Tuesday, February 19.
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Mr. Bidwell.—The motion, as now amended, embraces two objects: to provide additional penalties for the security of the privilege of habeas corpus, and to define the powers of the Supreme Court as to issuing writs of habeas corpus. It is proposed to appoint a select committee to inquire into the expediency of making these provisions. Each member of this proposition is expressly predicated, by its mover, upon particular recent occurrences; the one, upon the conduct of General Wilkinson, in seizing certain persons at New Orleans, and sending them to the seat of Government, under military arrest; the other, upon the late determination of a majority of the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in a case of habeas corpus, for the discharge of some of those persons. With respect to both of these objects, and also as it respects the propriety of referring the question to a select committee, I am opposed to the motion, and hope it will not be adopted.
But, sir, is it necessary or proper, if we had leisure, to pass a law on the subject, at the present time? The principal argument in favor of it has been drawn from the recent transactions at New Orleans. We have been told that the constitution has been violated, and that Congress ought to act on the occasion; otherwise, we may become familiarized to encroachments on the constitution, until all respect for that sacred instrument may be lost. Sir, this argument is a two-edged sword. It cuts both ways. If, for a temporary purpose, the trumpet of alarm is sounded, when there is no real danger; if, by way of appeal to the public, we are urged to legislate upon a suggestion that the constitution has been violated when there has been no such violation, or none but what the ordinary course of law is competent to correct and redress; we may be familiarized to charges of that nature, until we become insensible, indifferent, and disinclined to interpose, when legislative interposition may be really necessary.
For the sake of argument, let it be admitted that a constitutional right has been infringed. Does it follow that Congress ought to legislate on the occasion? Take the instance which, in order to bring the subject home to ourselves, has been put. Suppose a member of this House, in contempt of his constitutional exemption from arrest, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, is arrested on civil process, and imprisoned in this territory, or carried out of it, if you please, under arrest; would Congress feel themselves called upon to pass a law, in consequence of such infringement of a constitutional privilege? No, sir. The legal remedies already provided would be sufficient. The party injured might sue out a habeas corpus for his discharge, in the first place, and afterwards commence his action for damages, to be assessed by a jury, upon a full consideration of all the circumstances of aggravation or alleviation; and the officer or person who did the injury would be still further liable to be indicted by a grand jury and tried and punished by the proper tribunal. These, sir, are the existing provisions of law. And I am not willing to disparage the right of jury trial, so solemnly recognized in the constitution, by treating it as inadequate to give relief. It is a privilege by no means inferior to the habeas corpus. It is one, indeed, without which that cannot be enforced. It is a legal and constitutional remedy; and no friend to our laws and constitution will attempt to degrade it. I am not pretending that it is perfect. Imperfection is stamped upon every thing that is human. Courts and juries are not infallible; they are not inaccessible to those passions and prejudices which are common to men in all situations. But they are not more liable to the influence of erroneous or improper considerations than legislatures are. No safer institution than that of trial by court and jury, has been devised to redress infractions of personal rights. It is open to all persons who think they have sustained an injury, and is as free from objection as the lot of humanity will admit.
Has any officer refused to serve a writ of habeas corpus? No such refusal is pretended. Has any person, on whom a writ of habeas corpus, from a court or judge of the United States, has been served, refused to obey it? No instance of such disobedience has been officially communicated to us, according to my understanding and recollection of the official communications. It has, I am sensible, been charged upon General Wilkinson, and, in proof of the charge, a gentleman from Vermont has read, from a newspaper, that officer’s return to a writ granted by the Territorial court of Orleans. For it is to be observed, that the application was not made to the court of the United States there, but to that of the Territory. The General’s return was expressed in the language of a soldier, and not of a lawyer. It did not state, with technical precision, whether Dr. Bollman was within his control at the service of the writ. I may be incorrect, for I have not particularly investigated the subject, and it may not be very material, but I understand the fact to have been, that Dr. Bollman had been sent from New Orleans, on his way to this city, when the writ was served on General Wilkinson. This appears from the further proceedings of the court, as published in the same paper, from which the first return has been read.
[Here a message from the President was received and read, after which Mr. B. proceeded.]
When the message was announced, I was noticing an extract from the proceedings of the Territorial court at New Orleans, which I now beg leave to read.
