spain has dared us to the trial, and now bids us defiance; she is yet in possession of that country: it is at this moment within your reach and within your power; it offers a sure and easy conquest; we should have to encounter there now only a weak, inactive, and unenterprising people; but how may a few months vary this scene, and darken our prospects! Though not officially informed we know that the Spanish provinces on the Mississippi have been ceded to the French, and that they will as soon as possible take possession of them. What may we then expect? When in the last extremity we shall be driven to arms in defence of our indisputable rights, where now slumbers on his post with folded arms the sluggish Spaniard, we shall be hailed by the vigilant and alert French grenadier, and in the defenceless garrison that would now surrender at our approach, we shall see unfurled the standards that have waved triumphant in Italy, surrounded by impregnable ramparts, and defended by the disciplined veterans of Egypt.

But, Mr. President, what is more than all to be dreaded, in such hands, it may be made the means of access and corruption to your national councils and a key to your Treasury. Your Western people will see in Buonaparte, at their very doors, a powerful friend or a dangerous enemy; and should he, after obtaining complete control over the navigation of the Mississippi, approach them, not in the menacing attitude of an enemy, but under the specious garb of a protector and a friend; should he, instead of embarrassing their commerce by any fiscal arrangements, invite them to the free navigation of the river, and give them privileges in trade not heretofore enjoyed; should he, instead of attempting to coerce them to his measures, contrary to their wishes, send missionaries into their country to court and intrigue with them, he may seduce their affections, and thus accomplish by address and cunning, what even his force might not be equal to. In this way, having operated upon their passions, having enlisted in his service their hopes and their fears, he may gain an undue ascendency over them. Should these things be effected, which God forbid—but Buonaparte in a few years has done much more—what, let me ask honorable gentlemen, will be the consequences? I fear even to look them in the face. The degraded countries of Europe, that have been enslaved by the divisions and distractions of their councils, produced by similar means, afford us melancholy examples. Foreign influence will gain admittance to your national councils; the First Consul, or his interests, will be represented in the Congress of the United States; this floor may become the theatre of sedition and intrigue. You will have a French faction in the Government, and that faction will increase, with the rapidly increasing population of the Western world. Whenever this period shall arrive, it will be the crisis of American glory, and must result, either in the political subjugation of the Atlantic States, or in their separation from the Western country; and I am sure there is no American who does not view as one of the greatest evils that could befall us, the dismemberment of this Union. Honorable gentlemen may wrap themselves up in their present imaginary security, and say that these things are afar off, or that they can never happen; but let me beseech of them to look well to the measures they are now pursuing, for, on the wisdom, the promptness, and energy of those measures, will depend whether they shall happen or not. And let me tell them, sir, that the want of firmness or judgment in the cabinet, will be no apology for the disgrace and ruin of the nation.

Mr. Breckenridge observed, that he did not mean to wander in the field of declamation, nor, after the example of the honorable gentleman who had preceded him, endeavor to alarm or agitate the public mind; that he should endeavor to strip the subject of all improper coloring, and examine dispassionately the propriety of the measures which the Senate were called upon to sanction. He would be very brief.

What is the true and undisguised state of facts? Early in the session, the House of Representatives were informed, by a communication from the President, of the conduct of the Intendant at New Orleans. This communication stated, that he had taken measures to attempt a restoration of the right which had been violated; and that there were reasons to believe that the conduct of the Intendant was unauthorized by the Court of Spain. Accompanying this message were official papers, in which it appeared that the Governor of New Orleans had strongly opposed the conduct of the Intendant, declared that he was acting without authority in refusing the deposit, and indicated a disposition to oppose openly the proceeding. The Spanish Minister who resides here, also interposed on the occasion, and who stands deservedly high in the confidence of his Government, was clearly of opinion, that the Intendant was acting without authority, and that redress would be given so soon as the competent authority could interpose. From this state of things, and which is the actual state at this moment, what is the course any civilized nation who respects her character or rights, would pursue? There is but one course, which is admitted by writers on the laws of nations, as the proper one; and is thus described by Vattel, in his book, sec. 336, 338:

