Thursday, October 27.
Another member, to-wit, Abram Trigg, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
Louisiana Treaty.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, entitled, “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for other purposes.”
The bill having been read, by paragraphs, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris, on the thirtieth day of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the army and navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the third day of March last, entitled, “An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals,” which he may deem necessary; and so much of the sum appropriated by the said acts as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That, until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.
Mr. J. Randolph said he was apprised that the bill was of such a nature as seemed to delegate to the President of the United States a power, the exercise of which was intended to have but a short duration; he was also aware, that some such power was necessary to be vested in the Executive, to enable him to take possession of the country ceded by France. But he could conceive no cause for giving a latitude, as to time, so extensive as that allowed by the second section, which says, that “until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” If we give this power out of our hands, it may be irrevocable until Congress shall have made legislative provision; that is, a single branch of the Government, the Executive branch, with a small minority of either House, may prevent its resumption. He did not believe that, under any circumstances, it was proper to delegate to the Executive a power so extensive; but if proper under certain circumstances, he was sure it was improper under present circumstances. As he conceived it proper to deal out power to the Executive with as sparing a hand as was consistent with the public good, he should move an amendment to substitute in the place of the words “Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories”—these words, “the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of the said territories be sooner made by Congress.” So that if Congress shall make provision for the government of the territory at any time during the session, the power of the President will cease, and at any rate at the expiration of the session. In other words, this amendment will compel Congress to take early measures for reducing this enormous power, delegated to the Executive, by the establishment of a government for the people of Louisiana.
Mr. R. Griswold moved to strike out the whole of the second section, which would supersede the motion of the gentleman from Virginia. He made this motion to obtain an explanation respecting the nature and extent of the delegated power. That section provides “that until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” I wish to know, said Mr. Griswold, whether any gentleman can inform me what the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing province are; for we are about to confirm them, and direct their execution by the authorities of the United States.
It is probable that some of them may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. We have certain restrictions on powers exercised under it. For instance, that the habeas corpus shall not be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion, and a variety of other restraints. It is for this reason that I think we ought to have some knowledge of the powers exercised in Louisiana, before we confirm them in the lump; and in order to obtain this information, I move to strike out the section.
Mr. Elliot rose to second the motion of the gentleman from Connecticut, and to express his coincidence in the sentiments of that gentleman on this subject. He would never consent to delegate, for a single moment, such extensive powers to the President, even over a Territory. Such a delegation of power was unconstitutional. If such a provision as that contemplated by the section were necessary, it became Congress itself to enter upon the task of legislation.
Mr. J. Randolph had hoped that some other member would have given the gentleman from Connecticut the satisfaction he asked in relation to the provisions of the section proposed to be stricken out. No one having risen, he would do it himself as well as he was able. That gentleman asks whether we know the civil, military, and judicial powers that subsist in Louisiana; and contends that it is necessary we should know them before they are transferred to the Executive of the United States. If the section were to stand as it now does, Mr. R. said he would be as unwilling as the gentleman from Connecticut to agree to it. But, with the proposed limitation, he saw no substantial objection to it. He was one of those who did not know with precision what the subsisting civil, military, and judicial powers exercised in Louisiana were; and yet he saw not the difficulty which the gentleman had stated, as to the temporary transfer of the powers to the Executive with the limitation proposed—and wherefore? Because, in the nature of things, it was almost impossible to take possession of the country without the exercise of such powers at some point of time, and if they should be exercised but for a single moment, such exercise would be as hostile to the principles of the gentleman as the exercise of them for a whole year.
I ask, said Mr. R., whether if the country should be taken possession of on the principles advocated by the gentleman on a former day, these powers would not all have attached to the Executive? Suppose, instead of assuming the civil government of the territory, it had been taken possession of by storm, by an army of 40 or 50,000 soldiers—will the gentleman contend, that under such circumstances, the privilege of the habeas corpus or trial by jury would have been invaded? Undoubtedly not. If the gentleman will advert with precision to the first section, he will perceive that it is contemplated to take possession in such a manner as will give the United States security in that possession. For though we might not doubt the disposition of the Government of France to give us a secure possession, or apprehend difficulty from any other quarter, yet it would be recollected that there were citizens or subjects in the territory requiring some government. It was not impossible that on taking possession there may be some turbulent spirits, who, having at heart the advancement of personal schemes, may be disposed to resist. It would be unwise then in Congress to delay making the requisite provision, until necessity claimed it, and until, perhaps, after Congress had adjourned.
