Friday, December 11.
The Gunboat Bill.
Mr. Johnson said, although he should not pretend to propose measures of great national defence, he considered it a prudent exercise of his right as a member, to express his sentiments upon subjects proposed by others, upon which it became his duty to vote. He was in favor of the passage of the bill. He believed that they had arrived at a crisis; a crisis which had marked the maritime annals of Great Britain with the blood of American citizens; the period had arrived when this nation must receive a satisfaction for injuries inflicted, and a security from future wrong; or the sword must again be drawn to defend that liberty which was the boast of all, and which had cost so much. They had before them evidence sufficient to demonstrate the probability of war, an event which could not be long protracted but by an honorable accommodation. While America mourned the loss of her sons, she had wisely forborne to strike a blow which her wrongs had justified. New instructions had been despatched to our Minister at the Court of St. James since the outrage upon the Chesapeake, and a last appeal made to the reason and justice of that Government by whom they had been so much injured. The negotiation had terminated in England, and even now a special Minister was expected from Great Britain to attempt a settlement here. The door to reconciliation had not been closed, and he hoped it would not be barred so long as a real desire could be traced in Great Britain to make an honorable settlement of all important differences. But every thing they could hear or see proved the propriety of making preparations for the worst event. Our Government had been the injured party, and must have redress.
The conduct of the Administration had been arraigned. Mr. J. did not hesitate to approve the conduct of the Executive, and particularly in this late and important transaction, it had acted with prudence, wisdom, and firmness. If feeling had not been governed by prudence, the nation might have been in a state of actual war. Perhaps our wrongs might have justified it; but while there remained a hope for honorable peace, negotiation was the proper course. We fear no nation, but let the time for shedding human blood be protracted, when consistent with our safety. If our claims upon the justice of England should be disregarded, there would be time enough for human butchery. He looked around him, and saw many who had witnessed the calamities and miseries of the American Revolution. But if war could not be avoided, accumulated horrors would not induce the American people to endanger their independence. They would say, like the immortal Washington, the former victorious leader of their armies, “I will conquer or die with my countrymen.” Unanimity, in times of public exigency, was all-important; any other course than that which had been pursued by the Administration, might and would have created division; but if they should now be driven into war by the injustice of Great Britain, where was the man who would not be with them, who would not approve the conduct of the Administration, pronounce our cause just, and appeal to Heaven for victory.
As to the system of gunboats, which had involved such a wide range of discussion, and almost every national topic, he had no practical knowledge of their utility; but he could state the evidence he had of their utility to the full extent contended for. First, it was a system which had been recommended by the President, supported by the opinions of General Gates, Commodore Barron and Captain Tingey. He perceived that a very large majority of the Representatives of the seacoast, from Georgia to Maine, was in their favor. They are used by most of the powers of Europe, and particularly in the Mediterranean, for defence, and often for offence. They were considered particularly useful in the North of Europe and the Baltic, on account of moderate tides, shallow water, and narrow seas. He had also many examples of their practical utility. In the war between France and England and her colonies, a case had been cited of an attack and conflict in the river St. Lawrence, in the year 1763, between four American gunboats and a French vessel of war, carrying 16 guns and 180 men. The battle was obstinate; the French lost 60 or 70 men, the hull and rigging of the vessel were cut to pieces, while only one man was killed on board the gunboats. A battle had been mentioned by the same member, which happened in the Delaware during the Revolution, where two English frigates were attacked by gunboats, one of the frigates driven from our waters, and the other stranded, and would have been captured but for the want of powder. Again: the celebrated battle between the English navy and the French flotilla of gunboats off the port of Boulogne, in the British Channel. Lord Nelson was charged with the destruction of these gunboats, and made the attack for that express purpose. The first attack was made with thirty vessels of war of all sizes; he failed in the enterprise, and was obliged to retire. This great naval commander, not having satisfied himself or his nation by this attempt, ten days after returned to the assault, with more ships of the line, a larger number of frigates and brigs, and renewed the fight; after a very bloody battle and great loss, he was again repulsed. In fact, nothing did the English so much fear as these gunboats, properly managed. A few years ago, it would be recollected, Napoleon collected above one hundred thousand soldiers for the purpose of invading England. This created alarm and agitation in Great Britain, and this project the British Cabinet knew could not be effected without the aid of the French flotilla of gunboats at the port of Boulogne. The late Minister, Mr. Pitt, to divert the attention of Napoleon from this design, by British gold and British influence, created a new coalition upon the continent of Europe against France. For the moment, this coalition had its desired effect, and it is known to all how it had terminated. It had resulted in the conquest of the North, cost the lives of thousands, and inundated Europe with human blood.
