Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Friday, February 22.

Mr. Key.—Mr. President, I rise to make some observations on the second, third, and fourth articles of the impeachment. I shall not apologize for the manner in which I shall discharge a duty which I have voluntarily undertaken, but merely regret that indisposition has prevented my giving the subject that attention which it merits. It will be at once perceived that these articles relate to the trial of Callender. Before, however, I go into an examination of the second article, it may be proper to notice the situation in which the judge found himself and the state of the public mind at the time. The sedition law was passed in the year 1799. It immediately arrested the public attention, and strongly agitated the public feelings. In the State of Virginia it was peculiarly obnoxious; many of the most respectable characters considered it as unconstitutional, and as a violation of the liberty of the press; most deemed it impolitic; while some viewed it as a salutary restraint on the licentiousness of the press, more calculated to preserve than to destroy it. In this state of the public mind it became the duty of the respondent, in the ordinary assignment of judicial districts, to go into the district of Virginia, where he was entirely a stranger, to carry the laws into execution. It is scarcely necessary to observe that when laws are considered obnoxious, much of the odium attending them inevitably falls on those who carry them into effect. In May, 1800, Judge Chase went to Richmond to hold a court; and soon after it was in session, the grand jury found a presentment and afterwards a bill against James T. Callender for an infraction of this law, in publishing the book entitled “The Prospect before Us,” which brought into issue its constitutionality. Professional men of talents, carried along by the tide of public opinion, volunteered their services in defence of the accused; and every effort was exhausted to wrest the decision from the respondent. Exceptions were accordingly taken at every stage of the case; and when the jurors were brought to the book, a question arose which forms the foundation of the charge contained in the second article.

If we extract from this article the epithets it contains nothing will remain, and epithets fortunately do not constitute crimes. The offence and fact charged is, the permitting Mr. Basset to be sworn on the jury with an intention to oppress the traverser, which is not in the least supported by the testimony. The article alleges that Mr. Basset wished to be excused. I appeal to the testimony, whether he did wish or desire to be excused. The observations he made arose entirely from a scruple in his own mind, and not from any objection to serving. Instead of his wishing to be excused, the real fact is that which he said flowed from the peculiar situation in which he stood; and he says that he declared himself willing to serve, provided in law he was competent. The fact, therefore, on which this article rests, is not supported by the testimony, and not being supported, I might here dismiss this branch of the subject without further animadversion.

Suppose we are mistaken in the fact, which we say is proved, that Mr. Basset did not desire to be excused; admit that he did pray to be excused; still, so far as he has himself, on oath, explained the situation of his mind, there was no cause for challenge.

Admit, also, that we are mistaken in the law we have laid down, does it follow as a necessary consequence that the directing Basset to be sworn on the jury, was done with an intent to oppress the traverser? We call for the facts that impeach the motives of Judge Chase. In the opening of this case we were told that the respondent was highly gifted with rich attainments of mind. It was correctly said; and it might have been added that his integrity was equal to his talents. But the observation was made to raise his head at the expense of his heart. I will examine this argument.

The truth is that no judge is liable for an error of judgment. I apprehend this is conceded by the article itself, which states a criminal intent. Now for the evidence. What criminal intention do the honorable Managers draw from it? It is said that the respondent is highly gifted with intellectual powers, and must have known in this instance the law. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. I dislike the compliment; the best-gifted mortals are frail, and a single erroneous decision may be made by any man.

I will now proceed to the third article, which, when correctly understood, will be found as destitute of impeachable matter as either of the other articles. It is as follows: “That, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner, the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness on behalf of the aforesaid Callender, was not permitted by the said Samuel Chase to be given in, on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact.”