Gentlemen will see the absolute necessity of the path chalked out by the Senate. They will see the necessity of the United States taking possession of the country in the capacity of sovereigns, in the same extent as that of the existing government of the province. After having taken possession, and being in the secure enjoyment of the country, it will be extremely proper to guard against any apprehended Executive invasion of right. This step will then be politic, and it will be observed that the section as amended enjoins this duty upon Congress. If, however, the gentleman from Connecticut will show us any way in which the country may be taken possession of, with security, and by which the people may enjoy all the rights and franchises of citizens of the United States immediately, I shall be happy to give it the sanction of my vote. But to my mind this appears impossible.
Mr. Griswold thought it extraordinary that the gentleman from Virginia should call upon him to propose a plan for avoiding the difficulties that would apparently result from the system proposed by the bill, when it had only that day been laid upon their tables, and had been yesterday refused to be referred to a select committee; and of consequence, no time for reflection had been allowed. Under these circumstances, it was indeed extraordinary that he should be expected to propose a plan. He confessed he was unable to offer any. To do it would doubtless require time and deliberation. It was sufficient for him that the bill infringed the constitution. By the second section it is proposed to transfer to the President of the United States all the powers, civil, military, and judicial, exercised at present in that province. What are those powers? No gentleman is able to inform me. It may be presumed that they are legislative; the President, therefore, is to be made the legislator of that country; that they are judicial, the President, therefore, is to be made judge; that they are executive, and so far they constitutionally devolve on the President. Hence, we are about making the President the legislator, the judge, and the executive of this territory. I do not, said Mr. G., understand that, according to the constitution, we have a right to make him legislator, judge, and executive, in any territory belonging to the United States. Though, therefore, on this occasion, I feel no jealousy of the abuse of the powers conferred on the President, yet I cannot agree to them, because I consider them repugnant to the constitution.
The argument that the powers are necessary, though unconstitutional, is no argument with me. If gentlemen can so explain the section, as to show to the satisfaction of the committee that it is competent to this House to transfer to the President all these powers, I shall have no objection to the section; but until this is done, it is my duty to vote for striking it out. And though it is impossible for me, at this moment, to devise a plan for overcoming these difficulties, yet I trust, if time be allowed, there will be found wisdom enough in the committee to devise one. To the first section, authorizing the taking possession of the country, so far as I can understand it, I can see no objection.
Mr. Nicholson was opposed to striking out the second section, as he did not perceive the evils contemplated by the gentleman from Connecticut. The question is, whether we shall take immediate possession of this country, or wait till this body shall have time to form such a government as shall be hereafter likely to render the people happy, under laws according to the provisions of the constitution? I think, said Mr. N., it will be injudicious to delay taking the possession, until such a government shall be formed. The only question then that can be started is, whether the second section of this bill violates the constitution. On this point I differ entirely from the gentleman from Connecticut. I do not see in it any violation of the constitution. The gentleman supposes that by adopting the provisions of the second section we shall vest all the civil, military, and judicial powers of the existing Government of Louisiana in the President. But it clearly is not so. We vest in him the appointment of the persons who shall exercise these powers, but we do not delegate to him the exercise of the powers themselves. Is there any difference between this, and the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, which relates to territorial governments? By that ordinance, and I have never heard its constitutionality questioned, all the civil, military, and judicial powers are vested in such persons as the President may appoint.
Mr. Mitchill expressed his wish that the section of the bill might stand. To strike it out would be to make void all the proceedings respecting the province of Louisiana, on which Congress had been engaged with so much care and diligence. We had purchased the country, and made arrangements to pay for it; and now, with the consent of France, possession is to be taken; when behold! an objection is made to that part of the intended statute which confers on the President the power to occupy and hold it peaceably for the nation.
But, let it be examined fairly what Congress are meditating to do. The third section of the fourth article of the constitution contemplates that territory and other property may belong to the United States. By a treaty with France the nation has lately acquired title to a new territory, with various kinds of public property on it or annexed to it. By the same section of the constitution, Congress is clothed with the power to dispose of such territory and property, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting it. This is as fair an exercise of constitutional authority as that by which we assemble and hold our seats in this House. To the title thus obtained, we wish now to add the possession; and it is proposed that for this important purpose the President shall be duly empowered. There is no person in the nation to whom this can be so properly confided as to the President.
Mr. Dana said if the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania were inserted, it might imply that we may pass laws that were unconstitutional; it was, therefore, superfluous. It is objected to the scope of the second section, that it is unconstitutional; insert the amendment and it nullifies it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) has referred to a subject with which he is well conversant. He is correct in stating that the formal style of the English acts is in the name of the King. In the formal style of the acts of Parliament, the King is legislator; but will it be inferred from this circumstance that he is the real legislator? The gentleman is too well acquainted with the constitution and laws of that country, not to know that the King, though nominally the dispenser of justice, cannot himself sit upon the bench, and that this has been the case since the act of settlement. He might, in support of this position, refer to the declaration of a celebrated Chief Justice of England, who had said that the honor of the Crown had nothing to do with the courts of justice.