"A sovereign ought to show, in all his quarrels, a sincere desire of rendering justice and preserving peace. He is obliged before he takes up arms, and after having taken them up also, to offer equitable conditions, and then alone his arms become just against an obstinate enemy, who refuses to listen to justice or to equity. His own advantage, and that of human society, oblige him to attempt, before he takes up arms, all the pacific methods of obtaining either the reparation of the injury, or a just satisfaction. This moderation, this circumspection, is so much the more proper, and commonly even indispensable, as the action we take for an injury does not always proceed from a design to offend us, and is sometimes a mistake rather than an act of malice: frequently it even happens, that the injury is done by inferior persons, without their sovereign having any share in it; and on these occasions, it is not natural to presume that he would refuse us a just satisfaction."

This is the course which the President has taken, and in which the House of Representatives have expressed, by their resolution, their confidence.

What are the reasons urged by the gentlemen to induce a different proceeding, an immediate appeal to arms? You prostrate, say the gentlemen, your national honor by negotiating, where there is a direct violation of a treaty! How happens it that our national honor has, at this particular crisis, become so delicate, and that the feelings of certain gentlemen are now so alive to it? Has it been the practice of this Government heretofore to break lances on the spot with any nation who injured or insulted her? Or has not the invariable course been to seek reparation in the first place by negotiation? I ask for an example to the contrary; even under the Administration of Washington, so much eulogized by the gentleman last up. Were not the Detroit, and several other forts within our territory, held ten or a dozen years by Great Britain, in direct violation of a treaty? Were not wanton spoliations committed on your commerce by Great Britain, by France, and by Spain, to the amount of very many millions; and all adjusted through the medium of negotiations? Were not your merchants plundered, and your citizens doomed to slavery by Algiers, and still those in power, even Washington himself, submitted to negotiation, to ransom, and to tribute? Why then do gentlemen, who on those occasions approved of these measures, now despair of negotiation? America has been uniformly successful, at least in settling her differences by treaty.

But the gentleman is afraid that if we do not immediately seize the country, we shall lose the golden opportunity of doing it. Would your national honor be free from imputation by a conduct of such inconsistency and duplicity? A minister is sent to the offending nation with an olive-branch, for the purpose of an amicable discussion and settlement of differences, and before he has scarcely turned his back, we invade the territories of that nation with an army of fifty thousand men! Would such conduct comport with the genius and principles of our Republic, whose true interest is peace, and who has hitherto professed to cultivate it with all nations? Would not such a procedure subject us to the just censure of the world, and to the strongest jealousy of those who have possessions near to us? Would such a procedure meet the approbation of even our own citizens, whose lives and fortunes would be risked in the conflict? And would it not be policy inexcusably rash, to plunge this country into war, to effect that which the President not only thinks can be effected, but is now actually in a train of negotiation? If, on the other hand, negotiation should fail, how different will be the ground on which we stand! We stand acquitted by the world, and what is of more consequence, by our own citizens, and our own consciences. But one sentiment will then animate and pervade the whole, and from thenceforth we will take counsel only from our courage.

But to induce us to depart from this proper, this safe, and honorable course of proceeding, which is pursuing by the President, the gentleman from Pennsylvania first, and the gentleman from Delaware again told you, that by such pacific measures you will irritate the Western people against you; that they will not be restrained by you, but will either invade the country themselves, or withdraw from the Union and unite with those who will give them what they want. Sir, said Mr. B., I did not expect to hear such language held on this floor. Sir, the gentleman from Pennsylvania best knows the temper and views of the Western people he represents, but if he meant to extend the imputation to the State I have the honor to represent, I utterly disclaim it. The citizens of Kentucky value too highly their rights and character to endanger the one or dishonor the other. They deal not, sir, in insurrections. They hold in too sacred regard their federal compact to sport with it. They were among the first to oppose violations of it, and will, I trust, be the last to attempt its dissolution. The time indeed was, when not only irritation but disgust prevailed in that country; when, instead of sending fifty thousand men to seize on Orleans, an attempt was meditated, and a solemn vote taken in Congress to barter away this right for twenty-five years. The time indeed was, when great dissatisfaction prevailed in that country, as to the measures of the General Government; but it never furnished there, whatever it might have done elsewhere, even the germs for treasons or insurrections. The people I have the honor to represent are not accustomed to procure redress in this way. Instead of trampling on the constitution of their country, they rally round it as the rock of their safety. But, unhappily, these times have passed away. Distrust and dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in, and attachment to those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided. I ask no reliance on my opinion for this fact, but appeal to the memorial of the Legislature of Kentucky to the present Congress, for the truth of this assertion. In this disposition of mind, therefore, and from the sound sense and correct views and discernment of their true interest, which the people of Kentucky possess, I have no hesitation in pledging myself, that no such precipitate and unwarranted measures will be taken by them, as predicted by the gentlemen in the opposition.