Mr. Macon said it appeared to him that the only question at present discussed was, whether the number of boats authorized by this bill was the proper number. Some cases had been stated in which gunboats had been efficacious, and some in which they had not. Mr. M. did not mean to dispute their efficacy, but as gentlemen on the seacoast were divided on the subject, until gentlemen could better agree as to number and utility, so large a number ought not to be built.
There was another thing he should have been glad to have seen before he voted on this bill; he should have wished to have seen how these boats were to be manned. They might be told that people would volunteer their services on board of these boats. There must be some way in which they must be manned; unmanned, they would be perfectly useless. He did not like legislating in this detached way; it had been tried in former days; first passing one law, they must pass another to render it effectual. He wished to see some efficient method in which these boats should be manned; he could have wished that the whole system should go hand in hand. The President was authorized to man these boats. Was any authority given to draught sailors for the purpose, or how were they to be supplied? It was essential that this should be known. He should wish, and if he thought he could succeed he would make a motion to recommit the bill to a select committee for the purpose of making this provision. Suppose twenty boats were stationed at Norfolk, did they know that these boats could be manned? In his opinion, the bill should contain a regulation for manning them; every law should stand upon its own merits, and he should always protest against passing one law which would oblige them to pass another to carry it into effect. Let us, said he, see the whole system, and then let us vote upon it.
Mr. G. W. Campbell said it had not been his intention to speak on this subject. There was sufficient cause to induce him still to decline entering into the debate. His indisposition would certainly prevent him from examining the subject in that manner which its importance required; and he would therefore have persevered in his original intention of remaining silent, had not an attempt been made to make an impression on the public mind, that the friends of this measure were about to drain the Treasury of the United States for a system of defence that would prove inefficient—for a mere useless experiment. This might therefore require some explanation, that the motives of gentlemen who were about to vote for this system of defence should be known, as well as their objects. In the discussion of this subject, gentlemen had also gone into an examination of the utility of our Naval Establishment, and the expediency of increasing it at this time, which was in his opinion a distinct subject, that had little or no connection with the proposed measure. It would be time sufficient to examine that question when it came properly before the House. There had also been a very novel mode of argument introduced on this occasion, and it was the second time it had been used during the present session—that of gentlemen arguing against the expediency of a measure, while they declared their intention to vote for it. This was indeed a new method of legislating, and may be intended to answer a double purpose: it may perhaps enable gentlemen to say to those of their constituents opposed to this measure, (if such there are,) We were inimical to it; we exposed its weakness in the House, and showed its inefficiency—you cannot therefore blame us for its adoption. While, on the other hand, they might say to the friends of the measure, We have supported it by our votes, and are therefore entitled to your confidence on that ground. Mr. C. did not say that this was the object of gentlemen; but if it was not, it appeared to him difficult to ascertain what it could be. It would have appeared much more consistent for those gentlemen who seriously believed the system to be useless, to vote as well as speak against it; and it were to be wished that those who intended to vote for the bill before the House, had permitted it to pass without opposing it; but, as this course of argument had been pursued, he deemed it a duty he owed to his country, to those he had the honor to represent, and to himself, to express to the House (though in a very brief manner) some of the reasons which would induce him to vote for the bill. He did not pretend to possess much information on the subject of gunboats—he had therefore hitherto declined entering into the discussion, and waited to hear what might be advanced on the subject by those who had greater opportunities than himself of knowing their efficiency or inefficiency—but he had found those who had spoken on this subject were obliged, like himself, to depend on the information of others, and did not pretend to furnish the House with any practical knowledge on this subject. They must, therefore, form their opinions from the reasoning on the case, and such evidence as they were possessed of.