In opening the case one of the honorable Managers inquired what human subtilty or ingenuity could devise to extenuate this act of the respondent. Our reply is that it requires no subtilty or ingenuity; that it was correct in point of law, and that the case is so clear, that he who runs may read. The Court must permit me to observe that the article presents an abstract case, not growing out of, or connected with the evidence. This Court, I apprehend, is not sitting here to decide this abstract point, whether in any case it is admissible to prove one fact contained in a particular charge by one witness, and one by another; but to determine whether in this case, where one witness was offered to prove part of one charge, and no other witness offered to the same charge, it was proper to receive testimony offered. I contend that the decision was correct on the case before the Court.

Mr. Robertson says, “The attorney for the United States having concluded, the counsel for the traverser introduced Colonel Taylor as a witness, and he was sworn; but at the moment the oath was administered, the judge called on them, and desired to know what they intended to prove by the witness. They answered, that they intended to examine Colonel Taylor, to prove that Mr. Adams had avowed principles in his presence which justified Mr. Callender in saying that the President was an aristocrat—that he had voted against the sequestration law, and the resolutions concerning the suspension of commercial intercourse with Great Britain.” This was then the object and view with which Colonel Taylor was called on. What is the charge in the articles of impeachment? That the testimony of Colonel Taylor was rejected “on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges, contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact.” The charge in the indictment is that the President “was a professed aristocrat; that he proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest:” and Colonel Taylor was called to prove that Mr. Adams had voted against the sequestration law, and the resolutions concerning the suspension of commercial intercourse with Great Britain. Was it competent to Colonel Taylor to give evidence on this point? The best evidence the nature of the case will admit must be adduced. Colonel Taylor then was clearly an incompetent witness on this point; as there was better evidence, the journals of this honorable body, within the reach of the traverser. It only then remained for Colonel Taylor to prove that the President had avowed principles which showed him to be an aristocrat; which, if proved, would have been altogether immaterial. To prove no other facts was he called upon. Are then counsel to be indulged in consuming the time of courts in the examination of witnesses, who have nothing relevant to offer?

I will now proceed to the fourth article, which contains five distinct specifications of facts charging misconduct on the respondent at Richmond.

This conduct is said to have been evinced, in the first place, “In compelling the prisoner’s counsel to reduce to writing, and submit to the inspection of the Court, for their admission or rejection, all questions which the said counsel meant to propound to the above-named John Taylor, the witness.”

If this was incorrect, I cannot perceive its injustice to Callender, nor its partiality or intemperance. But did the conduct of the Court in this instance correspond with the law and the practice? I apprehend that it did. I understand it to be a clear and admitted principle of law, that the Court is the only competent tribunal to determine the competency, the admissibility, and the relevancy of evidence; when admitted, its credibility is the exclusive province of the jury. I have before stated the reasons which rendered it necessary in this case to know what Colonel Taylor could prove. To understand the object for which he was produced with greater certainty and precision, the judge ordered the questions proposed to be put to be previously reduced to writing. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the practice in the courts of Virginia to say this was not novel, but I may surely venture to affirm that there was nothing criminal in it. I know well that in different States there are different forms of practice. I can only say, that Judge Chase, going from Maryland, where the practice does prevail, would naturally carry to Virginia the knowledge of the practice of the State from which he went.

The second specification is in the following words:

“In refusing to postpone the trial, although an affidavit was regularly filed, stating the absence of material witnesses on behalf of the accused; and although it was manifest that, with the utmost diligence, the attendance of such witnesses could not have been procured at that term.”

This charge is grounded on the fact of a refusal to postpone the trial on an affidavit. That the Court acted correctly in this instance will appear from this consideration. Nothing is more clear than that, under the common law, all applications for a continuance, on affidavit, are founded on the discretion of the Court. Is it not wonderfully singular that there should have been an application founded on an affidavit, if the law of Virginia, as stated in the 6th article, applied to the case? One thing is clear: either that the Attorney-General and Mr. Hay lost all recollection of the existence of this law of Virginia respecting continuances, or that they considered it inapplicable; for they would not otherwise have founded the application on an affidavit. They would have produced the law and have demanded a continuance. Did they do so? No. If, then, the law officer of the State and Mr. Hay both forgot that it existed, is it surprising that it should be unknown to Mr. Chase? If those gentlemen did recollect the existence of the law, they must surely have been of opinion that it did not apply to the case of Callender, or they would have saved themselves the trouble of filing an affidavit. It will however be shown that it did not apply, and hence their application founded on affidavit.

