Wednesday, December 9.
Another member, to wit, Edward St. Loe Livermore, from Massachusetts, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
Fortifications and Gunboats.
The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported yesterday by the Committee of the Whole to the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats.”
Mr. Durell said, as there appeared to be a considerable diversity of opinion on this gunboat business, and as a number of gentlemen from, the North did not readily fall into the scheme of the Southern gentlemen, and as he was from the North, he would state some reasons why this bill should not pass. He thought, as every gentleman appeared to think, that this was a crisis which called for union and great exertion; the great object was, to arm the nation to meet an event which they would be called to meet ere long. The question was now on one species of this arming, on which there were different opinions.
It appeared that, in addition to fortifications, the precise number of one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats was called for. A question had been asked, why that number was exactly calculated as being necessary; the chairman of the committee, who reported the bill, states that this number was thought necessary by the Executive Department. It was not to the system of gunboats that he had an objection, for he believed that, to a certain extent, they might be useful; but he did not believe that gunboats in connection with fortifications, would attain the end for which they were acknowledged to be proposed. In casting his eye over the documents before him, he perceived that gunboats were assigned to certain situations in the North, where he was confident they could never be of use. He was positive of this fact. Four gunboats were assigned to the port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He would appeal to gentlemen in the House, acquainted with the situation of that port, whether they seriously believed that four gunboats, or that twenty, would be of any service there? It was impossible that they should; the situation of the port, the strength and rapidity of the tide, were such that they could not be used. The same observation would apply to a number of ports east of that; it was generally conceded that gunboats were not calculated for deep and turbulent waters; the Northern shores were not sand banks, and gentlemen seemed to think these were necessary to allow gunboats to defend even themselves.
He saw that for the ports of Norfolk and New York, there were assigned a large number of gunboats. He was inclined to believe that a number of frigates, to the amount of the expense of these gunboats, would be more consonant with the wishes of the people in the mouth of the Hudson, than so many gunboats.
One hundred and twenty-eight gunboats to Norfolk and New York! The expense of sixty-four, one half of this number, would be fully equal to the expense of four forty-four gun frigates; and he was of opinion that these, at one-half the expense, would be considered by the gentlemen from Norfolk and New York, and by the House, as better calculated than gunboats to defend those ports. Mr. D. could see no reason why they should not have their choice in this respect. He, therefore, concluded with moving to strike out “one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats,” and insert “one hundred and twenty-four gunboats, and four forty-four gun frigates.”
Mr. Blount called for a division of the question, wishing the first question taken on striking out.
Mr. Gardner felt very conscious of the importance of fortifying the various ports and harbors of the United States, and should give the bill his support on its passage; but he had been in hopes yesterday that the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would have prevailed. He wished to see the system of gunboats put into operation, and to see the efficiency of that mode of defence properly tested. There appeared to be many different opinions on the subject; and he perceived the House would not be satisfied till the experiment was tried, and their utility known. He was willing that as many gunboats should be employed as was sufficient for defence in those waters where they might be useful; but he did not think they would be efficient in the Northern and Eastern ports of the United States. He should be obliged to gentlemen if they would strike out a part of this number of gunboats, and appropriate the sum applicable to them to another mode of defence. There appeared to be a large majority in favor of the bill, but if they would be so condescending as to fortify the Northern ports in a way most agreeable to the people interested in their defence, he should feel gratified at it. He was in favor of the amendment, though he would rather a large number should be stricken out; and hoped the question on striking out would be carried, whether ships of war were inserted or not. It had been yesterday said, by a gentleman from Virginia, that if a less number were built than that proposed, they would be useless. This argument could have no weight with those who did not think they would afford defence at all; but, for his own part, he should vote for any thing in the shape of defence, till it should be found insufficient by experiment.
Mr. Bacon observed, that some gentleman had undertaken in themselves, to represent the whole Northern part of the Union, and had expressed their wishes that the House would condescend to listen to the united prayers of the representatives from those States. He only rose to say, that he, for one, protested against being considered as joining in that request. He was of opinion that the mode embraced by the bill would better accord with the sentiments of the people of the Northern States, than that which those gentlemen had proposed. He had no intention of making any calculation on the subject, because he did not consider himself qualified to do it; but would barely observe that, were the question fairly tried in the Northern interest, those gentlemen would be found in the negative.