The first important inquiry would seem to be, whether the present state of our relations with foreign powers was such as required the adoption of effective measures for national defence. It appeared to be agreed by all that it was. No one denied the importance of the present crisis. It could not be denied by any gentleman who would reflect a moment on the repeated aggressions that have been committed on our commerce, the violated rights of our seamen, the insult offered to our national flag, and the murder of our fellow-citizens. These all go to prove, incontestable, the necessity of our putting the nation in a state of defence. The next inquiry was, of what nature ought our defensive preparations to be? It is clear, they ought to be calculated to meet and repel the attacks that we have a right to expect from those who are likely to become our enemies. Those attacks are to be expected on our coasts and seaport towns which are most exposed, and most vulnerable to a marauding enemy. The species of defence, therefore, that we ought to adopt, should certainly be such as was calculated to protect, as far as in our power, our coast, our harbors, and our seaport towns, from insult and ruin; unless, indeed, these are to be abandoned to the enemy on his first approach. We are then to determine whether we shall defend these or not.
Will the nation consent to expose to an enemy, without an effort to repel him until he has landed, the whole extent of your seacoast, all your seaport towns on the margin of the ocean? This would be a dangerous experiment, and he had supposed too wild a scheme to be advocated by any reflecting politician: though it seemed to be the favorite doctrine of some gentlemen in this House, who were opposed to every species of defence, except placing arms in the hands of the militia. It is true the foe might be repelled by your militia, and no doubt would be; but, what would the citizens of those towns and on your seacoast say? Would they not justly complain that you had neglected their interest, had deserted them in the day of danger, and left them to be pillaged and destroyed by an enemy, without one effort to protect them? They certainly would, and their complaints would be well founded. There were, however, he presumed, but very few willing to subscribe to this doctrine—though it had been advocated by some gentlemen in this House, who appeared opposed not only to ships of war and gunboats, but also to fortifications.
Taking it then as admitted, that the coast and seaport towns are to be defended against naval attacks, what were the means in their power best calculated to effect that object? On this point there was, as might be expected, some difference of opinion. Mr. C. believed it would not be contended by any gentleman that our coast and seaport towns could be effectually defended by fortifications alone. No man was so wild in his plans as to say so. The whole coast, from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico, cannot be fortified—some other mode of defence must therefore be resorted to. He apprehended also, it would not be contended that the naval force now in our possession, in addition to fortifications, was sufficient to afford effectual protection to our seaports. This had not been pretended; its inefficiency was too well known for a single individual to rely upon it. There was then no question on the point that they must acquire an additional floating force in aid of fortifications. What kind of addition was it in their power to make? There was but one alternative left them—either to build an additional number of ships of war sufficient for that object, or to resort to the system of gunboats. They had been very earnestly called upon by some gentlemen to make an addition to the navy and unite this with gunboats. This would probably be found impracticable at the present crisis. Mr. C. had expected that those gentlemen who wished to have reduced the number of gunboats proposed, and substitute a few frigates in their place, would have shown the practicability of building their frigates in sufficient time to answer the present exigency. If this could not be effected, the proposition was useless. Mr. C. said the building of a large navy was not consistent with the policy or interest of this country. If it were in their power to do so, it would be at war with the genius of their Government, the interests of the people, and the security of their liberties.
Mr. Quincy said he would not have risen now, but for an observation of the gentleman from Tennessee, as to speculative opinions. Mr. Q. had before not expressed his own opinion merely, but the opinion of men deeply interested and much experienced in this question. He could not boast of personal experience on the subject, but he had conversed with merchants and persons in naval employ, and he had found but one sentiment existed, that they might be useful, but not so much as to supersede the necessity of other modes. He recollected an observation made by a merchant deeply interested in the defence of our ports. When his opinion was asked of the efficiency of gunboats, he said, “you may have gunboats; but attempt to use them on our coasts, and you would soon not have a gun left on your boats.” Much better would it be that these guns should be rested on carriages, and those distributed along the sea coasts. He had no objection to gunboats when contemplated to be used in shoal and narrow waters; but he must express an opinion against their efficiency in deep and rough waters, not from his own experience, but because it appeared to be the opinion of men skilled in naval affairs; and because the great mass of men interested in the defence of the ports were averse to this mode of defence. He should not vote for the bill, because he should, by so doing, abandon the best interests of the country; and because, when so large a sum was appropriated, it would seem that land batteries were to be proportionably neglected.