But he begged leave to ask gentlemen who hold such language, would the Western people, admitting they were to withdraw from the Union, be able to accomplish the object? Could they alone go to war with France and Spain? Could they hold Orleans, were they to take possession of it, without the aid of the United States? Admitting they could hold it, what security would they have for their commerce? A single ship of the line would be able completely to blockade that port. See, also, the Havana, one of the safest and strongest of the Spanish ports, and so situated as to possess every advantage in annoying our commerce. Are the gentlemen, therefore, really serious when they endeavor to persuade us that the Western people are in such a state of fury and mad impatience that they will not wait even a few months to see the fate of a negotiation, and, if unsuccessful, receive the aid of the whole nation, but that they will madly run to the attack without a ship, without a single cannon, without magazines, without money or preparation of any kind; and, what is worse, without union among themselves; and what is still worse, in face of the laws and constitution of their country? It is impossible. Such a desperate project could not come to a successful issue; for should they even obtain the right by their own exertions alone, they could not expect long to enjoy it in peace, without descending from that exalted, that enviable rank of one of the independent States of United America, to the degraded, dependent condition of a colonial department of a foreign nation.

Although he thought it incumbent on us, for the reasons he had stated, to try the effect of negotiation, yet, should that fail, he thought it incumbent on us also to be prepared for another resort. He considered this right, and upon a different footing from what we ever enjoyed it, so all-important, so indispensable to the very existence of the Western States, that it was a waste of words and time to attempt to portray the evils which a privation of it would produce; and he rejoiced to find that gentlemen with whom he had not been in the habit of voting on most political subjects so perfectly accord with him, that our precarious tenure of it must be changed. He hoped they were sincere in their declarations. If they were, the only difference between us now is, what are the proper means to obtain this great end? The course pursued by the President was, in his opinion, the only true and dignified course. It is that, and that only, which will certainly attain the object; and is the only one which will tend to unite cordially all parts of the Union. But we ought to be prepared, in case of a failure, instantly to redress ourselves. This, instead of having an evil, would, in his opinion, have a good effect on the negotiation. It would show, that although we are willing amicably to adjust our differences, yet that we are not only resolved on, but prepared for that resort which cannot fail to restore our violated rights. With that view, he would offer the following resolutions, as substitutes for those proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

He moved that the whole of the resolutions be struck out, excepting the word "Resolved," and the following be substituted in their place—after the word "Resolved:"

"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia, officers included.

Resolved, "That the President may, if he judges it expedient, authorize the Executives of the several States, to accept, as part of the detachment aforesaid, any corps of volunteers; who shall continue in service for such time, not exceeding —— months, and perform such services as shall be prescribed by law.

Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for paying and subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as, during the recess of Congress, the President may deem necessary for the security of the territory of the United States.

Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for erecting at such place or places on the Western waters, as the President may judge most proper, one or more arsenals."