“In the Superior Court of Orleans, December 26th. In the matter of the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to General Wilkinson, to produce the body of Dr. Erick Bollman; on motion of Mr. Livingston (in behalf of Mr. Alexander, the attorney upon record) that General Wilkinson be required to make a further and more explicit return to the said habeas corpus, or show cause to-morrow morning, at the opening of the court, why an attachment should not issue against him: It was ordered, that the rule be granted, and that a copy thereof be immediately delivered by the sheriff to General Wilkinson. On the next day, on motion of Mr. Duncan, in behalf of General Wilkinson, and on reading the following, as an amended return to the above-mentioned habeas corpus:
“The undersigned, commanding the Army of the United States, takes on himself the responsibility for the arrest of Dr. Erick Bollman, on a charge of misprision of treason against the United States, and has adopted measures for his safe delivery to the Executive of the United States. The body of the said Erick Bollman is now, and was at the time of the writ of habeas corpus, to which this return relates, out of the possession, power, or custody of the undersigned.
‘JAS. WILKINSON.’
“Ordered, That the same be received and filed, and the rule nisi of attachment be discharged.”
The fact is here stated as I have understood it. Dr. Bollman was on his passage to this place, before the writ of habeas corpus, sued out by his friends, was served on General Wilkinson; whose transaction, therefore, in whatever light it is to be viewed, in relation to the laws and authorities of that Territory, was not a disobedience to this writ of habeas corpus, but a military seizure and transmission of a person from New Orleans to Washington, under an avowed responsibility, and upon the principle that it was necessary for the public safety. At any rate it does not appear to have resulted from a want of penalty, or any defect whatever in the habeas corpus laws of that Territory, whose courts and laws, and not those of the United States, were resorted to for relief.
One case has been mentioned in the newspapers, in which a writ of habeas corpus, issued under the authority of the United States, was not obeyed. An officer at Charleston, South Carolina, it is said, instead of producing Dr. Bollman, in obedience to a writ from the district judge, transmitted him to Washington, because the orders of General Wilkinson, in general terms, directed his transmission, without any particular instructions respecting a habeas corpus. The officer seems to have considered it his duty to obey the orders of his commander, without regard to any interfering lawyer or civil process. I am of opinion that he erred, and has exposed himself to punishment, as well as to damages. But his error does not appear to have been wilful, nor to have resulted from any defect in the law, but from an erroneous military principle. The same principle, however, has, at the present session, found very respectable advocates on the floor of this House. Yes, sir, in the case of Captain George Little, gentlemen held that a military or naval officer is not bound to take notice of any law in opposition to, or even in explanation of, the orders of his superior. It will be recollected that I opposed that doctrine, although I admitted that an officer, civil or military, acting contrary to law, through misapprehension of its meaning in a doubtful case, or in some great emergency not provided for by law, might be equitably entitled to indemnification. Damages had been recovered against Captain Little, for doing an illegal act, in pursuance of orders from the late President of the United States, and Congress have passed a law to indemnify for those damages. The Executive orders, under which he claimed, taken in connection with the law, which was referred to in the orders, did not appear to me to warrant the transaction, which has been adjudged to be illegal, and for which the damages were recovered. I did not, therefore, vote with the majority in favor of his claim. But gentlemen who supported it on the ground I have mentioned, will, if they are consistent, be so far from inferring a necessity for further penalties, from the case of Captain Kaltiesas at Charleston, that they will be ready to grant him an indemnification, if he shall be found to have acted honestly, according to his understanding of his orders. By indemnification, I do not mean an act of indemnity, in the British sense of the term, pleadable in bar both to an action for damages and to a prosecution for an offence. Such an act might here be considered unconstitutional and void. A remuneration for damages incurred has been the mode of indemnification adopted by our Government.