Mr. Crowninshield said he considered the present proposition as much the same with that which was yesterday offered in Committee of the Whole, and to which the committee was decidedly opposed. He trusted the decision of the House to-day would be the same as that of the committee yesterday. He thought his friend from New Hampshire was extremely mistaken in his calculations of the comparative expense of gunboats, and frigates of forty-four guns. It would be seen by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, that the estimates for gunboats would amount to about $5,000; and he thought it would not go beyond it. Taking this for granted, the gentleman’s calculations of expense must fall to the ground. Mr. C. then stated the expense of frigates which had been built, from which it appeared that the expense of building one frigate was fully as much as that of sixty-four gunboats. If they proposed to strike out this number of gunboats in order to build frigates, they must add a sum of one million of dollars to the appropriation.
Mr. Sawyer said it was not his intention to trouble the House often with his observations; for, being but a young member, he sat there more for the purpose of acquiring information than of giving it; nor should he have risen at this time, had not his duty compelled him to reply to some remarks, and to oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Hampshire, (Mr. Durell.) The gentleman wished the United States to have a fleet; to have four forty-four gun frigates to assist in the defence of New York. For his own part, Mr. S. wished the United States were in such a situation as to enable them to usher into existence a fleet capable of annihilating at one blow the whole naval power of England, which had so long proved a scourge to all nations, and to this nation in particular. Such a consummation was devoutly to be wished; but the attainment of such an object by the United States, was utterly impossible: they had not means wherewith to do it, and an attempt which should fall short of the end, would do the nation more injury than good, by tending to swell the already overgrown naval power of Great Britain. At present, he must say, he was entirely opposed to a Naval Establishment, and differed entirely with the gentleman from Massachusetts, upon the propriety of any such establishment in the present situation of affairs; he wished to have nothing to do with any establishment unconnected with a system of land defence. There was a time when a Naval Establishment might have been consistent with national policy; when a naval armament, such as could then have been constructed, might have been instrumental, by proper management, in maintaining the balance of naval power in Europe; that time was, when the combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were nearly a match for the British naval force; but that time was now elapsed; that opportunity, which might have been so advantageously seized, was, through an unfortunate prejudice in favor of one nation and against another, suffered to escape unheeded. They now saw the effects of that policy; the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were swept from the ocean; the British Navy retained the undisputed possession of every sea, and it would be an extravagant undertaking in the United States to attempt the creation of a naval force calculated to make a serious impression upon Great Britain; they would become the mere shipwrights of Great Britain, who would be ready to receive their ships as fast as they could be launched. Could they erect a navy equal to that which Denmark had possessed? Could they build and equip twenty-four sail of the line at once? If they could do this, experience had fatally shown, that so far from aiding in the defence of this nation, that force would soon be turned against it; England, with a superior force, would soon convert them into a means of offence against this nation. But it would not be in the power of the United States, encumbered as they were by a great national debt, and cramped in their resources by interruptions of their trade, to provide a navy as respectable as that of Denmark was; and surely any smaller force could not be contemplated. Let us then, said he, apply our limited means to a mode of defence on which more reliance may be placed; let us in the first place put our ports and harbors in such a state of defence as will, in a great degree, prevent our feeling the want of a navy. To effect this object, he said, they must have recourse to gunboats. He did not conceive this means of defence to be so trivial as the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Durell) seemed to think them; not that they could be relied on as an efficient system of defence by themselves; not that they were to expel the British squadron from our shores, (though it was thought they could effect that object;) but because, in conjunction with land batteries and fortifications, they would ensure some safety of person and property in our seaport towns. By judicious management, by disposition in shoal waters, so as to aid the batteries on shore, they might be the means of preventing our cities from being plundered and burned, and our banks and stores from being rifled of their wealth. In this point of view, he considered them as part of a land defence, totally unconnected with a navy; they were not to go into deep water; the ocean was not their element; they were to remain in stations from which they might afford the greatest assistance to our forts and batteries, and when hard pressed or overpowered by force they could take shelter under them. This, said Mr. S., is the great advantage they have over heavy ships, there being no danger of their capture while we can maintain possession of our forts.