Mr. Clinton.—The importance of a free navigation of the Mississippi has been duly appreciated by the Government, and a constant eye has been kept upon it in our negotiations with foreign powers. An attempt was, indeed, made under the Old Confederation to barter it away for twenty-five years, which, however, was effectually controlled by the good sense and patriotism of the Government. By the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, by the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with her in 1794, and by the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain, in 1795, the right of a free navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and declared to exist from its source to the ocean, in the citizens of the United States. By the 22d article of the Treaty with Spain, it is declared that, "in consequence of the stipulations contained in the 4th article, his Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores. And his Majesty promises either to continue this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain; or, if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the lands of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." The 22d article, granting the right of deposit, is, therefore, founded upon the 4th article recognizing the right of free navigation, and is intended to give full and complete efficacy to it. By a proclamation of the Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, dated the 16th of October last, the right of deposit is prohibited. The reason assigned for this daring interdiction is, that the three years for which it was granted having expired, it cannot be continued without an express order from the King of Spain; and at the same time no equivalent establishment is assigned, according to the stipulations of the Treaty.

There can be no doubt but that the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans, and the assignment of another place equally convenient, ought to have been contemporaneous and concurrent; that the conduct of the Intendant is an atrocious infraction of the treaty, and that it aims a deadly blow at the prosperity of the Western States; but it is extremely questionable whether it was authorized by the Government of Spain or not. On this subject I am free to declare that I entertain great doubts, which can only be cleared up by the course of events, or perhaps it will be enveloped in darkness. On the one hand, the terms of the proclamation, indicating a misunderstanding of the treaty, the remonstrances of the Governor of the Province, whose authority does not extend to commercial and fiscal affairs, over which the Intendant has an exclusive control, and the prompt and decided assurances of the Spanish Minister near the United States, would induce a belief that the act of the Intendant was unauthorized. On the other hand, it cannot readily be believed that this officer would assume such an immense responsibility, and encounter an event so big with important consequences, not only to his country but to himself, without knowing explicitly the intentions of his Government. Such, then, is the true state of the Spanish aggression: an important right had been secured to our citizens by the solemnity of a treaty. This right had been withdrawn by an officer of the Spanish Government, and whether this aggression was directed by it or not, is not as yet known. Other aggressions have, indeed, been stated by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Ross,) in order to darken the picture, and with the manifest design of exasperating our feelings, inflaming our passions, and prompting an immediate appeal to the sword.

As to the nature, character, and tendency of the remedy proposed, there can be but one opinion. It proposes to enter the country of a foreign nation with a hostile force, and to seize a part of its territory. It is not preceded by a formal declaration, and cannot, therefore, come under the denomination of a solemn war, but it partakes of the character of a war not solemn. It answers to the definition of war, by Burlamaqui, "a nation taking up arms with a view to decide a quarrel;" to that given by Vattel, who represents it to be "that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force." A state of general hostilities would as necessarily follow as an effect would follow a cause; no nation would submit to the irruption of a hostile army without repelling it by force; the proud Castilian, as described by the gentleman from Delaware, would revolt at the insult; the door of negotiation would be effectually closed, and as the appeal would be to arms in the first instance, so the controversy must be finally decided by the preponderance of force. It would, therefore, not only have impressed me with a more favorable opinion of the honorable mover's candor, but also of his decision and energy as a statesman, if he had spoken out boldly, and declared his real object. War is unquestionably his design—his wish. Why, then, mask his proposition? Why combine it with considerations connected with negotiation? Why not furnish the American people at once with the real and the whole project of himself and his friends? If it is bottomed on patriotism and dictated by wisdom, it need not shrink from the touch of investigation—it will receive their approving voice, and be supported by all their force. The resolution is then to be considered as a war resolution; in no other light can it be viewed; in no other light ought it to be viewed; and in no other light will it be viewed by the intelligence of the country. In this point of view, I will proceed, said Mr. C., to consider its justice and policy; its conformity with the laws and usage of nations, and the substantial interests of this country.