On the third specification, which charges the respondent with “the use of unusual, rude, and contemptuous expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel; and in falsely insinuating that they wished to excite the public fears and indignation, and to produce that insubordination to law, to which the conduct of the judge did, at the same time, manifestly tend;” I have but a few observations to make. I should indeed have spared many of the remarks I have made, were it not for an ignorance of the peculiar ground on which the honorable Managers mean to rely in their reply, and were it not for the fear that an omission to notice any of the charges preferred, might be considered as an abandonment of our defence as far as related to them.

I have nowhere discovered in the evidence any thing that supports in point of fact the charge against Judge Chase, of falsely insinuating that the prisoner’s counsel wished to excite the public fears and indignation to produce insubordination to law. The judge did say that the counsel used a popular argument, calculated to mislead and deceive the populace; and this is the extent and head of his offending; but there is a wide difference between this and the charge laid to his door. He told the counsel, and told them truly, that they were availing themselves of a popular argument, calculated to mislead and deceive the people. Attend, I pray you, to the testimony of Mr. Hay. Did not the counsel for the prisoner say they had no hope of exculpating him on the facts? Did they not say they did not argue for Callender? That it was the cause, and not the man, they defended? That they did not expect to convince Judge Chase, or any other federal judge, of the unconstitutionality of the sedition act? Were they not then laboring with their whole talents to catch the popular ear? Did they not expressly declare that they had little hopes of the jury, and that their object was to make an impression on the public mind? And when the judge declared that the constitutionality of the act could not be discussed before the jury, did they not, failing in their object, abandon the defence? The ground which they meant to have taken was withdrawn, and they withdrew with it.

As to the use of unusual, rude, and contemptuous expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel, no particular facts appear to be relied on. The term captious may be unusual; the phrase young gentlemen, which in the opening the honorable Manager metamorphosed into boys, but which last word does not by the testimony appear to have been used, may have been obnoxious to the ears of those to whom it was applied. There may not have been manifested in this language the most refined decorum; but let us recollect that our honorable client is not now on his trial for a violation of the decorums of society. Possessed of great ardor of mind and quickness of feeling, he conceives with rapidity, and expresses with energy his ideas. This may be a weakness; but it is a weakness of nature. Had he a colder heart, and weaker head, he might not be exposed to these little indiscretions. But where is the vade mecum from which a judge is to derive precedents for his behavior? Courts are instituted, not to polish and refine, but to administer justice between man and man. One judge may possess a more pleasing urbanity of manners than another; but are we to infer that because a man is warm in the expression of his sentiments, he is, therefore, angry? It will not be contended that when the counsel for the traverser spoke of the necessity of the indictment being verbatim et literatim, in the witty reply of the judge that they might as well insist that it should be punctuatim, there was any violation of decorum manifested. The reply grew out of the occasion, and never was a remark better applied.

I know of no other unusual language, except the expression of non sequitur; and surely there was nothing improper in that. We have been told that it is the usual habit of Judge Chase to interrupt counsel when they attempt to lay down as law that which is not law. In this case, he certainly did so; but it does not appear that he departed from his ordinary course; and if he had, where is the rule which, on such occasions, is to govern a judge? Such conduct, as I have before observed on another point, violates no moral obligation, infringes no statutory provision. The judge may not have displayed the urbanity, the suavity, and the patience, which so happily characterize some high characters; but where or when has the absence of these minor qualities been considered as criminal? Some of the witnesses, and among them Colonel Taylor, have described the conduct of the judge as imperious, sarcastic, and witty; but no witness has pronounced it tyrannical or oppressive.