On this subject an example has been quoted for our instruction, from English history. It was a proclamation, issued in derogation of law, by the King, with the advice of the celebrated Lords Chatham and Camden, on a great national exigency. The measure was generally approved and applauded throughout the nation. The Parliament were ready to sanction it. But, instead of accepting an act of indemnity, those Ministers undertook to justify it, as legal, upon the principle of necessity. In that they erred. When the question came before the court for judicial consideration, Lord Mansfield decided against the doctrine of his great political rivals, and I think his decision was correct. As a judge or a juror I should have condemned them. But, sir, if instead of justifying the proclamation, as legalized by State necessity, the Ministers had acknowledged their responsibility for it, and thrown themselves upon the justice of their Government, had I been a member of the British Parliament I would have voted them an indemnity. Their error consisted, not in doing an illegal act for the public good, but in doing it under color of legal authority, when the law did not authorize it. Whether General Wilkinson’s conduct has been correct or erroneous in other respects, he has not fallen into this error of those celebrated English statesmen. He has not pretended that, in seizing the persons alluded to and transmitting them to the seat of Government, he was justified by orders or by law. He has not cast the responsibility upon any other officer or department of Government. He has explicitly assumed it all to himself, and put himself on the candor of his country for indemnification. If it shall appear that he has acted honestly, for the safety of the Army and the preservation of the Union, under the pressure of such urgent necessity as he professes, I trust he will be indemnified. On the contrary, if it shall turn out, upon future investigation, that he has acted unnecessarily and wantonly, from motives of malice or resentment, he will undoubtedly be left to suffer the consequences. I give no opinion of the merits of his conduct. I hope the House will not, at present, give an opinion, or adopt any measure calculated to have a bearing on the question. It is premature. We have not sufficient information. We have not a statement of all the facts, nor the evidence in support of the facts, which are stated. In due time an inquiry will be proper, and doubtless will be instituted. General Wilkinson will probably demand it himself. But it would be unfair and unjust, as well as impolitic, to anticipate it.
Mr. Quincy.—So long as an intention appeared to make this a party question, I had no inclination to intermeddle with it. The subject seems to me to be of too high a nature, and too deeply to be connected with the rights and liberties of us all, to be examined under those narrow and temporary views which party spirit necessarily introduces. Since the discussion has assumed a milder aspect, I shall offer a few considerations; limiting myself to a very simple and brief elucidation of the subject, in a point of view which no other gentleman has taken of it, as yet, on this floor.
I cannot agree with those gentlemen who maintain that in the arrest and transportation of Bollman and Swartwout, they can see no violation of the rights of individuals. The privileges of the constitution are as much the inheritance of the humblest and the most depraved, as of the most elevated or virtuous citizen. To be seized by a military force, to be concealed and hurried beyond the protection of the civil power, and to be sent a thousand miles for trial, in a place where the crime charged was not committed, I humbly conceive are violations of individual rights, and of the constitution. I am not, however, prepared to say, that in no possible case they can be pardoned; nor, with the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) that in no case, I would consent to indemnify a military commander for making such an arrest. A case might exist when it might be the duty of a legislature thus to indemnify. I agree, however, that it must be an extreme case, and that the party to be indemnified must evince that he had himself no voluntary agency in producing the state of things which made such an unconstitutional exercise of power necessary to the safety of the State. I give no opinion concerning the conduct of General Wilkinson. The events which happened at New Orleans have no other relation to the subject before the House than this: they have turned the attention of reflecting men in this nation to the nature of the security they possess against similar violence; and, in common with other reflecting men, it has become our duty not only to understand the nature of that security, but also to supply, as soon as possible, any deficiencies we may discover in it.
The only question is, Have this people the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus secured to them as fully and effectually as the constitution intended, and as wise and prudent men ought to desire? I answer, unequivocally, they have not. So far as relates to cases under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, we have virtually no writ of habeas corpus. And for this plain reason, that we have none of the sanctions of the writ; we have none of those penalties, without which the writ of habeas corpus is a dead letter: particularly in all cases in which the state of party passions, or of any predominant power, leads to the oppression of an individual.
The writ of habeas corpus and the penalties by which it is enforced, and in which the great benefit of the privilege consists, are distinct things in their nature. The former was known to the English common law, and although, at all periods of English history, it was held a very precious right, yet were its provisions found wholly inefficacious against arbitrary power, until after the statute of Charles II. called by Englishmen their second Magna Charta. This statute gave penalties unknown to the common law. If a judge refuses to grant, or an officer refuses to execute the writ, he is liable to a penalty of five hundred pounds sterling, and similar sanctions annexed to other neglects of the precept. The House will observe, that all these penalties are securities given to personal liberty, additional to those which exist at common law, and are not substituted for them. These penalties are annexed for disobedience to the writ, not as indemnification for the injury. All the other remedies against the judge, or the party imprisoning, remain unimpaired.