The British have not dared to attack a single French port since, though they had full possession of the channel and every means of attack which their unopposed naval superiority could afford. Though they saw preparing in those ports materials for their destruction, though they saw rising up in them means of offence so much dreaded as to require the utmost vigor of national exertion to provide against them, still did they stand aloof. Had Copenhagen been defended by gunboats distributed so as to act with the batteries, she would not have fallen so easy a prey; in fact, the few gunboats they had did all the execution that was done to the British shipping; for the fleet which remained in the port for its defence had no retreat from the superior force of the enemy, but where they could be pursued by vessels of equal size, while the gunboats ran under the forts and continued to annoy the British ships until those forts were taken by land. And if all the vessels which were captured had been gunboats, how much better would it have been for the Danes; how much less heavy would the loss of a few boats have been than that of so many large ships, so long building and accumulating, and at such an immense expense! But in order to show the inutility of gunboats, as well as fortifications, this House was told the British could succeed against our towns by landing a sufficient number of men below our forts and attacking them by land. This is exactly, Mr. S. said, what he wished to hear; for it was conceding at once that our gunboat and fortification defence would be too much for them to pass, that they would be compelled to give up the idea of carrying the place by water, and thus lose all the great advantages which their boasted irresistible naval power could afford them.
Mr. Cook said he could have wished that the different modes of defence should have been united, and decided upon together; but from the disposition of gentlemen who were in favor of the gunboat system, the House appeared to be compelled now to decide on this alone. It was well known that he was not averse to the proposition for constructing a number of gunboats; that he had last session given his vote in favor of them, and was now in favor of increasing the number, believing that in some situations they might be eminently useful; but when he found that so large a sum had been appropriated, almost to the exclusion of any other mode of defence, he deemed it his duty to give his vote in favor of a proposition tending more equally to apportion the modes of defence.
It had been moved to strike out of the bill a certain number of gunboats, and insert a certain number of ships of war. That a navy was necessary for the protection of our commerce was the opinion of President Washington, expressed at a time when our commerce was comparatively small. [Mr. C. here read an extract from an address to Congress from President Washington.] Mr. C. acknowledged that he had not experimental knowledge on this subject; but he appealed to the candor of those gentlemen who advocated this mode of defence, to accord to him that liberality which he would exercise towards them. He meant to impeach the motives of no man. He conceived that every gentleman would act according to the dictates of his conscience, and he claimed their indulgence to do the same.
Were the navy now to be increased to repel aggression from any foreign power, it would be regarded as a proper measure. He was not in favor of a large increase of our Navy; but he conceived it necessary to have a few large ships to drive from their ports scattering ships of an enemy. He thought himself not out of order, since the opinion of the President of the United States on the subject of gunboats had been read, verbally to quote his opinion on this subject. The President was in favor of large ships; he thought it was improper that any single ship should be able to block up a port or harbor of the United States; and that a remedy should be provided. Mr. C. thought that no danger could arise to the liberties of the people from an increase of the Navy; he called upon gentlemen who supported that doctrine to quote a single instance where any nation had lost its liberties from a navy. He did not himself consider an increase of our Navy necessary at the present moment, but it might be necessary at a future time; it would not, therefore, be improper now to provide materials, that they might have them in readiness when wanted. At present their attention should be directed solely to the defence of their cities on the seacoast; but at any future time, when it should be made satisfactorily to appear to this Government that the nations of Europe were disposed to coalesce for the purpose of asserting those rights which were dear to every maritime power, he hoped the United States would be ready and willing to join them in maintaining the freedom of navigation. It has been said, by some people, observed Mr. C., that we ought to lie by on our arms and avert the event of the European contest; let them alone, say they, let Buonaparte fight it out with them. Now this was a doctrine to which Mr. C. could not subscribe. If there was one great power disposed to control and domineer over the ocean, and the United States had great property at stake, why not pay their proportion, their footing as it were? He considered an opposite conduct pusillanimous and unjust. They had more tons of shipping afloat, and were more largely concerned in the freedom of the seas, than any nation on earth, one only excepted; and should they say that they would lie by unconcerned, while the dearest rights of nations were destroyed by any one nation! It must be clear to every one that they should not, and yet instead of increasing their defensive powers where they were assailable and most vulnerable, he was hurt to hear gentlemen propose means of defence for points perfectly unconnected with existing evils, which consisted in the harassing their navigation, and inflicting injuries on their floating commerce.