I shall not attempt to occupy your attention by threadbare declamation upon the evils of war, by painting the calamities it inflicts upon the happiness of individuals, and the prosperity of nations. This terrible scourge of mankind, worse than the famine or pestilence, ought not to be resorted to until every reasonable expedient has been adopted to avert it. When aggressions have been committed by the sovereign or representatives of a nation, negotiation ought in all cases to be first tried, unless the rights of self-defence demand a contrary course. This is the practice of nations, and is enjoined by the unerring monitor which the God of Nature has planted in every human bosom. What right have the rulers of nations to unsheath the sword of destruction, and to let loose the demon of desolation upon mankind, whenever caprice or pride, ambition or avarice, shall prescribe? And are there no fixed laws founded in the nature of things which ordain bounds to the fell spirit of revenge, the mad fury of domination, and the insatiable thirst of cupidity? Mankind have not only in their individual character, but in their collective capacity as nations, recognized and avowed in their opinions and actions, a system of laws calculated to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And it may be safely asserted, that it is a fundamental article of this code, that a nation ought not to go to war, until it is evident that the injury committed is highly detrimental, and that it emanated from the will of the nation charged with the aggression, either by an express authorization in the first instance, or by a recognition of it when called upon for redress, and a refusal in both cases to give it. A demand of satisfaction ought to precede an appeal to arms, even when the injury is manifestly the act of the Sovereign; and when it is the act of a private individual, it is not imputable to his nation, until his Government is called upon to explain and redress, and refuses; because the evils of war are too heavy and serious to be incurred, without the most urgent necessity; because remonstrance and negotiation have often recalled an offending nation to a sense of justice, and a performance of right; because nations, like individuals, have their paroxysms of passion, and when reflection and reason resume their dominion, will extend that redress to the olive-branch, which their pride will not permit them to grant to the sword; because a nation is a moral person, and, as such, is not chargeable with an offence committed by others, or where its will has not been consulted, the unauthorized conduct of individuals being never considered a just ground of hostility, until their sovereign refuses that reparation for which his right of controlling their actions, and of punishing their misconduct, necessarily renders him responsible. These opinions are sanctioned by the most approved elementary writers on the laws of nations.

If I were called upon to prescribe a course of policy most important for this country to pursue, it would be to avoid European connections and wars. The time must arrive when we will have to contend with some of the great powers of Europe, but let that period be put off as long as possible. It is our interest and our duty to cultivate peace, with sincerity and good faith. As a young nation, pursuing industry in every channel, and adventuring commerce in every sea, it is highly important that we should not only have a pacific character, but that we should really deserve it. If we manifest an unwarrantable ambition, and a rage for conquest, we unite all the great powers of Europe against us. The security of all the European possessions in our vicinity will eternally depend, not upon their strength, but upon our moderation and justice. Look at the Canadas—at the Spanish territories to the South—at the British, Spanish, French, Danish, and Dutch West India islands—at the vast countries to the West, as far as where the Pacific rolls its waves; consider well the eventful consequences that would result if we were possessed by a spirit of conquest; consider well the impression which a manifestation of that spirit will make upon those who would be affected by it. If we are to rush at once into the territory of a neighboring nation, with fire and sword, for the misconduct of a subordinate officer, will not our national character be greatly injured? Will we not be classed with the robbers and destroyers of mankind? Will not the nations of Europe perceive in this conduct the germ of a lofty spirit and an enterprising ambition which will level them to the earth, when age has matured our strength and expanded our powers of annoyance, unless they combine to cripple us in our infancy? May not the consequences be, that we must look out for a naval force to protect our commerce; that a close alliance will result; that we will be thrown at once into the ocean of European politics, where every wave that rolls, and every wind that blows, will agitate our bark? Is this a desirable state of things? Will the people of this country be seduced into it by all the colorings of rhetoric, and all the arts of sophistry—by vehement appeals to their pride, and artful addresses to their cupidity? No, sir. Three-fourths of the American people (I assert it boldly, and without fear of contradiction) are opposed to this measure. And would you take up arms with a millstone hanging around your neck? How would you bear up, not only against the force of the enemy, but against the irresistible current of public opinion? The thing, sir, is impossible; the measure is worse than madness; it is wicked beyond the powers of description.