The question recurs, does the Federal Constitution, by securing to us “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” secure to us those sanctions of the writ which constitute in England its characteristic security? If the constitution had re-enacted the statute of Charles, there could be no doubt. But will gentlemen seriously assert, that a penal statute of another country can, by construction, be declared the law of this, so as to make our citizens obnoxious to its penalties? If that statute be our national law, how was it obtained? Re-enacting statute we have none. And “the United States, as a Federal Government, have no common law,” if we give credit to declarations daily made upon this floor, or respect the opinions of one of the highest law authorities in this nation. I refer to the opinion of Judge Chase, in the case of the United States against Worrall. 2 Dallas, 394.
This view of the subject is certainly sufficient to satisfy this House, that their security for this great privilege is, at least, uncertain; and is not this reason enough, for this Legislature to commence an inquiry into the nature of that security, and the additional provisions it requires? This at present is the only question.
But the gentlemen ask “What need of further penalties? If the judge refuses the writ, is there not impeachment? Against the person illegally imprisoning another, is not an action for damages?” I answer: Both these securities for the personal liberty of the citizen existed, and do still exist in England, as fully as they do here, yet was it ever before heard that these were reasons against enacting that celebrated statute of Charles, or were ever urged as evidence that its provisions were needless, or useless? The penalties of that statute are guarantees of the liberties of the citizen, additional to those which result from the law and the constitution. The principle of that statute is, to rest satisfied with nothing short of the actual liberation of the person from illegal imprisonment, in the shortest time possible. To this end all its provisions tend. It will not leave a citizen to languish in prison, in expectation of the result of the slow progress of legislative inquisition, or for the purpose of ultimately qualifying him to receive a heavy compensation in damages. Impeachment is always a dubious, and an action for false imprisonment often an inadequate security for the observance of the writ of habeas corpus. Great violations of the privilege of this writ can never happen, unless in times of great violence. In such times, what hope of an impeachment against a judge who abuses his authority in coincidence with the views of a prevailing party? And as to damages, is personal liberty to be estimated by money? And if it were, what certainty that the person guilty of the illegal arrest will be competent to pay the damages recovered? In the case of seizure by a military power, can it ever be expected, from the universal pecuniary deficiencies of the soldiers, that damages will be realized, even should the civil arm be competent to enforce an execution?
The penalties affixed by the statute of Charles, on the contrary, assure the obedience of the courts and officers of justice, independent of all party influences which may happen to prevail in the nation, and secure personal liberty by pecuniary perils, suspended over the heads of men, whose situation in society is such as, in general, makes the attainment of the penalty certain, should it be incurred. Upon the whole, those who oppose the present motion seem to me to be reduced to this dilemma; either they must acknowledge that they are content that the citizens of these United States should possess less security for their liberties than the subjects of the law of England enjoy for theirs, or they are reduced to the necessity of adopting the doctrine that the statute penalties of another country may by construction become the laws of this nation; than which, I can conceive nothing more monstrous or absurd.
In this discussion it has been my wish to avoid all notice of the party and personal invectives which have been uttered. The question is too important to be mingled with feelings and passions of these descriptions. And the circumstances of the times and of the nation, seem to me to claim from us a contempt for these local and ephemeral distinctions.
Mr. Newton.—I presume I may be permitted, notwithstanding the motion has been tried, to go fully into the subject before the House. I hope this House will not indefinitely postpone it. If ever there was a subject within the attention of an enlightened Legislature, it is the subject before us. Every subject that regards the liberty of the citizen should be received with reverence and respect by the votaries of liberty. If we can better the situation of the people of the United States, and keep from them, under all circumstances, the hand of oppression, it is our duty to do it, and to pay attention to whatever is likely to eventuate in such an issue. I shall not consider this case as the basis of an impeachment. The only true inquiry at present is, whether the writ of habeas corpus is sufficiently fortified by legislative provisions? I will not commit my understanding so far as to decide on the conduct of the Commander-in-chief. If he has done wrong, let him be answerable to the laws of his country; much less will I talk of indemnifying him. For this reason, because the jury before which the case may come, may, under such circumstances, have regard, not to his circumstances, but to the Treasury of the United States.
My friend and colleague, from Virginia, has offered a most important amendment to this resolution. The Supreme Court of the United States, after having this all-important case for a long time under advisement, and after an argument from the bar, are again afloat on the ocean of uncertainty, have started some new doubts, and have asked the gentlemen of the bar to come forward with a new argument. If this is the fact, does it not show the necessity of our attending to the subject; and of some new legislative provisions upon it? I am for defining the power of our courts. I wish to understand the extent of their prerogatives; and particularly whether they have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases; before whom criminals are to be brought; who are to grant writs of habeas corpus, and admit to bail?