Mr. Randolph said that so long as the details of the bill were under consideration, he had forborne to trouble the House with his sentiments, but now, on its final passage, he conceived himself entitled to express freely and fully his objections to it. His object was not to make proselytes, but to present to the House and to his country the grounds of his refusal to sanction the measure. When perhaps seventy or eighty speakers had repeatedly risen in its favor, it was surely reasonable that the few individuals opposed to it should be heard in their own behalf. He complained of the manner in which business had been conducted. Instead of a comprehensive system, the whole extent of which might be embraced by the House, measures had been laid before them piecemeal, and discussions of the most vague and unprofitable nature had grown out of them. So far from that general diffusion of information which was so desirable, they were totally destitute of any concerning the disjointed members which had been laid upon their table, and which he despaired ever seeing connected in one perfect whole. The deliberations which had arisen upon them defied analysis. It was a sort of Parthian warfare, in which the difficulty lay not in vanquishing the enemy, but in coming up with him. He had not proceeded (as was alleged) upon his own speculative opinion. Experiment had proved the inadequacy of this species of armament. When the President of the United States issued his proclamation, commanding the British ships of war to retire from our waters, the want of adequate force alone could justify a failure to carry that proclamation into effect. A consciousness of his incapacity to enforce obedience to it, was notoriously one of the causes why Congress had been convened. Whosoever denied this must have the hardihood to charge the President with being deficient in his duty, which he presumed gentlemen were not prepared to do; and surely it was his bounden duty to enforce respect for the authority of the nation on those by whom it had been treated with derision and contempt. The British force remaining within our jurisdiction, in defiance of the laws, were as much an invading foe as if they had taken possession of the Capitol. The miseries of war had been feelingly depicted.
Mr. R. was as strong an advocate for peace as any gentleman on that floor; provided it were a safe and honorable peace. To his apprehension the arguments which had been urged would justify submission to any extent. He would ask if it was the duty of the Chesapeake to submit for the sake of peace, or to have resisted to the utmost of her strength? She was no more called upon by her duty to resist that attack, than the nation was now called upon to repel the attack which had been made upon her sovereignty. The obligation to resist was in both cases the same. Was any person disposed to applaud as a preserver of peace the unfortunate man of whom he should say no more than that he was not more bound to return the broadside of the enemy than Government were to expel their ships from our harbors after commanding them to depart. Much as he cherished peace, Mr. R. would be sorry to see it preserved by such forbearance; and it was only the inability to execute that could reconcile it for a moment to the feelings of the nation. The proclamation ought not to have been issued, or it should have been enforced. Let it not be supposed that he was an advocate for defence by forty-four gun frigates. Since the existence of their navy the United States had lost two of their stoutest ships to an enemy, and in both instances without even a show of resistance. It was true that in one of these instances, the victor, as if in contempt, had thrown the worthless thing back upon our hands, instead of sending it where he wished it had gone—to Halifax, or to the bottom. An attempt to build a navy at this time would bring not relief but suffering. Mr. R. put little confidence in the regular navy, as it was called, which just sufficed to bait the war-trap, or in the gunboats. Like the contemptible insects to which they had been compared by their advocates, it was hoped that they would find shelter in their insignificance, but if they should prove instruments of annoyance, eventually they would be turned against ourselves. He wished to see the public treasure employed in putting arms into the hands of all who were capable of bearing them, and in providing heavy artillery, not in the erection of a naval force, which, whether great or small, unless it too could retreat beyond the mountains, must fall into the hands of the enemy. If they wanted a force that should combine strength with simplicity, ready at all times for the public protection, they had such a force amply in their power.
The question was put on the passage of the bill, and decided in the affirmative—yeas 111, nays 19.