With regard to the fourth specification, which relates to the interruption of counsel, I shall say but little. A judge has a right at all times to interrupt counsel whenever they act improperly. It is the inherent right of courts. When that is laid down as law which is not law, it is not only their right, but it is their duty, to stop them. Such interruptions may be considered vexatious by the counsel that are interrupted; but of such matters the Court only can be the judge. One witness, examined on the frequency of the interruptions of counsel on the trial of Callender, has said that more interruptions occurred in a case before Judge Iredell, whose eulogium has been pronounced by an honorable Manager; and another witness has informed us that it is the habit of Judge Chase frequently to interrupt counsel in civil as well as criminal cases; that the habit arises from the vigor of his mind, and the ardor of his feelings; that this is somewhat embarrassing to counsel, but that a little suavity on their part soon restores the judge to good humor. On this point I have no further observations to make. I will leave it to the good sense of this honorable body to determine how far the conduct of the respondent was, on this occasion, indecorous, and how far, on account of this conduct, he is liable to impeachment.

As to the fifth specification, which is in these words: “In an indecent solicitude, manifested by the said Samuel Chase, for the conviction of the accused, unbecoming even a public prosecutor, but highly disgraceful to the character of a judge, as it was subversive of justice.” I have no precise idea of the meaning of the term indecent solicitude—solicitude means mental anxiety. If we are to understand by solicitude that the judge felt anxiety for the furtherance of justice, that is simply an operation of the mind, and to determine whether it is praiseworthy or reprehensible, some overt act must be shown. For is it possible that, in any interesting case, a judge can sit on the bench without feeling some interest in the issue? This is more than falls to the lot of mortal. No, he must have feelings; and all that can be required is, that he restrain them from breaking out into acts subversive of justice. I will endeavor, on this point, to condense the testimony. It is said that the solicitude of the respondent is evinced by his indecent behavior to the counsel, and by his conduct previous to the trial. A jocular conversation is resorted to; and expressions made in the most unguarded moments are drawn forth in judgment against him. After he had delivered a charge at Annapolis, Mr. Mason came up to him, and asked him what kind of charge he had delivered, whether it was to be considered as legal, religious, moral, or political. To which the judge replied that it was a little of all. Some conversation ensued on the licentiousness of the press, and he observed that when he went to Richmond, if a respectable jury could be found, he would have Callender punished. All this is worked up, as it were by magic, to prove a deliberate purpose on his part to institute a prosecution. That a man of the intelligence of Judge Chase, had he conceived such a project, should thus jocosely, as is proved, and in public have divulged it, is beyond all belief. Let not a casual conversation of this light and sportive kind be tortured into evidence of a deliberate design. No man, the least acquainted with the general character of Judge Chase, will entertain the idea for a minute.

Another circumstance complained of, is, that Judge Chase was provided with a scored copy of “The Prospect before Us;” and this is adduced to prove his purpose to oppress Callender. But we have given it in testimony that this copy was scored by Mr. Martin, who handed it to the judge, when he was about going to Richmond, to amuse him on the road, and to make such other use of it as he pleased. What was there improper or indecent in this? Further: the respondent is next hunted through a line of stages on his passage from Dumfries to Richmond; and Mr. Triplet is brought forward to prove that he expressed a wish that the damned rascal had been hanged. Had there been a settled purpose to convict or oppress Callender, would it not have been manifested by concealment and prudence, instead of being divulged by such an intemperate impulse of feeling?

We next find the respondent at Richmond. And here a gentleman states that having moved the Court for an injunction, he went to the chambers of Judge Chase on the subject, on the morning subsequent to the motion being made, and before the judge had gone to court; that while he was there, Mr. David M. Randolph, the marshal, came in, and showed the judge the panel of jurors for the trial of Callender; that the judge asked him whether there were on it any of the creatures called democrats; and added, if there are, strike them off. Here must be some mistake. The witness must have heard some other person say so. Sure I am that the testimony will show that the statement of Mr. Heath cannot be received as correct. I impute no criminal intention to the witness; this is not my habit; but, for ascertaining the weight which it ought to have, I will collect and compare the several parts of the testimony on this point.