These are all considerations of importance, and constitute the reasons which induce me to vote for referring this resolution to a select committee. But, say gentlemen, we cannot mature this subject this session. Perhaps so; but is this a sufficient reason for not commencing the investigation, for comparing our ideas on the subject, and going forward as far as we can in our progress towards a decision? I, for one, shall always be in favor of an inquiry into subjects that have a reference to personal liberty.
This subject has been spread over an immense extent of ground. The single point, however, at issue, is, whether we will commit this resolution, in order merely to obtain correct facts and information, which shall present the subject in such a form as shall enable us to act understandingly upon it. I am not at present in favor of acting definitively upon it; but merely for inquiry. So circumstanced, I presume our proceedings cannot injure any individuals implicated in this business, as nothing we can do can have a retrospective effect. These are my reasons for voting in favor of the present motion.
Mr. J. Randolph.—There has been a dispute in the world from time immemorial between wit and dullness—between imagination and judgment. So we have been told, though some who cultivate the sceptical philosophy dispute it. But this impression has been so long attempted to be made, that there is not a precise or formal coxcomb that does not on the score of dullness arrogate to himself judgment and profound wisdom. While I am willing to allow that declamation, or the powers of an effervescent imagination, are no evidences of wisdom, the House must admit that the mere dullness of a special pleader without his accuracy does not imply any pretensions to knowledge. The truth is, that on this as on other subjects, it has been my misfortune to come to the House too unprepared. I knew nothing of the subject until it was brought under discussion. I got up yesterday, as I have to-day, to say what first came into my head, and in this way I hope I shall be permitted to go on.
I consider the whole of this business as one of the most unfortunate kind that could have happened to the United States. If we had acquired Louisiana by force of arms or conquest, we could scarcely have inspired the people of that country with greater indignation than by these events—in which it is yet to be seen whether these people are at all concerned; or whether they are not standing like sheep, suffering the wolves to pass without disturbance—events which must sow the seeds of lasting misfortune, unless healed by a timely interposition of the Government. And nothing can have a more fatal effect than any thing done by this House, or the other part of the Government, to sanction the conduct of the Commander-in-chief, taking it to be such as is ascribed to him. As a member of this House I am free to give my opinion of what would restore peace to that country—though out of doors I might not do it. The first step ought to be the immediate recall of every man directly or indirectly concerned in this business. You can hardly suppose, sir, that I look forward to be made their Governor, or desire on my recommendation to introduce a friend to that place. But I have no hesitation in saying that unless some such step be taken, the attachment of that country to the United States is lost for ever. I would take such a step boldly—I would know nothing of their little disputes; I would act with the authority of a venerable parent, who, on returning home, found his children by the ears. I would correct them all, I would discountenance at once all such intrigues—I would recall every man who has directly or indirectly participated, or is suspected of having participated in them—I would, in short, rub out and begin again. It is an extremely unfortunate thing that the people of New Orleans, for the most part speaking the French language, a great part of them attached to the Crown of Spain—transferred to the United States by an honorable purchase—told they were about to taste the sweets of a Government of laws—told that arbitrary notions and lettres de cachet were to be proscribed—that the constitution was not to be departed from, but that they were to enjoy all the blessings of citizens of the United States—it is extremely unfortunate that New Orleans should be the first place in which a lesson of military despotism should be taught. I deem it extremely unfortunate—it cannot tend to attach those people to the United States; it will, however, have another tendency—it will prevent every man of character from emigrating to that country, and instead of mixing the Americans with the French, the latter will be kept as a distinct class. For will any man, having the least regard to his rights, go to a place where he will be seized by a military commandant? Suppose, Mr. Speaker, such a thing had taken place in your country or mine. The military would not at this period be before the court—the spirit of the country would have long since settled the question. I recollect in 1798 or 1799, when the officers of the army were following their legal avocation of enlisting recruits, such was the spirit of detestation in which a standing army was held in my district, that these men were obliged to break up and move off. That spirit would scarcely endure the legal act of a man acting under legal authority, and yet we have now an apology for men acting in direct contravention of legal authority. Will any man point out a good cause for this change?