Mr. C. did not want ships for protection of our cities; he had no fear of their being burnt; he considered them as sufficiently protected by the proposed fortifications and gunboats, but all the money in the Treasury should not be applied to these subjects. The merchants of the United States were more concerned for the defence of their property which they had sent beyond seas than for the burning or sacking of our cities. Some cities, it was true, had been burnt during the Revolutionary War; but it should be recollected that the enemy then carried on a war of extermination, and even invited the savages to burn our towns. The war which was now feared was not a war of the same stamp; it would be merely a war for the right of trade, and not carried on in so sanguinary a manner.
Mr. Fisk said the gentleman from Massachusetts was opposed to this measure because it would take all the money out of the Treasury. He should show: First, That it was beyond their means; and Second, That it was not a measure of exigency. Would he be willing to leave our ports and harbors unprotected, and go abroad to protect our commerce? Mr. F. did not think that the merchants of the United States would support that doctrine. If they did, he wished they were out of the United States. The gentleman had told the House that his feelings had been wounded at the deference shown to the statements of the Secretary of War, and a few minutes after, read an extract from an English newspaper, giving an account of a transaction which had taken place between gunboats and English vessels. Mr. F. confessed he was not a little surprised at his preferring the authority of English newspapers to that of the Head of a Department in our own country. A gentleman who did this, might be allowed to indulge in the spirit of prophecy. He had said, if they adopted this measure, they would soon feel the effects of it. Mr. F. wished the gentleman would show how. The gentleman had said, because a few towns were burnt last war, the House seemed to think that the war which was expected would be a war of extermination; but that this was to be a harmless war, a mere war of trade. He would ask that gentleman what was the conduct of Great Britain towards Denmark? Had they spared the town of Copenhagen? He believed not. Would they spare the towns of New York or Norfolk, if it were in their power to destroy them? He thought not. Mr. F. thought the great question now was, What was the most efficient force—what would afford the most complete protection to our ports and harbors? The gentleman had said that they had now no force which could contend with an eighty or ninety gun ship. If that were the case, Mr. F. said, his argument completely recoiled upon himself. They had now eight or ten frigates, and if these could not contend with one eighty or ninety gun ship, they had better stop where they were, and not erect more of such inefficient force. Let us consider the subject for a few moments, said Mr. F. This is not an untried force; it was tried before that gentleman had existence. The instance mentioned by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Sawyer,) might have shown that this force would be sufficient. It was the opinion of a most experienced naval commander, and whose standing and information entitled him to more than ordinary credit, that he would rather have four gunboats than a forty-four-gun frigate. A frigate could not carry the same metal as a gunboat. If a frigate was dismasted, becalmed, or any accident whatever happened to her, she could not get out of the way. These reasons should have weight on the minds of any gentleman, particularly of one who did not pretend to experimental knowledge on this subject. If the Treasury was as low as it was said to be, they should surely pursue the cheapest means of defence. By adopting the mode of defence by gunboats, in preference to defence by frigates, they would have, at the same expense, a third more in number of guns, besides double the weight of metal. With gunboats there was no loss of time in putting about. Not so with a frigate. She must first discharge one side, and then go about, before she could fire the other. But, gentlemen who were steeled against conviction, and determined, at all events, to have a Navy, would not be influenced by argument or reason. Had not Denmark a Navy? What became of it? It fell into the hands of a superior naval power, and that will be the fate of our Navy if we erect one.
Mr. Thomas said that the gentleman on his right, his colleague, (Mr. Gardenier,) had told the House that he should vote to build the whole number of gunboats, not because he thought them an efficient defence, but because he considered them feeble machines. This reasoning might be conclusive in the mind of that gentleman, and he did not care what influenced him, since it appeared they should have his vote for the bill.
However, Mr. T. said he merely rose to reply to one remark of that gentleman. He knew that it had been rung through the country, by electioneering gentry, for these number of years, that the formidable navy, so carefully raised by the former Administration, had been sold off by the present one, and the nation left without defence; and that gentleman (Mr. G.) had repeated the same story, that the formidable navy which had been raised with so much care had been sold off, to the eternal disgrace of the nation. Hearing this assertion, Mr. T. thought it his duty, on that floor, to declare that not a single national ship had been ordered to be sold since the present Administration came into power; that not a single vessel had been sold except from orders issued previous to the time that the administration of this Government was taken out of the hands of those coinciding with that gentleman in political sentiment.
The amendment offered by Mr. Durell was then negatived—ayes 19.
The bill being about to be read a third time this day, its decision was, on motion of Mr. Elliot, postponed till to-morrow.