The gentleman is equally unfortunate in his remarks on the power of Congress to make rules for the government of a Territory. It is objected to this, that in this case you make no laws at all. Is it to make laws, to say a man may do as he pleases? The proposed government is not even provisional or circumscribed. Insufficient also is any argument deducible from the ordinance establishing territorial governments. He presumed the ordinance alluded to was that of 1787. Under that ordinance the President is authorized to appoint the judges of the Territory; but once appointed, they hold their offices during good behavior. Who, under that ordinance, make the laws? Neither the judges nor the President. No laws can be accepted but such as have received the sanction of a representative body. What is proposed by the bill? That all powers, military, civil, and judicial, exercised by the officers of the existing government, shall be vested in such persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President shall direct. He may, under this authority, establish the whole code of Spanish laws, however contrary to our own; appoint whomsoever he pleases as judges, and remove them according to his pleasure; thus uniting in himself all the power, legislative, executive, and judicial. This, though a complete despotism, gentlemen may perhaps say is necessary. If so, let the military power be exercised by the President as commander-in-chief of the armies.
Mr. Eustis said it was possible the bill under consideration might in its details be objectionable, but in principle it was certainly sound. The Government of the United States has a constitutional right to acquire territory, and they have consequently a right to take possession of it when acquired. The taking possession of it was not only the right, but the duty of the Government. And how is this to be effected? Will any gentleman venture to propose a delay until Congress shall have passed a new code of laws? Are gentlemen, at this late day, to be informed that this would be to throw away one of the most valuable acquisitions made by our country since the adoption of the constitution, or the Declaration of Independence? As the gentleman, last speaking, rightly observes, the entire government of Spain ceases on our taking possession. Are we then to abandon the people to anarchy?
As to the extent of the power vested in the Executive, it arises from necessity. This is a new case altogether. There is no doubt that on many particular subordinate points, respecting the secure possession of this country, difficulties may present themselves. But Mr. E. presumed and expected that the same wisdom that acquired it, would preside over the councils of the nation to meet and overcome those difficulties. The second section of the bill contemplates the transfer to officers of the United States, of the same powers now exercised. It may be that the exercise of all these powers will not be necessary; while it is possible that others may be necessary. There may be difficulties of various kinds. He should name none. But as they arise, it will be the duty of the Government to be prepared to meet them. He would, therefore, wish this act rather to increase than curtail them; and that the President should be authorized not only to continue all necessary existing powers, but to institute such other powers as may be necessary for the well-being of the Territory. Till when? Until this House and the other branch of the Legislature shall make the necessary laws. The powers delegated by the bill are imposed by the imperious circumstances of the case. What if forcible possession shall prove necessary, and the innocent inhabitants should be slaughtered, through a want of the powers necessary to preserve tranquillity and good order; whose will, under such circumstances, will be the governing one? Will not the President, in such event, have all the powers now given him?
Mr. R. Griswold.—The powers proposed to be conferred by the gentleman are without limits. It may be necessary for the welfare of the people, to secure their religion. The President may be, therefore, constituted grand inquisitor, he may also be made a king, and likewise a judge, for the good of the people. I am not, said Mr. G., willing myself to give him such extensive powers. I can, however, well account for certain gentlemen urging on this occasion the old French argument of “imperious necessity.” But such a pretext can never justify me in giving a vote that will violate the constitution. I can, in truth, see no such necessity, as provision can be made for admitting these people to the enjoyment of all the privileges stipulated by the treaty, without involving a violation of the constitution. Gentlemen may criminate, as they please, the motives of those who are for restraining this extension of executive power; but I trust, whatever may be the feelings of gentlemen, that the committee will not be impressed with the same opinion entertained by them; but that if they consider this delegation of power as repugnant to the constitution, they will not agree to it, or, in other words, to the investiture of the President with absolute power over this province. If, on the other hand, they think the delegation is constitutional, they will feel no repugnance to agreeing to it; because, as I observed before, the power will be of short duration, and will not, probably, be abused.