The writ of habeas corpus is the only writ sanctioned by the constitution. It is guarded from every approach except by the two Houses of Congress; and yet this writ, thus acknowledged, thus specially designated, this second Magna Charta, as it has been called, is to be put on the footing of a common trespass. Really, when a man tells me that if imprisoned I may get damages, it requires no ghost to come and tell us that this may be done even without the writ of habeas corpus. But will gentlemen point to any legislative sanction by which the execution of this writ is guarded? Perhaps action on the case might be sustained for disobeying it; but suppose a judge should deny it. Impeach him, say gentlemen. But will gentlemen rely on that? That affords no certain punishment, and an uncertain punishment is inadequate. We want a certain and adequate remedy.
I stated that I would make a military officer, acting under his own responsibility, acting as commander-in-chief, punishable with death for such an infraction. Did I, in saying so, also say that I would punish an inferior officer with death? Will any man deny that a military character arraying himself against the constitution of his country is worthy of death? I say he is a traitor. A commander-in-chief of an army, who, on his own responsibility, puts the constitution and laws of his country at defiance, is a traitor; and, supposing the case stated at New Orleans to be correctly stated, the Commander-in-chief is as much a traitor as any other man concerned in the conspiracy. Who are these traitors? Burr & Co. What are they about to do? To put down the civil authority by military force; and is there any substantial difference whether the civil authority is trampled under foot by Burr and his banditti, or by a commander-in-chief and his regular army? I will go farther. Suppose these measures for putting down Burr shall eventually prove to have been measures for putting up somebody else, in what will these men differ? In nothing. If the commander of an army, to give himself a false eclat, shall trample the constitution under foot, shall go a certain length with conspirators, and finding his ground no longer tenable, shall determine to make up in zeal what he wanted in fidelity, he is guilty of treachery to the constitution and laws—he is guilty of more—he is guilty of violating the principle respected by knaves—the principle of fidelity to each other.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) has stated the difference that exists between the right of the writ of habeas corpus and the remedy. He has correctly stated that it is not intended as a remedy—not to allow an action for false imprisonment—but to prevent false imprisonment, and therefore that it ought to be guarded by sanctions. But the gentleman has omitted to mention one circumstance, which is, that in England the writ of habeas corpus is secured by the sanction of death. And is our attachment to liberty less than that of England? I say that a Chief Justice of England for refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus, may be impeached, taken to Tower Hill and decollated. If there had existed the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in England at the time of the impeachment of Strafford, could there have been a charge more strong than a settled design to do away that privilege? In England also it is guarded by the power of attainder. Thank God! we have not that feature in our constitution. But if the same spirit pervades that country now which once did, nothing would sooner pass a bill of attainder, through the two Houses of Parliament, than a known and wanton invasion of this privilege. But fortunately our constitution has denied to us this power; and it is because we cannot pass bills of attainder, and because judgments on impeachments do not affect the life, that it behooves us to guard this important principle with some more solemn sanctions than it now possesses.
Mr. J. Clay said, before the question was taken, he would mention one or two points that went to show the necessity of a reference. He understood that one of the persons arrested by General Wilkinson had been landed on an island near Charleston, and, on the issuing a writ, the officer had refused to obey it. He would ask whether this was not a violation of the writ of habeas corpus that required a remedy by law? Mr. C. said he always viewed it as a matter of regret, that questions of this kind should be taken up on party ground. He considered such a suggestion, on the present occasion, as a mere trap to get a few votes. They were told of the dark times when alien and sedition laws were passed. If, however, under the alien law, men might be deported, gentlemen should recollect that it was according to law—that there was an express statute that justified the measure. Mr. C. said he considered the kidnapping alluded to by gentlemen as a gross violation of the habeas corpus, and would be glad to know whether sending a man to Baltimore from Orleans, was not as gross a violation of principle as sending him from this place to Orleans? Mr. C. concluded by observing that he considered it a very unfortunate thing for any gentleman of talents to be educated at the bar. So many distinctions were there taken, that a man of his plain mind could scarcely see any thing. He should, however, adhere to the constitution, and would ask whether a military arrest was not a gross violation of it; and whether there ought not to be some exemplary punishment to guard against it?