It appears that Mr. Heath was at the judge’s chambers but once. Mr. Marshall, the clerk of the Court, called on Judge Chase the same morning that Mr. Heath was there—he cannot recollect whether Mr. Randolph went with him, according to his usual practice, but he is certain, from a conversation he states, that they walked together to court; he met Mr. Heath either in the act of coming out of the judge’s room, or exterior to the door; and he heard no such conversation as he relates. What says Mr. Randolph? That no such conversation ever did take place. Here, then, the testimony is directly opposed. But it is said that our testimony is negative, and is therefore outweighed by the positive testimony of Mr. Heath; this, however, is not the fact. Much of our testimony is positive. Mr. Randolph declares that he has never shown the panel of a jury to a judge, except in the case of a grand jury offered to the Court to select a foreman; and he is positive that the panel in the case of Callender was not made out until the morning of the third of July, in court, when his deputies came forward with the names of the jurors they had summoned, on small slips of paper; and in corroboration of this evidence, it appears on the testimony of Mr. Basset, who was sworn on the jury, that he was not summoned until the third of July; and that the marshal sent out his deputies that very morning to summon jurors. We oppose, then, to the simple declaration of Mr. Heath, unaccredited by other witnesses, the clear and strong evidence of Mr. Randolph, corroborated by that of Mr. Marshall and Mr. Basset.

It does, then, appear to me that none of the alleged facts are so supported as to show an indecent solicitude on the part of the respondent.

Mr. Lee.—May it please this honorable Court: We are now arrived, Mr. President, in the course of the defence, to the fifth article of impeachment. I have, sir, been led to believe, that the present prosecution is brought before this honorable Court as a court of criminal jurisdiction, and that this high Court is bound by the same rules of evidence, the same legal ideas of crime, and the same principles of decision which are observed in the ordinary tribunals of criminal jurisdiction. The articles themselves seem to have been drawn in conformity to this opinion, for they all, except the fifth, charge, in express terms, some criminal intention upon the respondent. This doctrine relative to impeachment is laid down in 4 Black., 259, and in 2 Woodeson, 611. “As to the trial itself, it must of course vary in external ceremony, but differs not in essentials from criminal prosecutions before inferior courts. The same rules of evidence, the same legal notions of crimes and punishments, prevail. For impeachments are not framed to alter the law, but to carry it into more effectual execution, where it might be obstructed by the influence of too powerful delinquents, or not easily discerned in the ordinary course of jurisdiction, by reason of the peculiar quality of the alleged crimes. The judgment, therefore, is to be such as is warranted by legal principles and precedents.” The Constitution of the United States appears to consider the subject in the same light. By the third section of the third article, “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;” and by the fourth section of the second article, the nature and extent of the punishment in cases of impeachment is defined. Hence it may be inferred that a person is only impeachable for some criminal offence. With this view, I have examined and re-examined the fifth article of impeachment, to know against what the defence should be made. Looking at it with a legal eye, I find no offence charged to have been committed; and although it may seem strange, it is not the less true, this circumstance has produced the greatest difficulty and embarrassment in what manner the defence should be made.

In conformity to the rule of the Supreme Court and the authority of the case just cited, Judge Chase determined that the laws of the State of Virginia, which require a summons to be issued in cases of the Commonwealth, did not apply to the courts of the United States. Why, let me again ask, should this section receive the construction contended for by the honorable Managers? It has been shown that the laws of the United States provide fully in regard to the process to be issued by their courts: that, for the furtherance of justice, such a construction is neither necessary nor convenient, and is inconsistent with other parts of the same statute. It is therefore perfectly correct in the Court to bestow no attention upon the laws of Virginia concerning the process to be awarded against Callender. When a presentment was found by the grand jury, it was the duty of the Court to act; it was their duty to award a proper process for arresting the offender. This is not only warranted by the principles and reasons already adduced, but is inferrible from various passages of the laws of Congress, particularly from the 19th and 20th sections of the statute passed 30th April, 1790, 1st vol. page 108.