As to the idea of some gentlemen, that this territory, not being a part of the United States, but a colony, and that therefore we may do as we please with it, it is not correct. If we acquire a colony by conquest or purchase—and I believe we may do both—it is not consistent with the constitution to delegate to the President, even over a colony thus acquired, all power, legislative, executive, and judicial; for this would make him the despot of the colony. Mr. G. concluded his remarks by observing that he had no jealousy of the abuse of this power by the President; but not being, in his opinion, authorized by the constitution, he could not agree to vote for it.
Mr. Smilie said, this subject struck him differently from other gentlemen. If it appeared clear to him that the constitutional right to delegate the powers contemplated by the second section did not exist, he should vote against it. But he entertained no doubt on this point. He knew that it had been doubted whether the constitution authorized the Government of the United States to acquire territory; but those doubts were this day abandoned. He agreed in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) that the Constitution of the United States did not extend to this territory any further than they were bound by the compact between the ceding power and the people. On this principle they had a right, viewing it in the light of a colony, to give it such government as the Government of the United States might think proper, without thereby violating the constitution; when incorporated into the Union, the inhabitants must enjoy all the rights of citizens. He would thank gentlemen to show any part of the constitution that extends either legislative, executive, or judicial power, over this territory. If none such could be shown, it must rest with the discretion of the Government to give it such a system as they may think best for it. At the same time, Mr. S. said, he would pledge himself to be among the first to incorporate the territory in the Union, and to admit the people to all the rights of citizens of the United States.
Mr. Rodney.—When a constitutional question is made, and constitutional objections urged by a respectable member of this House, they shall always receive from me a respectful attention. On this occasion I shall endeavor to answer the objections, and remove the doubts entertained by some gentlemen. I believe we shall find that, by adopting the second section of the bill under consideration, we shall not infringe the constitution in the remotest degree. No person is more opposed to the extreme of absolute and unlimited power, or to vesting in any man that authority which, by not being circumscribed within known bounds, may be easily abused. No man can be more opposed to the exercise by the President of powers exercised by the Spanish inquisition, and authorized by other Governments. But cases may occur where, for a moment, powers to which, without an absolute necessity, no one would agree, become necessary to be vested in some department of the Government; and I am in favor of this section for the reasons assigned by my friend from Virginia, to wit, that the exercise of the powers delegated will be confined to a short space, and will be of no further duration than shall be necessary to obtain the end of a secure possession of the Territory.
The United States, it is acknowledged, have a right to extend their territory beyond that which they possessed when the constitution was formed. If, then, there exist the right to acquire territory, there is a consequence of the laws that pervade all civilized nations, which will show not only the constitutionality but the propriety also of this section. It is a received principle of the law of nations, that, when territory is ceded, the people who inhabit it have a right to the laws they formerly lived under, embracing the whole civil and criminal code, until they are altered or amended by the country to whom the cession is made. This is the received principle of the law of nations, and operates wherever the right to acquire territory is previously given. I will put a plain case, on the ground so commonly of late resorted to, that of acquiring territory by war. The right to make war is vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States. Suppose we had gone down the Mississippi, and favored the wishes of some of our citizens. Would not gentlemen, in that case, have acknowledged that we should have possessed the right of laying contributions? Should we not have had the right of saying to those who exercised the powers of government in that country, “Begone! We will make new arrangements; the powers of government shall be exercised by such particular organs as we like. Your laws and your religion shall be preserved; but your officers shall be replaced by ours.” Under the laws of nations we should have enjoyed all these powers.
But, independent of this power conferred by the law of nations, I am inclined to think the provisions of the constitution apply to this case. There is a wide distinction between States and Territories, and the constitution appears clearly to indicate it. By examining the constitution accurately, it will be found that the provision relied upon by the gentleman from Connecticut will not avail to support his argument. It will appear that it is to operate in the case of States only. By the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, it is declared that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or any particular State.”
This provision does not limit or restrain the authority of Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and complete power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject. Let us not be told this power, from its greatness, is liable to abuse. If arguments are drawn from the abuse against the use of power, I know no power which may not be abused, and it will follow that the same arguments that are urged against the use of this power may be urged against the use of all power.
We may be told that, in the government of the North-western Territory, there are certain fixed rules established. But by a recurrence to the ordinance for the government of that Territory, and to the laws of Congress subsequently made, it will be seen that Congress have conceived themselves to be possessed of the right, and have actually exercised the power, to alter the Territory, by adding to or taking from it as they thought proper, and by making rules variant from those under which it was originally organized.
In the Territories of the United States, under the ordinances of Congress, the governor and the judges have a right to make laws. Could this be done in a State? I presume not. It shows that Congress have a power in the Territories, which they cannot exercise in States; and that the limitations of power, found in the constitution, are applicable to States and not to Territories.
The question was then put on striking out the second section, and lost—ayes 30.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.