Mr. Elmer said he should vote for the postponement of the resolution. It had been under discussion for three days, and he did not perceive they were nearer a result than on the first day. Was it discreet to refer this resolution to a select committee, when it was manifest they could not go through the business without neglecting important business already before them? He should also vote for the postponement, as, although three days had been taken up in the discussion, he had not heard any one gentleman urge a single reason to show the necessity of any additional provisions. This very transaction, he believed, would ultimately turn out beneficial to the United States, notwithstanding the arts of ambitious men. It would display such a striking regard of the people to the government of their choice, as to prevent any like attempts in future. Mr. E. said he did not know whether General Wilkinson was a conspirator, but in this case he did not see that the constitution had been so flagrantly violated. Take the case of a conspiracy against the constitution, to level and destroy the constitution altogether, and directed towards the garrison which General Wilkinson commanded, in a remote part of the United States, and distant from any strength to support him. If we consider the question in this view, that the lives and property of the citizens were at stake, and even the judges engaged with the conspirators, was it improper to take up these men and send them to a place where they could be impartially tried? Let gentlemen, said Mr. E., pass as sanguinary laws as they please, if I considered the judges concerned, and were satisfied there were conspirators within, I would arrest them, though death were the consequence, and I am persuaded every officer faithful to his trust, would do the same thing. I admit that in all cases, except of the greatest emergency, the military ought to give way to the civil power. With regard, however, to what gentlemen call the audacity of sending these people here, in the face of the legislative body, I confess I entertain a different opinion. In cases of military arrest, I am most afraid of secrecy. Does not publicity, as far as it goes, show a good conscience? Does it not show the wish of the Commander-in-chief that his conduct should be examined in the face of the nation, conscious that, on a full examination, he will appear to have acted as a good officer and an honest man? As I have said before, I do not know that he is honest. I know that he has been charged with being a conspirator, but on this point we have no proof before us.
Mr. Kelly said, in order to obtain a right understanding of the subject, it is necessary to inquire how this inestimable privilege was secured to the subjects of Great Britain by Magna Charta, the great charter of their privileges, which was extorted sword in hand by the Lords and Barons, from King John at Runnymede, and how far the privilege thus secured, was made more effectual by the statute of Charles II., which was called the second great charter of their liberties. This writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was secured by this charter, became a writ of right, not less secured to the subjects of that kingdom than the same is secured to our citizens by our constitution.
We are informed by Sir William Blackstone, in his famous commentaries on the English law, that the inestimable privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was of early date in Great Britain, almost coëval with the first rudiments of their constitution. The liberty of the subject could not be abridged in any case without special permission of law, although sometimes impaired by the usurpation of princes and the ferocity of particular times. It was, however, established on the firmest basis by the provisions of Magna Charta, and a long succession of statutes under Edward III., and was recognized by the Crown in several after reigns. And it will hardly be contended that this privilege is better secured to the citizens of the United States by our constitution, than the same was secured to the subjects of the British Crown by the provisions of Magna Charta. Yet abuses had crept into daily practice in England, which had in a great measure defeated this great constitutional remedy. The flagrant abuse of power by the Crown, generally, produced a struggle which discovered the exercise of that power to be contrary to law, or restrained it for the future. An obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus act in the reign of Charles II., which was justly called another Magna Charta of the kingdom. Francis Jenkes was committed by the Council Board for a turbulent speech made at a common hall assembled at Guildhall, for the purpose of choosing officers. He applied to the then Lord Chief Justice Kaimsford for a habeas corpus, who alleged that he could not grant the writ in vacation. The friends of the prisoner afterwards applied to the Lord Chancellor, who said the king would not grant it without a petition; application was afterwards made to the court of quarter sessions to have him bailed; the court said, there was no such name in the calendar; upon application to the jailer, he said he never returned any man committed by the Council Board. When a copy of the commitment was obtained, the jailer evaded making proof of it by going away, as was believed with the privity of the court; at length, the commitment being established, the court doubted their power to act, when the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor had refused, the court took time to consider of the application until next term. A petition was afterwards presented to the Lord Chancellor, who also took further time to consider; at length the Lord Chief Justice, upon the matter being suggested to the King, issued a habeas corpus, and the prisoner was discharged. To prevent similar abuses in future was the famous habeas corpus act passed, which regulated the mode of proceeding upon writs of habeas corpus, and fully ensured its benefits and provisions to the subject.
The question on indefinite postponement was then taken by yeas and nays, and carried—yeas 60, nays 58.