I will now proceed to make some observations upon the sixth article of impeachment: “And whereas it is provided by the 24th section of the aforesaid act, entitled ‘An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,’ that the laws of the several States, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as the rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply; and whereas by the laws of Virginia it is provided, that in cases not capital, the offender shall not be held to answer any presentment of a grand jury until the Court next succeeding that during which such presentment shall be made; yet the said Samuel Chase, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said James Thompson Callender, did, at the Court aforesaid, rule and adjudge the said Callender to trial, during the term at which he, the said Callender, was presented and indicted, contrary to law in that case made and provided.”

The charge in this article against the respondent is in substance that he, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of Callender, ruled him to trial during the term at which he was presented and indicted, contrary to the laws of Virginia, which it is alleged have provided that in cases not capital, the offender shall not be held to answer any presentment of a grand jury until the next succeeding Court.

This article it is admitted does contain an accusation of crime; but I hope I shall be able to satisfy this honorable Court, that in this instance no crime or offence was committed. I shall undertake to show that no error in law was committed, and that if the judge had done otherwise he would have been more liable to censure than he now is. If this be made to appear, as a supposed illegality of his conduct is the foundation of the charge, there will remain nothing to support the charge.

The accused judge had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and to administer justice without respect to persons, and to perform all the duties of his office according to the laws of the United States. If in ruling Callender to trial at the same term at which he was indicted, he acted according to law, the judge performed his duty, and ought not to be charged with oppression.

The article may be understood as affirming, that there exists some law of Virginia which positively prohibits the trial of a misdemeanor at the same term at which the indictment is found. No such law has been produced, and I must be allowed to deny that any such law of Virginia exists. When the party appears and answers the presentment, the trial may immediately take place. When the party appears and answers an indictment, the trial may immediately take place, if so ruled by the Court, who are vested with a discretion unfettered by any positive statute. The defence of this article may therefore be placed on two grounds, either of which will be sufficient. 1st. There is no law of Virginia which prohibits the trial of a misdemeanor at the same term the indictment is found. And, 2dly. If there be such a law, the same is not binding on the courts of the United States, in respect to offences against the United States.

In cases where bail is requirable, to delay the trial may be used to the oppression of the accused. It is therefore enjoined by the constitution and by the laws that there shall be no delay. If the honorable judge, who stands accused of trying Callender too soon, had deferred the trial to another term, that is to say six months, and the traverser could not have given bail, he would have been imprisoned six months without a trial. After he was convicted, the sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the same judge was only an imprisonment of about nine months. He had acted, therefore, not only according to law, but with humanity, in bringing the traverser to trial at the same term at which he was indicted. If the trial had been postponed to another term, and Callender in the mean time had been imprisoned, such a conduct in the Court would have given cause of complaint against the judge, who would then have been accused of postponing the trial of an innocent man, for the purpose of oppression. What in such a case ought the judge to have done? Exactly what he did. Obeying the constitution and the laws of the United States, he brought the traverser to a speedy and public trial.

It is, may it please the honorable Court, upon these grounds that the respondent stands justified in his conduct, in relation to the charge contained in the sixth article of impeachment.

In the distribution of the articles of impeachment among the counsel of the respondent, he assigned to me the 5th and 6th, and I humbly indulge the hope that the defence which has been made will be deemed satisfactory. But before I conclude, I hope I may be allowed shortly to advert to some of the remarks which have fallen from the honorable Managers in respect to this part of the accusation.