It is in vain for the mover to oppose these weighty considerations by menacing us with an insurrection in the Western States, that may eventuate in their seizure of New Orleans without the authority of Government; their throwing themselves into the arms of a foreign power; or in a dissolution of the Union. Such threats are doubly improper—improper as they respect the persons to whom they are addressed, because we are not to be deterred from the performance of our duty by menaces of any kind, from whatever quarter they may proceed; and it is no less improper to represent our Western brethren as a lawless, unprincipled banditti, who would at once release themselves from the wholesome restraints of law and order; forego the sweets of liberty, and either renounce the blessings of self-government, or, like Goths and Vandals, pour down with the irresistible force of a torrent upon the countries below, and carry havoc and desolation in their train. A separation by a mountain, and a different outlet into the Atlantic, cannot create any natural collision between the Atlantic and Western States; on the contrary, they are bound together by a community of interests, and a similarity of language and manners—by the ties of consanguinity and friendship, and a sameness of principles. There is no reflecting and well-principled man in this country who can view the severance of the States without horror, and who does not consider it as a Pandora's box, which will overwhelm us with every calamity; and it has struck me with not a little astonishment that, on the agitation of almost every great political question, we should be menaced with this evil. Last session, when a bill repealing a Judiciary act was under consideration, we were told that the Eastern States would withdraw themselves from the Union, if it should obtain; and we are now informed that, if we do not accede to the proposition before us, the Western States will hoist the standard of revolt and dismember the empire. Sir, these threats are calculated to produce the evils they predict, and they may possibly approximate the spirit they pretend to warn us against. They are at all times unnecessary, at all times improper, at all times mischievous, and ought never to be mentioned within these walls.

Mr. J. Jackson, of Georgia.—Coming from a State, at the extreme of the Union in the South, and excepting the States immediately interested in the navigation of the Mississippi, the most concerned, on the present occasion, of any in the Union, he hoped it would not be deemed improper in him to offer his sentiments on the resolution before the Senate; for, sir, no event can affect the settlers on the Mississippi, no change of masters can take place there, without the shock being felt on the frontiers of Georgia. The nation which holds New Orleans must eventually possess the Floridas, and Georgia cannot remain an indifferent spectator; in case of war, the blow struck on that river will be vibrated on the Saint Mary's, and the attack on the one will be seconded by an attack on the other.

The gentlemen from Kentucky and Tennessee have not those fears expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania; they have declared their citizens satisfied with negotiation in the first place, and the conduct pursued by the Executive. He could say the same, as respects the citizens of the State he represents, and begged leave to read a letter on the subject, from a respectable gentleman of Georgia, applauding the appointment of Mr. Monroe. [He here read a letter expressing the approbation generally expressed at the nomination.]

That there has been an indignity offered to the United States by the Spanish Government of New Orleans, he should not deny; so far, he joined the gentlemen on the other side, as not only to declare that sense of it, but to assert that the withdrawing the right of deposit, given under the fourth article of our treaty with Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, prior to the pointing out another place for that purpose, is such a violation of our right, and such an insult to the dignity of the nation, as ought not to be put up with in silence. We ought, we are bound to demand a restoration of that right, and to secure it to our Western citizens, let the risk be what it may, if it even extends to life and fortune. He cordially agreed with the gentleman who had preceded him, (Mr. Mason,) that it is a momentous subject; but could not consent to go at once to war, without trying, in the first place, every peaceable mode to obtain redress.

The first part of the resolution declares, that the United States have an indisputable right to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and to a convenient place of deposit for their produce and merchandise, in the island of New Orleans. Now, sir, the former part of this resolution is not affected by any proceedings of the Spanish Government. You are as perfectly in possession of the right as you ever were; your vessels are at this moment freely navigating that river; you have not heard of a single interruption; you have not learnt that the Spaniards, so far from interrupting that navigation, have ever doubted your right. Why then, sir, resolve on the assertion of rights which are not questioned, but of which you are completely in possession! He could compare it to no other case than that of a man in private life, in peaceable possession of his house, resolving on and publishing his own right to it, and thereby rousing the suspicions of his neighbors to doubt the title to it. Passing over the latter division of the first resolution, and which he acknowledged to be the fact, let us consider the second proposition, "That the late infraction of such their unquestionable right, is an aggression hostile to their honor and interest." Sir, after a declaration of this kind, can you retract? You cannot; it is in fact a declaration of war itself. Many of the courts of Europe would consider it so, and have engaged in war for less cause of offence than this resolution contains. You pronounce at once, without knowing whether the proceedings at New Orleans were sanctioned by the Court of Spain, that that nation is in a state of hostility against your honor and interest, which declaration, coupled with the following resolution, "That it does not consist with the dignity or safety of this Union to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain," is a direct insult to that nation. But if war is not to be found in those resolutions, is it not in the fifth resolution, "That the President be authorized to take immediate possession of such place or places in the said island, or the adjacent territories, as he may deem fit or convenient." Is this not war? If it be not, he knew not what war was! And now let us inquire, if we should be justified in adopting those measures, on the grounds of public or private justice, or the laws of nations.

Sir, the going to war has always been considered, even among barbarous nations, a most serious thing; and it has not been undertaken without the most serious deliberation. It was a practice among the Romans, prior to undertaking a war, to consult the faciales on the justice of it; and, after it had been declared just, to refer it to the Senate, to judge of the policy of it; and unless the justice and the policy were both accorded in, the war was not undertaken. If this was the case then among barbarous nations, shall we, who call ourselves a civilized nation, not well weigh the justice and the policy of going to war, before we undertake it?

As to national honor and dignity, he believed we have all a proper sense of it, and he would be one of the last on this floor to put up with insult and indignity from any nation; but, as much as we had heard of it, he did not think we ought, without negotiation, to resent every injury by war. In many cases, national honor is only a convertible term for national interest; and he begged leave to relate an anecdote of a celebrated soldier on this head. After the failure of the attempted storm of Savannah, in the year 1779, Count D'Estaing, who was wounded in the attack, and lay in that situation about five miles from Savannah, was visited by Governor Rutledge and other gentlemen of South Carolina and Georgia. The Governor having perceived some movements in camp indicative of a retrogade motion, told the Count that his own honor and the honor of France were concerned in his remaining and taking the city. The Count very mildly replied, "Gentlemen, if my honor is to be lost by not taking the city, it is lost already; but I deem my honor to consist in the honor of my country, and that honor is my country's interest!" The time of operation in the West Indies was arrived, and the Count re-embarked his troops.

Now, sir, is it not our duty to consult our country's interest, before we take this rash step, which we cannot recall? Peace is the interest of all republics, and war their destruction; it loads and fetters them with debt, and entangles not only the present race, but posterity. Peace, sir, has been the ruling policy of the United States throughout all her career. If we show the citizens that we are not willing to go to war, and load them with taxes, they will all be with us, when a necessity for war arrives. What, sir, was the policy of America, from the commencement of the Revolution? At that day, did we hastily go to war? No; we tried every peaceable means to avoid it, and those means induced a unanimity in the people.

At the commencement many States were exceedingly divided, in some a majority were against us; yet, seeing the moderation and justice of our measures, and the rashness and tyranny of the British cabinet, they came over to our side, and became the most zealous among us. At the present moment, sir, the people are averse to war, they are satisfied with the steps of the Executive, they wish negotiation. If you adopt these resolutions, they will be still divided; if you negotiate, and fail in that negotiation—if you cannot obtain a redress of the injury which they feel as well as you, they will go all lengths with you, and be prepared for any event; you will have this advantage, you will be unanimous, and America united is a match for the world. In such a case, sir, every man will be anxious to march, he would go himself if called on, and whether the sluggish Spaniard or the French grenadier commands New Orleans, it must fall; they will not be able to resist the brave and numerous hosts of our Western brethren, who are so much interested in the injury complained of. He was himself of opinion that New Orleans must belong to the United States; it must come to us in the course of human events, although not at the present day; for he did not wish to use force to obtain it, if we could get a redress of injury; yet it will naturally fall into our hands by gradual but inevitable causes, as sure and certain as manufactures arise from increased population and the plentiful products of agriculture and commerce. But let it be noticed, that if New Orleans by a refusal of justice falls into our hands by force, the Floridas, as sure as fate, fall with it. Good faith forbids encroachment on a pacific ally; but if hostility shows itself against us, interest demands it; Georgia in such case could not do without it. God and nature have destined New Orleans and the Floridas to belong to this great and rising empire. As natural bounds to the South, are the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi, and the world at some future day cannot hold them from us.