The honorable Managers have attempted to show a difference between a presentment and an indictment, and that until the indictment was found, a capias ought not to have been issued, even if it were lawful to issue it upon an indictment. That there is no such distinction, I appeal to those passages of the acts of Congress to which reference has been already made. I appeal to the reason of the thing and to the nature of a presentment. It is a species of indictment, an informal indictment; it is an accusation of a grand jury. There are cases where it would be improper in a court to wait until a presentment shall be put in the form of an indictment. Circumstances may be such that the offender would escape if process was not issued upon the presentment.

It has been objected that the judge misconducted himself towards the counsel during the trial of Callender in various instances, which it has been argued proceeded from a desire to convict and punish the traverser, howsoever innocent. I will observe with great deference, that if in the opinion of some gentlemen the judge did not act with becoming politeness to the counsel, it is not a high crime or misdemeanor that may be examined or tried in this honorable Court. But I trust, upon a view of the circumstances as they have been given in evidence, that this Court will be of opinion that the respondent behaved to the counsel with sufficient propriety. One of the counsel, Mr. Wirt, offered to the Court a syllogism, to which the honorable judge promptly replied in a technical phrase of logic, and this excited in the audience some diversion. When another of the counsel, Mr. Nicholas, was speaking on the favorite topic of the right of the jury to consider the constitutionality of the sedition law, he was not interrupted by the judge. But Mr. Nicholas has been proved to have been always civil, always respectful to a court of justice, consequently the Court would be civil to him. A third counsel, Mr. Hay, who was extremely desirous, as he has himself testified, to make an oration, not only for the purpose of satisfying the jury but the audience that a jury had a right to judge of the constitutionality of the sedition law, was interrupted by the judge, who denied his position. Mr. Hay had stated other matters during the trial which appeared to the judge to be erroneous. He had stated that a jury in this case of Callender, was the proper tribunal to assess the fine, in which he had been corrected by the Court; that one of the jurors, Mr. Basset, was not qualified to serve, &c. His zeal in the cause of liberty and the constitution made him pertinacious in some things which the judge pronounced to be errors. It was no wonder then that such an advocate was stopped and often interrupted by the Court. If any thing was done amiss by the judge during the trial, it was his desiring Mr. Hay to proceed in his own way, and promising to interrupt him no more let him say what he would; but this circumstance plainly evinces that the interruptions did not arise from corrupt motives. It may truly be said that Judge Chase, in his behavior to counsel, was “all things to all men.” To the logical Mr. Wirt, he was logical; to the polite Mr. Nicholas, he was polite; to the zealous and pertinacious Mr. Hay, he was warm and determined. If the counsel had conducted themselves with propriety towards the Court there would have been no interruptions; but when the judge found that the opinions of the bench were slighted, and that the conduct of the bar had a tendency to mislead and influence the public mind against a statute of Congress, he endeavored to turn their sentiments and reasoning into ridicule, and he produced by his wit a considerable degree of merriment at their expense, of which no doubt Colonel John Taylor, who has proved it for the prosecutors, was, from his natural temper, a full partaker.

You are now about to set an example in a case of impeachment which will have a most important influence in our country. It will be an example to the tribunals in the several States who like you possess the power of trying impeachments, and who may learn from you by what rules the doctrine of impeachment is to be regulated. It will be a polar star to guide in prosecutions of this kind. You are about to set an example to the ordinary tribunals of justice in every corner of the United States. They will know how this high Court has done justice between the House of Representatives of the American nation and a single individual, and hence they may learn how to do justice to the most weak and friendless individual, when accused in their courts by the most powerful. An upright and independent judiciary is all-important in society. Let your example be as bright in its justice as it will be extensive in its influence. If the people shall find that their confidential servants, the House of Representatives, have brought forward an accusation against another of their servants for high crimes and misdemeanors in his exalted office, which after a fair and patient hearing has not been supported by evidence, it will afford them pleasure to hear of his honorable acquittal, and such, may it please this honorable Court, will be, I trust, the result of your deliberations.